Capstones, Theses and
\nDissertations
\n2018
\nBelief perseverance: The staying power of
\nconfession evidence<\/p>\n
TABLE OF CONTENTS
\nPage
\nLIST OF FIGURES ……………………………………………………………………………………… v
\nLIST OF TABLES……………………………………………………………………………………….. vi
\nACKNOWLEDGMENTS …………………………………………………………………………….. vii
\nABSTRACT\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026……………………………………………………… viii
\nCHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………………… 1
\nError and Bias………………………………………………………………………………………… 2
\nBelief Perseverance…………………………………………………………………………………. 3
\nThe Power of Confession Evidence…………………………………………………………… 5
\nAmbiguity ………………………………………………………………………………………… 7
\nCommitment …………………………………………………………………………………….. 7
\nResearch Overview and Hypotheses………………………………………………………….. 8
\nCHAPTER 2. METHOD ………………………………………………………………………………. 10
\nPower Analysis ………………………………………………………………………………………. 10
\nParticipants…………………………………………………………………………………………….. 10
\nDesign …………………………………………………………………………………………………… 11
\nCrime Report………………………………………………………………………………………….. 11
\nMeasures……………………………………………………………………………………………….. 12
\nGuilt Judgments………………………………………………………………………………… 12
\nPerceptions of Impartiality………………………………………………………………….. 12
\nManipulation Check…………………………………………………………………………… 12
\nAttention Check ………………………………………………………………………………… 13
\nSuspicion Check………………………………………………………………………………… 13
\nScrambled Anagrams…………………………………………………………………………. 14
\nProcedures……………………………………………………………………………………………… 14
\nCHAPTER 3. ANALYSES …………………………………………………………………………… 16
\nPreliminary Analyses………………………………………………………………………………. 16
\nDescriptive Statistics………………………………………………………………………….. 16
\nCommitment Manipulation Check……………………………………………………….. 16
\nConfession Timing Manipulation Check………………………………………………. 16
\nAttention Check ………………………………………………………………………………… 17
\nSuspicion Check………………………………………………………………………………… 17
\nAnalytic Plan………………………………………………………………………………………….. 17
\nModel 1: Total Effect of Confession Timing on Phase 2 Guilt Judgments… 18
\nModel 2: Belief Perseverance Effect ……………………………………………………. 19
\nPath a: Confession Effect……………………………………………………………………. 19
\niv
\nPath b: Judgment Stability ………………………………………………………………….. 20
\nPath a \u00d7 b: Belief Perseverance …………………………………………………………… 20
\nPath c: Adding Confession Evidence and Procedural Effects………………….. 20
\nModeration of Belief Perseverance by Commitment………………………………. 22
\nMain Analyses ……………………………………………………………………………………….. 22
\nModel 1: Total Effect of Confession Timing…………………………………………. 22
\nModel 2: Belief Perseverance Effect ……………………………………………………. 23
\nPath a: Confession Effect……………………………………………………………………. 24
\nPath b: Judgment Stability ………………………………………………………………….. 24
\nPath a \u00d7 b: Belief Perseverance …………………………………………………………… 25
\nPath c: Adding Confession Evidence and Procedural Effects………………….. 25
\nPath a \u00d7 b + c: Total Effect of Confession Evidence………………………………. 25
\nModeration of Belief Perseverance by Commitment………………………………. 26
\nCHAPTER 4. DISCUSSION…………………………………………………………………………. 27
\nBelief Perseverance…………………………………………………………………………………. 27
\nCommitment ………………………………………………………………………………………….. 29
\nAccountability………………………………………………………………………………………… 29
\nLimitations…………………………………………………………………………………………….. 30
\nConclusion …………………………………………………………………………………………….. 31
\nREFERENCES ……………………………………………………………………………………………. 33
\nAPPENDIX A. PHASE 1 CRIME REPORT: CONFESSION EARLY………………. 45
\nAPPENDIX B. PHASE 1 CRIME REPORT: CONFESSION LATE …………………. 47
\nAPPENDIX C. PHASE 2 CRIME REPORT …………………………………………………… 48
\nAPPENDIX D. GUILT JUDGMENTS…………………………………………………………… 52
\nAPPENDIX E. PERCEPTIONS OF IMPARTIALITY …………………………………….. 53
\nAPPENDIX F. MANIPULATION CHECK ……………………………………………………. 54
\nAPPENDIX G. ATTENTION CHECK…………………………………………………………… 55
\nAPPENDIX H. SUSPICION CHECK…………………………………………………………….. 56
\nAPPENDIX I. SCRAMBLED ANAGRAMS………………………………………………….. 57
\nAPPENDIX J. INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD APPROVAL FORM……….. 58
\nv
\nLIST OF FIGURES
\nPage
\nFigure 1. Participant Verdicts by Condition and Phase ……………………………………… 37
\nFigure 2. Model 1: Examination of Total Effects……………………………………………… 38
\nFigure 3. Model 2: Mediated Model Examining Indirect Effects………………………… 39
\nvi
\nLIST OF TABLES
\nPage
\nTable 1. Experimental Design………………………………………………………………………. 40
\nTable 2. Descriptive Statistics………………………………………………………………………. 41
\nTable 3. Correlations…………………………………………………………………………………… 42
\nTable 4. Correlations by Commitment Condition……………………………………………. 43
\nTable 5. Model 2 Path Coefficients ………………………………………………………………. 44
\nvii
\nACKNOWLEDGMENTS
\nI would like to thank some of the incredible mentors I have encountered leading up to this
\nthesis. To Dr. Leora Dahl for inspiring me to study forensic psychology rather than English. To
\nDr. Linda Hatt and the late Dr. Claire Budgen for the opportunity to be a part of a research team
\nas an undergraduate. To Dr. Michael Woodworth for his mentorship of my honours thesis. To
\nDr. Jan Cioe for his friendship and guidance on how to be a better student, a better teacher, and a
\nbetter person. To Dr. Marcus Cred\u00e9 and Dr. Gary Wells for their advice throughout the crafting
\nof this thesis. And finally to my co-advisors, Dr. Max Guyll and Dr. Stephanie Madon, for their
\nconstant support and encouragement, without which this thesis would not have been possible.
\nviii
\nABSTRACT
\nThis research examined whether a criminal confession causes people to discount
\nsubsequently encountered exculpatory evidence. Participants (N = 238) read a crime report
\nacross two phases and judged a suspect’s guilt after each phase. In phase 1, the crime report
\npresented circumstantial evidence indicative of the suspect’s guilt. In phase 2, exculpatory
\nevidence indicative of the suspect’s innocence was added. The crime report manipulated whether
\nparticipants received confession evidence during phase 1 (confession\u2013early) or phase 2
\n(confession\u2013late). In addition, some participants publicly committed to their phase 1 guilt
\njudgments prior to receiving the crime report in phase 2 (high commitment), whereas others did
\nnot (low commitment). Results provided some support for the hypothesis that a confession biases
\nthe way that people use subsequently encountered exculpatory evidence to judge a suspect\u2019s
\nguilt; under conditions of low commitment, participants more often rendered guilty verdicts in
\nthe confession\u2013early conditions than the confession\u2013late conditions. The results are discussed in
\nterms of police investigator and juror decision-making.
\n1
\nCHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
\nIt is well-established that a confession, even a false one, is a highly incriminating form of
\nevidence (Kassin, 2008; Leo & Drizin, 2010). Confession evidence is more powerful than
\neyewitness and character testimony (Kassin & Neumann, 1997), and can even attenuate the
\nformidable power of DNA evidence under some conditions (Appleby & Kassin, 2016). Jurors
\nwill sometimes convict defendants on the basis of confession evidence alone, and they do not
\nappropriately discount confessions that they believed were obtained under duress or that were
\nruled inadmissible (Kassin et al., 2010; Kassin & Sukel, 1997; Smalarz, Madon, Yang, Guyll, &
\nBuck, 2016). Not surprisingly, jury conviction rates for false confessors are very high, ranging
\nfrom 73% \u2013 81% (Drizin & Leo, 2004; Ofshe & Leo, 1997).
\nThe power of confession evidence stems, in large part, from the widespread belief that
\nsuspects, motivated by self-interest, would not confess to crimes that they did not commit unless
\nsubjected to physical abuse or torture (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1981). However, psychological
\nresearch findings and proven false confession cases reveal this belief to be a misconception.
\nInnocent suspects do sometimes confess to crimes that they did not commit. In fact, false
\nconfessions are a leading cause of wrongful convictions in the United States, contributing to the
\nconvictions of nearly 28% of defendants who were later exonerated by DNA evidence (\u201cDNA
\nExonerations Nationwide,\u201d 2016).
\nAlthough the widespread belief that false confessions only arise under egregious
\ncircumstances is not true, it hints at the way that error and bias may contribute to the power of
\nconfession evidence. That is, once people learn that a suspect has confessed, they may develop
\nsuch a strong belief in the suspect’s guilt that they fail to appropriately adjust their guilt
\njudgments in response to subsequently encountered evidence that points to the suspect’s
\n2
\ninnocence. In psychological terms, a confession may elicit belief perseverance \u2013 a cognitive bias
\nin which people cling to their original beliefs even when the basis for the belief has been
\ndiscredited (Nestler, 2010). The idea that belief perseverance may contribute to the power of
\nconfession evidence has been hypothesized by legal scholars (Findley & Scott, 2006), but has not
\nbeen empirically demonstrated.
\nError and Bias
\nSocial psychology has long emphasized the role that error and bias play in perception.
\nThis emphasis dates back at least as far as the 1940s and 1950s when New Look in Perception
\nresearchers proposed that people’s motivations, needs, goals, and expectations colored their
\nperceptions of reality (Bruner, 1992; Erdelyi, 1974). Bruner and Goodman (1947) provide a
\nclassic illustration of this theoretical perspective. They presented 10-year-old children with coins
\nof varying values. In general, the children tended to overestimate the size of the coins, and this
\ntendency increased as the value of the coins increased. For example, children overestimated the
\nsize of a penny by approximately 15%, whereas they overestimated the size of a quarter by more
\nthan 35%. These results showed that the children\u2019s perceptions of the coins were influenced by
\ntheir internal psychological states.
