Analysis of Human Factors in Cyber Security: A Case Study of Anonymous Attack on Hbgary Benjamin Aruwa Gyunka Directorate of Information and…<\/p>\n
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Analysis of Human Factors in Cyber Security: A Case
\nStudy of Anonymous Attack on Hbgary
\nBenjamin Aruwa Gyunka
\nDirectorate of Information and Communication Technology
\nNational Open University of Nigeria (NOUN)
\nAbuja, Nigeria
\ngyunkson@gmail.com
\nAbikoye Oluwakemi Christiana
\nDepartment of Computer Science
\nUniversity of Ilorin
\nIlorin, Nigeria
\nkemi_adeoye@yahoo.com
\nABSTRACT
\nPurpose:
\nThis
\npaper
\ncritically
\nanalyses
\nthe
\nhuman factors or behaviours as major threats to
\ncyber security. Focus is placed on the usual roles
\nplayed by both the attackers and defenders (the
\ntargets
\nof
\nthe
\nattacker)
\nin
\ncyber
\nthreats\u2019
\npervasiveness and the potential impacts of such
\nactions on critical security infrastructures.
\nDesign\/Methodology\/Approach:
\nTo enable an
\neffective and practical analysis, the Anonymous
\nattack against HBGary Federal (A security firm
\nin the United State of America) was taken as a
\ncase study to reveal the huge damaging impacts
\nof human errors and attitudes against the security
\nof organizations and individuals.
\nFindings:
\nThe
\nfindings
\nrevealed
\nthat
\nthe
\npowerful security firm was compromised and
\novertaken
\nthrough
\nsimple
\nSQL
\ninjection
\ntechniques and a very crafty social engineering
\nattack
\nwhich
\nsucceeded
\nbecause
\nof
\nsheer
\npersonnel negligence and unwitting utterances.
\nThe damage caused by the attack was enormous
\nand it includes the exposure of very sensitive
\nand personal data, complete shutdown of the
\nwebsite, loss of backup data and personnel
\ncharacter deformations. The research also found
\nthat
\ndamaging
\nhuman
\nfactors
\nresults
\nfrom
\nignorance or illiteracy to basic security practices,
\ncarelessness
\nand
\nsometimes
\nsabotage
\nby
\ndisgruntled employees from within and these
\nvulnerabilities have become prime target for
\nexploitation
\nby
\nattackers
\nthrough
\nsocial
\nengineering attacks. Social engineering was also
\ndiscovered to be the leading attack technique
\nadopted by attackers within the cyber space in
\nrecent years.
\nPractical Implications:
\nThe paper concludes by
\nadvocating assiduous training and cyber security
\nawareness programmes for workforces and the
\nimplementations
\nand
\nmaintenance
\nof
\nbasic
\nsecurity culture and policies as a panacea for
\nsocial
\nengineering
\ncyber
\nattacks
\nagainst
\nindividuals and organizations.
\nOriginality:
\nLots of work has been done and
\nmany
\nstill
\non-going
\nin
\nthe
\nfield
\nof
\nsocial
\nengineering attacks and human factors, but this
\nstudy is the first to adopt an approach of a
\npractical case study to critically analyze the
\neffects of human factors on cyber security.
\nKeywords:
\nThe Anonymous; HBGary Federal;
\nUniform
\nResource
\nLocation
\n(URL);
\nContent
\nManagement
\nSystem
\n(CMS);
\nSQL
\nInjection;
\nCross-site Scripting (XXS); Social Engineering;
\nCyber Security; Information Security
\nPaper Type:
\nResearch Paper
\n1
\nIntroduction
\nHumans have been found to be truly the weakest
\nlink of security (Mitnick, Simon, & L., 2011) and
\n(GBC-DELL Survey, 2015). The psychology of
\nhuman workforce is being viewed as a critical
\nfactor that poses serious cyber-attacks risks to all
\nusers (Ranjeev & Lawless, 2015). Human cyber
\nsecurity
\nbehaviours
\nhas
\ncreated
\nserious
\nvulnerabilities which attackers exploits using
\nsocial engineering attack techniques and findings
\nrevealed that human factors are responsible for
\n95% of all security incidences (IBM, 2015).
\nHuman threats to critical infrastructures and
\nservices
\ncome
\nmostly
\nfrom
\ncareless
\nwork
\nbehaviours and ignorance of basic cyber security
\npractices
\nwhich
\ninclude
\nirregular
\nsoftware
\npatching to get rid of bugs, installations of
\nmalicious software, careless communication of
\n10<\/p>\n
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sensitive information and connection to insecure
\ninternet networks or Wi-Fi (Aziz, 2013) and
\n(James, 2015). They also include poor attitudes to
\nweb
\napplications
\nusage
\nand
\ndatabase
\nmanagement which opens door to cross-site
\nscripting
\n(XXS)
\nand
\nSQL
\nInjection
\nvulnerabilities
\n(Stuttard
\n&
\nMarcus,
\n2011).
\nAttackers these days find it interestingly easier
\nto begin their attacks by the exploitation of
\nhuman ignorance, weakness and selfish interests
\nto gain an open entrance for a mega attack.
