{"id":114181,"date":"2022-11-30T05:16:56","date_gmt":"2022-11-30T05:16:56","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/nursingstudybay.com\/?p=114181"},"modified":"2022-11-30T05:16:58","modified_gmt":"2022-11-30T05:16:58","slug":"econ-100a-microeconomics","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/econ-100a-microeconomics\/","title":{"rendered":"Econ 100A: Microeconomics"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Econ 100A: Microeconomics<br \/>\n\u201cMidterm 3\u201d homework exercise<br \/>\nJim Campbell<br \/>\nUniversity of California, Berkeley<br \/>\nDue by Dec. 2nd, 2022<br \/>\n11.59pm<br \/>\n\u0088 Please complete the assignment on your own paper and scan and upload to<br \/>\nGradescope. As part of your submission, you must indicate where on your<br \/>\nscan to find each answer.<br \/>\n\u0088 You must handwrite (not type) your answers, unless you have a specific DSP<br \/>\naccommodation that allows typing.<br \/>\n\u0088 You may discuss the homework with other students in groups, but each person<br \/>\nmust upload their own work, in their own words, in their own handwriting.<br \/>\n\u0088 You may not collaborate at large scale (i.e. on Ed Discussion, Discord etc.)<br \/>\nand you may not get \u2018professional\u2019 help (i.e. from Jim, the SLC etc.) with<br \/>\nthe specific questions on the exam. I am asking you to use this opportunity<br \/>\nto demonstrate your own knowledge and understanding of the material.<br \/>\n1<br \/>\nEcon 1, Fall 2022 | \u201cMidterm 3\u201d Jim Campbell | UC Berkeley<br \/>\n1. Consider a two player, simultaneous move game. The strategies available to each player and<br \/>\npayoffs are shown in the following matrix form:<br \/>\nPlayer 1<br \/>\nPlayer 2<br \/>\nL C R<br \/>\nT 6, 4 5, 2 8, 5<br \/>\nM 4, 4 9, 3 5, 9<br \/>\nB 7, 5 4, 4 5, 2<br \/>\nGame 5<br \/>\na) Find and write down the Nash equilibria in pure strategies, if any exist.<br \/>\nb) Say that instead of being a simultaneous move game this game had been sequential. First<br \/>\nplayer 1 will choose a strategy and then player 2 will observe the choice made by player<br \/>\n1 and choose a strategy. The full structure of the game, including all payoffs, is common<br \/>\nknowledge to both players. Sketch a game tree to represent the extensive form of this<br \/>\ngame. Find and write down the subgame perfect Nash equilibria.<br \/>\n2. In this question we will combine a very simplified model of an externality that has long-lasting<br \/>\nimpacts with the model of discounted utility that we learned in our game theory topic (sample nursing essay examples by the best nursing assignment writing service). Consider<br \/>\na hypothetical environmental externality: produced as the byproduct of industrial activity, each<br \/>\nunit of emission of a pollutant that is emitted once, today, causes $10 of external harm to society<br \/>\neach and every year, starting immediately, forever. Let\u2019s say that policymakers apply a discount<br \/>\nfactor of \u03b4 \u2208 (0, 1) to future gains and losses, in an analog of the discounted utility model except<br \/>\nfor cash payoffs rather than utilities.<br \/>\nWhat would the socially efficient Pigouvian tax on the emission of this pollutant be if we applied<br \/>\na discount factor of (i) \u03b4 = 0.5, (ii) \u03b4 = 0.9, and (iii) \u03b4 = 0.99? Give an intuitive explanation<br \/>\nof how to interpret the parameter \u03b4 in this context, and explain precisely but in simple terms<br \/>\nwhat the goal and effect of the Pigouvian tax would be.<br \/>\n3. Consider a model of Cournot duopoly. Two firms produce an identical product. The inverse<br \/>\ndemand function for the product is given by p = 60 \u2212 y, where y = y1 + y2 is the sum of the<br \/>\nquantity produced by the two firms. Production costs are zero for both firms.<br \/>\na) Find the quantity produced by each firm in the Nash equilibrium of this game. Find the<br \/>\nprice of the product and the profit of each firm.<br \/>\nb) Now say that marketing guru Jim has a proposal for firm 1. He would be able to convince<br \/>\npeople that the two firms\u2019 products were in fact slightly different from each other, so that<br \/>\nthe amount produced by each firm would not impact the price of the other\u2019s product<br \/>\nas much as it did before. The inverse demand function for each product would become<br \/>\np1 = 60 \u2212 y1 \u2212<br \/>\n1<br \/>\n2<br \/>\ny2 and p2 = 60 \u2212 y2 \u2212<br \/>\n1<br \/>\n2<br \/>\ny1. What is the most that firm 1 would be willing<br \/>\nto pay Jim to do this? Show your work and explain in a few sentences what you did to<br \/>\nfind your answer.<br \/>\n2<br \/>\nEcon 1, Fall 2022 | \u201cMidterm 3\u201d Jim Campbell | UC Berkeley<br \/>\n4. A profit-maximizing monopolist produces a good and sells it to three consumers, A, B and C.<br \/>\nIt has zero costs. The consumers have inverse demand curves given by<br \/>\npA = 10 \u2212 qA, (1)<br \/>\npB = 12 \u2212 2qB, (2)<br \/>\npC = 4 \u2212<br \/>\n1<br \/>\n2<br \/>\nqC. (3)<br \/>\na) If consumer B had been the only consumer and the monopolist had to set a single, uniform<br \/>\nprice for its product, what price would it choose and how many units would it sell? What<br \/>\nwould be the socially efficient price and quantity?<br \/>\nThe monopolist has decided to price its good using a two part tariff. It knows that it has three<br \/>\nconsumers, and it knows exactly what the demand curve is for each one.<br \/>\nb) Say that the monopolist could tell the consumers apart and set a personalized two part<br \/>\ntariff for each of them. What two part tariff would it set for each consumer?<br \/>\nc) Say that the monopolist cannot tell the three consumers apart and has to set just a single<br \/>\ntwo part tariff that all three consumers can then decide whether or not to pay. What two<br \/>\npart tariff would it set? Explain your answer.<br \/>\n3<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Econ 100A: Microeconomics \u201cMidterm 3\u201d homework exercise Jim Campbell University of California, Berkeley Due by Dec. 2nd, 2022 11.59pm \u0088 Please complete the assignment on\u2026<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1393],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-114181","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-essay-writing-service"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/114181","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=114181"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/114181\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=114181"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=114181"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=114181"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}