\nAs a result of findings such as these, social and behavioral scientists turned their attention
\nto the way that biases may distort judgment and decision-making. Kahneman and Tversky
\n(1973), for instance, introduced numerous cognitive biases and heuristics, and in doing so called
\ninto question the prevailing view that people rely on formal statistical rules to make social
\ninferences. For example, they argued that rather than using base rates to make judgments, people
\ninstead have a tendency to make judgments on the basis of similarity, that people infer the
\nfrequency of events according to the ease with which examples come to mind, and that people
\n3
\nare not sufficiently sensitive to the impact of sample size on probability judgments. The idea that
\npeople rely on heuristics when making judgments sparked considerable interest in cognitive
\nbiases and the way in which these biases may distort perception.
\nBelief Perseverance
\nOf particular importance to the current research is the cognitive bias of belief
\nperseverance. As previously noted, belief perseverance is the tendency for people to cling to their
\ninitial beliefs even after the foundation supporting those beliefs has been discredited (Nestler,
\n2010). Numerous studies in the basic psychological literature have demonstrated this effect, with
\nmost relying on what is commonly referred to as the debriefing paradigm.
\nThe debriefing paradigm involves two groups of participants who receive conflicting
\ninformation about a topic (sample nursing essay examples by the best nursing assignment writing service). Participants in both groups subsequently learn that the information
\nthey received is false, after which they make judgments relevant to the discredited information.
\nAlthough logically, participants should not use the discredited information to make their
\njudgments, the literature consistently shows that they do. For example, following a
\ndiscrimination task, participants who received positive feedback rated themselves as having
\ngreater discrimination abilities than participants who received negative feedback despite that all
\nparticipants had earlier been informed that the feedback was false (Ross, Lepper, & Hubbard,
\n1975). Similarly, participants who were initially informed of a positive relationship between risktaking and being a successful firefighter continued to rate risky behavior as diagnostic of
\nfirefighting success despite having already been debriefed to the false nature of the relationship
\n(Anderson, Lepper, & Ross, 1980).
\nA key strength of the debriefing paradigm is that it permits a decisive test of the belief
\nperseverance effect. That is, because the information on which participants based their initial
\n4
\nbeliefs was completely discredited, any subsequent between-group difference in judgments that
\nis in the direction of the discredited information shows that participants inappropriately used the
\ndiscredited information. However, it is important not to equate the paradigm with the effect.
\nEven though the debriefing paradigm involves the complete discrediting of information, the
\nconcept of belief perseverance does not. Failure to revise a belief when the information on which
\nit was based has been partially discredited is also irrational and also constitutes belief
\nperseverance. In addition, restricting the concept of belief perseverance only to situations
\ninvolving the complete discrediting of information raises conceptual problems. Most notably, it
\nwould mean that beliefs that persevered in the context of less than completely discredited
\ninformation could not, by definition, indicate belief perseverance. This would be the case even if
\nthe degree of discrediting was as high as 99%, and even though the underlying psychological
\nprocess responsible for the effect is indistinguishable from the process that operates when the
\ndegree of discrediting is complete.
\nIn fact, psychological theory never conceptualized belief perseverance as restricted to
\nsituations involving the complete discrediting of information. For example, in the opening
\nparagraphs of Ross et al.\u2019s (1975) seminal article on the belief perseverance effect, the authors
\nprovided examples that specifically involved the partial discrediting of information: a teacher
\nattributes a student\u2019s disengagement to lack of motivation, but later learns that the student is
\nundernourished and sleep deprived; a woman infers romantic interest from a man who gives her
\nflowers, but later learns that the man\u2019s father is a florist. In both of these examples, the new
\ninformation partially discredited the foundation upon which the original beliefs were based by
\nway of offering alternative explanations. The logical response would be for the teacher and the
\n5
\nwoman to revise their beliefs in a manner commensurate with the degree of discrediting. A
\nfailure to do so would indicate belief perseverance.
\nAlthough Ross et al. (1975) recognized that belief perseverance can occur in the context
\nof partially discredited information, their experiments used the debriefing paradigm as a way to
\navoid the complexities created by partially discredited information. However, subsequent to the
\npublication of their article, a number of studies have examined belief perseverance in the context
\nof partially discredited information. These studies, which investigated the belief perseverance
\neffect with a wide-range of topic (sample nursing essay examples by the best nursing assignment writing service)s (e.g., capital punishment, judgments of a suspect\u2019s guilt,
\nattitudes toward Richard Nixon) underscore the point that belief perseverance occurs under a
\nbroader set of conditions than the debriefing paradigm permits (Carretta & Moreland, 1982;
\nMarksteiner, Ask, Reinhard, & Granhag 2011; Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979).
\nThe Power of Confession Evidence
\nPeople\u2019s tendency to show belief perseverance may help to explain the power of
\nconfession evidence. Once a suspect has confessed, people tend to develop an initial expectation
\nor presumption of guilt (Kassin & Neumann, 1997). Moreover, because of the widespread belief
\nthat innocent suspects would not confess to crimes that they did not commit, it stands to reason
\nthat people would likely hold this initial presumption of guilt quite strongly (Kassin &
\nWrightsman, 1981). This is not to say that people necessarily presume innocence in the absence
\nof a confession, but rather that a confession increases the certainty or strength with which people
\npresume guilt. Further, even though it is not irrational for a confession to have this effect (a
\nconfession should produce a stronger presumption of guilt than if no confession was present) it
\ncan still have negative consequences for suspects\u2019 outcomes.
\n6
\nFor example, a confession that is obtained early in a police investigation may cause
\ndetectives to discount subsequently discovered exculpatory evidence more than they would have
\nhad the confession been obtained at the same time or after the exculpatory evidence. High
\nprofile, proven false confession cases illustrate this hypothesized effect. The police and
\nprosecutor in Jeffrey Deskovic\u2019s case continued to believe in the validity of his confession even
\nafter learning that DNA recovered from the victim excluded him (Leo & Drizin, 2010).
\nSimilarly, the police and prosecutor in the case of the Central Park Five continued to believe in
\nthe validity of the confessions made by the five teenagers accused of the brutal attack and rape of
\na jogger in New York City\u2019s Central Park even after discovering that their confessions were
\nriddled with inconsistencies, did not correspond to witness statements, and that DNA recovered
\nfrom the victim did not implicate them (Weiss, Watson, & Cynwyd, 2013).
\nAlthough proven false confession cases such as these provide anecdotal evidence that a
\nconfession can lead people to cling to the belief that a suspect is guilty despite the subsequent
\ndiscovery of exculpatory evidence, only one study has empirically tested this effect (More,
\nMadon, Guyll, & Atkinson, 2015). Participants in the study read a crime report across two
\nphases, rating the suspect\u2019s guilt at each phase. In phase 1, the crime report described
\ncircumstantial evidence that pointed toward the suspect\u2019s guilt. In phase 2, exculpatory evidence
\nthat pointed toward the suspect\u2019s innocence was added. All participants also received confession
\nevidence, but half of the participants receive it during phase 1, whereas the other half received it
\nduring phase 2. Therefore, all participants ultimately received identical evidence, with the only
\nvariation being when the confession evidence was presented.
\nThe authors hypothesized that participants who received confession evidence before the
\nexculpatory evidence would be more likely than participants who received it alongside the
\n7
\nexculpatory evidence to presume that the suspect was guilty. However, the findings did not
\nsupport this hypothesis. Instead, the findings indicated that the timing of the confession evidence
\ndid not influence participants\u2019 judgments of the suspect\u2019s guilt at phase 2. Consideration of the
\nstudy\u2019s methods suggests two factors that may have contributed to this non-significant effect.
\nAmbiguity
\nOne aspect of the study that may have contributed to the non-significant effect was the
\nnature of the exculpatory evidence. Because More et al. (2015) relied on clearly unambiguous
\nexculpatory evidence, participants may have had no reason to doubt the suspect\u2019s innocence. A
\nlarge literature in psychology indicates that ambiguity increases people\u2019s susceptibility to
\ncognitive biases (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). In fact, this is a central thesis of the literature on
\nerror and bias \u2013 i.e., that people use heuristics when making probabilistic judgments. Therefore,
\nit is possible that participants in More et al.\u2019s study might have been more likely to discount the
\nexculpatory evidence in favor of their initial guilt judgments had it been ambiguous rather than
\nclearly unambiguous. According to this reasoning, the hypothesized belief perseverance effect
\nmay be more likely when a confession is discredited by ambiguous, rather than clearly
\nunambiguous, exculpatory evidence.
\nCommitment
\nA second aspect of More et al.\u2019s (2015) procedures that may have contributed to the nonsignificant belief perseverance effect is that participants were not particularly motivated to
\nmaintain their initial guilt judgments. This possibility is consistent with a core theme that runs
\nthroughout the psychological literature; namely, that motivational factors influence people\u2019s
\nbeliefs and behaviors. For example, Cialdini (1984) outlined six key principles of social
\ninfluence, one of which was the principle of commitment and consistency. According to this
\n8
\nprinciple, a central motive that influences people’s behavior is the need to behave consistently
\nwith their previously established beliefs (Cialdini, 1999). If people commit to a belief or
\nbehavior, then they are more likely to maintain that belief or behavior at a later point in time
\n(Cialdini, 1984), an effect that has received strong empirical support (Baca-Motes, Brown,
\nGneezy, Keenan, & Nelson, 2013; Dickerson, Thibodeau, Aronson, & Miller, 1992).
\nThe principle of commitment and consistency may also be relevant to understanding how
\nbelief perseverance operates in the context of criminal investigations. Due to internal and
\nexternal pressures to capture perpetrators and solve crimes, police investigators may be
\nmotivated to maintain their beliefs in a suspect\u2019s guilt after obtaining a confession. Put
\ndifferently, after police investigators have obtained a confession from a suspect, they may be
\ndisinclined to revise their judgments about the suspect\u2019s guilt even if they later discover
\nexculpatory evidence. Therefore, the hypothesized belief perseverance effect may partly depend
\non people\u2019s motivation to maintain their initial beliefs, with stronger effects occurring under
\nconditions of high commitment.
