{"id":107105,"date":"2022-07-07T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2022-07-07T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/nursingstudybay.com\/2022\/07\/07\/over-the-course-of-only-one-generation-american-educational-policy-3\/"},"modified":"2022-07-07T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2022-07-07T00:00:00","slug":"over-the-course-of-only-one-generation-american-educational-policy-3","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/over-the-course-of-only-one-generation-american-educational-policy-3\/","title":{"rendered":"Over the course of only one generation, American educational policy"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>http:\/\/aerj.aera.net<br \/>\nJournal<br \/>\nAmerican Educational Research<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/aer.sagepub.com\/content\/50\/2\/285<br \/>\nThe online version of this article can be found at:<br \/>\nDOI: 10.3102\/0002831212471417<br \/>\nAm Educ Res J 2013 50: 285 originally published online 24 January 2013<br \/>\nJal Mehta<br \/>\nEducational Policy, 1980 \u22122001<br \/>\nHow Paradigms Create Politics : The Transformation of American<br \/>\nPublished on behalf of<br \/>\nAmerican Educational Research Association<br \/>\nand<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.sagepublications.com<br \/>\nAdditional services and information for American Educational Research Journal can be found at:<br \/>\nEmail Alerts: http:\/\/aerj.aera.net\/alerts<br \/>\nSubscriptions: http:\/\/aerj.aera.net\/subscriptions<br \/>\nReprints: http:\/\/www.aera.net\/reprints<br \/>\nPermissions: http:\/\/www.aera.net\/permissions<br \/>\nWhat is This?<br \/>\nOnlineFirst Version of Record &#8211; Jan 24, 2013<br \/>\n&gt;&gt; Version of Record &#8211; Mar 22, 2013<br \/>\nDownloaded from http:\/\/aerj.aera.net at UNIV CALIFORNIA BERKELEY LIB on July 23, 2013<br \/>\nHow Paradigms Create Politics:<br \/>\nThe Transformation of American Educational<br \/>\nPolicy, 1980\u20132001<br \/>\nJal Mehta<br \/>\nHarvard Graduate School of Education<br \/>\nAmerican educational policy was rapidly transformed between 1980 and<br \/>\n2001. Accountability was introduced into a sphere that had long been<br \/>\nloosely coupled, both major political parties reevaluated longstanding positions, and significant institutional control over the schooling shifted to the<br \/>\nfederal government for the first time in the nation\u2019s history. These changes<br \/>\ncannot be explained by conventional theories such as interest groups, rational choice, and historical institutionalism. Drawing on extensive archival<br \/>\nresearch and more than 80 interviews, this article argues that this transformation can be explained by a changed policy paradigm which restructured<br \/>\nthe political landscape around education reform. More generally, while previous scholars have observed that \u2018\u2018policies create politics,\u2019\u2019 it should also be<br \/>\nrecognized that \u2018\u2018paradigms create politics.\u2019\u2019<br \/>\nKEYWORDS: A Nation at Risk, accountability, assessment, No Child Left<br \/>\nBehind, paradigm, politics, school reform<br \/>\nOver the course of only one generation, American educational policy has<br \/>\nbeen substantially transformed into the system we have today. As<br \/>\nrecently as 1980, states and local districts were primarily in charge of schooling; a Republican president was calling for the abolition of the Department<br \/>\nof Education; and the most influential scholarly lens for understanding<br \/>\nschools depicted them as \u2018\u2018loosely coupled systems\u2019\u2019 in which myth and ceremony mattered more than academic outputs (Meyer &amp; Rowan, 1977).<br \/>\nToday, under the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, the federal government<br \/>\nhas assumed a greater degree of control over schooling than at any previous<br \/>\npoint in the nation\u2019s history. A Republican president led the charge for this<br \/>\nexpanded federal role, and demands for accountability for results are so<br \/>\nJAL MEHTA is an Helpant professor at the Harvard Graduate School of Education, 447<br \/>\nGutman Library, 6 Appian Way, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA, e-mail: mehtaja@gse<br \/>\n.harvard.edu. His research focuses on the policy and politics of creating high quality<br \/>\nschooling at scale, with a particular interest in the professionalization of teaching.<br \/>\nAmerican Educational Research Journal<br \/>\nApril 2013, Vol. 50, No. 2, pp. 285\u2013324<br \/>\nDOI: 10.3102\/0002831212471417<br \/>\n! 2013 AERA. http:\/\/aerj.aera.net<br \/>\nDownloaded from http:\/\/aerj.aera.net at UNIV CALIFORNIA BERKELEY LIB on July 23, 2013<br \/>\nubiquitous that even one of the leading theorists of loosely coupled systems<br \/>\nhas argued that that framework no longer applies (Rowan, 2006).<br \/>\nWhat explains this transformation? Traditional approaches that privilege<br \/>\ninterest groups, rational choice calculations, or path dependent processes<br \/>\nare unable to explain key features of these changes. The most powerful<br \/>\ninterest groups in the domain, teachers unions, have frequently been<br \/>\nopposed to the movement towards accountability.1 Rational choice explanations can explain why politicians emphasize testing and accountability in<br \/>\na context in which the public favors them, but they cannot explain how<br \/>\nor why that context shifted between 1980 and 2001. Path dependent explanations can explain the persistence of long-standing norms against federal<br \/>\ninvolvement in schooling, but are particularly unsuited to explaining why<br \/>\nthere recently has been such a significant departure from this well-worn<br \/>\npath.<br \/>\nThis article suggests that the impetus for the transformation was the creation of a powerful educational paradigm, which crystallized in the famous A<br \/>\nNation at Risk report. This paradigm, which emerged in the early 1980s and<br \/>\nis still dominant today, holds that educational success is central to national,<br \/>\nstate, and individual economic success; that American schools across the<br \/>\nboard are substantially underperforming and in need of reform; that schools<br \/>\nrather than social forces should be held responsible for academic outcomes;<br \/>\nand that success should be measured by externally verifiable tests. This paradigm has directed the school reform movement over the last 25 years, producing a variety of policy efforts that are consistent with its tenets, including<br \/>\ncharter schools, public school choice, vouchers, and the subject of this article, the growth of state and federal efforts to impose standards and introduce<br \/>\naccountability. These assumptions not only have redirected the policy goals<br \/>\naround schooling; they have restructured the politics of education.<br \/>\nSpecifically, under the reign of the A Nation at Risk paradigm, more powerful political actors have entered the domain; interest groups have shifted to<br \/>\nembrace the new paradigm; critics out of step with the paradigm have been<br \/>\nrhetorically marginalized; and the venue in which education policy is discussed has shifted upwards, as the new paradigm has legitimized the claims<br \/>\nof federal and state government to assert increasing control over what had<br \/>\npreviously been the province of local districts.2<br \/>\nA Nation at Risk has not been ignored in previous accounts of American<br \/>\neducational history; it is often cited as a critical document in American<br \/>\nschool reform (Boyd &amp; Kerchner, 1988; DeBray-Pelot &amp; McGuinn, 2009;<br \/>\nGraham &amp; Gordon, 2003; Guthrie &amp; Springer, 2004; McDermott, 2011).<br \/>\nThis article seeks to build on and extend this literature by drawing on<br \/>\nnew state-level evidence to explore exactly why A Nation at Risk resonated<br \/>\nso powerfully with such diverse constituencies and how A Nation at Risk reshaped state politics. I also look deeper into the past, finding a more diverse<br \/>\nset of antecedents than is usually identified; and further into the future,<br \/>\nMehta<br \/>\n286 Downloaded from http:\/\/aerj.aera.net at UNIV CALIFORNIA BERKELEY LIB on July 23, 2013<br \/>\nseeking to specify more precisely how A Nation at Risk affected subsequent<br \/>\nreform efforts.<br \/>\nThe article also makes a theoretical contribution by showing the mechanisms through which paradigms can shape politics. In its emphasis on paradigms, this article joins a growing literature that emphasizes the role that<br \/>\nideational factors play in affecting political outcomes (Beland &amp; Cox, 2010;<br \/>\nBerman, 2001; Blyth, 2002; Somers &amp; Block, 2005; Steensland, 2006; see<br \/>\nMehta, 2010, for a review). This piece builds upon this growing literature<br \/>\nto illustrate the ways in which a powerful paradigm can restructure the political landscape. Paradigms can shift the direction and boundaries of debate,<br \/>\nwhich actors are involved, and ultimately can provide the impetus for institutional transformation. In so doing, ideas provide an important complement<br \/>\nto more traditional interest group, rational choice, or institutional explanations. Implications for understanding the role of paradigms in social and<br \/>\npolitical life are discussed in conclusion.<br \/>\nChanges to Explain<br \/>\nNo Child Left Behind is the culmination of nearly two decades of changes<br \/>\nthat have transformed American education. Changes are evident in policy, in<br \/>\ninstitutional responsibility, and in politics. At the policy level, an array of reforms has proliferated at the state level since the 1980s, including charter<br \/>\nschools, public school choice, vouchers, and standards-based reform. All of<br \/>\nthese reforms have challenged traditional public schools. The most ubiquitous<br \/>\nof these reforms, and the one that became the template for federal policy, is<br \/>\nstandards-based reform. Standards-based reform brought together three elements that its proponents hoped would create systemic change: setting standards for what students should be expected to do, establishing assessments to<br \/>\nmeasure progress, and holding schools accountable for progress towards<br \/>\nthese goals. Standards-based reform spread through the states beginning in<br \/>\nthe early 1990s, was encouraged by the federal passage of Goals 2000 and<br \/>\nthe Improving America\u2019s Schools Act in 1994, and became a federal requirement under No Child Left Behind.3 Given the pluralism that has traditionally<br \/>\ncharacterized American schooling\u201410,000 Democracies, as one prominent<br \/>\nbook about local districts labeled it\u2014this movement marks a considerable<br \/>\nshift towards a particular policy vision of school reform.<br \/>\nNot only has a particular vision of schooling become dominant; there is<br \/>\nincreasing evidence that the policy emphasis on accountability is penetrating<br \/>\nthe technical core of actual school practice, a significant departure from many<br \/>\nprevious policy efforts. Historically, educational policy has been seen as pendulum-swinging cycles of policy reform that have done little to alter the<br \/>\nunderlying grammar of schooling (Tyack &amp; Cuban, 1995). This view is consistent with Meyer and Rowan\u2019s (1977) famous description of schools as \u2018\u2018loosely<br \/>\ncoupled systems\u2019\u2019 that conform to public will in their outward appearance but<br \/>\nHow Paradigms Create Politics<br \/>\n287 Downloaded from http:\/\/aerj.aera.net at UNIV CALIFORNIA BERKELEY LIB on July 23, 2013<br \/>\nnot their internal practice. Recent work on the implementation of test-based<br \/>\naccountability suggests that loosely coupled systems are giving way to more<br \/>\ntightly coupled ones, as the attaching of significant stakes to testing has caused<br \/>\nschools and teachers to direct their efforts towards improving student performance on those tests (Fuhrman, 1999, 2001). While a significant debate rages<br \/>\nabout whether these changes have been good (Peterson &amp; West, 2003), bad<br \/>\n(Meier, 2002), or mixed (Elmore, 2004), what matters for these purposes is<br \/>\nthat they clearly have been consequential in how the school system functions,<br \/>\nso much so that even Rowan (2006) now argues that loosely coupled school<br \/>\nsystems are a thing of the past.<br \/>\nThese changes have also marked a considerable shift in who has institutional control over schooling. Since the nation\u2019s inception, schooling in<br \/>\nAmerica has been controlled by local school districts, with states playing an<br \/>\nimportant but secondary role. The initial break with state and local control<br \/>\ncame with the creation of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act<br \/>\n(ESEA) in 1965, which established the precedent of federal involvement in<br \/>\nschooling and created an ongoing federal funding stream for education.<br \/>\nHowever, these funds were directed primarily to high-poverty schools, did<br \/>\nnot ask for accountability for results, and left almost all decisions about the<br \/>\ngovernance of schools to localities and states. What is notable about the recent<br \/>\nchanges encapsulated in No Child Left Behind is the way in which the federal<br \/>\ngovernment has significantly extended its reach: while still footing less than 10<br \/>\npercent of the bill, it has now extended its reach from high poverty schools to<br \/>\nall public schools, specifying the grades in which students need to be tested,<br \/>\nthe pace at which schools need to improve, and the series of escalating consequences if schools do not improve. While schooling remains a function<br \/>\nshared across levels of government, the federal government has greatly<br \/>\nincreased its role in shaping the day to day life of all public schools<br \/>\n(McGuinn, 2006; Peterson &amp; West, 2003).<br \/>\nFinally, these changes have been possible only because of considerable<br \/>\npolitical shifts in the positions of the major parties on educational issues.<br \/>\nDemocrats retreated from their long-standing position that the role of the<br \/>\nparty was to provide greater funding for high-poverty students to a vision<br \/>\nof school reform that emphasizes accountability as much as spending. The<br \/>\nshift was even greater for Republicans, who moved from President Ronald<br \/>\nReagan\u2019s pledge to abolish the Department of Education in 1980 to the greatest expansion of the federal role in the nation\u2019s history when President<br \/>\nGeorge W. Bush signed the No Child Left Behind Act. This article seeks to<br \/>\nexplain these policy, institutional, and political changes.<br \/>\nPuzzles Not Fully Explained by Other Approaches<br \/>\nThese developments pose a number of problems for the leading theories in political sociology. While the debate between competing approaches<br \/>\nMehta<br \/>\n288 Downloaded from http:\/\/aerj.aera.net at UNIV CALIFORNIA BERKELEY LIB on July 23, 2013<br \/>\non education policy is not as fully developed as the debate about the welfare<br \/>\nstate, the leading explanations for these changes can be grouped under three<br \/>\nheadings: interest groups, rational choice, and historical institutionalism.<br \/>\nInterest group explanations emphasize the role that business groups<br \/>\nhave played in demanding standards and accountability (Goldberg &amp;<br \/>\nTraiman, 2001; Murphy, 1990; Odden &amp; Marsh, 1990). Previously a nonfactor<br \/>\nin educational politics, business groups are said to have provided powerful<br \/>\nvoices supporting standards and accountability at both the state and federal<br \/>\nlevels (Ginsberg &amp; Wimpelberg, 1987; Goldberg &amp; Traiman, 2001). There are<br \/>\ntwo problems with this view. First, a business-centered approach does not<br \/>\nexplain why business groups, which historically have been opposed to<br \/>\nschool finance reforms in an effort to keep their taxes down (Mazzoni,<br \/>\n1995), have come in recent years to see their interests as lying with school<br \/>\nreform. Explaining this change is critical to understanding their role in this<br \/>\ntransformation. Second, a business-driven view of the changes fails to<br \/>\nexplain why business was able to impose its will in an increasingly crowded<br \/>\ninterest group landscape. Detailed studies of education politics have suggested that since 1980 the number of groups involved in educational reform<br \/>\nhas multiplied, with business being only one group among many that have<br \/>\nsought to make a greater claim over education (Mawhinney &amp; Lugg, 2001;<br \/>\nMazzoni, 1995). The most important of these groups are the teachers unions:<br \/>\nOne study suggested that in 43 of 50 states they were the most powerful actors in educational politics (Thomas &amp; Herbenar, 1991). The larger of these<br \/>\nunions, the National Education Association (NEA), has consistently opposed<br \/>\nefforts to introduce educational accountability. Yet despite its considerable<br \/>\nfinancial resources and political power, it failed to block movements for<br \/>\naccountability.4 Any interest group explanation has to explain why accountability triumphed (even among Democrats) despite objections from the<br \/>\nstrongest interest groups in school politics.