\nPeople are now inadvertently deceived to either
\ninitiate
\nor
\neven
\ncarry
\nout
\nthe
\nattacks
\nby
\nthemselves
\nwithout
\nthe
\nattacker
\nnecessarily
\nintroducing an external event or involving very
\nexpensive technical exploit kits. Human factor is
\nan insider threat against security either through
\ndisgruntled employees seeking to cause pains or
\nthrough social engineering which appeals to
\npersonnel\u2019s instincts and attackers would rather
\ntake advantage of these vulnerabilities, where
\navailable, than engaging other exploits against
\ntechnical
\nsecurity
\ndevices
\n(James,
\n2015),
\n(Warwick, 2016) and (CeBIT Australia, 2017).
\nResearch has shown that it is not good
\nenough to have all the state-of-the-art security
\nsoftware and hardware properly installed and
\nrunning in an organization if the human factor to
\ncyber security is neglected (Nate L. , 2016), and
\n(James,
\n2015).
\nFirewalls,
\nIntrusion
\nDetection
\nSystems, Antimalware and many authentication
\nmechanisms
\nsuch
\nas
\ntime-based
\ntokens
\nor
\nbiometric smart devices, are usually installed to
\nprotect
\nagainst
\nexternal
\nthreats
\nbut
\ncannot
\nprotect against threats from within, caused by
\nignorant and careless personnel (Mitnick, Simon,
\n& L., 2011) or by disgruntled employees aiding
\nexternal attacker (Blythe, 2013). Cyber attackers
\nwould rather now want to exploit the vulnerable
\nhuman factors through simple tricks than to
\nspend much time and resources trying to gain
\naccess by breaking through the different strong
\ntechnical security systems. This paper seeks to
\npractically analyze the impacts of human factors
\nto critical security infrastructures. The attack of
\nthe
\nAnonymous
\nHacktivist
\ngroup
\nagainst
\nHBGary Federal, a US based security firm, was
\ntaken as a case study to analyze the different
\nphases of cyber attacks against human cyber
\nsecurity behaviours. The different phases include
\nthe analysis of defender(s) vulnerabilities (target
\nof attack \u2013 the human factors), the analysis of
\nthe attackers\u2019 tricks and techniques, and finally,
\nthe analysis of the resulting damages. The paper
\nconcludes
\nwith
\nsuggestive
\ntechniques
\nfor
\npreventing against such exploitations.
\n2
\nSocial Engineering
\nSocial engineering is a non-technical method of
\ncyber-attacks
\nwhich
\nabsolutely
\ndepends
\non
\nhuman
\npsychology
\nand
\nmostly
\ninvolves
\ndeceiving
\npeople
\ninto
\nbreaching
\nstandard
\nsecurity practices (Nate, 2016). Researches have
\nshown that social engineering attacks are the top
\nmost
\nthreats
\nagainst
\ninformation
\nsecurity
\n(Warwick, 2016) and (Nate, 2016). The whole
\ntechnique
\nof
\nsocial
\nengineering
\nattacks
\nis
\ncompletely anchored on the principle and art of
\ndeception, making people do things that they
\nwould ordinarily not want to do for a complete
\nstranger (Mitnick et al, 2011). Thus, victims of
\nthis attack techniques are usually persuaded to
\nwillingly open wide their security door ways to
\nunknown persons (Ranjeev & Lawless, 2015) or
\nare tricked to do things like giving out sensitive
\ninformation
\nor
\ndocuments,
\ndisabling
\ncritical
\nsecurity
\nsystems,
\ntransferring
\nmoney
\nto
\nunknown persons\u2019 accounts and many other
\ndevastating things (Warwick, 2016). Sometimes
\nthey are tricked to believe that the order they are
\nobeying is coming from a superior, colleague, or
\npartner sitting somewhere (Mitnick, Simon, & L.,
\n2011). Often times, what they are persuaded to
\ndo are highly regrettable, causing irreversible
\ndamages.
\nCommon
\napproaches
\nor
\nattack
\nvectors
\nadopted in social engineering attacks include
\nengaging people through fake emails, social
\nmedia, voice calls, mobile apps, or through
\ndirect physical contact with the defendant (target
\nof the attacker). Social engineering attacks, or
\nattacks against human psychology and instincts,
\nmay come in the forms of phishing, malware
\nattacks, pretexting, baiting, quid pro quo and
\ntailgating (David, 2015). Phishing scams and
\nmalware infections have be found to be the most
\nadopted
\nforms of
\nsocial
\nengineering
\nattacks
\n(GBC-DELL Survey, 2015) as indicated in Figure
\n1.
\nAnyone that falls victim of social engineering
\nattack would normally become the enabler of the
\nbigger attack or might even unknowingly be
\nused to directly complete the full-scale attack.