\nResearch Overview and Hypotheses
\nThis research tested two hypotheses. First, it tested the hypothesis that people who
\nencounter confession evidence before encountering exculpatory evidence are more vulnerable to
\nbelief perseverance than people who encounter confession and exculpatory evidence
\nsimultaneously. Second, it tested whether this predicted effect is moderated by people\u2019s
\ncommitment to their initial beliefs about a suspect’s guilt, with stronger effects occurring among
\npeople who are highly committed. The research tested these hypotheses in the context of an
\nexperiment that manipulated whether participants encountered confession evidence before or at
\n9
\nthe same time as exculpatory evidence, and whether or not they publicly committed to an initial
\njudgment of a suspect\u2019s guilt prior to receiving exculpatory evidence.
\n10
\nCHAPTER 2. METHOD
\nPower Analysis
\nThe statistical software G*Power was employed to estimate the appropriate sample size
\nnecessary to detect main effects of confession timing and commitment, plus an interaction effect
\ninvolving these variables (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). The analysis was conducted
\nusing the conventional power value of 1-b = 0.80 at an alpha level of \u03b1 = .05 (Cohen, 1992). The
\nonly known previous study examining confession evidence and belief perseverance had nonsignificant results with a moderate effect size, Cohen\u2019s f = .21 (More et al., 2015). Moreover,
\nstudies such as Dickerson et al. (1992) have found a moderate effect of commitment on behavior,
\nCohen\u2019s f = .27. With these studies in mind, a moderate effect size, Cohen\u2019s f = .25, was used to
\nestimate the sample size (Cohen, 1988). Using this estimate, the power analysis indicated that a
\nsample size of 179 would be required to achieve the desired level of power. The sample size of
\nthe current research exceeded this minimum.
\nParticipants
\nParticipants (N = 250) were Iowa State University students who participated in exchange
\nfor partial fulfillment of a course requirement. Eight participants were excluded for failing two
\nkey attention check questions, and four experimental sessions were terminated due to a computer
\nmalfunction. Therefore, there were 238 participants in the final sample, including 84 men and
\n154 women between the ages of 18 and 50 with a mean age of 19.46 years. There were 199
\nEuropean Americans, 10 Asian Americans, 9 Latin Americans, 8 African Americans, 1 Native
\nAmerican, and 11 participants who identified as multi-ethnic. All participants were native
\nEnglish speakers. This study was approved by the Institutional Review Board at Iowa State
\nUniversity (Appendix J).
\n11
\nDesign
\nParticipants were randomly assigned to a 2 (phase: phase 1 vs. phase 2) \u00d7 2 (confession
\ntiming: early vs. late) \u00d7 2 (commitment: high vs. low) mixed-model experimental design, with
\nrepeated measures on the factor of phase (see Table 1). Confession timing manipulated whether
\nparticipants received confession evidence before (phase 1) or at the same time as (phase 2)
\nexculpatory evidence. Participants in the confession\u2013early conditions received the confession
\nevidence before the exculpatory evidence (phase 1), whereas participants in the confession\u2013late
\nconditions received the confession and exculpatory evidence simultaneously (phase 2).
\nCommitment manipulated the degree to which participants were motivated to maintain their
\nphase 1 judgment of a suspect’s guilt. Participants in the high commitment conditions publicly
\nrevealed their phase 1 guilt judgments to the experimenter and signed a form confirming their
\njudgment immediately after phase 1 and prior to beginning phase 2. Participants in the low
\ncommitment conditions neither publicly revealed nor confirmed their phase 1 guilt judgments
\nprior to beginning phase 2.
\nCrime Report
\nA fictional crime report (see Appendices A, B, and C) described an assault and theft in
\nwhich a male assailant struck a woman on the head from behind and stole her purse as she was
\nentering a car in a parking lot. The victim was unable to describe the perpetrator, and footage
\nfrom a surveillance video was too grainy to be useful. Based on the circumstantial evidence,
\nKyle James became the prime suspect. During an interrogation, James confessed to the crime,
\nbut later recanted his confession, claiming that he had been at a local restaurant when the crime
\noccurred. His alibi was supported by a credit card transaction and a questionable eyewitness
\nidentification.
\n12
\nMeasures
\nGuilt Judgments
\nParticipants judged the suspect\u2019s guilt by responding to three questions: (1) \u201cBased on the
\ninformation presented in the criminal report, if you had to choose, would you say that Kyle
\nJames is more likely to be guilty or innocent?\u201d, with response options 1 (guilty) and 2 (innocent),
\n(2) \u201cHow confident are you in your decision?\u201d, with endpoints 1 (not at all confident) and 10
\n(very confident), and, (3) \u201cHow likely do you think it is that James is guilty?\u201d, with endpoints 1
\n(very unlikely) and 10 (very likely). Participants responded to these questions twice, once during
\nphase 1 and then again during phase 2 (see Appendix D). These variables are subsequently
\nreferred to as verdict, confidence, and likelihood of guilt.
\nPerceptions of Impartiality
\nTwo questions assessed the degree to which participants perceived themselves as having
\nprovided an impartial judgment of the defendant\u2019s guilt: (1) \u201cTo what extent was your Assessment
\nbased on the evidence provided within the crime report?\u201d, with endpoints 1 (not at all evidencebased) and 10 (completely evidence-based); and (2) \u201cHow impartial was your Assessment of the
\ncase?\u201d, with endpoints 1 (not at all fair and impartial) and 10 (very fair and impartial).
\nParticipants\u2019 responses to these questions were averaged to create one score per participant with
\nhigher scores corresponding to greater levels of perceived impartiality. Participants answered
\nthese questions during phase 2 (see Appendix E).
\nManipulation Check
\nParticipants answered five manipulation check questions (see Appendix F). One question
\nused a multiple-choice format to assess whether participants correctly recalled the confession.
\nResponses were coded as 1 (correct) and 0 (incorrect). The four remaining manipulation check
\n13
\nquestions assessed the strength of participants’ commitment to their guilt judgments: (1) \u201cAfter
\nyou read the crime report for the first time, how strong was your belief that the suspect was
\nguilty or innocent?\u201d, with endpoints 1 (very weak belief) and 10 (very strong belief), (2) \u201cAfter
\nyou read the crime report for the first time, how strong would new evidence had to have been for
\nyou to change your verdict from guilty to innocent or innocent to guilt?\u201d, with endpoints 1 (not
\nvery strong) and 10 (very strong), (3) \u201cThinking about your final verdict in this case, how
\ndifficult would it be for someone to convince you to change your verdict from guilty to innocent
\nor from innocent to guilty?\u201d, with endpoints 1 (not very difficult) and 10 (very difficult), and (4)
\n\u201cThinking about your final verdict in this case, how strong would new evidence have to be for
\nyou to change your verdict from guilty to innocent or innocent to guilty?\u201d, with endpoints 1 (not
\nvery strong) and 10 (very strong). Participants\u2019 responses to these four questions were averaged
\nto create one score per participant with higher scores indicating greater commitment to their guilt
\njudgments.
\nAttention Check
\nEight questions assessed the extent to which participants attended to the crime report (see
\nAppendix G). These questions asked participants to recall the suspect\u2019s name, whether the
\nsuspect confessed to the crime, what the suspect\u2019s alibi was, and the circumstantial evidence that
\nthe police had against the suspect. Responses were coded as 1 (correct) and 0 (incorrect) and
\nsummed to create one score per participant that ranged from 0 to 8, with higher scores indicating
\na greater degree of attentiveness to the crime report.
\nSuspicion Check
\nFour questions assessed participants\u2019 general level of suspicion, prior knowledge about
\nthe experiment, and the degree to which they perceived the experimenter to be credible (see
\n14
\nAppendix H): (1) \u201cSometimes experiments study questions that are not obvious. Do you believe
\nthat is the case in this experiment?\u201d, with response options 1 (yes) and 2 (no), (2) \u201cIf yes, please
\nindicate what research question(s) might be under investigation in this experiment.\u201d (openended), (3) \u201cPlease indicate what you knew about this experiment before participating.\u201d (openended), and (4) \u201cPlease rate as honestly as possible how believable you found the experimenter
\nwhen he or she informed you that some of the materials had been left out. This question will
\nremain anonymous and the experimenter will never learn of your rating.\u201d, with endpoints 1
\n(completely unbelievable) and 6 (completely believable). Responses were evaluated to identify
\nparticipants who identified the research hypotheses, had prior knowledge of the experimenter, or
\nwere suspicious about the feigned experimental mistake.
\nScrambled Anagrams
\nAs a filler task, all participants attempted to solve up to 44 scrambled anagrams within
\nfour minutes (see Appendix I). Pilot testing showed that college students can complete an
\naverage of 20 anagrams in this timeframe, with a minimum and maximum of 9 and 32,
\nrespectively. The filler task was included to provide a window of time that supported a feigned
\nclaim by the experimenter that a portion of the crime report had accidentally been omitted from
\nthe materials, thus necessitating that they receive the full crime report and respond to the
\nquestions a second time. Because the scrambled anagram task is unrelated to the hypotheses
\nunder investigation, it was not scored or used in any of the analyses.
\nProcedures
\nParticipants were run individually. Upon arrival to the experimental session, the
\nparticipant signed a consent form and was told that the study was designed to examine how
\npeople evaluate evidence in a criminal case. The experimenter then explained that the participant
\n15
\nwould review evidence from a real, ongoing case after which the participant received a portion of
\na crime report that included circumstantial evidence (phase 1). This portion of the crime report
\nalso included confession evidence for participants in the confession\u2013early conditions. After
\nreading this portion of the crime report, the participant made several guilt-relevant judgments
\nincluding a verdict (guilty vs. innocent), confidence rating, and likelihood of guilt judgment. The
\ncommitment manipulation occurred immediately after.
\nIn the high commitment conditions, the participant publicly stated his or her phase 1
\nverdict (guilty vs. innocent) and signed a form confirming it. Participants performed these tasks
\nbelieving that the signed form would be sent to the county prosecutor\u2019s office to help with the
\ncase. To support the veracity of this claim, the experimenter placed the participant\u2019s signed form
\nin an envelope addressed to the county prosecutor\u2019s office and left the room under the guise of
\ndepositing it in the mail. In the low commitment conditions, the participant did not publicly state
\nhis or her phase 1 verdict, nor sign any form to confirm it.