<br \/>\nA second explanation draws on the rational choice tradition, particularly<br \/>\nthe median voter theorem. McGuinn (2006) has done some of the most<br \/>\ndetailed reconstruction of the federal politics of this transformation, and<br \/>\nwhile he is not a rational choice theorist himself, a number of his observations are consistent with the idea that strategic imperatives have led both<br \/>\nparties to increasingly emphasize education reform. As education rose on<br \/>\nthe agenda in recent years, first state and later federal politicians acted strategically to offer plans for education reform in order to win voters to their<br \/>\ncause. There is considerable merit to this strategic rational choice view. It explains why both parties have pursued the education issue, why Democrats<br \/>\nwere willing to buck the NEA, and why Republicans were willing to sacrifice<br \/>\nlong-standing principles against federal control in favor of short-term electoral advantage. But it is also limited in that it assumes much of what needs<br \/>\nto be explained, offering no account of how the context was created within<br \/>\nwhich these choices became rational.5 Key aspects of the context that need<br \/>\nHow Paradigms Create Politics<br \/>\n289 Downloaded from http:\/\/aerj.aera.net at UNIV CALIFORNIA BERKELEY LIB on July 23, 2013<br \/>\nto be explained include the following: Why is education now a high salience<br \/>\nissue for states and the federal government when that was not the case in the<br \/>\npast? What has primed the public to see the problem in terms that make<br \/>\nstandards and accountability the logical solution? Overall, while rational<br \/>\nchoice approaches can be important in explaining the strategic behavior<br \/>\nof political actors in pursuing education reform, they do not explain how<br \/>\nthe context was created within which these strategic actions were carried<br \/>\nout.<br \/>\nIf rational choice is overly focused on a short time horizon, historical institutionalism is often the preferred approach for those whose questions are<br \/>\nfocused on change over longer periods (Orren &amp; Skowronek, 2004; Thelen<br \/>\n&amp; Steinmo, 1992). But while historical institutionalism can explain the baseline from which the recent changes depart\u2014decentralized federalism that<br \/>\nhad long inhibited national action on schools\u2014its long-standing emphasis<br \/>\non path dependence would seem to foreclose the institutional changes<br \/>\nthat are so remarkable about the case under study. In partial answer to<br \/>\nthis objection, an important book by Manna (2006) has argued that while<br \/>\nhistorical institutionalism has traditionally focused on how America\u2019s system<br \/>\nof federalism impedes major policy development, in this case having multiple venues provided opportunities for \u2018\u2018borrowing,\u2019\u2019 with state and federal<br \/>\ndevelopments feeding off one another. Of course, this begs a further question: Given that American education had embraced local control of schooling since its inception and that the arrangements of federalism had always<br \/>\npermitted borrowing between levels of government, what prompted<br \/>\nincreased state and federal involvement over the past 20 years? As is often<br \/>\ntrue of historical institutionalist approaches, the mechanism for change is<br \/>\nnot specified (Clemens &amp; Cook, 1999).<br \/>\nFinally, any theory of these changes that gives causal primacy to any<br \/>\nsingle set of actors is likely to fall short, since the existing literature on<br \/>\nstandards-based reform suggests that many different actors were responsible<br \/>\nfor initiating the policy. Standards-based reform was driven by business<br \/>\ngroups in Texas, a court decision in Kentucky, state legislators in Utah, the<br \/>\ngovernor\u2019s office in Michigan, and a state superintendent of schools in<br \/>\nMaryland, to name just five.6 Any workable theory would need to explain<br \/>\nhow different actors came to advocate similar policies.<br \/>\nTo briefly summarize the puzzles unexplained by these approaches:<br \/>\n1. Why did the agenda status of education rise, encouraging \u2018\u2018rational\u2019\u2019 politicians<br \/>\nto make it a central issue?<br \/>\n2. Why did both parties come to support the reforms, despite the long-standing<br \/>\nhistorical differences on education between the parties?<br \/>\n3. What explains why different actors\u2014courts, legislators, governors, state bureaucrats, business groups\u2014each initiated similar reforms?<br \/>\nMehta<br \/>\n290 Downloaded from http:\/\/aerj.aera.net at UNIV CALIFORNIA BERKELEY LIB on July 23, 2013<br \/>\n4. Why did standards and accountability triumph despite the opposition of the<br \/>\nstrongest interest group in the field?<br \/>\n5. Given predictions of institutional \u2018\u2018lock-in\u2019\u2019 and \u2018\u2018path dependence,\u2019\u2019 why was<br \/>\nthere such a significant shift away from the institutional patterns that had characterized American schooling since its inception?<br \/>\nThe Power of Ideas: How Paradigms Create Politics<br \/>\nRecognizing the limitations of these approaches, a quickly growing literature on \u2018\u2018ideas and politics\u2019\u2019 has sprung up over the past 15 years (Beland,<br \/>\n2005; Beland &amp; Cox, 2010; Berman, 1998; Campbell, 2002; Hall, 1993; Mehta,<br \/>\n2010; Steensland 2006). Using a variety of different frameworks and language, scholars have invoked paradigms (Hall, 1993; Kuhn, 1962), roadmaps<br \/>\nor worldviews (Goldstein &amp; Keohane, 1993), or simply ideas (Berman, 1998)<br \/>\nas ways to explain actors\u2019 commitments to their chosen ends. In areas as<br \/>\ndiverse as human rights policy (Sikkink, 1993), airline and trucking deregulation (Derthick &amp; Quirk, 1985), industrial policy (Dobbin, 1994), and the<br \/>\nwelfare state (Berman, 1998), research suggests that ideas provide important<br \/>\ntemplates that guide policy action. Responding to earlier materialist contentions that ideas are largely epiphenomenal, much of this work has sought to<br \/>\ncontrast interest-based and ideational approaches, showing that ideas were<br \/>\nimportant in creating policy even when interest groups were arrayed against<br \/>\ntheir triumph (Derthick &amp; Quirk, 1985). This work has had considerable<br \/>\nimpact in the field, and even those who were at one time skeptical about<br \/>\nthe causal role of ideas have begun to incorporate them into their work.7<br \/>\nIf ideationally inclined scholars have succeeded in creating a place at<br \/>\na table previously dominated by Marxist, pluralist, state-centered, and rational choice approaches, they have only just begun to build a more sophisticated set of conceptual tools that would specify how ideas matter and how<br \/>\nthey interact with other forces (such as interests, institutions, and policy entrepreneurs) to affect policy selection and change. In recent years, a few ideationally oriented scholars have started to specify pathways through which<br \/>\nideas affect politics, but they remain few and far between (Blyth, 2002;<br \/>\nLieberman, 2002; Steensland, 2006).<br \/>\nIn this work, I explore the salience of one particular kind of idea:<br \/>\na \u2018\u2018problem definition\u2019\u2019 or \u2018\u2018policy paradigm.\u2019\u2019 A problem definition is a particular way of understanding a complex reality. For example, homelessness can<br \/>\nbe seen as the product of a housing shortage, high unemployment, or a lack<br \/>\nof individual gumption. Problem definitions resist efforts to separate the normative and the empirical, as they generally evoke both normative and<br \/>\nempirical descriptions in ways that are mutually reinforcing.8 The way<br \/>\na problem is framed has significant implications for the types of policy solutions that will seem desirable, and hence much of political argument is<br \/>\nHow Paradigms Create Politics<br \/>\n291 Downloaded from http:\/\/aerj.aera.net at UNIV CALIFORNIA BERKELEY LIB on July 23, 2013<br \/>\nfought at the level of problem definition. During the conflict stage, \u2018\u2018problem<br \/>\ndefinition\u2019\u2019 is the appropriate term; when one has triumphed and assumes<br \/>\nthe status of a master narrative, it can be called a \u2018\u2018policy paradigm,\u2019\u2019 following Kuhn\u2019s view of paradigms as dominant views that preclude significant<br \/>\ndissent.<br \/>\nHere I will focus on paradigms at a middle level of generality\u2014that of<br \/>\ndefining a problem within an issue area, in this case education. There are<br \/>\nalso shifts in the climate of ideas at the broader level of public philosophies\u2014such as whether the government is seen as the solution or the problem\u2014that are both informed by and shape the way more specific issues are<br \/>\nregarded (Mehta, 2010). While I focus primarily on the story of how the educational problem definition was reshaped, I also discuss in passing the<br \/>\nbroader shifts in public dialogue around government and social policy as<br \/>\nthey are relevant for fully understanding the story.<br \/>\nIn particular, this article uses the educational case to investigate one<br \/>\nstrand of how ideas matter; more specifically, how paradigms can create politics.9 While some of the most cited writing about paradigms has focused on<br \/>\nhow they shape and reshape the cognitive maps held by key policymakers<br \/>\n(Hall, 1993; Legro, 2000; Weir, 1992), less attention has been devoted to how<br \/>\nparadigms can reshape the political environment around an issue (see also<br \/>\nBaumgartner &amp; Jones, 1993). Once a changed definition of a problem comes<br \/>\nto the fore, I will argue, it has the potential to reshape virtually every aspect<br \/>\nof the politics governing the issue.<br \/>\nOne impact of a new problem definition is that it changes the nature of<br \/>\nthe debate. A dominant problem definition serves to bound the potential<br \/>\npossibilities of what can be advocated, giving it a powerful agenda-setting<br \/>\nfunction. Policy entrepreneurs who offer solutions that are consistent with<br \/>\nthe broader agenda are elevated, while those whose solutions do not fit<br \/>\nthe dominant problem definition are marginalized. The dominant problem<br \/>\ndefinition also affects who has standing to speak: If the problem is that<br \/>\nschools are not as efficient as for-profits, business leaders become emboldened; if the problem is unleashing students\u2019 creativity, then artists and teachers are empowered. Problem definitions not only provide a template for<br \/>\ntheir proponents; they also can constrain the positions that their opponents<br \/>\ncan take.<br \/>\nAnother effect of a new problem definition is that it changes the constellation of actors. When new problem definitions come to the fore, new actors<br \/>\nbecome involved and new cleavages are created.10 New problem definitions<br \/>\ncan motivate the formation of new groups, which in turn can have a significant effect on subsequent debate. Precisely because these new groups<br \/>\naccept the dominant conception of the problem, they are welcomed by<br \/>\nthe broader political environment and can play a critical role in shaping policy alternatives. New problem definitions can also create opportunities for<br \/>\nMehta<br \/>\n292 Downloaded from http:\/\/aerj.aera.net at UNIV CALIFORNIA BERKELEY LIB on July 23, 2013<br \/>\npolicy entrepreneurs and experts since existing groups seek guidance on<br \/>\nhow to position themselves in a new environment.<br \/>\nA new problem definition can also create an opportunity for major institutional change. Which actors are motivated and legitimated to act in an area<br \/>\nis dependent in part upon how the area is defined. As we will see, when<br \/>\neducation became more heavily defined as an economic issue, state and federal actors who had previously seen education as largely a local function<br \/>\nwere motivated and enabled to act because the issue was now seen as falling<br \/>\nwithin their jurisdiction. While institutional theories tend to emphasize stability, idea-oriented theories can provide an account of major shifts in institutional responsibility.<br \/>\nIn sum, once crystallized, a new paradigm not only delimits policy options<br \/>\nto conform to that paradigm (Hall, 1993; Weir, 1992), but it can restructure the<br \/>\npolitical landscape around an issue and change the agenda status of the issue,<br \/>\nthe players involved, their standing to speak, and the venue in which the issue<br \/>\nis debated. In recent years, scholars in American political development<br \/>\n(Campbell, 2003; Pierson, 2003) have seized on Schattschneider\u2019s (1935) observation that \u2018\u2018policies create politics.\u2019\u2019 Scholars of paradigm changes should recognize that \u2018\u2018paradigms create politics\u2019\u2019 as well.11<br \/>\nSuch a view complements the other explanations above in ways that allows for a fuller explanation of these changes. Interests still matter, but paradigms can help us understand why actors come to assume the positions that<br \/>\nthey did. Rational calculations are still useful for understanding why politicians take the positions they do in the short run, but paradigms help to<br \/>\nexplain how the context was created in which those positions came to<br \/>\nseem rational. Historical institutional explanations help us understand the<br \/>\npotency of norms against federal action, while ideas can help us understand<br \/>\nhow and why federal actors were able to expand their purview.<br \/>\nData and Methods<br \/>\nThere have been three critical events in the transformation of schooling<br \/>\nsince 1980. The first was the publication of the blockbuster 1983 report A<br \/>\nNation at Risk, a catalytic document that crystallized a new paradigm that<br \/>\nwould spark an avalanche of efforts to reform American schools. The second<br \/>\nwas the states\u2019 adoption of standards-based reform in the 1990s. The third<br \/>\nwas the federal move towards standards-based reform, which built upon<br \/>\nthe state reforms and culminated in No Child Left Behind. Each of these<br \/>\nevents is examined using careful process tracing (Mahoney, 1999), drawing<br \/>\non documentary and interview evidence that allows for a detailed reconstruction of who advocated what and for what reason. Taken at any given<br \/>\nmoment in time, process tracing allows us to see which actors, interests, institutions, and ideas were important in producing a paradigm or a policy outcome. Taken over two decades, it permits an analysis of how actors\u2019<br \/>\nHow Paradigms Create Politics<br \/>\n293 Downloaded from http:\/\/aerj.aera.net at UNIV CALIFORNIA BERKELEY LIB on July 23, 2013<br \/>\npositions changed over time, a perspective that is critical for an examination<br \/>\nthat seeks to understand not only who pushed for what but how they came<br \/>\nto know what to push for.<br \/>\nWhile there has been previous work on the changing federal politics of<br \/>\neducation (Cross 2004; DeBray, 2006; Kosar, 2005; Manna, 2006; McGuinn,<br \/>\n2006), there has been far less that has sought to integrate empirical research<br \/>\non states into a broader account of the national movement towards<br \/>\nstandards-based reform. This is a considerable gap in the literature, given<br \/>\nthat most scholars agree that long-standing norms against federal involvement in schools meant that the recent federal changes could have happened<br \/>\nonly by building on an already existing state movement (Manna, 2006).<br \/>\nParticularly important to the overall account is understanding why states<br \/>\nconverged around standards-based reform in the 1990s, before they were<br \/>\nrequired to adopt it under No Child Left Behind in 2001.12<br \/>\nTo understand this convergence, this study considers three states\u2014<br \/>\nMichigan, Maryland, and Utah\u2014and tracks their respective paths to<br \/>\nstandards-based reform. I chose these states for two reasons. First, since I<br \/>\nwas trying to understand how so many states came to adopt the same policy,<br \/>\nI wanted to choose states that were very different on a number of dimensions<br \/>\nthat would presumably affect their education policy choices. These three states<br \/>\ndiffer on the following dimensions: region, partisanship, timing of adoption of<br \/>\nstandards-based reform, minority population, initial test scores, level of local<br \/>\ncontrol, political culture, and per pupil spending (see the appendix). Second,<br \/>\nthere has been a lot of work done on a few well-known standard leading states,<br \/>\nparticularly Kentucky, Texas, North Carolina, and California. But if the goal is to<br \/>\nunderstand how 49 states came to adopt standards-based reform before No<br \/>\nChild Left Behind, understanding the politics of lower profile states is also<br \/>\nimportant. Maryland was an early adopter of standards, thus I have one from<br \/>\nthe lead states, but also two that came later to standards. In addition, by researching less well-known states, what I learn about them can be pooled<br \/>\nwith others\u2019 research on the more well-known states to create a fuller understanding of the standards movement.13<br \/>\nThe data for this work come from a wide range of sources. Interviews<br \/>\nwith key participants, examination of primary documents, and use of archival materials allowed for reconstruction of the course of events. Eighty interviews were conducted with informants involved with state and federal<br \/>\nreforms. Interviews ranged in length from 30 minutes to 3 hours, with an<br \/>\naverage of 1 hour. Almost all were conducted in person: the author spent<br \/>\n3 to 8 weeks in each of the states and in Washington, D.C. Interviews<br \/>\nwere taped and transcribed. Interviewees included state legislators, a former<br \/>\ngovernor (John Engler of Michigan), federal legislative aides, policy experts,<br \/>\njournalists, interest group representatives, and federal and state department<br \/>\nof education officials. Some of these interviewees also permitted access to<br \/>\ntheir personal or organizational files, sources that provide a more complete<br \/>\nMehta<br \/>\n294 Downloaded from http:\/\/aerj.aera.net at UNIV CALIFORNIA BERKELEY LIB on July 23, 2013<br \/>\nrecord of what they were thinking at the time of key decisions. Several thousand pages of documents were culled from state libraries and archives in<br \/>\nMaryland, Utah, and Michigan, as well as from the Library of Congress.