\nFollowing the commitment manipulation, the participant was left alone to work on the
\nfiller task for four minutes. Afterward, the experimenter informed the participant that during the
\nfiller task, she or he had discovered that a portion of the crime report had accidentally been
\nomitted, thus necessitating that the participant read the full crime report and answer the questions
\na second time. After having done so, the participant responded to the manipulation checks,
\nattention checks, suspicion checks, and reported demographic information. After all measures
\nhad been completed, the experimenter fully debriefed the participant.
\n16
\nCHAPTER 3. ANALYSES
\nPreliminary Analyses
\nDescriptive Statistics
\nTable 2 presents the means, standard errors, and confidence intervals for participants\u2019
\nverdicts, confidence ratings, and likelihood of guilt judgments organized by experimental
\ncondition. Table 3 presents the correlations between variables for the entire sample whereas
\nTable 4 presents the correlations separately for participants in the low commitment and high
\ncommitment conditions. Figure 1 presents participants\u2019 verdicts, which are shown by condition
\nand phase as they proceeded through the study.
\nCommitment Manipulation Check
\nAn independent samples t-test assessed the effectiveness of the commitment
\nmanipulation. Results indicated no significant difference in self-reported commitment levels
\nbetween participants in the low commitment and high commitment conditions, t (236) = 0.80, p
\n= .427, d = .10. Note that d values of .2, .5, and .8 correspond to small, medium, and large
\neffects, respectively (Cohen, 1988). These results suggest either that the commitment
\nmanipulation was unsuccessful or that the self-report questionnaire failed to properly assess
\nparticipants\u2019 commitment levels.
\nConfession Timing Manipulation Check
\nA frequency analysis indicated that 210 participants (88.2%) correctly identified whether
\nthe confession was presented during phase 1 or phase 2, whereas 28 (11.8%) incorrectly reported
\nits timing. A series of independent samples t-tests that compared participants who correctly and
\nincorrectly answered the confession timing manipulation check question revealed no significant
\ndifferences in their phase 2 likelihood of guilt judgments, t (236) = -0.55, p = .586, d = .11, or
\n17
\nphase 2 verdicts, t (236) = 0.13, p = .901, d = .02. These results suggest that there were no
\nmeaningful differences between participants who correctly identified the timing of the
\nconfession evidence and those who did not. Accordingly, no participants were excluded on the
\nbasis of their answer to the timing of the confession evidence.
\nAttention Check
\nA frequency analysis identified participants who had not adequately attended to the crime
\nreport according to the following a priori decision criterion (a) incorrectly answered six or more
\nof the eight attention check questions, (b) incorrectly reported the suspect\u2019s name or (c)
\nincorrectly reported that the suspect never confessed. Eight participants were identified.
\nAlthough all subsequently reported results omitted these participants\u2019 data the analyses were
\nconducted both with and without these participant\u2019s data included, and no meaningful
\ndifferences emerged.
\nSuspicion Check
\nAssessment of participants\u2019 responses to the suspicion check items indicated that none
\nwere suspicious and none correctly identified the study hypotheses.
\nAnalytic Plan
\nThe main analyses address the hypotheses that confession timing influences phase 2 guilt
\njudgments by means of belief perseverance, and that commitment moderates the hypothesized
\nbelief perseverance effect. These hypotheses are tested with respect to two measures of
\nparticipants\u2019 guilt judgments: phase 2 likelihood of guilt judgments and verdicts (guilty vs.
\ninnocent). As discussed in detail below, support for belief perseverance in these data requires
\nthat two effects be significant \u2013 i.e., confession timing must have a significant total effect on
\nparticipants\u2019 phase 2 guilt judgments and a significant indirect effect on participants\u2019 phase 2
\n18
\nguilt judgments through participants\u2019 phase 1 guilt judgments. These effects were tested with the
\nfollowing, closely related sequential models.
\nModel 1: Total Effect of Confession Timing on Phase 2 Guilt Judgments
\nThe first model (Figure 2) was designed to test whether confession timing had a
\nsignificant total effect on phase 2 guilt judgments, with a greater perceived likelihood of guilt
\nand a greater likelihood of guilty verdicts expected among participants in the confession\u2013early
\nconditions. This effect reflects a necessary, but insufficient, condition to conclude that belief
\nperseverance had a meaningful impact on phase 2 guilt judgments. It is necessary because it is
\nonly possible that belief perseverance had a meaningful impact if confession timing had an effect
\non participants\u2019 phase 2 guilt judgments. However, it is insufficient because the total effect of
\nconfession timing captures not only the belief perseverance effect, but also additional effects
\nlinked to the experimental procedures, as subsequently detailed. Hence, the second model is
\nneeded to parse the total effect of confession timing and isolate that portion associated with
\nbelief perseverance.
\nIt is worth noting that, in general, a significant total effect is not necessary to find a
\nmediation effect. However, for the purposes of this research, a significant total effect of
\nconfession timing is necessary as a lack of such an effect would suggest that guilt judgments do
\nnot vary depending on when confession evidence is encountered. Therefore, a significant indirect
\neffect would be of little consequence if final guilt judgments are not impacted in a meaningful
\nway as evidenced by a significant total effect.
\nThe first model would support the belief perseverance hypothesis if confession timing
\nevidenced either a significant main effect on phase 2 guilt judgments or a significant simple main
\neffect on phase 2 guilt judgments in the context of an interaction involving commitment, or both.
\n19
\nFor the continuous guilt judgment of likelihood of guilt, a 2 \u00d7 2 (confession timing
\n\u00d7 commitment) regression analysis was performed. For the dichotomous guilt judgment of
\nverdict, a 2 \u00d7 2 (confession timing \u00d7 commitment) logistic regression was performed. For both
\nanalyses, the experimental manipulations of confession timing (late vs. early) and commitment
\n(low vs. high) were effect-coded as -1 and +1, respectively. If confession timing demonstrates
\neither a significant main effect, or a significant simple main effect, then a second, more detailed
\npath model becomes necessary.
\nModel 2: Belief Perseverance Effect
\nThe second model was designed to test whether a significant total effect of confession
\ntiming on phase 2 guilt judgments revealed by the prior model corresponded to belief
\nperseverance (see Figure 3). This was accomplished by examining whether confession timing
\nevidenced a significant indirect effect on phase 2 guilt judgments through phase 1 guilt
\njudgments. The model tests this indirect effect with the Mplus statistical program (Mplus, 2018).
\nIf the first model yields a simple main effect of confession timing on phase 2 guilt judgments in
\nthe context of an interaction with commitment, then the second model tests the indirect effect
\nseparately for each level of commitment. Therefore, the variable corresponding to the
\nexperimental manipulation of commitment is held constant in each group, requiring removal of
\nthe two terms involving commitment and their corresponding paths, d and e in Figure 3.
\nRegardless of these effects related to commitment, the paths a, b, and c are included, and their
\nmeanings in the context of the path model merit detailed consideration.
\nPath a: Confession Effect
\nParticipants made guilt judgments twice, first at phase 1 and then again at phase 2. As
\nshown in Table 1, because the commitment manipulation did not occur until after participants
\n20
\nmade their phase 1 guilt judgments, the only difference between the confession timing conditions
\nat phase 1 was the presence or absence of the confession; at phase 1, the confession was present
\nfor participants in the confession\u2013early conditions and absent for participants in the confession\u2013
\nlate conditions. Therefore, path a in Figure 3 reflects the effect of confession evidence on
\nphase 1 guilt judgments above and beyond the effect of the circumstantial evidence presented at
\nphase 1.
\nPath b: Judgment Stability
\nPath b in Figure 3 represents the stability of guilt judgments from phase 1 to phase 2.
\nPath a \u00d7 b: Belief Perseverance
\nBy definition, the phenomenon of belief perseverance requires that people maintain their
\ninitial beliefs in the face of subsequently encountered discrediting information. In the current
\nstudy, this means that differences in guilt judgments at phase 2 between participants in the
\nconfession\u2013early and confession\u2013late conditions must be conveyed by differences in their
\npreceding guilt judgments at phase 1. In terms of the model shown in Figure 3, this corresponds
\nto a significant indirect effect of confession timing on phase 2 guilt judgments via phase 1 guilt
\njudgments (a \u00d7 b). At this point it is worth restating that this effect only indicates belief
\nperseverance if confession timing also evidenced a significant total effect on phase 2 guilt
\njudgments in the corresponding 2 \u00d7 2 analysis previously described. In the absence of a total
\neffect, a significant indirect effect indicates that the information added in phase 2 (exculpatory
\nand circumstantial, as detailed in Table 1) counteracted any effect of the confession evidence on
\nphase 2 guilt judgments, as described next.
\nPath c: Adding Confession Evidence and Procedural Effects
\nTo understand the direct effect of the confession timing manipulation on phase 2 guilt
\n21
\njudgments represented by path c it is necessary to understand the differences that exist between
\nthe confession timing conditions at the time phase 2 guilt judgments were made. As detailed in
\nTable 1, at the time phase 2 guilt judgments are made, the two confession timing conditions were
\nidentical with respect to the information they had received. However, the effect represented by
\npath c is unique of the indirect effect of the confession itself on phase 2 guilt judgments,
\nrepresented by path a \u00d7 b. Thus, path c captures the effect of adding the confession in the
\nconfession\u2013late condition, thereby causing the total effect of confession timing on phase 2 guilt
\njudgments, path a \u00d7 b + c, to reflect the fact that both conditions have precisely the same
\ninformation at phase 2.
\nPath c also captures three other condition differences associated with confession timing
\nthat operate at phase 2 but not phase 1, none of which reflect belief perseverance. First, it
\ncaptures any primacy or recency effects associated with participants in the confession\u2013early
\nconditions having received the confession earlier than participants in the confession\u2013late
\ncondition. Second, it captures any pairing effects caused by the fact that participants in the
\nconfession\u2013early conditions received the confession without the simultaneous presentation of
\nexculpatory evidence, whereas participants in the confession\u2013late conditions received the
\nconfession simultaneously with the exculpatory evidence. Third, it captures any effects of
\ninformation quantity that resulted from participants in the confession\u2013early conditions having
\nreceived the confession in the context of less additional information (only the circumstantial 1
\nevidence, as detailed in Table 1) compared to participants in the confession\u2013late conditions who
\nreceived the confession in the context of more additional information (both the circumstantial 2
\nand the exculpatory evidence, as detailed in Table 1). Thus, path c includes the potential
\ninfluence of several procedural effects possibly associated with the confession timing
\n22
\nmanipulation, and thereby separates them from the belief perseverance effect represented by the
\nindirect effect, path a \u00d7 b.
\nModeration of Belief Perseverance by Commitment
\nThe analytic plan described above also enables Assessment of commitment\u2019s ability to
\nmoderate belief perseverance. Results consistent with moderation would include a significant
\ninteraction of commitment and confession timing on phase 2 guilt judgments in the 2 \u00d7 2 model,
\ncoupled with significant belief perseverance effects in the follow up path model that differ across
\nlevels of commitment.
\nMain Analyses
\nThe main analyses tested two hypotheses pertaining to the effects of confession timing
\nand commitment on phase 2 guilt judgments. The first hypothesis was that the confession would
\nhave a stronger effect on phase 2 guilt judgments among participants in the confession\u2013early
\nthan confession\u2013late conditions. The second hypothesis was that the predicted effect of
\nconfession timing would be stronger among participants in the high than low commitment
\nconditions. As noted above, these hypotheses were tested with respect to participants\u2019
\nperceptions of the suspect\u2019s likelihood of guilt and verdicts of guilty versus innocent.
\nModel 1: Total Effect of Confession Timing
\nFollowing the analytic plan described above, the first set of analyses tested whether
\nconfession timing had a significant total effect on phase 2 guilt judgments. First, a 2 \u00d7 2
\n(confession timing \u00d7 commitment) regression analysis was performed using the phase 2
\ncontinuous guilt judgment of likelihood of guilt as the dependent variable. Results indicated that
\nconfession timing was not a significant predictor of phase 2 guilt judgments, b = .103, t (234) =
\n0.91, p = .365, d = .12. Conversely, commitment was a significant predictor of phase 2 guilt
\n23
\njudgments, b = -.330, t (234) = -2.90, p = .004, d = -.38. The negative beta weight of the
\ncommitment predictor indicates that participants in the low commitment conditions were more
\nlikely to have a stronger likelihood of guilt belief than participants in the high commitment
\nconditions. The interaction term for the two predictors was not significant, b = -.059, t (234) = –
\n0.52, p = .607, d = -.07.
\nParalleling the regression analysis, a 2 \u00d7 2 (confession timing \u00d7 commitment) logistic
\nregression analysis was performed using the phase 2 dichotomous guilt judgment of verdict as
\nthe dependent variable. Results revealed that confession timing did not have a significant effect
\non phase 2 verdicts, b = .144, Wald \u03c7\u00b2 (1) =1.02, p = .313, OR = 1.15. Note that odds ratios of
\n1.5, 2.5, and 4.3 correspond to small, medium, and large effects, respectively (Cohen, 1988).
\nConversely, commitment, b = -.272, Wald \u03c7\u00b2 (1) = 3.65, p = .056, OR = 0.76, and the confession
\ntiming by commitment interaction, b = -.275, Wald \u03c7\u00b2 (1) = 3.71, p = .054, OR = 0.76, had
\nmarginally significant effects on phase 2 verdicts.
\nA follow-up analysis was conducted to examine the simple main effects of confession
\ntiming. Pairwise comparisons indicated that confession timing had no significant effect on
\nverdicts in the high commitment conditions, t (120) = -0.70, p = .482, OR = 0.79. Confession
\ntiming did have a significant effect on verdicts in the low commitment conditions, t (114) = 2.00,
\np = .045, OR = 1.96, with participants in the confession\u2013early condition more often finding the
\nsuspect guilty than participants in the confession\u2013late condition. Thus, belief perseverance could
\nnot have occurred under conditions of high commitment, but may have occurred under
\nconditions of low commitment.
\nModel 2: Belief Perseverance Effect
\nAs described in the analytic plan, the second model was designed to test whether
\n24
\nsignificant results associated with confession timing from the first model corresponded to belief
\nperseverance. This was accomplished by examining whether confession timing had a significant
\nindirect effect on phase 2 guilt judgments through phase 1 guilt judgments using the analytic
\nmodel depicted in Figure 3. The first model showed that belief perseverance was only a
\npossibility for the dichotomous verdict dependent variable, and only for the low commitment
\ncondition. Therefore, the second model tested for indirect effects of confession timing on the
\ndichotomous guilt judgment of verdict, doing so separately for each level of commitment.
\nSpecifically, the analysis was conducted using the model depicted in Figure 3 that included only
\npaths a, b, and c, and was performed using MPlus with commitment as the grouping variable.
\nDue to the nonsignificant findings in the high commitment conditions, only results from the low
\ncommitment conditions are relevant to the belief perseverance hypothesis. Therefore, only the
\nresults for participants in the low commitment conditions will be presented. However, for
\ncompleteness all high commitment results are presented in Table 5.
\nPath a: Confession Effect
\nFor participants in the low commitment conditions, results revealed that confession
\ntiming had a significant direct effect on phase 1 verdicts (path a), b = .48, SE = 0.14, p < .01, OR
\n= 1.62. As previously noted, path a in Figure 3 represents the effect of confession on phase 1
\nguilt judgments beyond the impact of the circumstantial evidence presented at phase 1.
\nTherefore, the results for path a indicate that the presence of confession evidence significantly
\ninfluenced verdicts.
\nPath b: Judgment Stability
\nFor participants in the low commitment conditions, results showed that phase 1 verdicts
\nsignificantly predicted phase 2 verdicts (path b), b = .64, SE = 0.12, p < .01, OR = 1.90.
\n25
\nRecalling that path b in Figure 3 represents the stability of guilt judgments from phase 1 to phase
\n2, the results indicate that verdicts evidenced a degree of stability from phase 1 to phase 2.
\nPath a x b: Belief Perseverance
\nFor participants in the low commitment conditions, results revealed that confession
\ntiming had a significant indirect effect on phase 2 verdicts via phase 1 verdicts (path a \u00d7 b), b =
\n.31, SE = 0.10, p < .01, OR = 1.36. Although there was a significant indirect effect of confession
\ntiming, it is worth restating that this effect only represents belief perseverance because
\nconfession timing also evidenced a significant total effect on phase 2 verdicts, as reported above
\nfor Model 1 with respect to the simple main effect results of confession timing on phase 2
\nverdicts in the low commitment conditions.
\nPath c: Adding Confession Evidence and Procedural Effects
\nFor participants in the low commitment conditions, results revealed that confession
\ntiming had a non-significant direct effect on phase 2 verdicts (path c), b = -.06, SE = .13, p = ns,
\nOR = 0.94. However, as previously noted in the analytic plan, path c captures several condition
\ndifferences associated with confession timing that operate at phase 2 but not phase 1, none of
\nwhich reflect belief perseverance.
\nPath a x b + c: Total Effect of Confession Evidence
\nFor participants in the low commitment conditions, results showed that confession timing
\nhad a significant total effect on phase 2 verdicts (path a \u00d7 b + c), b = .25, SE = 0.13, p < .05, OR
\n= 1.28. This result replicates the simple main effect of confession timing in the low commitment
\nconditions from Model 1. Moreover, the presence of the aforementioned significant indirect
\neffect and a significant total effect indicates support for a belief perseverance effect for
\nparticipants in the low commitment conditions. Specifically, this indicates that participants who
\n26
\nreceived confession evidence early at phase 1 had a greater likelihood of providing a guilty
\nverdict at phase 2 with a significant portion of this effect resulting from the perseverance of
\nparticipants\u2019 phase 1 verdicts.
\nModeration of Belief Perseverance by Commitment
\nAs noted above, the analytic plan allowed for the Assessment of commitment\u2019s ability to
\nmoderate belief perseverance. Results were consistent with a moderation effect. A marginally
\nsignificant interaction between confession timing and commitment on phase 2 verdicts was
\nfound in the first model. Moreover, in the follow-up path model, the results supported a belief
\nperseverance effect for participants in the low commitment conditions. Taken together these
\nresults suggest that belief perseverance was greater when commitment to an initial verdict was
\nlow.
\n27
\nCHAPTER 4. DISCUSSION
\nDrawing on research relevant to the cognitive bias of belief perseverance, this research
\ntested whether a confession causes people to discount subsequently encountered exculpatory
\nevidence, and whether this effect is stronger when people are highly committed to maintaining
\ntheir initial beliefs about a suspect\u2019s guilt. Results provided some support for the presence of a
\nbelief perseverance effect. However, belief perseverance only occurred under low commitment
\nconditions and not under high commitment conditions, as had been originally hypothesized. In
\naddition, a main effect of commitment emerged such that participants who were committed to
\ntheir initial beliefs about a suspect\u2019s guilt were more likely than those who were less committed
\nto adjust their initial verdicts in response to exculpatory evidence, a pattern that runs counter to
\nthe hypothesized moderating effect of commitment.
\nBelief Perseverance
\nAlthough the timing of confession evidence did not have an overall effect on verdicts, it
\ndid evidence a simple main effect on verdicts among participants in the low commitment
\nconditions. Specifically, participants in the low commitment conditions who received confession
\nevidence before receiving exculpatory evidence were more likely to find the suspect guilty than
\nparticipants who received confession and exculpatory evidence at the same time. It is worth
\nnoting that this pattern was only present with verdict judgments and not with likelihood of guilt
\njudgments. However, this discrepancy may be due to the fact that the commitment manipulation
\nwas implemented in an attempt to make participants feel committed to their verdicts. Participants
\nwere encouraged, in the high commitment conditions, to become committed to their initial
\nverdicts by having participants verbally state and sign a form affirming them. By contrast, no
\nsuch attempt was ever made to make any participants adhere to their original likelihood of guilt
\n28
\njudgments. Therefore, the commitment manipulation may have been experienced as most
\nrelevant with respect to verdicts, and rather less so with respect to likelihood of guilt judgments.
\nThe lack of a main effect for the timing of the confession evidence in these data may
\nsuggest that the intensity of the manipulation was insufficient. For the purposes of this study,
\nparticipants received the first portion of the crime report and then completed a four-minute filler
\ntask before receiving the full crime report. Considering that investigators often have weeks or
\neven months to ruminate about a given case before possibly receiving exculpatory evidence, this
\nmay not have been an adequate amount of time for strong beliefs to develop. The lack of a strong
\ninitial belief may have discouraged participants from discounting the subsequently encountered
\nexculpatory evidence.