<br \/>\nThese primary materials were supplemented with an examination of local<br \/>\nnewspapers, published and unpublished dissertations, state and federal legislative records, and a variety of secondary sources. This range of material<br \/>\nallows triangulation (Roth &amp; Mehta, 2002; Yin, 1994) to compensate for<br \/>\nthe weaknesses of individual data sources. In general, this study uses the interviews to inform the overall argument, but relies more on documents (and<br \/>\nnewspaper accounts) than interviews to reconstruct past events because<br \/>\nthey provide a more detailed account of what happened when and why.<br \/>\nThe Emergence of a Powerful Paradigm: A Nation at Risk<br \/>\nThere was no obvious indication in 1982 that the next two decades<br \/>\nwould witness an explosion of reform strategies aiming to increase performance in schooling. An economic recession, severe state budget deficits,<br \/>\nand Reagan\u2019s stated intention to downgrade the federal role in education<br \/>\npolicy all pointed to education remaining a low-priority item. In their 1982<br \/>\ntextbook on the politics of education, longtime education policy analysts<br \/>\nMichael Kirst and Frederick Wirt pointed to tax revolts, slow national economic growth, the shrinking share of the population with students in the<br \/>\nschools, and the decreasing federal role as factors that likely precluded significant education reform, concluding that \u2018\u2018the 1980s will be a decade of<br \/>\nconsolidating and digesting the large number of innovations from the<br \/>\n1970s\u2019\u2019 (Kirst and Wirt, 1982, p. 250).<br \/>\nThis prediction proved incorrect, because of the release of the A Nation<br \/>\nat Risk report in 1983. A Nation at Risk was the product of a commission created by Reagan administration Secretary of Education Terrel Bell, whose primary assignment from Ronald Reagan was to find a way to eliminate his own<br \/>\ndepartment. He devised the idea of a national commission to report on the<br \/>\nquality of American education and make suggestions for improvement as<br \/>\na way of increasing national attention to the important functions of public<br \/>\neducation. Finding little support from Reagan\u2019s office for the appointment<br \/>\nof a presidential commission amid criticisms that it might generate a greater<br \/>\nfederal role for education, in July of 1981 Bell appointed a commission himself (Bell, 1988). The committee was chaired by University of Utah President<br \/>\nDavid P. Gardner, and was composed of seven university faculty and administrators; seven state and local school personnel, including principals, teachers, school board members, and superintendents (seven members); one<br \/>\nbusiness leader; one politician; and two others.14 It included some very distinguished educators, including Gardner, Chemistry Nobel Prize winner<br \/>\nGlenn Seaborg, Harvard physics professor Gerald Holton, and Yale<br \/>\nPresident A. Bartlett Giamatti. The group engaged in 18 months of factHow Paradigms Create Politics<br \/>\n295 Downloaded from http:\/\/aerj.aera.net at UNIV CALIFORNIA BERKELEY LIB on July 23, 2013<br \/>\nfinding, commissioning dozens of papers and holding six public meetings as<br \/>\nwell as a number of regional meetings with a variety of stakeholders, before<br \/>\nproducing its analysis.<br \/>\nIn a short report that employed bold and ominous language, the report<br \/>\nassailed the nation\u2019s poor educational performance, famously declaring that<br \/>\nthe United States was caught in a \u2018\u2018rising tide of mediocrity\u2019\u2019 that imperiled<br \/>\nthe nation\u2019s economic future. In support of its case, it cited a variety of academic indicators, most notably high levels of illiteracy, poor performance on<br \/>\ninternational comparisons, and a steady decline in SAT scores from 1963 to<br \/>\n1980. Quoting analyst Paul Copperman, the report claimed that this would<br \/>\nbe the first time in the history of the country that the educational skills of<br \/>\none generation would not be equal to those of their parents. Contrasting<br \/>\nthis declining educational picture with the centrality of skills and human capital in the knowledge-based postindustrial economy, the report linked the<br \/>\nfuture of the nation\u2019s international economic competitiveness to the reform<br \/>\nof its educational system. The report\u2019s recommendations called for a new<br \/>\nfocus on \u2018\u2018excellence\u2019\u2019 for all, which would be achieved through a revamped<br \/>\nhigh school curriculum with fewer electives and more required courses in<br \/>\nmath, English, science, and social studies, a combination that the authors<br \/>\ncalled \u2018\u2018the New Basics.\u2019\u2019 It also called for a longer school day and school<br \/>\nyear, more homework, tighter university admission standards, and more testing for students as indicators of proficiency. For teachers, it recommended<br \/>\nhigher standards for entry into the profession, an 11-month professional<br \/>\nyear, and market-sensitive and performance-based teacher pay.<br \/>\nThe reaction to the report was instantaneous and overwhelming. The<br \/>\nreport was released in a Rose Garden Ceremony in which Reagan, disregarding the report\u2019s findings, used it as an occasion to highlight his familiar agenda<br \/>\nof school prayer, tuition tax credits, and the end of the \u2018\u2018federal intrusion\u2019\u2019 into<br \/>\neducation. But the media reports of the Rose Garden ceremony highlighted<br \/>\nthe claims about the \u2018\u2018rising tide of mediocrity,\u2019\u2019 pushing Reagan\u2019s agenda to<br \/>\nthe background (Fiske, 1983, p. A1). The U.S. Government Printing Office<br \/>\nreceived more than 400 requests for copies in a single hour the following<br \/>\nday and distributed more than 6 million copies over the course of the next<br \/>\nyear. The press interest was insatiable: The Washington Post published almost<br \/>\ntwo articles per week on A Nation at Risk in the year following the report\u2019s<br \/>\nrelease (Guthrie &amp; Springer, 2004, p. 12). An assessment in 1984 found that<br \/>\nmore than 250 state task forces had been put together to study education<br \/>\nand recommend changes (Guthrie &amp; Springer, 2004, p. 14). As we will see<br \/>\nin the discussions of the subsequent state and federal changes below, this<br \/>\nimpact proved enduring over many years to come.<br \/>\nThe reasons why the report hit such a chord are multifaceted and have<br \/>\nbeen discussed in more detail by the author elsewhere (Mehta, in press-a).<br \/>\nSince the focus of this article is on the consequences of paradigm changes<br \/>\nand not its causes, here I just briefly note that the following factors were<br \/>\nMehta<br \/>\n296 Downloaded from http:\/\/aerj.aera.net at UNIV CALIFORNIA BERKELEY LIB on July 23, 2013<br \/>\nimportant in the report capturing such widespread attention: (a) the brevity<br \/>\nof the report and its hyperbolic language; (b) the citing of alarming indicators, particularly the SAT decline; (c) the news hook created by the conflict<br \/>\nbetween Reagan\u2019s initial comments and the report\u2019s findings; (d) the high<br \/>\nstatus and legitimacy of the authors; (e) the timing of the report, as it fell<br \/>\nin the midst of an economic recession, and seemed to explain in part why<br \/>\nthe U.S. was being outpaced by international competitors; (f) the linking<br \/>\nof the educational to the economic, which greatly widened the interest in<br \/>\nthe report; and, as I will discuss in more detail in the next section, (g) the<br \/>\nway in which the report\u2019s narrative resonated (Binder, 1993) with a variety<br \/>\nof political, economic, and educational developments.<br \/>\nCrystallizing a Powerful Paradigm: The Problem<br \/>\nDefinition of A Nation at Risk<br \/>\nAs we will see in the pages that follow, the paradigm framed in A Nation<br \/>\nat Risk launched a national school reform movement. But this paradigm was<br \/>\nnot created out of whole cloth\u2014its framing of the problem brought together<br \/>\na number of strands that had been developing during the 1970s and early<br \/>\n1980s. By crystallizing these various strands into a short catalytic document,<br \/>\nit was able to frame an agenda for the future by knitting together a number<br \/>\nof streams from the past. By building on these existing streams, the report<br \/>\nensured that it would have a significant initial constituency; by powerfully<br \/>\nand evocatively framing an agenda, it built a new and much larger group<br \/>\nof stakeholders who would carry forward its analysis.<br \/>\nFour strands in particular were important (see Table 1). The first<br \/>\nand most important was the economic shift towards a postindustrial<br \/>\nknowledge-based economy. A Nation at Risk defined the purpose of schooling primarily in economic terms, as part of a battle for international competitiveness. This analysis resonated because it was becoming widely apparent<br \/>\nthat the economy was shifting to reward skills, a change that meant that<br \/>\nschooling would be increasingly important for international, state, and individual success. The idea that schooling was a key to individual mobility was<br \/>\nnot new (Grubb &amp; Lazerson, 2004); nor was the idea of human capital<br \/>\n(Schultz, 1963); what was freshly resonant was the notion that national<br \/>\n(and state) economic success was becoming increasingly dependent upon<br \/>\nthe available stock of this human capital. State governors, particularly in<br \/>\nthe South, had already begun to see that improving human capital was<br \/>\nbecoming increasingly central to their economic standing (Southern<br \/>\nRegional Education Board, 1981; Toch, 1991), a position that was increasingly taken up by governors across the country after A Nation at Risk. The<br \/>\nwidespread acceptance of the centrality of the link between educational production and economic growth, at both national and state levels, was the single most important factor in launching the subsequent reform movement.<br \/>\nHow Paradigms Create Politics<br \/>\n297 Downloaded from http:\/\/aerj.aera.net at UNIV CALIFORNIA BERKELEY LIB on July 23, 2013<br \/>\nTable 1<br \/>\nA Nation at Risk and Redefining the Educational Problem<br \/>\nDimension<br \/>\nPrevious Problem<br \/>\nDefinition<br \/>\nProblem Definition in A<br \/>\nNation at Risk<br \/>\nFactors That Fed Into Changing<br \/>\nProblem Definition<br \/>\nPurpose of<br \/>\neducation<br \/>\nDiverse, no one purpose<br \/>\ndominant<br \/>\nEducation a tool of<br \/>\neconomic development<br \/>\nNational perception that education is key for<br \/>\ninternational economic competition<br \/>\nState perception that education is key for<br \/>\neconomic development (particularly<br \/>\nSouthern governors)<br \/>\nIncrease in individual returns to schooling<br \/>\nGoals of reform Categorical programs for<br \/>\ndisadvantaged groups;<br \/>\nincreased performance<br \/>\nof low performing<br \/>\nstudents (minimum<br \/>\ncompetency movement)<br \/>\nHigher standards for all<br \/>\nstudents, \u2018\u2018excellence\u2019\u2019<br \/>\nState economic competition, spurring higher<br \/>\nstandards<br \/>\nStandards a reaction to perception of 1960s<br \/>\nprogressivism in schools<br \/>\nExcellence for all an antidote to perceived<br \/>\nexcesses of equity emphasis<br \/>\nResponsibility<br \/>\nfor schooling<br \/>\nShared between parents,<br \/>\nschools, and<br \/>\ngovernment<br \/>\nEducators primarily<br \/>\nresponsible for<br \/>\nschooling<br \/>\nRise of conservative political economy and<br \/>\nretreat from social responsibility for<br \/>\nschooling<br \/>\nEffective schools research<br \/>\nOutcome<br \/>\nmeasure \/ site<br \/>\nof<br \/>\naccountability<br \/>\nQualitative standards set<br \/>\nby local school and<br \/>\nschool board<br \/>\nExternal tests, accountable<br \/>\nto state<br \/>\nMinimum competency testing<br \/>\nGreater state spending\/perception that<br \/>\nincreasing spending not producing results<br \/>\nChanging image of teachers as interest groups<br \/>\n(unionization, collective bargaining, teacher<br \/>\nstrikes)<br \/>\nDeclining public view of schools; low<br \/>\nperformance on international tests; other<br \/>\ndyspeptic reports on American education<br \/>\n298<br \/>\nat UNIV CALIFORNIA BERKELEY LIB on July 23, 2013 http:\/\/aerj.aera.net Downloaded from<br \/>\nSecond, A Nation at Risk marked the crystallization of a different set of<br \/>\ngoals for schooling, which shifted from moderately improving the lowest<br \/>\nperforming students to increasing performance across the board under the<br \/>\nbanner of higher standards for all. High standards for all drew its power<br \/>\nthrough a kind of symbolic boundary drawing (Lamont &amp; Molnar, 2002),<br \/>\ncounterposing itself to a variety of trends it took to be inauspicious. At the<br \/>\npolicy level, it represented a reaction against \u2018\u2018back to basics\u2019\u2019 that seemed<br \/>\nnot ambitious enough to match the scale of the problem; at the social and<br \/>\npolitical level, it reacted against what many (particularly on the right) perceived as an overemphasis on equity stemming from the 1960s; at the pedagogical level, it reacted against \u2018\u2018child-centered\u2019\u2019 pedagogical views that had<br \/>\ngained prominence in the 1960s in favor of a more traditional view of<br \/>\nschooling as teaching material that needed to be mastered.<br \/>\nThird, A Nation at Risk placed the responsibility for addressing the problem of poor school performance on the schools, crystallizing a retreat from<br \/>\na broader social responsibility for education that had been on the rise since<br \/>\nthe 1960s.15 The political ill will engendered by desegregation through busing left politicians fearful of educational reforms that would require broader<br \/>\nsocietal commitment (Rieder, 1985), particularly in a period of growing skepticism of government and a shift towards a more conservative political economy (McGuinn, 2009; Wells, 2009). At the same time, research on \u2018\u2018effective<br \/>\nschools\u2019\u2019 (Edmonds, 1979) seemed to suggest that schools could make significant differences in outcomes even for high-poverty students, providing<br \/>\na boost to the idea that school characteristics, including higher expectations,<br \/>\ncould be the first step toward change.<br \/>\nFourth, A Nation at Risk accelerated a shift in the site of accountability<br \/>\nfor schooling. Schools had long been primarily accountable to local school<br \/>\nboards for whatever those boards felt was important; A Nation at Risk<br \/>\nincreased the emphasis on schools being held accountable by the state on<br \/>\nstandardized tests. Part of this shift was directly attributable to A Nation at<br \/>\nRisk\u2019s analysis: since the problem was underperformance on international<br \/>\ntests, success would be measured by higher performance on quantitative<br \/>\ntests. But the need for external markers was also related to a growing distrust<br \/>\nof educators\u2019 expertise. Rising rates of unionization among teachers in the<br \/>\n1960s and 1970s undermined their claims to be guardians of the public<br \/>\ngood and increased legislator skepticism about their claims of professional<br \/>\nexpertise (Toch, 1991). The rise and spread of minimum competency tests<br \/>\nin the 1970s presaged the standards and accountability movement to<br \/>\ncome, as it reflected the growing skepticism among legislators about the failings of schools and the need for measurable accountability (Guthrie, 1981).<br \/>\nFinally, fiscal issues contributed to the growing demand for external<br \/>\naccountability. The share of total education spending by the states as<br \/>\nopposed to localities had increased to the point where states were now contributing the plurality of the total funds. The combination of greater state<br \/>\nHow Paradigms Create Politics<br \/>\n299 Downloaded from http:\/\/aerj.aera.net at UNIV CALIFORNIA BERKELEY LIB on July 23, 2013<br \/>\nspending and the economic pressures and tax revolts of the 1970s meant that<br \/>\nstate legislators were becoming increasingly likely to demand accountability<br \/>\nfor their limited state resources.