\nAn alternative explanation that may explain why the timing of the confession did not
\nhave a significant main effect on guilt judgments is that the procedures used in this study did not
\nclosely mimic the processes of police investigators. In fact, they were more similar to the
\nprocesses of jurors. Participants in this study were presented with incriminating evidence
\nfollowed by exculpatory evidence and then asked to make a guilt judgment. This presentation of
\nevidence mirrors that which jurors experience in trials. In court proceedings the prosecution first
\noffers incriminating evidence for the jurors to consider before the defense has the opportunity to
\nprovide exculpatory evidence. Moreover, participants in this study did not seek out information
\nor spend weeks investigating and building a strong belief. Further, participants, like jurors, may
\nbe motivated to be accurate whereas police investigators may be motivated to avoid being
\nperceived as fallible. Therefore, the results of this study may have failed at assessing how police
\ninvestigators make judgments, but succeeded at examining the decision making processes of
\njurors.
\n29
\nCommitment
\nAlthough only an interaction with confession timing had been predicted, commitment
\nalso had a significant main effect on guilt judgments. Participants in the high commitment
\nconditions gave lower guilt judgments than participants in the low commitment conditions. Thus,
\ncommitment had a clear effect, which indicates that the lack of support for what had been
\nhypothesized was not due to a failed manipulation. Additionally, suspicion checks indicated low
\nlevels of suspicion and no participants correctly identified the study hypotheses, which indicates
\nthat the results were not due to psychological reactance.
\nAccountability
\nBased on anecdotal evidence from proven false confession cases and the empirical
\nliterature on commitment, it was hypothesized that the predicted belief perseverance effect
\nwould be moderated by people\u2019s commitment to their initial beliefs about a suspect’s guilt, with
\nstronger effects occurring among people who are highly committed. However, the results showed
\nthe opposite effect. This raises the possibility that perhaps the experimental manipulation did not
\nmanipulate commitment after all, but instead accountability \u2013 an expectation of having to justify
\nor explain one\u2019s feelings, beliefs, or behaviors to others (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). Participants in
\nthe high commitment conditions were asked to verbally state and sign a document affirming their
\nguilt judgments that they believed were being sent to the county prosecutor in an attempt to
\nimpress upon them that their decisions were meaningful. Therefore, participants may have been
\nmore analytical in their assessments as research has found that holding people accountable for
\ntheir judgments and decisions leads them to think in more critical and complex ways such that
\nthey are more likely to consider multiple perspectives on the issue at hand (Tetlock, 1983a;
\nTetlock, 1983b).
\n30
\nResearch has long established that the innate need to appear consistent in terms of one\u2019s
\nbeliefs and attitudes is a fundamental basis of behavior (Festinger, 1957). Most people strive for
\nconsistency in terms of what they say and do. Therefore, after committing to a given opinion,
\nespecially when that opinion is freely chosen, people are likely to continue to behave in a manner
\nthat is in line with their original position (Cialdini, 1999). However, if the commitment
\nmanipulation used in the current study inadvertently manipulated accountability, then
\nparticipants in the high commitment conditions may have more thoroughly assessed the
\nexculpatory evidence and been more likely to entertain the possibility that the suspect was
\nactually innocent despite his confession than participants in the low commitment conditions out
\nof an increased desire to be accurate. To the extent this happened, then a conservative criterion
\nshift may have occurred among participants in the high commitment conditions. That is,
\nparticipants in the high commitment conditions may have required a greater degree of certainty
\nin the suspect\u2019s guilt before being willing to render a guilty verdict. Consistent with this,
\npreliminary analyses showed that participants in the high commitment conditions reported being
\nless confident in their phase 2 verdicts than participants in the low commitment conditions.
\nLimitations
\nSeveral limitations of this research warrant mention. First, the participant sample
\nconsisted entirely of college students. Although this limitation characterizes many empirical
\nstudies, it has meaningful repercussions for the current research. Due to the relative youth of the
\nsample and their enrollment in a secondary education institute, it is possible that they have
\ngreater cognitive flexibility than other populations. Had the sample consisted of a more
\nheterogeneous sample, or even a sample of older adults, participants may have shown a greater
\ntendency to cling to their initial beliefs.
\n31
\nSecond, although this study attempted to manipulate commitment, the procedures may
\nnot have been especially well-suited to capturing an investigator\u2019s sense of responsibility and
\ndesire to find justice; participants did not have much personally riding on their guilt judgments.
\nHowever, this also means that the results are likely a conservative estimate of the possible effects
\nof the timing of confession evidence and commitment on guilt judgments of actual investigators.
\nRelatedly, given that this study relied on the judgments of college students rather police
\ninvestigators, the results may say more about the way that jurors assess evidence than the way
\nthat investigators do.
\nFinally, the commitment manipulation may have inadvertently manipulated
\naccountability, possibly explaining the presence of belief perseverance in the low, but not the
\nhigh commitment conditions. A key aspect of commitment in previous studies involves the
\ndesire to appear consistent and also to avoid appearing hypocritical. For example, in Dickerson et
\nal.\u2019s (1992) study, participants who signed a flyer in support of water conservation took
\nsignificantly shorter showers. An individual who signs a flyer supporting the conservation of
\nwater and then proceeds to shower for half an hour is behaving in an inconsistent manner and
\nwould appear to be a hypocrite. However, in the current study, participants were able to assign a
\nverdict of guilty and then switch to innocent without appearing hypocritical due to the nature of
\nthe evidence presented. Therefore, future studies should attempt to create situations wherein
\nparticipants are motivated to maintain consistency, such as if changing one\u2019s mind would be
\nviewed as an admission of incompetence.
\nConclusion
\nThe present study applied theory from the literature on error and bias in an attempt to
\nunderstand the impact of confession evidence on an individual\u2019s guilt judgments. Although this
\n32
\nstudy failed to find an overall belief perseverance effect, it did find such an effect for participants
\nwho were not made to feel committed to (or accountable for) their initial guilt belief.
\nAdditionally, it was found that commitment had a meaningful impact on guilt judgments such
\nthat those participants who were made to feel committed to (or accountable for) their initial guilt
\njudgments gave lower final guilt judgments. Future studies should examine whether these
\nprocedures truly lead participants to feel committed to their beliefs or instead lead to a greater
\nsense of accountability, which then creates a conservative criterion shift in their guilt judgment
\ndecisions such that they require a greater degree of certainty of guilt to offer a guilty verdict.
\nMoreover, future research should attempt to include people who are more invested in the
\ndecisions by, if possible, recruiting participants from law enforcement.
\n33
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\n37
\nFigure 1. Participants\u2019 verdicts by condition and phase as they proceeded through the study.
\n38
\nFigure 2. Model examining the total effect of confession timing, commitment, and the
\nconfession timing by commitment interaction on phase 2 guilt judgments.
\n39
\nFigure 3. Mediated model examining the effect of phase 1 guilt judgments, confession timing,
\ncommitment, and the confession timing by commitment interaction on phase 2 guilt judgments.
\n40
\nTable 1
\nExperimental Design: Confession x Commitment x Phase
\nCommitment Confession
\nTiming
\nPhase 1
\nCrime Report
\nPhase 2
\nCrime Report
\nHigh Early Circumstantial 1 + Confession add Circumstantial 2 +
\nExculpatory
\nLate Circumstantial 1 add Circumstantial 2 +
\nConfession + Exculpatory
\nLow Early Circumstantial 1 + Confession add Circumstantial 2 +
\nExculpatory
\nLate Circumstantial 1 add Circumstantial 2 +
\nConfession + Exculpatory
\n41
\nTable 2
\nDescriptive Data for Dependent Variables by Experimental Condition (N = 238)
\nVariable
\nCommitment Low Commitment High
\nConfession
\nEarly
\nConfession
\nLate
\nConfession
\nEarly
\nConfession
\nLate
\nPhase 1 Verdict
\nM (SE) 88% (4%) 58% (7%) 82% (5%) 58% (6%)
\n95% CI 79%, 97% 45%, 71% 72%, 92% 45%, 71%
\nPhase 1 Confidence
\nM (SE) 7.77 (.24) 6.03 (.23) 7.68 (.22) 5.60 (.20)
\n95% CI 7.29, 8.25 5.58, 6.49 7.25, 8.12 5.19, 6.00
\nPhase 1 Likelihood
\nof Guilt Judgment
\nM (SE) 7.81 (.24) 5.85 (.21) 7.58 (.26) 5.76 (.21)
\n95% CI 7.33, 8.29 5.43, 6.26 7.07, 8.10 5.33, 6.19
\nPhase 2 Verdict
\nM (SE) 81% (5%) 64% (6%) 58% (6%) 65% (6%)
\n95% CI 70%, 91% 52%, 77% 45%, 71% 52%, 77%
\nPhase 2 Confidence
\nM (SE) 6.72 (.19) 6.49 (.21) 6.28 (.21) 5.97 (.23)
\n95% CI 6.34, 7.10 6.07, 6.91 5.86, 6.70 5.50, 6.43
\nPhase 2 Likelihood
\nof Guilt Judgment
\nM (SE) 6.54 (.22) 6.22 (.24) 5.77 (.25) 5.68 (.20)
\n95% CI 6.10, 6.98 5.74, 6.70 5.27, 6.26 5.27, 6.08
\nIncriminatinga
\nM (SE) 6.36 (.25) 5.89 (.26) 5.92 (.22) 5.68 (.25)
\n95% CI 5.86, 6.85 5.36, 6.41 5.47, 6.37 5.18, 6.18
\nExoneratingb
\nM (SE) 4.80 (.18) 5.29 (.21) 5.34 (.21) 5.40 (.19)
\n95% CI 4.44, 5.15 4.88, 5.70 4.92, 5.76 5.02, 5.79 a
\nIncriminating = Perceived strength of the incriminating evidence.
\nb
\nExonerating = Perceived strength of the exonerating evidence.
\n42
\nTable 3
\nCorrelations (N = 238)
\nVariable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
\n1. Confession Timing – .00 .30** .49** .47** .05 .08 .06
\n2. Commitment – -.03 -.07 -.04 -.12 -.15* -.19*
\n3. Phase 1 Verdict – .35** .67** .40** .16* .32**
\n4. Phase 2 Confidence – .59** .31** .45** .32**
\n5. Guilt 1a – .31** .20** .43**
\n6. Phase 2 Verdict – .37** .69**
\n7. Phase 2 Confidence – .46**
\n8. Guilt 2b –
\nM -.02 .03 .71 6.75 6.73 .67 6.36 6.04
\nSD 1.00 1.00 .46 1.96 2.01 .47 1.65 1.78
\nNote. Confession Timing coded as: Confession Early = 1; Confession Late = -1.
\nCommitment coded as: Commitment High = 1; Commitment Low = -1. Phase 1 Verdict and
\nPhase 2 Verdict coded as: Innocent = 0; Guilty = 1. a
\nGuilt 1 = Phase 1 Likelihood of Guilt Judgment.
\nb
\nGuilt 2 = Phase 2 Likelihood of Guilt Judgment.
\n* p < .05. ** p < .01.
\n43
\nTable 4
\nCorrelations by Commitment Low (N = 116) and Commitment High (N = 122) Conditions
\nVariable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
\nCommitment Low
\n1. Confession Timing – .34** .44** .50** .18 .08 .09
\n2. Phase 1 Verdict – .29** .65** .44** .23* .33**
\n3. Phase 2 Confidence – .54** .47** .51** .32**
\n4. Guilt 1a – .36** .24** .45**
\n5. Phase 2 Verdict – .47** .67**
\n6. Phase 2 Confidence – .54**
\n7. Guilt 2b –
\nM -.02 .72 6.89 6.81 .72 6.60 6.38
\nSD 1.00 .45 1.98 1.96 .45 1.53 1.76
\nCommitment High
\n1. Confession Timing – .26** .54** .45** -.06 .09 .03
\n2. Phase 1 Verdict – .40** .69** .36** .10 .32**
\n3. Phase 2 Confidence – .63** .17 .39** .31**
\n4. Guilt 1a – .26** .15 .41**
\n5. Phase 2 Verdict – .27** .70**
\n6. Phase 2 Confidence – .37**
\n7. Guilt 2b –
\nM -.02 .70 6.62 6.66 .61 6.12 5.72
\nSD 1.00 .46 1.95 2.06 .49 1.73 1.75
\nNote. Confession Timing coded as: Confession Early = 1; Confession Late = -1.
\nPhase 1 Verdict and Phase 2 Verdict coded as: Innocent = 0; Guilty = 1. a
\nGuilt 1 = Phase 1 Likelihood of Guilt Judgment.
\nb
\nGuilt 2 = Phase 2 Likelihood of Guilt Judgment.
\n* p < .05. ** p < .01.
\n44
\nTable 5
\nDirect, Indirect, and Total Effects of Confession Timing on Phase 2 Guilt Verdicts
\nPath Variable b 95% CI pa OR
\nCommitment Low
\na Confession Timing on Verdict 1 .484 .217, .775 < .01 1.62
\nb Verdict 1 on Verdict 2 .643 .356, .834 < .01 1.90
\nc Confession Timing on Verdict 2 -.062 -.313, 202 ns 0.94
\na x b Indirect Effect of Confession Timing .311 .147, .534 < .01 1.36
\na x b + c Total Effect of Confession Timing .249 .003, .516 < .05 1.28
\nCommitment High
\na Confession Timing on Verdict 1 .350 .106, .612 < .01 1.42
\nb Verdict 1 on Verdict 2 .637 .386, .814 < .01 1.89
\nc Confession Timing on Verdict 2 -.304 -.524, -.088 < .01 0.74
\na x b Indirect Effect of Confession Timing .223 .082, .404 < .01 1.25
\na x b + c Total Effect of Confession Timing -.081 -.310, .162 ns 0.92
\nNote. Paths correspond to those depicted in Figure 3. CI, confidence interval. a
\nEffects tested through bias-corrected bootstrapping procedure which precludes calculation of
\nexact p values.
\n\u201cns\u201d corresponds to p > .05.
\n45
\nAPPENDIX A. PHASE 1 CRIME REPORT: CONFESSION EARLY
\nOn November 15, 2014, just past 8:45pm, a purse was stolen from a woman as she
\nattempted to enter her 2007 Honda Civic inside a local parking garage. Video surveillance
\nshowed the perpetrator smoking a cigarette before hitting the woman in the back of the head and
\ntaking her purse. The victim never saw the perpetrator\u2019s face and film taken from within the
\nparking garage was inconclusive due to the poor quality of the video, which made the
\nperpetrator\u2019s face too blurry to identify. Based on the video footage, police could only determine
\nthat the perpetrator was male, in his late teens or early twenties, had dark hair, light-to-medium
\ntoned skin, and wore blue jeans and a dark colored jacket.
\nPolice searched the nearby area and found a purse in an apartment complex garbage
\ndumpster located approximately three blocks from the parking garage. The purse was returned to
\nthe victim who identified it as hers and informed the police that all the contents were accounted
\nfor except for approximately $75 in cash that was now missing. After confirming it was the
\nvictim\u2019s purse, police went door-to-door in the apartment complex before eventually finding 24-
\nyear-old Kyle James. James, a Caucasian with a thin, shortcut beard, was found in his home
\nalone wearing blue jeans and a white t-shirt. A heavy dark blue rain coat was found draped
\nacross the back of his couch. James\u2019 coat contained a pack of cigarettes and his wallet, which
\nwas found to have $83 in it. After finding James and noting that he fit the description of the
\nperpetrator, police brought him in for questioning.
\n46
\nAt the police station, officers brought James to an interrogation room to question him.
\nJames waived his Miranda rights and agreed to speak freely with the investigators. During
\nquestioning, James came across to the officers as equal parts defiant and annoyed. After
\napproximately two hours of questioning, police offered James coffee and a cigarette and allowed
\nhim to use the restroom. After he had rested, investigators returned to questioning him. James
\nconsistently denied any wrongdoing, so the officers reminded him that they had footage of the
\ncrime.
\nJames accused investigators of being incompetent and continued to proclaim his
\ninnocence. The officers countered by playing the tape of the crime and pointing out that he was
\nwearing blue jeans and a dark coat just like the perpetrator. Investigators also reminded James
\nthat, like the perpetrator in the video, he is a smoker and he was found with just over $80 in his
\nwallet right after $75 was reported missing. Officers continued to question James over the course
\nof the next two hours. During this time, the officers again reminded James of the evidence they
\nhad against him at which point James confessed to the crime. He told the police that he was
\nsmoking a cigarette while walking by a woman in the parking garage and saw her purse. He told
\nof how he hit her in the back of the head and then fled the scene on foot after grabbing the purse.
\nAfter verbally confessing, investigators had James write out his confession by hand and sign it.
\n47
\nAPPENDIX B. PHASE 1 CRIME REPORT: CONFESSION LATE
\nOn November 15, 2014, just past 8:45pm, a purse was stolen from a woman as she
\nattempted to enter her 2007 Honda Civic inside a local parking garage. Video surveillance
\nshowed the perpetrator smoking a cigarette before hitting the woman in the back of the head and
\ntaking her purse. The victim never saw the perpetrator\u2019s face and film taken from within the
\nparking garage was inconclusive due to the poor quality of the video, which made the
\nperpetrator\u2019s face too blurry to identify. Based on the video footage, police could only determine
\nthat the perpetrator was male, in his late teens or early twenties, had dark hair, light-to-medium
\ntoned skin, and wore blue jeans and a dark colored jacket.
\nPolice searched the nearby area and found a purse in an apartment complex garbage
\ndumpster located approximately three blocks from the parking garage. The purse was returned to
\nthe victim who identified it as hers and informed the police that all the contents were accounted
\nfor except for approximately $75 in cash that was now missing. After confirming it was the
\nvictim\u2019s purse, police went door-to-door in the apartment complex before eventually finding 24-
\nyear-old Kyle James. James, a Caucasian with a thin, shortcut beard, was found in his home
\nalone wearing blue jeans and a white t-shirt. A heavy dark blue rain coat was found draped
\nacross the back of his couch. James\u2019 coat contained a pack of cigarettes and his wallet, which
\nwas found to have $83 in it. After finding James and noting that he fit the description of the
\nperpetrator, police brought him in for questioning.
\n48
\nAPPENDIX C. PHASE 2 CRIME REPORT
\nOn November 15, 2014, just past 8:45pm, a purse was stolen from a woman as she
\nattempted to enter her 2007 Honda Civic inside a local parking garage. Video surveillance
\nshowed the perpetrator smoking a cigarette before hitting the woman in the back of the head and
\ntaking her purse. The victim never saw the perpetrator\u2019s face and film taken from within the
\nparking garage was inconclusive due to the poor quality of the video, which made the
\nperpetrator\u2019s face too blurry to identify. Based on the video footage, police could only determine
\nthat the perpetrator was male, in his late teens or early twenties, had dark hair, light-to-medium
\ntoned skin, and wore blue jeans and a dark colored jacket.
\nPolice searched the nearby area and found a purse in an apartment complex garbage
\ndumpster located approximately three blocks from the parking garage. The purse was returned to
\nthe victim who identified it as hers and informed the police that all the contents were accounted
\nfor except for approximately $75 in cash that was now missing. After confirming it was the
\nvictim\u2019s purse, police went door-to-door in the apartment complex before eventually finding 24-
\nyear-old Kyle James. James, a Caucasian with a thin, shortcut beard, was found in his home
\nalone wearing blue jeans and a white t-shirt. A heavy dark blue rain coat was found draped
\nacross the back of his couch. James\u2019 coat contained a pack of cigarettes and his wallet, which
\nwas found to have $83 in it. After finding James and noting that he fit the description of the
\nperpetrator, police brought him in for questioning.
\n49
\nAt the police station, officers brought James to an interrogation room to question him.
\nJames waived his Miranda rights and agreed to speak freely with the investigators. During
\nquestioning, James came across to the officers as equal parts defiant and annoyed. After
\napproximately two hours of questioning, police offered James coffee and a cigarette and allowed
\nhim to use the restroom. After he had rested, investigators returned to questioning him. James
\nconsistently denied any wrongdoing, so the officers reminded him that they had footage of the
\ncrime.