<br \/>\nA Nation at Risk integrated these four strands into a short and catalytic<br \/>\ndocument. As we will see, by linking the educational to the economic and<br \/>\nshifting the problem from poor students to all students, the document called<br \/>\ninto existence a broad public backing for school reform. But the analysis was<br \/>\nbuilt on more than just the economic rationale. The commission took a variety<br \/>\nof existing developments\u2014the shift to the postindustrial economy, the rise of<br \/>\ninternational economic competitors, the cultural backlash against the permissiveness of the 1960s, the political backlash against the Great Society and busing, the decline in test scores, the rising distrust of educators\u2014and integrated<br \/>\nthem into one master narrative that seized the nation\u2019s attention and would set<br \/>\nthe terms of subsequent debate.<br \/>\nThe Impact of Paradigm Change in the States: Changing Goals,<br \/>\nRestructuring Politics, Transforming Policy<br \/>\nThe paradigm change described above sparked a series of changes in<br \/>\neducational policy and politics and eventually in the institutional responsibility for schooling. These changes spread across the states first, a development<br \/>\nthat then enabled federal reform.<br \/>\nChanging goals of education. The impact of the paradigm described in A<br \/>\nNation at Risk was apparent throughout the states. Research on the national<br \/>\nimpact of A Nation at Risk revealed that 45 states initiated or increased graduation requirements for course taking, and two thirds of states increased teacher<br \/>\ntesting (Firestone, 1990, p. 145). But more than specific initiatives, the A Nation<br \/>\nat Risk paradigm framed the very ends that schooling was seeking to accomplish. As evidence on this point, consider the discussion of education in governors\u2019 State of the State addresses in the three case study states. In each of the<br \/>\nstates, the discussion of education after 1983 reflects the new paradigm\u2019s<br \/>\nemphasis on education as part of a broader strategy for human capital.<br \/>\nThe shift was most apparent in Michigan. In the pre-1983 addresses,<br \/>\neducation is largely characterized as an end that is important in itself rather<br \/>\nthan as a means to a broader goal of economic development. The 1982 State<br \/>\nof the State address, for example, has sections on school finance, educational assessment, compensatory education, and special and bilingual education, but it has no mention of the economic purpose of education.<br \/>\nInstead, the 1982 address lists as primary educational objectives for the state:<br \/>\nensuring equal opportunity, distributing the tax burden equitably, and devising systems of testing that ensure the effectiveness of educational programs<br \/>\n(William Milliken, \u2018\u2018State of the State Address,\u2019\u2019 1982). The 1984 State of the<br \/>\nState address, by contrast, begins to talk of education in human capital terms,<br \/>\nopining that if state support for education continues to decline, \u2018\u2018this<br \/>\nMehta<br \/>\n300 Downloaded from http:\/\/aerj.aera.net at UNIV CALIFORNIA BERKELEY LIB on July 23, 2013<br \/>\ndisinvestment in the future, if left unchecked, would undermine our efforts to<br \/>\nspur economic development, create jobs and improve our quality of life\u2019\u2019<br \/>\n(James Blanchard, \u2018\u2018State of the State Address,\u2019\u2019 1984). Subsequent addresses<br \/>\nwould reaffirm this theme, with economic and educational sections of the addresses merging into one another. For example, by 1989, the section on economic development included a lengthy discussion of \u2018\u2018developing a skilled<br \/>\nworkforce,\u2019\u2019 and the education section in turn devoted one third of its pages<br \/>\nto \u2018\u2018our workers, our future\u2019\u2019 (James Blanchard, \u2018\u2018State of the State Address,\u2019\u2019<br \/>\n1989). Governor John Engler continued this theme in his State of the State addresses, arguing that with the decline of manufacturing in Michigan, building<br \/>\na stronger workforce was a critical part of inter-state competition. For example, he titled his 1999 address \u2018\u2018The Smart State First in the 21st Century\u2019\u2019<br \/>\n(John Engler, \u2018\u2018State of the State Address,\u2019\u2019 1999). From 1984 to the present,<br \/>\nschooling in Michigan has been seen primarily in human capital terms.16<br \/>\nThe Maryland addresses show a similar shift, although given that the<br \/>\nstate is less reliant on manufacturing, the economy-education link is not as<br \/>\npronounced. The 1984 address by Democrat Harry Hughes calls for the<br \/>\n\u2018\u2018greatest increase in State aid to education in the history of our state\u2019\u2019<br \/>\n(Harry Hughes, \u2018\u2018State of the State Address,\u2019\u2019 1984). Subsequent addresses<br \/>\ninclude mentions of the need for greater quality and excellence in education,<br \/>\nreflecting the concerns of A Nation at Risk. Maryland more fully embraced<br \/>\nthe idea that its state economy was dependent upon the quality of its education system in the 1990s, when Governor Parris Glendening began to discuss<br \/>\nthe importance of \u2018\u2018all our citizens reach[ing] their full potential in the knowledge-based economy of the future\u2019\u2019 (Parris Glendening, \u2018\u2018State of the State<br \/>\nAddress,\u2019\u2019 1999). As the economy frame for education became more prominent in Maryland, the share of the agenda devoted to education increased,<br \/>\nproviding further evidence for the link between the two.<br \/>\nSimilar trends are evident in Utah. Early State of the States focus on the<br \/>\nbasic goal of expanding access to secondary education: The 1975 address<br \/>\ncalled for making free public education available to all students in Grades 9<br \/>\nto 12. In 1981, in the midst of a crisis of rising school population and diminishing revenues, Republican Governor Scott Matheson\u2019s focus was on finding<br \/>\na way to provide minimally adequate funding for the basic upkeep of state<br \/>\nschools. In Matheson\u2019s 1983 address, he spoke eloquently about the coming<br \/>\nchanges to a postindustrial society, noting the decline of smokestack industries and the project ( help with nursing paper writing from experts with MSN &#038; DNP degrees)ed growth of professional, managerial, technical and clerical jobs.17 He concluded, \u2018\u2018Education then\u2014an investment in our human<br \/>\ncapital\u2014is the key to economic growth in this new era. Utah has long been<br \/>\namong the leading states in the literacy of its people. . . . Our challenge is<br \/>\nto sustain our commitment to education and prepare our people to participate<br \/>\nin the new technological age\u2019\u2019 (Scott Matheson, \u2018\u2018State of the State Address,\u2019\u2019<br \/>\n1989). In 1989, Governor Norman Bangerter spoke of education as an important part of \u2018\u2018our economic development team,\u2019\u2019 making education, along with<br \/>\nHow Paradigms Create Politics<br \/>\n301 Downloaded from http:\/\/aerj.aera.net at UNIV CALIFORNIA BERKELEY LIB on July 23, 2013<br \/>\nthe economy, efficiency, and the environment, the key priorities of his terms<br \/>\nas governor (Norman Bangerter, \u2018\u2018State of the State Address,\u2019\u2019 1989). In 1996,<br \/>\nGovernor Leavitt made the economy-education link explicit, declaring that<br \/>\nkey businesses were settling in Utah because of the quality of its schools<br \/>\n(Michael Leavitt, \u2018\u2018State of the State Address,\u2019\u2019 1996). In 2003, Leavitt launched<br \/>\nyet another round of school reforms, arguing that \u2018\u2018in the economic race of this<br \/>\ncentury, the society with the best-educated people wins. Period. End of conversation\u2019\u2019 (Michael Leavitt, \u2018\u2018State of the State Address,\u2019\u2019 2003).<br \/>\nThe changes in Utah\u2019s goals and objectives for schooling, before and<br \/>\nafter A Nation at Risk, show clearly the impact that this increasing emphasis<br \/>\non the economy had on the direction of the school reform debate. The official state goals and objectives for education, as formulated in 1972 through<br \/>\na process that involved statewide community input, reveal a very different<br \/>\nview of educational purpose from the human capital approach. This view<br \/>\nstill prevailed as recently as 1982. A state curriculum plan for the years<br \/>\n1982 to 1988 summarizes the overall purpose of schooling as follows:<br \/>\n\u2018\u2018The education system is seen as a vehicle which provides for the growth<br \/>\nof each individual as he searches for meaning and builds competencies in<br \/>\nthese eight important areas of his life.\u2019\u2019 The eight areas are \u2018\u2018intellectual maturity,\u2019\u2019 \u2018\u2018ethical-moral-spiritual maturity,\u2019\u2019 \u2018\u2018emotional maturity,\u2019\u2019 \u2018\u2018social maturity,\u2019\u2019 \u2018\u2018physical maturity,\u2019\u2019 \u2018\u2018environmental maturity,\u2019\u2019 \u2018\u2018aesthetic maturity,\u2019\u2019<br \/>\nand \u2018\u2018productive maturity.\u2019\u2019 The 1982 goals show a concern with the spiritual,<br \/>\nethical, social, and even existential purposes of schooling.<br \/>\nShortly after A Nation at Risk, the Utah State Board of Education (1984,<br \/>\np. 1) reformulated its aims in a single sentence on the first page of its new<br \/>\n\u2018\u2018action goals.\u2019\u2019 The goals read, \u2018\u2018The Utah State Board of Education sets as<br \/>\nits primary goals the attainment of excellence in education and the improvement of productivity as expressed in the following objectives.\u2019\u2019 To the word<br \/>\nproductivity is appended a footnote, which reads,<br \/>\nThe State Board of Education considers productivity in education to<br \/>\nhave several definitions, all of which are important in providing excellence in education: (1) teaching an increased number of students for<br \/>\na given amount of money while maintaining current quality, (2) increasing quality for a given amount of money and a given number of students, and (3) increasing quality through increasing expenditures.<br \/>\nThe new goals showed a dramatic shift to a more practical, economic, and<br \/>\nutilitarian view of schooling\u2019s purpose, consistent with the view outlined in<br \/>\nA Nation at Risk.<br \/>\n18<br \/>\nIncreasing agenda status and involving new actors. The change in how<br \/>\neducation was discussed led almost immediately to a change in how political<br \/>\nattention was accorded to schooling. We can roughly track the lasting impact<br \/>\nof A Nation at Risk on states\u2019 political priorities by considering the space<br \/>\ndevoted to education in governors\u2019 State of the State Addresses. Figure 1<br \/>\nMehta<br \/>\n302 Downloaded from http:\/\/aerj.aera.net at UNIV CALIFORNIA BERKELEY LIB on July 23, 2013<br \/>\ndisplays the relative importance of education as an issue in governors\u2019 State<br \/>\nof the State addresses in each of the case study states between 1973 and<br \/>\n2005. The Y-axis measures the proportion of the total lines in the State of<br \/>\nthe State address devoted to elementary and secondary education. Note<br \/>\nthat in Utah, where the legislature met every other year until 1985, the<br \/>\nState of the State address was also a biannual event until 1985.<br \/>\nThis graph indicates a clear break in 1983. On average, Michigan governors<br \/>\ndevoted 4.8% of their addresses to education up through January of 1983,<br \/>\nwhereas in the period since A Nation at Risk they have devoted 19.2% to education. Results are similar in Utah: 4.8% of space in the addresses was devoted<br \/>\nto education before A Nation at Risk, and 21% since. In Maryland, where the<br \/>\naddresses are on average significantly longer and the number of topic (sample nursing essay examples by the best nursing assignment writing service)s covered<br \/>\ngreater, the total space devoted to education is less, but the fourfold rate of<br \/>\nincrease is similar: 2.7% before A Nation at Risk, and 10.8% since.<br \/>\nThe shift cannot be explained by partisanship. Table 2 provides a breakdown of the share of each address devoted to K-12 education, by governor.<br \/>\nGovernors of both parties devoted relatively little attention to education<br \/>\nbefore A Nation at Risk and have devoted significantly more since. The<br \/>\nmost striking change was in Michigan, perhaps not surprisingly given that<br \/>\n0<br \/>\n0.1<br \/>\n0.2<br \/>\n0.3<br \/>\n0.4<br \/>\n0.5<br \/>\n0.6<br \/>\n1973<br \/>\n1975<br \/>\n1977<br \/>\n1979<br \/>\n1981<br \/>\n1983<br \/>\n1985<br \/>\n1987<br \/>\n1989<br \/>\n1991<br \/>\n1993<br \/>\n1995<br \/>\n1997<br \/>\n1999<br \/>\n2001<br \/>\n2003<br \/>\n2005<br \/>\nPercentage Devoted to Education<br \/>\nYears<br \/>\nMichigan<br \/>\nUtah<br \/>\nMaryland<br \/>\nFigure 1. Proportion of Michigan, Utah, and Maryland State of State addresses<br \/>\ndevoted to elementary and secondary education, 1973\u20132005.<br \/>\nHow Paradigms Create Politics<br \/>\n303 Downloaded from http:\/\/aerj.aera.net at UNIV CALIFORNIA BERKELEY LIB on July 23, 2013<br \/>\nits troubled automobile industry was ripe for the A Nation at Risk message.<br \/>\nRepublican Governor William Milliken devoted 5.4% of his addresses<br \/>\nbetween 1974 and 1982 to education and Democratic Governor James<br \/>\nBlanchard did not devote any of his address to education in 1983. This<br \/>\nshifted quickly after A Nation at Risk, as Blanchard devoted 14% of his<br \/>\naddress to education in 1984, and 16.6% of his total space to schooling<br \/>\nbetween 1984 and 1990. Reflecting the raised agenda status of schooling,<br \/>\nRepublican Governor John Engler (1991\u20132002) devoted 20.4% of his addresses to education, and Democratic Governor Jennifer Granholm (2003\u2013<br \/>\n2005) devoted 18.6% of her addresses to education. Similar trends are evident in Utah, where greater attention was paid to education in the addresses<br \/>\nafter A Nation at Risk under a string of almost exclusively Republican governors; and in Maryland, where an increase in agenda status after A<br \/>\nNation at Risk was evident in the addresses of the state\u2019s almost exclusively<br \/>\nDemocratic governors.<br \/>\nThe shift in the definition and agenda status of the issue also brought in<br \/>\nother new actors, particularly state legislators and business groups. As education became more central to economic growth, state legislators and business<br \/>\ngroups were no longer willing to leave schooling in the hands of local or state<br \/>\nschool boards. As one Michigan legislator dismissively put it in discussing education reform in the 1990s: \u2018\u2018The State Board of Education wasn\u2019t a player. The<br \/>\nDepartment of Ed wasn\u2019t a player\u2019\u2019 (Personal interview, October 2004). The<br \/>\nkey players were now the governor, the state legislature, the unions, and, in<br \/>\nsome states, business coalitions demanding educational reform. By 1990,<br \/>\nMaryland and Michigan had state outposts of the national Business<br \/>\nRoundtable that were beginning to advocate standards-based reform. These<br \/>\nbusiness leaders, like many state legislators, had gradually shifted their priorities in wake of A Nation at Risk. While they previously had opposed school<br \/>\nreform as an expensive undertaking that would necessitate higher taxes, they<br \/>\nwere increasingly persuaded that a better bet would be to essentially socialize<br \/>\nthe costs of training their workers. By linking the educational and economic<br \/>\nspheres, the paradigm of A Nation at Risk had weakened the long-standing<br \/>\nclaims of local school boards to have the final say on educational policy,<br \/>\nand brought in more powerful state political and economic elites who now<br \/>\nincreasingly saw education policy as part of their purview.<br \/>\nChanging politics and policy: Democrats, Republicans converge; schools,<br \/>\nteachers, unions resist. Inevitably, the changes described above in who was<br \/>\ninvolved in education and what was debated would manifest themselves in<br \/>\na series of policy reforms. Looking across the three states, we will see that<br \/>\nthe A Nation at Risk paradigm affected the goals of policymakers initiating<br \/>\nreform, weakened the hand of unions who sought to resist the reforms,<br \/>\nand created the broader public and interest group support that helped<br \/>\npass and sustain standards-based reform. The power of this paradigm thus<br \/>\nhelps to explain several of the puzzles listed above, including why a set of<br \/>\nMehta<br \/>\n304 Downloaded from http:\/\/aerj.aera.net at UNIV CALIFORNIA BERKELEY LIB on July 23, 2013<br \/>\nTable 2<br \/>\nProportion of Michigan, Utah, and Maryland State of State Addresses Devoted to K-12 Education, by Governor, 1973\u20132005<br \/>\nMichigan Utah Maryland<br \/>\nBefore A Nation at Risk<br \/>\nWilliam Milliken (R), 1974\u20131982 5.4% Calvin Rampton (R), 1973\u20131978 3.0% Marvin Mandel (D), 1973\u20131977 3.1%<br \/>\nJames Blanchard (D), 1983 0.0% Scott Matheson (R), 1979\u20131983 6.6% Blair Lee (D), 1978 2.4%<br \/>\nHarry Hughes (D), 1979\u20131983 2.4%<br \/>\nAfter A Nation at Risk<br \/>\nJames Blanchard (D), 1984\u20131990 16.6% Norman Bangerter (D), 1985\u20131992 23.4% Harry Hughes (D), 1984\u20131986 5.7%<br \/>\nJohn Engler (R), 1991\u20132002 20.4% Michael Leavitt (R), 1993\u20132003 18.4% William Donald Schaefer (D), 1987\u20131994 6.4%<br \/>\nJennifer Granholm (D), 2003\u20132005 18.6% Olene Walker (R), 2004 29.9% Parris Glendening (D), 1995\u20132002 17.5%<br \/>\nJames Huntsman (R), 2005 20.3% Robert Ehrlich (R), 2003\u20132005 9.5%<br \/>\n305<br \/>\nat UNIV CALIFORNIA BERKELEY LIB on July 23, 2013 http:\/\/aerj.aera.net Downloaded from<br \/>\nreforms triumphed despite the opposition of the strongest interest groups in<br \/>\nits domain (Puzzle 2), and why there was such wide policy convergence<br \/>\naround standards-based reform among different actors (Puzzle 3) and<br \/>\nfrom both sides of the political spectrum (Puzzle 4).<br \/>\nAcross the three states, the initiating actors for standards-based reform came<br \/>\nfrom the left and the right,19 although the rationales for reform on both sides<br \/>\ngrew out of aspects of the paradigm crystallized in A Nation at Risk. Two distinct, but overlapping, visions emerged. One vision, mostly championed by<br \/>\nmainstream Democrats on the left, emphasized the way that the changed economy would require higher skills for all students, particularly poor and minority<br \/>\nstudents, if they were to have a decent shot at competing in a postindustrial<br \/>\neconomy. These equity liberals consistently supported standards as a way of<br \/>\nseeking to ensure that all students gained these skills, and sometimes supported<br \/>\naccountability as a top-down mechanism that would seek to ensure that schools<br \/>\nwere making the needed changes to improve students\u2019 skills. A second vision,<br \/>\nchampioned by those on the right, focused less on the equity implications of A<br \/>\nNation at Risk\u2019s analysis, and gave greater attention to the idea that state or<br \/>\nnational competitiveness would be threatened if workers did not gain higher<br \/>\nskills. Coupled with this economic rationale was an emphasis on the need<br \/>\nfor accountability, as, in the right\u2019s view, external pressure was needed to force<br \/>\na recalcitrant educational establishment to change. Both of these views shared A<br \/>\nNation at Risk\u2019s assumptions about the relationship between education and the<br \/>\neconomy, the need for across the board rather than targeted improvement, the<br \/>\nemphasis on schools as opposed to society as the locus of change, and the need<br \/>\nfor external accountability for results.<br \/>\nMaryland provides an example of the movement for standards from the<br \/>\nleft. The impetus in Maryland was a 1989 commission report known as the<br \/>\n\u2018\u2018Sondheim Report,\u2019\u2019 named after its chair, Walter Sondheim. The report called<br \/>\nfor a public accountability system for all of Maryland\u2019s schools, driven by high<br \/>\nstandards set by the state, to be enforced by a system of accreditation that<br \/>\nwould evaluate whether each school was meeting those standards. The commission was appointed and given its charge by Democratic Governor William<br \/>\nDonald Schaefer, who was drawing upon an earlier memo written by<br \/>\nMaryland State Superintendent David Hornbeck. Hornbeck\u2019s goals, as expressed in a 1987 memo and in an interview with the author, were to utilize<br \/>\nthe newfound emphasis on school accountability both to spur improved practice in failing Baltimore city schools and to convince legislators to increase<br \/>\ntheir funding with the promise of greater results for those dollars. In<br \/>\nMaryland, one of the \u2018\u2018bluest\u2019\u2019 states in the nation, the push for accountability<br \/>\ncame out of a desire of those on the left at the state level to take control over,<br \/>\nand increase funding for, what state actors saw as failing high-poverty schools.<br \/>\nIn Utah, by contrast, the movement for standards-based reform was<br \/>\nlargely championed by the political right. Utah developed some early<br \/>\nstandards-based policies in the wake of A Nation at Risk,<br \/>\n20 but these policies<br \/>\nMehta<br \/>\n306 Downloaded from http:\/\/aerj.aera.net at UNIV CALIFORNIA BERKELEY LIB on July 23, 2013<br \/>\nwere underdeveloped in comparison to the comprehensive models that had<br \/>\nbeen developed in some other states. An influential white paper by former<br \/>\nUtah State Superintendent John Bennion summarized the efforts of three of<br \/>\nthese leading states (Maryland, Texas, Kentucky), and his work was picked<br \/>\nup under the accountability banner by Republican State Representative<br \/>\nTammy Rowan. Rowan had become convinced that the school system was<br \/>\nunduly lax in its standards as she watched her own daughter being passed<br \/>\nfrom grade to grade despite her weak reading skills (Haney, 1999). After reading Bennion\u2019s paper, Rowan began to advocate a Texas-style system of<br \/>\naccountability, initiating a legislative task force that laid the groundwork for<br \/>\nwhat would become Utah\u2019s standards-based system. Reflecting impatience<br \/>\nwith the rate of improvement in the school system, Republicans in both the<br \/>\ngovernor\u2019s office and the legislature argued for a system that placed heavier<br \/>\nemphasis on outcomes. Republican State Senator Howard Stephenson, the<br \/>\ncochair of the task force, argued in its initial meeting that a greater emphasis<br \/>\non results was needed: \u2018\u2018We\u2019ve done a lot . . . but where are the results?\u2019\u2019 he<br \/>\nasked (Toomer-Cook, 1999b). Republican Governor Mike Leavitt supported<br \/>\nthis view at a conference sponsored by the commission, stressing that \u2018\u2018we<br \/>\nsee the results in the inputs but not the results we want to see in the outputs\u2019\u2019<br \/>\n(Toomer-Cook. 1999c). In a heavily Republican state with few minority students, the rationale for reform lay not in preparing disadvantaged students<br \/>\nfor the new economy, but rather in a desire to hold an underperforming<br \/>\nschool system accountable for results.<br \/>\nIf Maryland and Utah represent the \u2018\u2018blue state\u2019\u2019 and \u2018\u2018red state\u2019\u2019 versions<br \/>\nof the drive for standards-based reform, the story in Michigan was that of<br \/>\na \u2018\u2018purple state\u2019\u2019 in which Democrats and Republicans alternated in the<br \/>\npush for standards-based reform, but with different rationales and policy<br \/>\ntools. The need for reform of some sort was accepted by both parties beginning in the mid 1980s, as the message of A Nation at Risk resonated with the<br \/>\ndeclining Michigan automobile industry. A prominent 1987 Michigan commission on school finance comprised of leaders from business, industry,<br \/>\nagriculture, labor, education and government echoed the declensionist rhetoric of A Nation at Risk: \u2018\u2018Michigan has a long and honored tradition of providing quality, equitable educational services for all of its people. This<br \/>\ntradition is now in jeopardy\u2019\u2019 (Michigan School Finance Commission,<br \/>\nEdgar Harden and Phillip Runkel, cochairs, p. 4). In response to this crisis,<br \/>\nMichigan political leaders took a series of steps towards standards-based<br \/>\nreform that can be roughly grouped into two movements: a movement<br \/>\nfocused around standards, led by Democrats in the early part of the<br \/>\n1990s; and one for accountability, pioneered by Republican Governor<br \/>\nJohn Engler in the later part of the 1990s. The first movement was embodied<br \/>\nin the push for a state core curriculum, which many, particularly on the left,<br \/>\nsaw as a mechanism to create greater similarity and therefore equity among<br \/>\nMichigan\u2019s many districts. Over the objections of some conservatives who<br \/>\nHow Paradigms Create Politics<br \/>\n307 Downloaded from http:\/\/aerj.aera.net at UNIV CALIFORNIA BERKELEY LIB on July 23, 2013<br \/>\nthought that a state curriculum impeded local control, the Michigan legislature passed a voluntary core curriculum in 1990, and a mandatory core curriculum in 1993. When Republicans took full control of the state legislature as<br \/>\npart of the 1994 Gingrich revolution, they abolished the core as an infringement upon local control. However, Governor Engler continued to demand<br \/>\naccountability through performance on state tests, seeking to tighten state<br \/>\naccreditation standards and close schools that were not making sufficient<br \/>\nprogress on these tests. The push for accountability reflected a familiar conservative belief about the unwillingness of schools and unions to make needed<br \/>\nchanges. As one Republican legislator said, \u2018\u2018The schools are not going to<br \/>\nchange unless change is forced upon them\u2019\u2019 (Vergari, 1996, p. 213). Overall,<br \/>\nwhile some important differences between the parties remained, both supported some version of standards or accountability, drawing upon A Nation<br \/>\nat Risk\u2019s assumptions about the schools as the primary source of economic<br \/>\ndecline and the corresponding need for system-wide reform.<br \/>\nThat many Democrats and Republicans had converged did not mean<br \/>\nthat there was consensus around educational accountability. Rather, the<br \/>\nnew cleavages were institutional rather than partisan, with the central divisions now between state politicians and officials who were holding the<br \/>\naccountability strings, and teachers, who were the ones being held to<br \/>\naccount. In all three states, teachers unions vehemently protested the<br \/>\nmove for greater accountability, arguing that accountability by testing was<br \/>\nunfair or unproductive. A survey by the Maryland State Teachers<br \/>\nAssociation (Maryland\u2019s largest teachers\u2019 union and the state affiliate of the<br \/>\nNEA) found that its members thought the proposed accountability and<br \/>\naccreditation measures had \u2018\u2018limited value\u2019\u2019 and that a better approach would<br \/>\nbe to help tackle the problems they faced by removing disruptive students,<br \/>\nproviding help for clerical chores, and freeing teachers from tasks such as<br \/>\nmonitoring lunchrooms. MSTA leader Jane Stern publicly challenged the<br \/>\nmerits of the program in a joint appearance with commission chair Walter<br \/>\nSondheim on the Today Show in 1989 shortly after the Sondheim report<br \/>\nwas released.21 Similarly, the Michigan Education Association (MEA), one<br \/>\nof the most powerful teachers unions in the country, argued in the early<br \/>\n1990s that standardized testing, particularly for minority students, was likely<br \/>\nto be harmful, and \u2018\u2018encourag[ed the] curtailment or elimination of group<br \/>\nstandardized, aptitude or achievement assessments until such time as a critical appraisal of current testing programs [has] taken place.\u2019\u2019 The MEA also<br \/>\nasserted that \u2018\u2018teachers must have a say in determining who will be assessed,<br \/>\nwhen, and on what; which assessments to use and why.\u2019\u2019 In Utah, almost<br \/>\na decade later, a similar pattern prevailed, as the Utah Education<br \/>\nAssociation appropriated their opponents\u2019 favorite word and argued that<br \/>\nlegislators needed to be \u2018\u2018held accountable\u2019\u2019 as well. Phyllis Sorenson, president of the Utah Education Association, made this argument repeatedly:<br \/>\n\u2018\u2018For me, the bottom line is: If they want to hold schools accountable,<br \/>\nMehta<br \/>\n308 Downloaded from http:\/\/aerj.aera.net at UNIV CALIFORNIA BERKELEY LIB on July 23, 2013<br \/>\nthen, by darn, legislators should be held accountable for the amount that is<br \/>\nspent on education\u2019\u2019 (Haney, 1999). Teachers also argued that the scores<br \/>\nwould simply reflect the backgrounds from which their students came.<br \/>\n\u2018\u2018This can be compared to students being graded according to their height<br \/>\nand father\u2019s yearly income, and it is unfair,\u2019\u2019 said sixth-grade teacher Amy<br \/>\nMartz. \u2018\u2018Your threats . . . will only disrupt students, demoralize teachers<br \/>\nand disable communities\u2019\u2019 (Kapos, 1999). Finally, teachers also argued that<br \/>\nthey were professionals whose authority and discretion should be respected.<br \/>\nTeachers were not shy about voicing what they felt was an unwarranted<br \/>\nabrogation of their authority. \u2018\u2018You people need to quit threatening us and<br \/>\ncome into the classroom and see what it is we do,\u2019\u2019 said teacher Deanna<br \/>\nJohnson at a public forum on the proposed reforms\u2019\u2019 (Kapos, 1999). \u2018\u2018I would<br \/>\nnever tell a doctor or lawyer how to run his practice,\u2019\u2019 she added. \u2018\u2018You need<br \/>\nto come spend more time in the classroom\u2019\u2019 (Toomer-Cook, 1999a).<br \/>\nBut on each of these grounds\u2014that tests were not good measures of<br \/>\nschool quality, that funding was the key to improvement, that society and<br \/>\nnot schools should be responsible for test scores, and that teachers should<br \/>\nbe trusted to improve their own practice\u2014the arguments of the teachers<br \/>\nand their unions were running in the face of the paradigm set by A<br \/>\nNation at Risk. In Michigan, Engler was able to effectively create a distinction<br \/>\nbetween teachers, to whom he pledged respect and admiration, and teachers\u2019 unions, which he fought as an enemy of excellence and free enterprise<br \/>\n(Boyd, Plank, &amp; Sykes, 2000). A September 1993 Free Press poll found that<br \/>\n58% of the Michigan citizenry either strongly agreed or somewhat agreed<br \/>\nwith the statement that teachers\u2019 unions were too powerful (Vergari, 1996,<br \/>\np. 173). In Maryland, Governor Schaefer repeatedly portrayed teachers in<br \/>\nthe media as agents of the status quo. On the day the report was released,<br \/>\nhe said, \u2018\u2018Whenever you try to shake up education, you immediately run<br \/>\ninto a lot of problems because people love the status quo. I just hope the<br \/>\nreport shakes up education and sends us in a new direction\u2019\u2019 (Lally, 1989).<br \/>\nEditorials in The Baltimore Sun, The Evening Sun, and The Washington<br \/>\nPost all endorsed the commission\u2019s recommendations using similar reasoning, further rhetorically isolating the education community and emboldening<br \/>\nthe reformers.22 Finally, in Utah, arguments for professional control were rebuffed by critics like Rowan, who, using the \u2018\u2018no excuses\u2019\u2019 framework, were<br \/>\nnot mollified by the appeal to professional expertise. \u2018\u2018The task force\u2019s ultimate goal is to no longer make or accept excuses about why children can\u2019t<br \/>\nlearn but instead to do whatever it takes to help every child learn the basics<br \/>\nof math, reading and language,\u2019\u2019 wrote Rowan in The Deseret News. \u2018\u2018This is<br \/>\nthe very minimum of what we should expect from our schools\u2019\u2019 (Rowan,<br \/>\n1999). By labeling the impact of social background as an excuse rather<br \/>\nthan a legitimate difficulty in the schooling process, Rowan was mobilizing<br \/>\none of the critical assumptions of A Nation at Risk against criticisms from<br \/>\nteachers. In all three states, standards and accountability legislation was<br \/>\nHow Paradigms Create Politics<br \/>\n309 Downloaded from http:\/\/aerj.aera.net at UNIV CALIFORNIA BERKELEY LIB on July 23, 2013<br \/>\nvictorious, as the material resources of the unions were negated by a rhetorical climate that undermined many of their strongest arguments.<br \/>\nFinally, the paradigm of A Nation at Risk not only put teachers on the<br \/>\nrhetorical defensive; it also created a set of allies for the standards and<br \/>\naccountability movement. The paradigm had convinced legislators from<br \/>\nleft and right; it also had been embraced by the business community, state<br \/>\ndepartments of education, some civil rights groups, and the public across<br \/>\nthe three states. These groups, despite their differences, sat on the right<br \/>\nside of the institutional divide\u2014demanding accountability rather than being<br \/>\nsubject to it. The lead actors varied considerably across the states\u2014a state<br \/>\nsuperintendent in Maryland, a policy entrepreneur and a state legislator in<br \/>\nUtah, state legislators and a governor in Michigan\u2014but what appears to<br \/>\nbe theoretical chaos from the perspective of an actor-based theory instead<br \/>\nappears theoretically ordered from the perspective of an ideational one.<br \/>\nAll of these actors shared an overlapping view of the problem drawn from<br \/>\nA Nation at Risk, and, more broadly, they sat on one side of a set of institutional cleavages created by the new paradigm.