\nJames accused investigators of being incompetent and continued to proclaim his
\ninnocence. The officers countered by playing the tape of the crime and pointing out that he was
\nwearing blue jeans and a dark coat just like the perpetrator. Investigators also reminded James
\nthat, like the perpetrator in the video, he is a smoker and he was found with just over $80 in his
\nwallet right after $75 was reported missing. Officers continued to question James over the course
\nof the next two hours. During this time, the officers again reminded James of the evidence they
\nhad against him at which point James confessed to the crime. He told the police that he was
\nsmoking a cigarette while walking by a woman in the parking garage and saw her purse. He told
\nof how he hit her in the back of the head and then fled the scene on foot after grabbing the purse.
\nAfter verbally confessing, investigators had James write out his confession by hand and sign it.
\n50
\nAfter bringing James to the police station, officers returned to the parking garage to
\ninterview local shop owners about whether they witnessed anyone entering the parking garage
\naround the time of the crime. Diane Forrester, a hair stylist at a salon half a block from the
\nparking garage, informed police that she remembered seeing a young man enter the parking
\ngarage while smoking a cigarette. When asked what time this occurred, Diane informed the
\nofficers that she was closing up the salon at the time so it would have been just past 8:30pm. She
\ndescribed the man as being somewhere between his late twenties to early thirties and light
\nskinned. Diane told police that the man had short, dark hair and was wearing blue jeans with a
\nblack coat. She also thought that he may have had facial hair.
\nOfficers showed Diane Forrester a lineup that included James. Diane took her time and
\ncarefully examined each of the individuals in the lineup before she eventually identified James as
\nthe man that she had seen outside of the parking garage. After Diane had identified James,
\nofficers asked her how certain she was that the man she identified from the lineup was the man
\nshe had seen at the parking garage. Diane informed the investigating officers that she thought he
\nwas the man she saw, but that she was not certain.
\n51
\nAfter a few nights spent in jail, James requested to speak to investigators. James claimed
\nthat he was innocent and that he had an alibi. He told police that he was at a restaurant at the time
\nof the crime and that he could prove it as he used his MasterCard to pay his bill. Investigators
\nchecked credit card records and found that his card was used to make a purchase at a local
\nsteakhouse shortly before the crime took place. James\u2019 lawyer proclaimed that this provided
\nclear evidence of his client\u2019s innocence and moved to have James released immediately. Police
\nwere not convinced, however, because James could have easily given his card to someone else to
\nuse. Because there were no security cameras at the restaurant, this possibility could not be ruled
\nout.
\nInvestigators obtained access to restaurant records for the night in question and contacted
\neveryone who made a purchase by credit card that evening. Of the twelve individuals contacted,
\none claimed to have seen James at the restaurant. Susan Brayshaw was at the restaurant with her
\nfather for his birthday. She claimed that a man matching James\u2019 description was seated at the bar
\nacross from her booth while she was having dinner. Upon request, Susan came to the police
\nstation where investigators assembled a lineup. Susan identified James as the man from the
\nrestaurant. Officers asked Susan how certain she was that the man she identified from the lineup
\nwas the man she saw at the restaurant. She responded that she thought it was him. However, she
\nalso explained that she had several drinks on the night in question and that her memory for the
\nnight was a little hazy.
\n52
\nAPPENDIX D. GUILT JUDGMENTS
\n1.) Based on the information presented in the criminal report, if you had to choose would you say
\nthat Kyle James is more likely to be guilty or innocent?
\n\u274f – Guilty \u274f – Innocent
\n2.) How confident are you in your decision?
\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
\nNot At All Very
\nConfident Confident
\n3.) How likely do you think it is that James is guilty?
\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
\nVery Very
\nUnlikely Likely
\n53
\nAPPENDIX E. PERCEPTIONS OF IMPARTIALITY
\n1.) To what extent was your Assessment based on the evidence provided within the crime report?
\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
\nNot At All Completely
\nEvidence-Based Evidence-Based
\n2.) How impartial was your Assessment of the case?
\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
\nNot At All Completely
\nFair and Impartial Fair and Impartial
\n54
\nAPPENDIX F. MANIPULATION CHECK
\n1.) When did you learn that the suspect in the case confessed to committing the crime?
\na.) NEVER \u2013 the suspect did not confess to the crime
\nb.) The FIRST time I read the crime report
\nc.) The SECOND time I read the crime report
\n2.) After you read the crime report for the first time, how strong was your belief that the suspect
\nwas guilty or innocent?
\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
\nVery
\nWeak
\nBelief
\nVery
\nStrong
\nBelief
\n3.) After you read the crime report for the first time, how strong would new evidence had to have
\nbeen for you to change your verdict from guilty to innocent or innocent to guilt?
\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
\nNot Very
\nStrong
\nVery
\nStrong
\n4.) Thinking about your final verdict in this case, how difficult would it be for someone to
\nconvince you to change your verdict from guilty to innocent or from innocent to guilty?
\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
\nNot Very
\nDifficult
\nVery
\nDifficult
\n5.) Thinking about your final verdict in this case, how strong would new evidence have to be for
\nyou to change your verdict from guilty to innocent or innocent to guilt?
\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
\nNot Very
\nStrong
\nVery
\nStrong
\n55
\nAPPENDIX G. ATTENTION CHECK
\n1.) What was the suspect\u2019s name?
\na.) Steve Park
\nb.) Mark Lindsay
\nc.) Kyle James
\nd.) Ryan Johnson
\n2.) Did the suspect confess to the crime?
\na.) Yes
\nb.) No
\n3.) What was the suspect\u2019s alibi?
\na.) He was at the dentist
\nb.) He was at a restaurant
\nc.) He was at his nephew\u2019s graduation
\nd.) He was at a baseball game
\n4.) Did the suspect\u2019s clothes match the perpetrator\u2019s clothing from the video?
\na.) Yes
\nb.) No
\n5.) Was the suspect found with cigarettes?
\na.) Yes
\nb.) No
\n6.) Did the suspect have a similar amount of cash as was stolen?
\na.) Yes
\nb.) No
\n7.) Was the suspect found with house keys stolen from the purse?
\na.) Yes
\nb.) No
\n8.) Did an eyewitness identify the suspect as being near the scene of the crime?
\na.) Yes
\nb.) No
\n56
\nAPPENDIX H. SUSPICION CHECK
\n1.) Sometimes experiments study questions that are not obvious. Do you believe that is the case
\nin this experiment? No: Yes: If yes, please indicate what research questions you
\nbelieve might be under investigation in this experiment.
\n2.) Please indicate what you knew about this experiment before participating.
\n3.) Please rate as honestly as possible how believable you found the experimenter when he or she
\ninformed you that some of the materials had been left out. This question will remain anonymous
\nand the experimenter will never learn of your rating
\n1 2 3 4 5 6
\nCompletely
\nUnbelievable
\nModerately
\nUnbelievable
\nSlightly
\nUnbelievable
\nSlightly
\nBelievable
\nModerately
\nBelievable
\nCompletely
\nBelievable
\n57
\nAPPENDIX I. SCRAMBLED ANAGRAMS
\nA scrambled anagram is a word or phrase made that has had its letters reordered. For example,
\nthe letters \u2018plepa\u2019 can be rearranged to create the word \u2018apple\u2019.
\nPlease attempt to solve the following scrambled anagrams:
\n1.) House suhoe 23.) Down dnwo
\n2.) Screwdriver drrviewecsr 24.) Archive eiahcvr
\n3.) College ceeogll 25.) Left lfte
\n4.) Laptop lpaotp 26.) Answer earnws
\n5.) Dish dhsi 27.) Contact cottanc
\n6.) Work rkow 28.) Straight ttiahgrs
\n7.) Laundry ladrynu 29.) Suit tius
\n8.) Truck tckur 30.) Present teenspr
\n9.) Coffee efefoc 31.) Thrill llhrti
\n10.) Vacuum uumavc 32.) Thursday daysurht
\n11.) Driveway yweavird 33.) Gossip poigss
\n12.) Baseball lblbaaes 34.) Sneeze eeenzs
\n13.) Purple plperu 35.) Heaven neeavh
\n14.) Canada caaand 36.) Ruler rlure
\n15.) Clothes coheslt 37.) Push phus
\n16.) Stairs sritas 38.) Electric eccirtel
\n17.) Rocket koctre 39.) Cake eack
\n18.) Mail alim 40.) Oxygen nyxgeo
\n19.) Bump bmpu 41.) Boss bsso
\n20.) Dance dcnea 42.) Seven svnee
\n21.) Glass gssla 43.) Bacon bcnoa
\n22.) Plane pealn 44.) Spoon soonp
\n58
\nAPPENDIX J. INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD APPROVAL FORM<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Capstones, Theses and Dissertations 2018 Belief perseverance: The staying power of confession evidence TABLE OF CONTENTS Page LIST OF FIGURES ……………………………………………………………………………………… v LIST OF TABLES………………………………………………………………………………………..\u2026<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[10601,10596,10882,479,537,172,478,10597,10599,10595],"tags":[10524,10522,10890,10561,10883,10889,10515,10521,10696,10518,10888,10887,10886,10885,10884,10525],"class_list":["post-124697","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-assignment-help-by-uks-no-1-writing-service","category-assignment-writers-canada-university-cost","category-free-ai-english-assignment-writers-china","category-nursing-course-hero","category-nursing-essay-pro","category-nursing-study-bay","category-nursing-study-pool","category-professional-assignment-writers-usa","category-uae-1-cheap-assignment-writing-service","category-write-a-word-essay","tag-apa-citation-format-assignment","tag-assignment-writers-australia-college-student","tag-best-nursing-case-study-writing-services","tag-buy-essay-usa","tag-case-study-nursing-writing-services-for-care-plans","tag-free-nursing-case-study-writing-services","tag-help-write-a-page-assignment","tag-i-need-someone-to-do-my-assignment-within-hours","tag-need-assistance-completing-the-assignment","tag-need-to-write-an-essay","tag-nursing-case-studies-with-answers","tag-nursing-case-study-paper-example","tag-nursing-case-study-template-examples-of-case-studies-nursing","tag-pharmacology-case-study","tag-soap-note-case-study","tag-write-pages"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/124697","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=124697"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/124697\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=124697"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=124697"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=124697"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}