<br \/>\nThe Transformation of Federal Policy: The Long<br \/>\nShadows of A Nation at Risk<br \/>\nThe consensus around standards-based reform at the state level paved the<br \/>\nroad for federal standards legislation, first in two pieces of legislation in 1994<br \/>\n(Goals 2000 and the reauthorization of the ESEA) and then in the 2001 No<br \/>\nChild Left Behind Act. Table 3 briefly summarizes the trajectory of federal<br \/>\nreform. Unlike the state reforms, the details of the federal reform have been<br \/>\nwell-described by previous scholars (see DeBray, 2006; Jennings, 1998;<br \/>\nMcGuinn, 2006), so I focus here briefly on four conceptual points about the<br \/>\npower of the A Nation at Risk paradigm in setting the direction for reform<br \/>\nand particularly in enabling a major shift towards federal control (Puzzle 5).23<br \/>\nFirst, A Nation at Risk provided the impetus and basis for what became<br \/>\nthe federal movement for reform. The meeting between President George<br \/>\nH.W. Bush and the nation\u2019s governors at Charlottesville (the Charlottesville<br \/>\nSummit) in 1989 is widely agreed to be the first step at the federal level<br \/>\ntowards standards-based reform (McGuinn, 2006; Vinovskis, 1999). For the<br \/>\ngovernors, it reflected an effort to create national support for a state school<br \/>\nreform movement which had been developing since A Nation at Risk. For<br \/>\nthe president, it provided a way to stake his claim to an issue that had<br \/>\nbeen rising in voters\u2019 concerns since A Nation at Risk (Hess &amp; McGuinn,<br \/>\n2002). While there has been some disagreement about whether the governors or the president initiated the meeting,24 the important point from this<br \/>\nperspective is that the two groups were able to come together because<br \/>\nthey had a similar understanding of the educational problem, as the joint<br \/>\ncommunique\u00b4 released at the end of the meeting suggested: \u2018\u2018The President<br \/>\nMehta<br \/>\n310 Downloaded from http:\/\/aerj.aera.net at UNIV CALIFORNIA BERKELEY LIB on July 23, 2013<br \/>\nTable 3<br \/>\nDevelopments of Federal Education Policy, 1989\u20132001<br \/>\nYear Event Details<br \/>\n1989 National Education<br \/>\nSummit<br \/>\nGovernors and President George H.W. Bush meet in Charlottesville. Agree to National Education<br \/>\nGoals, including goals to improve performance in math and science (first in the world by 2000);<br \/>\nalso agree to assess students\u2019 performance at 4th, 8th, and 12th grades.<br \/>\n1991 America 2000<br \/>\n(failed legislation)<br \/>\nProposed creation of voluntary national standards.<br \/>\nWas not enacted.<br \/>\nChampioned by President George H.W. Bush; opposition from Republicans to federal control and<br \/>\nDemocrats to testing defeats legislation.<br \/>\n1994 Goals 2000 Congressional legislation that provides seed money for states to voluntarily develop standards.<br \/>\nAvoids fight over national standards by focusing on state standards.<br \/>\nChampioned by President Bill Clinton, supported by Democratic Congress; opposition from<br \/>\nRepublicans seeking to limit federal role in schools.<br \/>\n1994 Improving<br \/>\nAmerica\u2019s Schools<br \/>\nAct (1994<br \/>\nreauthorization of<br \/>\nthe ESEA)<br \/>\nPassed after Goals 2000.<br \/>\nConditions Title I money on the development of state standards and assessments. Introduces idea<br \/>\nthat states should show \u2018\u2018adequate yearly progress\u2019\u2019 in return for Title I funds.<br \/>\nAvoids fight over national standards by letting states set standards.<br \/>\nSets policy framework for what would become No Child Left Behind.<br \/>\nChampioned by President Bill Clinton, supported by Democratic Congress; opposition from<br \/>\nRepublicans seeking to limit federal role in schools.<br \/>\n2001\u20132002 No Child Left<br \/>\nBehind (2001<br \/>\nreauthorization of<br \/>\nthe ESEA)<br \/>\nEvolution, not revolution, from 1994 ESEA. Same framework of federal government building on<br \/>\nstate standards-based reform.<br \/>\nAdds harder edge of accountability: annual student testing in grades 3\u20138, escalating set of sanctions<br \/>\nif schools do not make \u2018\u2018adequate yearly progress.\u2019\u2019<br \/>\nOther big change is new support from Republicans. Championed by President George W. Bush;<br \/>\noverwhelming bipartisan approval in both Senate and House.<br \/>\n311<br \/>\nat UNIV CALIFORNIA BERKELEY LIB on July 23, 2013 http:\/\/aerj.aera.net Downloaded from<br \/>\nand the nation\u2019s Governors agree that a better educated citizenry is the key<br \/>\nto the continued growth and prosperity of the United States. . . . [A]s a Nation<br \/>\nwe must have an educated workforce, second to none, in order to succeed<br \/>\nin an increasingly competitive world economy.\u2019\u2019 The key outcome of the<br \/>\nmeeting was a set of National Education Goals, a series of educational targets<br \/>\nthat the nation would aim to meet by 2000. These goals also reflected the<br \/>\nparadigm defined by A Nation at Risk in that they focused primarily on output targets rather than increased inputs. Most notably, they promised that<br \/>\nAmerica would be first in the world in international tests of math and science<br \/>\nby 2000, a goal that was consistent with the focus on international competition in A Nation at Risk.<br \/>\nSecond, the convergence of a redefined educational paradigm with<br \/>\nbroader changes in party politics in the 1990s and early 2000s created a context in which leaders of both parties saw advantage in pushing a centrist<br \/>\nagenda of standards-based reform at the federal level. The push to embrace<br \/>\nfederal standards-based reform came in two movements: President Clinton<br \/>\nbrought Democrats on board for Goals 2000 and the 1994 ESEA legislation,<br \/>\nand President George W. Bush brought along Republicans for No Child Left<br \/>\nBehind in 2001. For President Clinton, federal support for standards was<br \/>\na natural extension of the work he had done on standards in Arkansas<br \/>\nand as the governor\u2019s cochair at the Charlottesville Summit. It also supported<br \/>\nhis claim to be a New Democrat, as holding schools accountable and challenging the teachers unions enabled him to separate himself from old-style<br \/>\nliberals\u2019 argument that fixing schools meant sending more money. Taking<br \/>\non a Democratic Congress who wanted the 1994 ESEA reauthorization to<br \/>\nbe primarily about funneling greater resources to high-poverty students,<br \/>\nClinton successfully argued, consistent with both A Nation at Risk and his<br \/>\nNew Democrat philosophy, that the path to improved performance was<br \/>\nnot more money but higher standards and greater accountability for results.<br \/>\nFor President George W. Bush, education proved to be the perfect issue on<br \/>\nwhich to stake his claim to be a \u2018\u2018compassionate conservative,\u2019\u2019 mixing traditionally liberal ends of creating opportunities for disadvantaged students<br \/>\nwith conservative means of standards and accountability. Bush renounced<br \/>\nthe longtime Republican stance in favor of abolishing the Department of<br \/>\nEducation in favor of a Texas-style regime of more tests and accountability,<br \/>\nsubstantially erasing the nearly 30-point edge that Democrats had previously<br \/>\nheld on the educational issue. When he made education reform his primary<br \/>\ndomestic initiative during his first year, he was able to bring over<br \/>\nRepublicans in Congress who had previously been hostile to greater degrees<br \/>\nof federal control (see DeBray, 2006; Rudalevige, 2003, for more detail on<br \/>\nthe congressional politics). Overall, both presidents did tack to the center<br \/>\nas the median voter theorem would predict, but A Nation at Risk is important<br \/>\nin explaining the context in which it came to be rational to do so. A Nation at<br \/>\nRisk set the parameters for what seemed like sensible centrist education<br \/>\nMehta<br \/>\n312 Downloaded from http:\/\/aerj.aera.net at UNIV CALIFORNIA BERKELEY LIB on July 23, 2013<br \/>\nreform, and it triggered the state reform movement that gave these former<br \/>\ngovernors experience with standards in the first place.25<br \/>\nThird, the new paradigm created a wide basis of support behind the<br \/>\nstandards-based vision at the federal level. This coalition, developed in the<br \/>\nearly 1990s, was critical to the passage of the 1994 ESEA, and was similarly<br \/>\nsupportive of No Child Left Behind. As in the states, these groups came<br \/>\nfrom left and right, with concerns ranging from economic competitiveness<br \/>\nto greater equity\u2014they supported similar policies, but not for the same reasons. Business groups, including the Chamber of Commerce, the National<br \/>\nAlliance of Business, and most prominently the Business Roundtable, began<br \/>\nto throw their support behind educational reform as a central input in the battle for international economic competitiveness. The National Governors<br \/>\nAssociation and the Council of Chief State School Officers were each composed of many members who were pursuing some version of standards<br \/>\nand accountability in their states; these collective associations in turn advocated federal Helpance to state standards-based reform. Equity-driven groups<br \/>\nlike the Education Trust and the Citizens Commission on Civil Rights also<br \/>\nbecame strong backers of standards-based reform. Influential policy academics came on board, most notably Stanford\u2019s Marshall \u2018\u2018Mike\u2019\u2019 Smith, who is<br \/>\ncredited with an influential early formulation of standards-based reform<br \/>\n(Smith &amp; O\u2019Day, 1991), and the Fordham Foundation\u2019s Checker Finn, perhaps<br \/>\nthe best-known conservative commentator on education reform. These<br \/>\ngroups and individuals helped to develop the framework for standards<br \/>\nbased-reform in the early 1990s and provided critical direction and support<br \/>\nfor federal standards legislation. When Clinton drew together his policy<br \/>\nteam, much of its expertise came from those who had been extensively<br \/>\ninvolved in the standards movement, including Secretary of Education<br \/>\nRichard Riley, the former governor of South Carolina; Undersecretary of<br \/>\nEducation Mike Cohen, who had been the NGA\u2019s lead education staffer at<br \/>\nCharlottesville and was former copresident of the National Alliance for<br \/>\nRestructuring Education; and Mike Smith, the coauthor of the systemic reform<br \/>\nframework. As was the case in the states, this wide coalition was able to overcome the objections of the NEA to greater accountability.26<br \/>\nFourth and finally, the paradigm enabled the expansion of the federal<br \/>\nrole (Puzzle 5) because the paradigm had created a convergence among<br \/>\nstate reforms on which the federal government could piggyback without<br \/>\nseeming overly intrusive. Forty-two states had some version of standards<br \/>\nby 1994, and the federal legislation was crafted to expand upon these existing efforts. Goals 2000 funded the development of state standards; and the<br \/>\nImproving America\u2019s Schools Act, which was the 1994 reauthorization of<br \/>\nthe Elementary and Secondary Education Act, predicated the delivery of<br \/>\nTitle I funds on the development of state standards-based reform. While<br \/>\nGeorge H.W. Bush\u2019s proposal for national standards had gone down to<br \/>\npolitical defeat, Clinton was able to head off the most virulent objections<br \/>\nHow Paradigms Create Politics<br \/>\n313 Downloaded from http:\/\/aerj.aera.net at UNIV CALIFORNIA BERKELEY LIB on July 23, 2013<br \/>\nto national control by building on state standards. No Child Left Behind in<br \/>\nturn built upon the framework established in the 1994 reforms\u2014an \u2018\u2018evolution\u2019\u2019 not a \u2018\u2018revolution\u2019\u2019 as one scholar put it (McDonnell, 2005)\u2014but added<br \/>\na harder edge of accountability. In a neat move of jujitsu, federal policymakers and advocacy groups simultaneously drew upon the existence of<br \/>\nstate action to claim legitimacy for federal reforms that built on top of<br \/>\nthem, but criticized the slow and uneven pace of state reforms to argue<br \/>\nthat more stringent federal measures were necessary.27 The result was No<br \/>\nChild Left Behind, which simultaneously deferred to states in the content<br \/>\nof the standards and the cut scores for success, but also created a series of<br \/>\nrequirements\u2014mandating annual tests in grades 3 through 8 and creating<br \/>\nan escalating series of sanctions for schools that did not improve\u2014that substantially increased federal requirements for states and schools. In the longer<br \/>\nview, by creating a movement of state reform, A Nation at Risk enabled the<br \/>\nfederal government to gradually expand its influence in a previously local<br \/>\nrealm by creating a state consensus (49 states had adopted standards by<br \/>\n2001) upon which the federal government could piggyback.<br \/>\nDiscussion and Conclusion<br \/>\nAmerican educational policy was transformed between 1980 and 2001.<br \/>\nStandards and accountability rose to the top of the state and federal political<br \/>\nagenda, long-standing cleavages between Democrats and Republicans diminished as the two parties united behind top-down reform, and long-standing traditions of local control gave way to unprecedented state and then federal<br \/>\ninvolvement. These changes were sparked by the emergence of a newly dominant paradigm, which emphasized schooling\u2019s economic importance, the need<br \/>\nfor across-the-board improvement, the responsibility of schools rather than society for tackling the reform challenges, and measurement of success by test<br \/>\nscores. This powerful paradigm sparked changes throughout the political landscape around education reform, raising the agenda status of the issue, bringing<br \/>\nin powerful actors who previously were uninterested in the issue, and setting<br \/>\nand delimiting the direction of the debate. At both the state and federal level,<br \/>\nit created new cleavages between political elites and advocacy groups demanding greater accountability and standardization from above, and teachers and<br \/>\ntheir representatives seeking to maintain greater autonomy and discretion at<br \/>\nthe school level. Over time, first states and then the federal government settled<br \/>\non standards-based reform as the vehicle for these changes; standards and<br \/>\naccountability were consistent with the new paradigm, and drew support<br \/>\nfrom left, center, and right, although not always for the same reasons.<br \/>\nThis idea-centered account can explain the puzzling aspects of these<br \/>\nchanges that are unexplained by other approaches. The shift to a postindustrial<br \/>\nMehta<br \/>\n314 Downloaded from http:\/\/aerj.aera.net at UNIV CALIFORNIA BERKELEY LIB on July 23, 2013<br \/>\neconomy, with an accompanying claim that individual, state, and national<br \/>\neconomic viability depended on improved educational performance, accounts for the increase in the attention devoted to education reform (Puzzle<br \/>\n1). The paradigm contained themes from the mainstream left and right:<br \/>\nfrom the left a desire to promote equity by increasing standards, particularly<br \/>\nin high poverty schools; from the right a sense that the system was averse<br \/>\nto change and required external pressure for reform. Both of these strands<br \/>\nwere captured in A Nation at Risk and in standards-based reform,28 making<br \/>\nthe paradigm and the policy attractive to elites on both sides of the political<br \/>\nspectrum (Puzzle 2). The key actors pushing standards-based reform varied<br \/>\nfrom case to case because they were all operating within a paradigm that<br \/>\ngave them a similar definition of the problem; what looks like theoretical<br \/>\nchaos from an actor-centered perspective looks relatively straightforward<br \/>\nfrom an ideational one (Puzzle 3). The combination of this coalition and<br \/>\na changed rhetorical climate that depicted teachers unions as defenders of<br \/>\nan increasingly defunct status quo effectively neutralized the unions\u2019 considerable material power, explaining why the reforms ran counter to the desires of<br \/>\nthe single strongest actors in the system (Puzzle 4). Finally, the new paradigm<br \/>\nexplains the institutional shifts that resulted in greater state and later federal<br \/>\ninvolvement (Puzzle 5). By emphasizing the economic effects of schooling,<br \/>\nthe new paradigm gave state legislators a stake in an arena that had been outside of their scope; and by setting a common direction for the debate, it created enough similarity among state reforms for the federal government to<br \/>\nextend its reach by building on these reforms.<br \/>\nThis argument fills gaps left by other accounts of these same changes.<br \/>\nMuch previous work has focused on the federal politics of education<br \/>\n(Cross, 2004; DeBray, 2006; Kosar, 2005; Manna, 2006; McGuinn, 2006),<br \/>\nwhile paying little empirical attention to the state origins of the reforms<br \/>\n(but see McDermott, 2011). The account presented here develops evidence<br \/>\non the states, showing how states with different political histories came to<br \/>\ntake similar approaches, which in turn enabled federal reforms. Previous accounts, particularly Manna\u2019s (2006), have shown how America\u2019s federal system provides opportunities for borrowing of educational policy between<br \/>\nlevels of government; but in their emphasis on institutional structures,<br \/>\nthey offer less of an account of the timing of the reforms or their substantive<br \/>\ncontent. In contrast, by focusing on how the emergence of a paradigm structured subsequent policy reform, this argument offers an explanation of why<br \/>\nthe reforms emerged when they did and why they took the particular substantive form that they did. Finally, previous accounts have emphasized<br \/>\nhow strategic politicians on both left and right moved to claim the center<br \/>\non educational policy (DeBray, 2006; Kosar, 2005) and have briefly alluded<br \/>\nto the historical context in which these shifts took place. The argument presented here moves the history of this changing context to center stage,<br \/>\nHow Paradigms Create Politics<br \/>\n315 Downloaded from http:\/\/aerj.aera.net at UNIV CALIFORNIA BERKELEY LIB on July 23, 2013<br \/>\noffering a theoretical account of exactly how and why the context shifted<br \/>\nsuch that accountability and federal control become mainstream policy<br \/>\npositions.<br \/>\nThis piece also seeks to contribute to the literature on ideas in politics by<br \/>\nclosely documenting how a new paradigm was able to reshape a variety of<br \/>\naspects of the social and political landscape, eventually resulting in new policy and major institutional shifts in responsibility. The new paradigm affected<br \/>\nthe content of what was being discussed, the agenda status of the issue, the<br \/>\nplayers involved, their standing to speak, and the venue in which the issue<br \/>\nwas debated. Paradigms create politics, and can explain major shifts not only<br \/>\nin what key policymakers think, but also in the social and political landscape<br \/>\nthat surrounds an issue.<br \/>\nThis perspective reflects a cultural ontology that both complements and<br \/>\nchallenges interest group approaches. It complements these perspectives in<br \/>\nthat it does not seek to deny that interest groups matter or that the nature of<br \/>\ndecision rules affects outcomes. But, at a deeper level, it challenges the<br \/>\nnotion that groups have preset \u2018\u2018interests\u2019\u2019 or that institutions have given<br \/>\nrealms of authority. Rather it suggests that the content of interests need to<br \/>\nbe defined, as do the scope of institutional responsibilities. Ideas are not<br \/>\nopposed to interests and institutions. Interests and institutions are ideas<br \/>\nabout what we should be for and who should decide what.<br \/>\nUnderstanding how paradigms shape politics illustrates concretely the way<br \/>\nin which a changing menu of ideas can recast the purposes and goals of<br \/>\ninterest groups and institutions.<br \/>\nFinally, understanding the causes and consequences of new paradigms<br \/>\ncan help to explain the vexing questions of \u2018\u2018path-shaping\u2019\u2019 change. Path<br \/>\ndependent forms of historical institutionalism have been critiqued as seeming to foreclose the potential for significant change, as actors\u2019 agency is constrained by historical choices often made decades ago (Clemens &amp; Cook,<br \/>\n1999). This account, by contrast, joins some recent institutionalist scholars<br \/>\n(Lieberman, 2002; Streeck &amp; Thelen 2005; Thelen, 2004) in emphasizing<br \/>\nhow a multiplicity of ideas, logics, or orders are always at play (Binder,<br \/>\n2007; Davies &amp; Binder, 2007), creating recurring opportunities for change.<br \/>\nOnce these diverse strands are linked together into a powerful master narrative, they can reverberate outwards, creating changes in the politics, policy,<br \/>\ninstitutional control, and substantive direction of entire policy arenas.<br \/>\nMehta<br \/>\n316 Downloaded from http:\/\/aerj.aera.net at UNIV CALIFORNIA BERKELEY LIB on July 23, 2013<br \/>\nNotes<br \/>\n1<br \/>\nThere is one important exception to this claim. The national American Federation of<br \/>\nTeachers (AFT), when led by Al Shanker, was for the most part supportive of standards<br \/>\nand accountability. Elsewhere I have argued that Shanker\u2019s support was also a by-product<br \/>\nof the paradigm created by A Nation at Risk (Mehta, in press-a). 2<br \/>\nThe paradigm was \u2018\u2018new\u2019\u2019 in the sense that it crystallized a master narrative that was<br \/>\ndifferent from what had come immediately before. At the same time, as I have argued elsewhere, the way in which the educational problem was defined here is quite similar to the<br \/>\nway it has been defined at other times in our nation\u2019s history (see Mehta, in press-a, in<br \/>\npress-b). It is also the case that the most recent paradigm resonated in part because it built<br \/>\nupon strands that had been developing in the period that preceded it, but gained its<br \/>\nimpact by bringing these strands together in a particularly forceful way. 3<br \/>\nTechnically, states could choose to opt out of the requirements of No Child Left<br \/>\nBehind by refusing the money that comes with federal support of education through<br \/>\nTitle I. While some states threatened to pull out, no state did so. 4<br \/>\nIt should be noted that the national AFT has shown greater support of standards and<br \/>\naccountability, due in large part to the leadership of Albert Shanker, although local AFT<br \/>\naffiliates have not been as supportive. 5<br \/>\nAs Paul Pierson (2003) has emphasized, rational choice theories are among the<br \/>\nmodes of political science explanation that employ a short time horizon, with the consequence of minimizing potentially more important longer term causes. 6<br \/>\nEvidence on Maryland, Michigan, and Utah comes from this study; on Kentucky and<br \/>\nparticularly Texas, see Toch (1991). 7<br \/>\nFor example, compare Skocpol (1979) to Rueschemeyer and Skocpol (1996).<br \/>\n8<br \/>\nOn the necessity of integrating the normative and the empirical, see Putnam (2002).<br \/>\n9<br \/>\nBaumgartner and Jones (1993) also discuss the effects of changing issue definition<br \/>\non politics\u2014the difference here is that this article seeks to more specifically map the different dimensions that are changed when a problem definition changes. 10See also Schattschneider (1960) and Baumgartner and Jones (1993). 11This view differs from other accounts of the policy process. It complements John<br \/>\nKingdon\u2019s (1984) well-known account of the way in which policy entrepreneurs link<br \/>\nthe problem, policy, and politics streams in key policy windows. Kingdon\u2019s account<br \/>\nAppendix<br \/>\nVariation Among States Chosen for Case Studies<br \/>\nState Utah Michigan Maryland<br \/>\nInitial test scores High Moderate High<br \/>\nInitial per pupil spending Low (lowest in the nation) Moderate High<br \/>\nMinority population Low High High<br \/>\nPolitical context Republican Mixed Democratic<br \/>\nLevel of local control Moderate High Low<br \/>\nFinance equity cases No Yes Yes<br \/>\nPolitical culture Moralistic Moralistic Individualistic<br \/>\nInitial state educational capacity Low High High<br \/>\nNote. Test scores, per pupil spending, and minority population are from the State Politics<br \/>\nand Policy Quarterly Database. They are measured as of 1988, before the movement to<br \/>\nstandards-based reform. Political culture is from Elazar (1984), and finance equity data<br \/>\ncomes from Reed (2001). Political context refers to control of the legislature and the governorship. Political context is for the 1990s, the period when the reforms took place.<br \/>\nClassifications of initial state capacity are based on interviews with my respondents.<br \/>\nHow Paradigms Create Politics<br \/>\n317 Downloaded from http:\/\/aerj.aera.net at UNIV CALIFORNIA BERKELEY LIB on July 23, 2013<br \/>\ndoes well to explain the politics of enactment in the short-term; the approach I have<br \/>\ndeveloped here explains why there is continuity in the agenda over the longer run and<br \/>\nhow the context is created in which actors make their short-term calculations. The<br \/>\nAdvocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) (Sabatier &amp;Jenkins-Smith, 1993) has some similarities in that it too is also concerned with actors and ideas, but this framework gives more<br \/>\nemphasis to the way that ideas in the problem space inspire, frame and delimit the positions actors\u2019 take, whereas ACF is more about actors using ideas to find allies and build<br \/>\ncoalitions. Baumgartner and Jones\u2019s (1993) punctuated equilibrium model is perhaps<br \/>\nthe closest to the argument developed here, and I build on their work, but this piece differs by specifically delineating the array of mechanisms through which new paradigms can<br \/>\nreshape politics. 12The 1994 reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act premised<br \/>\nTitle I aid on development of standards-based reform, but subsequent reports showed that<br \/>\nstates were uneven in their development of standards, and no money was ever taken<br \/>\naway.13Thus in total, this study considers four case studies of the movement to standardsbased reform, three at the state level, and one at the federal level. Increasing the number<br \/>\nof cases within the larger case study provides for greater confidence in the Assessment of<br \/>\ncausal inferences (King, Keohane, &amp; Verba, 1994). 14The other two were Charles A. Foster, who was the immediate past president of the<br \/>\nFoundation for Teaching Economics; and Annette Y. Kirk, wife of conservative intellectual<br \/>\nRussell Kirk, whose affiliation at the time was given as \u2018\u2018Kirk Associates.\u2019\u2019 15As they write, \u2018\u2018We conclude that declines in educational performance are in large<br \/>\npart the result of disturbing inadequacies in the way the educational process itself is often<br \/>\nconducted.\u2019\u2019 While the report repeatedly mentioned the importance of a wide variety of<br \/>\nstakeholders, including parents, students, unions, business groups and legislatures, its<br \/>\ncall for excellence focused primarily on schools themselves as the prime enforcers of<br \/>\na new set of expectations (National Commission on Educational Excellence, 1983). 16Given the growing conflation of educational and economic ends, the share of the<br \/>\naddresses devoted to education would grow even further if discussion of schooling in<br \/>\nthe sections on economic development were included in the count. (To allow for comparability over time, the measure used in the charts and figure is limited to the sections that<br \/>\nare devoted only to education, excluding mentions of education in the sections on the<br \/>\neconomy.) Roughly 30% of the 2000 address, for example, was devoted to education if<br \/>\nmentions of education in the economic development section are included. 17This address actually came shortly before the publication of A Nation at Risk in<br \/>\nApril of 1983. My full argument in a book in press (Mehta, in press-a), which is necessarily<br \/>\nabridged here, suggests that while the agenda status of education showed a sharp and discontinuous change after A Nation at Risk, the change in the problem definition was happening more gradually. Specifically, changes to the economy made it clear to a wide<br \/>\nvariety of analysts that schooling would become more important economically; A<br \/>\nNation at Risk was the report that crystallized this message and gave it much wider currency, but it was not the first to identify these developments. 18While it is of course true that economic mobility has always been one of the major<br \/>\npurposes of schooling, the period since A Nation at Risk has shown an elevation of the<br \/>\neconomic purpose over the other purposes of schooling. 19\u2018\u2018Left\u2019\u2019 and \u2018\u2018right\u2019\u2019 here are broad terms that encompass elected officials, advocacy<br \/>\ngroups, and others on each side of the American political spectrum who came to support<br \/>\nthe standards movement for different reasons. This was a coalition of mainstream liberals<br \/>\nand conservatives in the middle against those further to the left and right. In contrast to the<br \/>\nmajority coalition, there were a smaller number of actors further to the left who opposed<br \/>\nthe standards movement because it held students accountable without supplying sufficient<br \/>\nopportunities to learn, and a similar group on the far right that opposed the standards<br \/>\nmovement for overextending state and federal reach into local schools. 20Beginning shortly after A Nation at Risk, the state developed a core curriculum<br \/>\n(1984); norm-referenced tests for all 5th, 8th, and 11th graders (1990); and criterionreferenced tests (1990s) for a sample of students.<br \/>\nMehta<br \/>\n318 Downloaded from http:\/\/aerj.aera.net at UNIV CALIFORNIA BERKELEY LIB on July 23, 2013<br \/>\n21In Stern\u2019s telling, the primary problem was resources; accountability was a way of<br \/>\ndeferring legislative responsibility. Politicians \u2018\u2018have it backward,\u2019\u2019 she said in her yearly<br \/>\naddress to the MSTA in November of 1989. \u2018\u2018When they tell us that there\u2019s no more money<br \/>\nfor education, we should tell them they\u2019re not really trying and that they should try harder\u2019\u2019<br \/>\n(Merwin, 1989). 22The Baltimore Sun wrote that the report\u2019s recommendations were \u2018\u2018so commonsensical they are bound to be controversial. Educators, after all, are often distinguished by<br \/>\nprofessional arrogance,\u2019\u2019 which has \u2018\u2018put them increasingly at odds with the politicians<br \/>\nwho hold the purse strings.\u2019\u2019 The Evening Sun picked up on the resources theme, arguing<br \/>\nthat \u2018\u2018how money is spent can be as important as how much is spent.\u2019\u2019 See The Baltimore<br \/>\nSun (1989, p. 18A), The Evening Sun (1989, p. A20), The Washington Post (1989, p. A20). 23It also provides an additional case for understanding why left and right converged<br \/>\n(Puzzle 2), why a variety of actors supported reform (Puzzle 3), and why unions were<br \/>\nunable to defeat it (Puzzle 4). 24The conventional understanding is that Bush initiated the meeting; Manna (2006)<br \/>\nargued that the impetus came from the governors. 25For Bush in particular, he inherited a state movement that was already under way:<br \/>\nthe Texas school accountability system, which was put in place shortly after A Nation at<br \/>\nRisk and which Bush continued when he became governor in 1994 (Rudalevige, 2003,<br \/>\np. 50, note 28). 26Of the two major unions, the NEA has been particularly publicly opposed to<br \/>\naccountability; the story of the AFT is more complicated. For details, see Koppich (2005). 27A 1999 report from the Citizens\u2019 Commission on Civil Rights sharply criticized the<br \/>\nlack of implementation of the 1994 ESEA. Their analysis revealed \u2018\u2018wide variance in the<br \/>\ndegree to which states have complied with the new Title I,\u2019\u2019 with some states still resistant<br \/>\nto adopting standards-based reform. Arguing that these states were subverting the intention of the law, the Commission noted, \u2018\u2018Many states and local officials have received the<br \/>\nimpression that the new Title I is largely a deregulation law that will free them from bothersome federal conditions, and have failed to understand that the tradeoff in the law is<br \/>\nhigher standards and accountability for results\u2019\u2019 (Yu &amp; Taylor, 1999). 28Standards-based reform was thus a centrist policy vehicle that appealed to both left<br \/>\nand right. Other policy proposals, particularly market-based approaches, were also consistent with some of the assumptions of A Nation at Risk (as well as a broader conservative<br \/>\nshift in the political economy), but were not able to win as widespread support as standards because they drew supporters from the right but were opposed by portions of the<br \/>\nleft. At both the state and federal levels, conservatives like Engler and George W. Bush jettisoned market-based proposals in favor of standards-based ones in order to pick up<br \/>\nenough support from the left to assure passage.<br \/>\nReferences<br \/>\nThe Baltimore Sun. (1989, August 23). Quality control in education.<br \/>\nBaumgartner, F., &amp; Jones, B. (1993). Agendas and instability in American politics.<br \/>\nChicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.<br \/>\nBeland, D. (2005). Ideas and social policy: An institutionalist perspective. Social<br \/>\nPolicy and Administration, 39(1), 1\u201318.<br \/>\nBeland, D., &amp; Cox, R. (2010). Ideas and politics in social science research. Oxford,<br \/>\nUK: Oxford University Press.<br \/>\nBell, T. (1988). The thirteenth man: A Reagan cabinet memoir. New York, NY: Free<br \/>\nPress.<br \/>\nBerman, S. (1998). The social democratic moment: Ideas and politics in the making of<br \/>\ninterwar Europe. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.<br \/>\nBerman, S. (2001). Ideas, norms and culture in political analysis. Comparative<br \/>\nPolitics, 33(2), 231\u2013250.<br \/>\nHow Paradigms Create Politics<br \/>\n319 Downloaded from http:\/\/aerj.aera.net at UNIV CALIFORNIA BERKELEY LIB on July 23, 2013<br \/>\nBinder, A. (1993). Constructing racial rhetoric: Media depictions of harm in heavy<br \/>\nmetal and rap music. American Sociological Review, 58(6), 753\u2013767.<br \/>\nBinder, A. (2007). For love and money: Organizations\u2019 creative responses to multiple<br \/>\nenvironmental logics. Theoretical Sociology, 36, 547\u2013571.<br \/>\nBlyth, M. (2002). Great transformations: Economic ideas and institutional change in<br \/>\nthe twentieth century. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.<br \/>\nBoyd, W., &amp; Kerchner, C. (Eds.) (1988). The politics of excellence and choice in education. New York: Falmer Press.<br \/>\nBoyd, W., Plank, D., &amp; Sykes, G. (2000). Teachers unions in hard times. In T.<br \/>\nLoveless, (Ed.), Conflicting missions?: Teachers unions and educational reform<br \/>\n(pp. 174\u2013210). Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.<br \/>\nCampbell, J. (2002). Ideas, politics, and public policy. Annual Review of Sociology,<br \/>\n28, 21\u201338.<br \/>\nClemens, E., &amp; Cook, J. (1999). Politics and institutionalism: Explaining durability and<br \/>\nchange. Annual Review of Sociology, 25, 441\u2013466.<br \/>\nCross, C. (2004). Political education: National policy comes of age. New York, NY:<br \/>\nTeachers College Press.<br \/>\nDavies, S., &amp; Binder, A. (2007). Importing school forms across societal domains:<br \/>\nFrames, hybrids and institutional effects (Working Paper). San Diego, CA:<br \/>\nDepartment of Sociology, University of California.<br \/>\nDeBray, E. (2006). Politics, ideology and education: Federal policy during the Clinton<br \/>\nand Bush administrations. New York, NY: Teachers College Press.<br \/>\nDeBray-Pelot, E., &amp; McGuinn, P. (2009). The new politics of education: Analyzing the<br \/>\nfederal education policy landscape in the post-NCLB era. Educational Policy,<br \/>\n23(1), 15\u201342.<br \/>\nDerthick, M., &amp; Quirk, P. (1985). The politics of deregulation. Washington, DC:<br \/>\nBrookings Institution.<br \/>\nDobbin, F. (1994). Forging industrial policy: The United States, Britain and France in<br \/>\nthe railway age. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.<br \/>\nEdmonds, R. (1979). Effective schools for the urban poor. Educational Leadership,<br \/>\n37(1), 15\u201327.<br \/>\nElazar, D. (1984). American federalism: A view from the states. New York, NY: Harper<br \/>\n&amp; Row.<br \/>\nElmore, R. (2004). School reform from the inside out. Cambridge, MA: Harvard<br \/>\nEducation Press.<br \/>\nThe Evening Sun. (1989, August 24). Accountable schools.<br \/>\nFirestone, W. (1990). Continuity and incrementalism after all: State responses to the<br \/>\nexcellence movement. In J. Murphy (Ed.), The educational reform movement<br \/>\nof the 1980s: Perspectives and cases (pp. 143\u2013166). Berkeley, CA: McCutchan.<br \/>\nFiske, E. (1983, April 27). Commission on education warns \u2018\u2018tide of mediocrity\u2019\u2019 imperils U.S. New York Times.<br \/>\nFuhrman, S. (1999). The new accountability (CPRE Policy Brief). Philadelphia, PA:<br \/>\nUniversity of Pennsylvania.<br \/>\nFuhrman, S., ed. (2001). From the Capitol to the classroom. Chicago, IL: National<br \/>\nSociety for the Study of Education.<br \/>\nGinsberg, R., &amp; Wimpelberg, R. (1987, Winter). Education changes by commission:<br \/>\nAttempting \u2018\u2018trickle down reform.\u2019\u2019 Educational Assessment and Policy<br \/>\nAnalysis, 9, 344\u2013360.<br \/>\nGoldberg, M., &amp; Traiman, S. (2001). Why business backs education standards. In<br \/>\nD. Ravitch (Ed.), Brookings papers on educational policy (pp. 75\u2013129).<br \/>\nWashington, DC: Brookings Institution.<br \/>\nMehta<br \/>\n320 Downloaded from http:\/\/aerj.aera.net at UNIV CALIFORNIA BERKELEY LIB on July 23, 2013<br \/>\nGoldstein, J., &amp; Keohane, R. (1993). Ideas and foreign policy: An analytical framework. In J. Goldstein &amp; R. Keohane (Eds.), Ideas and foreign policy: Beliefs, institutions and political change. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.<br \/>\nGraham, P., &amp; Gordon, D. (2003). A nation reformed? American education 20 years<br \/>\nafter A Nation at Risk. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Education Press.<br \/>\nGrubb, W. N., &amp; Lazerson, M. (2004). The education gospel: The economic power of<br \/>\nschooling. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.<br \/>\nGuthrie, J. (1981). Minimum competency testing: A brief history. The Reading<br \/>\nTeacher, 34(7), 874\u2013876.<br \/>\nGuthrie, J., &amp; Springer, M. (2004). A nation at risk revisited: Did \u2018\u2018wrong\u2019\u2019 reasoning<br \/>\nresult in \u2018\u2018right\u2019\u2019 results? At what cost? Peabody Journal of Education, 79(1), 7\u201335.<br \/>\nHall, P. (1993). Policy paradigms, social learning, and the state: The case of economic<br \/>\npolicymaking in Britain. Comparative Politics, 29, 275\u2013296.<br \/>\nHaney, J. P. (1999, May 31). Setting school standards\u2014Utahns looking at ways to hold<br \/>\nteachers, students accountable. The Deseret News.<br \/>\nHess, F., &amp; McGuinn, P. (2002). Seeking the mantle of \u2018\u2018opportunity\u2019\u2019: Presidential politics and the educational metaphor, 1964-2000. Educational Policy, 16(1), 72\u201395.<br \/>\nJennings, J. (1998). Why national standards and tests? Politics and the quest for better<br \/>\nschools. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.<br \/>\nKapos, K. (1999, October 21). Testing plan irks teachers. The Salt Lake Tribune.<br \/>\nKing, G., Keohane, R., &amp; Verba, S. (1994). Designing social inquiry: Scientific inference in qualitative research. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.<br \/>\nKingdon, J. (1984). Agendas, alternatives, and public policies. Boston: Little, Brown.<br \/>\nKirst, M., &amp; Wirt, F. (1982). Schools in conflict. Berkeley, CA: McCutchan.<br \/>\nKoppich, J. (2005). A tale of two approaches\u2014The AFT, the NEA, and NCLB. Peabody<br \/>\nJournal of Education, 80(2), 137\u2013155.<br \/>\nKosar, K. (2005). Failing grades: The federal politics of education standards. Boulder,<br \/>\nCO: Lynne Rienner.<br \/>\nKuhn, T. S. (1962). The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago, IL: University of<br \/>\nChicago Press.<br \/>\nLally, K. (1989, August 23). Md. task force proposes public school rating system. The<br \/>\nBaltimore Sun.<br \/>\nLamont, M., &amp; MolnA\u02dcr, V. (2002). The study of boundaries in the social sciences.<br \/>\nnnual Review of Sociology 28, 167\u2013195.<br \/>\nLegro, J. (2000). The transformation of policy ideas. American Journal of Political<br \/>\nScience, 44, 419\u2013432.<br \/>\nLieberman, R. (2002). Ideas, institutions and political order: explaining political<br \/>\nchange. American Political Science Review, 96(4), 697\u2013712.<br \/>\nMahoney, J. (1999). Nominal, ordinal, and narrative appraisal in macrocausal analysis. American Journal of Sociology, 104(4), 1154\u20131196.<br \/>\nManna, P. (2006). Schools in: Federalism and the national education agenda.<br \/>\nWashington, DC: Georgetown University Press.<br \/>\nMawhinney, H., &amp; Lugg, C. (2001). Introduction: Interest groups in United States education. Educational Policy, 15, 3\u201311.<br \/>\nMazzoni, T. (1995). State policy-making and school reform: Influences and influentials. In J. Scribner &amp; D. Layton (Eds.), The study of educational politics (pp.<br \/>\n53\u201373). Washington, DC: Falmer.<br \/>\nMcDermott, K. (2011). High stakes reform: The politics of educational accountability.<br \/>\nWashington, DC: Georgetown University Press.<br \/>\nMcDonnell, L. (2005). No Child Left Behind and the federal role in education:<br \/>\nEvolution or revolution? Peabody Journal of Education, 80(2), 19\u201338.<br \/>\nHow Paradigms Create Politics<br \/>\n321 Downloaded from http:\/\/aerj.aera.net at UNIV CALIFORNIA BERKELEY LIB on July 23, 2013<br \/>\nMcGuinn, P. (2006). No Child Left Behind and the transformation of federal education policy, 1965-2005. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.<br \/>\nMcGuinn, P. (2009). Education policy from the Great Society to 1980: The expansion<br \/>\nand institutionalization of the federal role in schools. In B. Glenn &amp; S. Teles<br \/>\n(Eds.), Conservatism and American political development. New York, NY:<br \/>\nOxford University Press.<br \/>\nMehta, J. (2010). From \u2018\u2018whether\u2019\u2019 to \u2018\u2018how\u2019\u2019: The varied roles of ideas in politics. In<br \/>\nD. Beland &amp; R. Cox (Eds.), How ideas matter: Reframing political research.<br \/>\nOxford, UK: Oxford University Press.<br \/>\nMehta, J. (in press-a). The allure of order: High hopes, dashed expectations and the<br \/>\ntroubled quest to remake American schooling. New York, NY: Oxford<br \/>\nUniversity Press.<br \/>\nMehta, J. (in press-b). The penetration of technocratic logic into the educational field:<br \/>\nRationalizing schooling from the progressives to the present. Teachers College<br \/>\nRecord.<br \/>\nMeier, D. (2002). In schools we trust: Creating communities of learning in schools in<br \/>\nan era of testing and standardization. Boston, MA: Beacon.<br \/>\nMerwin, J. (1989, January 4). Cut talk, boost funds, teachers says. Baltimore Evening<br \/>\nSun.<br \/>\nMeyer, J., &amp; Rowan, B. (1977). Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as<br \/>\nmyth and ceremony. American Journal of Sociology, 83(2), 340\u2013363.<br \/>\nMichigan School Finance Commission, E. Harden, &amp; P. Runkel (Cochairs). (1987).<br \/>\nEducational quality in the 21st century. Lansing: The Commission.<br \/>\nMurphy, J. (1990). The educational reform movement of the 1980s: Perspectives and<br \/>\ncases. Berkeley, CA: McCutchan.<br \/>\nNational Commission on Excellence in Education. (1983). A nation at risk: The<br \/>\nimperative for educational reform. Washington, DC: Author.<br \/>\nOdden, A., &amp; Marsh, D. (1990). Local responses to the 1980s state education reforms:<br \/>\nNew patterns of local and state interaction. In J. Murphy (Ed.), The educational<br \/>\nreform movement of the 1980s: Perspectives and cases (pp. 167\u2013186). Berkeley,<br \/>\nCA: McCutchan.<br \/>\nOrren, K., &amp; Skowronek, S. (2004). The search for American political development.<br \/>\nCambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.<br \/>\nPeterson, P., &amp; West, M. (2003). No Child Left Behind? The politics and practice of<br \/>\nschool accountability. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.<br \/>\nPierson, P. (2003). Big, slow-moving and.invisible: Macrosocial processes in the<br \/>\nstudy of comparative politics. In J. Mahoney &amp; D. Rueschemeyer (Eds.),<br \/>\nComparative historical analysis in the social sciences (pp. 177\u2013198).<br \/>\nCambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.<br \/>\nPutnam, H. (2002). The collapse of the fact-value dichotomy and other essays.<br \/>\nCambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.<br \/>\nReed, D. (2001). On equal terms: The constitutional politics of equal opportunity.<br \/>\nPrinceton, NJ: Princeton University Press.<br \/>\nRieder, J. (1985). Canarsie: The Jews and Italians of Brooklyn against liberalism.<br \/>\nCambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.<br \/>\nRoth, W., &amp; Mehta, J. (2002). The Rashomon effect: Combining positivist and interpretivist approaches in the analysis of contested events. Sociological Methods<br \/>\nand Research, 31(2), 131\u2013173.<br \/>\nRowan, B. (2006). The institutional environment and instructional practice: Changing<br \/>\npatterns of guidance and control in public education. In H. Meyer &amp; B. Rowan<br \/>\n(Eds.), The new institutionalism in education. Albany: State University of New<br \/>\nYork Press.<br \/>\nMehta<br \/>\n322 Downloaded from http:\/\/aerj.aera.net at UNIV CALIFORNIA BERKELEY LIB on July 23, 2013<br \/>\nRowan, T., Representative. (1999, December 3). Task force\u2019s goal is to aid Utah students. The Deseret News.<br \/>\nRudalevige, A. (2003). Forging a congressional compromise. In P. Peterson &amp; M. West<br \/>\n(Eds.), No Child Left Behind? The politics and practice of school accountability<br \/>\n(pp. 23\u201354). Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.<br \/>\nRueschemeyer, D., &amp; Skocpol, T. (1996). States, social knowledge and the origins of<br \/>\nmodern social policies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.<br \/>\nSabatier, P., &amp; Jenkins-Smith, H. (1993). Policy change and learning: An advocacy<br \/>\ncoalition approach. Boulder, CO: Westview.<br \/>\nSchattschneider, E. E. (1935). Politics, pressure and the tariff. New York, NY: Prentice<br \/>\nHall.<br \/>\nSchattschneider, E. E. (1960). The semi-sovereign people: A realist\u2019s guide to democracy in America. New York, NY: Holt.<br \/>\nSchultz, T. (1963). The economic value of education. New York, NY: Columbia<br \/>\nUniversity Press.<br \/>\nSikkink, K. (1993). The power of principled ideas: Human rights policies in the<br \/>\nUnited States and Western Europe. In J. Goldstein &amp; R. Keohane (Eds.), Ideas<br \/>\nand foreign policy: Beliefs, institutions and political change (pp. 139\u2013170).<br \/>\nIthaca, NY: Cornell University Press.<br \/>\nSkocpol, T. (1979). States and social revolutions. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge<br \/>\nUniversity Press.<br \/>\nSmith, M., &amp; O\u2019Day, J. (1991). Systemic school reform. In S. Fuhrman &amp; B. Malen<br \/>\n(Eds.), The politics of curriculum and testing (pp. 233\u2013267). Philadelphia, PA:<br \/>\nFalmer.<br \/>\nSomers, M., &amp; Block, F. (2005). From poverty to perversity: Ideas, markets, and institutions over 200 years of welfare debate. American Sociological Review, 70(2),<br \/>\n260\u2013287.<br \/>\nSouthern Regional Education Board. (1981). The need for quality. Atlanta, GA:<br \/>\nAuthor.<br \/>\nState Board of Education. (1984). Action goals of Utah State Board of Education.<br \/>\nArchival document.<br \/>\nSteensland, B. (2006). Cultural categories and the American welfare state: The case of<br \/>\nguaranteed income policy. American Journal of Sociology, 111(5), 1273\u20131326.<br \/>\nStreeck, W., &amp; Thelen, K. (Eds.). (2005). Beyond continuity: Institutional change in<br \/>\nadvanced political economies. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.<br \/>\nThelen, K. (2004). How institutions evolve: The political economy of skills in<br \/>\nGermany, Britain, the United States and Japan. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge<br \/>\nUniversity Press.<br \/>\nThelen, K., &amp; Steinmo, S. (1992). Historical institutionalism in comparative politics. In<br \/>\nS. Steinmo, K. Thelen, &amp; F. Longstreth (Eds.), Structuring politics: Historical institutionalism in comparative analysis. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University<br \/>\nPress.<br \/>\nThomas, C., &amp; Herbenar, R. (1991). Nationalizing of interest groups and lobbying in<br \/>\nthe states. In A. Cigler &amp; B. Loomis (Eds.), Interest group politics (3rd ed., pp. 63\u2013<br \/>\n80). Washington, DC: CQ Press.<br \/>\nToch, T. (1991). In the name of excellence: The struggle to reform the nation\u2019s schools,<br \/>\nwhy it\u2019s failing, and what should be done. New York, NY: Oxford University<br \/>\nPress.<br \/>\nToomer-Cook, J. (1999a, October 21). Educators flay standardized tests. The Deseret<br \/>\nNews.<br \/>\nToomer-Cook, J. (1999b, May 11). Education group talks roles, goals. The Deseret<br \/>\nNews.<br \/>\nHow Paradigms Create Politics<br \/>\n323 Downloaded from http:\/\/aerj.aera.net at UNIV CALIFORNIA BERKELEY LIB on July 23, 2013<br \/>\nToomer-Cook, J. (1999c, September 7). Schools must do better\u2014or else? The Deseret<br \/>\nNews.<br \/>\nTyack, D., &amp; Cuban, L. (1995). Tinkering toward utopia: A century of public school<br \/>\nreform. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.<br \/>\nVergari, S. (1996). Policy crisis and policy change: Toward a theory of crisis policymaking (PhD dissertation). Lansing: Michigan State University.<br \/>\nVinovskis, M. (1999). The road to Charlottesville. Retrieved from http:\/\/www.negp<br \/>\n.gov\/reports\/negp30.pdf<br \/>\nThe Washington Post. (1989, August 26). A new way to judge schools.<br \/>\nWeir, M. (1992). Politics and jobs. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.<br \/>\nWells, A. S. (2009). \u2018\u2018Our children\u2019s burden\u2019\u2019: A history of federal education policies<br \/>\nthat ask (now require) our public schools to solve societal inequality. In<br \/>\nM. Rebell &amp; J. Wolff (Eds.), NCLB at the crossroads. New York, NY: Teachers<br \/>\nCollege Press.<br \/>\nYin, R. K. (1994). Case study research: Design and methods. Thousand Oaks, CA:<br \/>\nSage.<br \/>\nYu, C. M., &amp; Taylor, W. L. (1999). Title I in midstream: The fight to improve schools for<br \/>\npoor kids. Washington, DC: Citizens\u2019 Commission on Civil Rights.<br \/>\nManuscript received February 8, 2012<br \/>\nFinal revision received September 7, 2012<br \/>\nAccepted October 18, 2012<br \/>\nMehta<br \/>\n324 Downloaded from http:\/\/aerj.aera.net at UNIV CALIFORNIA BERKELEY LIB on July 23, 2013<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>http:\/\/aerj.aera.net Journal American Educational Research http:\/\/aer.sagepub.com\/content\/50\/2\/285 The online version of this article can be found at: DOI: 10.3102\/0002831212471417 Am Educ Res J 2013 50: 285\u2026<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[9033,7586,1386,7589,9034,9031,7587,7588,7584,7585,9032],"tags":[8809,7838,8811,8808,8813,8807,8806,8814,8810,8812],"class_list":["post-107105","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-assignment-help-uae","category-best-dissertation-writing-service-in-australia","category-best-research-paper-writing-services-in-usa","category-capstone-project-writing-service","category-cheap-essay-writing-services-china","category-essay-writing-service-usa","category-legitimate-phd-dissertation-writing-services-usa","category-term-paper-writing-service","category-thesis-writing-service-in-canada","category-uae-best-dissertation-writing-help-service","category-write-my-essay-australia","tag-best-master-thesis-writing-service","tag-best-thesis-writing-services","tag-cheap-thesis-writing-services","tag-master-thesis-help","tag-master-thesis-writing-service","tag-thesis-help-online-free","tag-thesis-writing-help-online","tag-thesis-writing-services-cost","tag-thesis-writing-services-near-me","tag-thesis-writing-services-reviews"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/107105","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=107105"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/107105\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=107105"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=107105"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=107105"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}