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Journal of Business Continuity & Emergency Planning Volume 7 Number 2
\nCyber security:
\nA
\ncritical examination
\nof
\ninformation sharing versus data sensitivity
\nissues
\nfor
\norganisations
\nat
\nrisk
\nof
\ncyber attack
\nJason Mallinder and Peter Drabwell
\nReceived (in revised form): 15th July 2013
\nCredit Suisse, Z\u00fcrich, Switzerland
\nE-mail: jason.mallinder@credit-suisse.com
\nJason Mallinder
\njoined Credit Suisse in 1998,
\ninitially managing the Access Control team in
\nLondon. During his time at the bank, he has
\nmanaged a number of teams and programmes in
\nthe identity management and IT risk manage-
\nment areas. In July 2011, Jason moved to focus
\non operational risk management within the
\ninvestment bank for a year, before returning to
\ntechnology risk management as the EMEA
\nregional head. Prior to joining Credit Suisse,
\nJason worked at Aon Risk Services for seven
\nyears and he has supported his career by
\nachieving qualifications in both risk management
\nand project ( help with nursing paper writing from experts with MSN & DNP degrees) management
\nPeter Drabwell
\nis a senior technology risk ana-
\nlyst at Credit Suisse within the Risk Management
\ndivision, responsible for private banking, wealth
\nmanagement and shared services IT clients
\nacross EMEA. Prior to joining Credit Suisse,
\nPeter was responsible for the risk assessment of
\nABN AMRC\/RBS IT integration, and the devel-
\nopment of risk management strategy for
\nmergers, acquisition and divestitures. Peter is an
\nactive member of the ISC(2) European Advisory
\nBoard and is currently President of the ISACA
\nLondon Chapter.
\nABSTRACT
\nCyber threats are growing and evolving at an
\nunprecedented rate. Consequently, it is becoming
\nvitally important that organisations share infor-
\nmation internally and externally before, during
\nand after incidents they encounter so that les-
\nsons can be learned, good practice identified and
\nnew cyber resilience capabilities developed.
\nMany organisations are reluctant to share such
\ninformation for fear of divulging sensitive infor-
\nmation or because it may be vague or incom-
\nplete. This provides organisations with a
\ncomplex dilemma: how to share information as
\nopenly as possibly about cyber incidents, while
\nprotecting their confidentiality and focusing on
\nservice recovery from such incidents. This paper
\nexplores the dilemma of information sharing
\nversus sensitivity and provides a practical
\noverview of considerations every business conti-
\nnuity plan should address to plan effectively for
\ninformation sharing in the event of a cyber
\nincident.
\nKeywords: cyber, threat, incident, infor-
\nmation security, business continuity
\nplanning,
\nintelligence,
\nprevention,
\ndetection, response
\nINTRODUCTION
\nCyber threats are growing and evolving at
\nan unprecedented rate.^ Rapidly evolving
\ncyber criminal networks have already
\nrecognised the value of intelligence shar-
\ning and collaboration as evidenced by the
\ngrowing number and sophistication of
\nJournal of Business Continuity
\n& Emergency Planning
\nVol.7 No. 2, pp. 103-111
\n\u00a9 Henry Stewart Publications,
\n1749-9216<\/p>\n
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Underground forums and information
\nexchanges.” Government and industry
\ninformation sharing is far less advanced.
\nWhile organisations are beginning to
\nrecognise the imperative for cyber infor-
\nmation sharing, they still face the chal-
\nlenge of balancing transparency and
\nconfidentiality.
\nThis challenge is significantly increased
\ngiven the growing
\ninterconnectivity
\nbetween organisations and their partners;
\nby way of example, it is increasingly
\ncommon for attackers seeking sensitive
\ninformation to target an organisation’s
\nsupply chain (the attack vector being
\nfocused on a third-party vendor in order
\nto reach the principal target). An example
\nof such a data breach recently occurred at
\nBank of America, whereby attackers man-
\naged to successfully access employee and
\nexecutive data stored through a third-party
\nsubcontractor. What is particularly inter-
\nesting about this attack is that it was
\nallegedly motivated by a project ( help with nursing paper writing from experts with MSN & DNP degrees) initiated
\nby Bank of America to monitor publicly
\navailable information in an effort to iden-
\ntify security threats.
\nThe increasing complexity of supply
\nchains coupled w^ith the adoption of
\ncloud-based services places greater onus on
\norganisations to understand where their
\ndata are and to ensure that they are man-
\naged appropriately, in order to prevent sup-
\npliers’ vulnerabilities from becoming their
\now^n. This further emphasises the impor-
\ntance of information exchange regarding
\ncyber incidents within a supply chain.’*
\nCommonality between cyber land-
\nscapes within organisations increases the
\nappeal of exploiting shared weaknesses as
\nmalicious parties find cyber attacks that
\ncan be reused against multiple targets to be
\nmore attractive. Organisations and indus-
\ntries with mechanisms to disseminate
\ninformation about cyber-attacks rapidly
\nnot only help others to minimise the
\nimpact from such incidents but also
\ndecrease the long-term attractiveness of
\nthemselves and their industry as targets.
\nDespite the challenges, organisations
\ncan take steps to enable their ability to
\nshare information before during and after
\ncyber incidents, helping organisations and
\nindustries to buud more resilient operating
\nframeworks, while presenting themselves
\nas less attractive targets.
\nPRE-INCIDENT DATA MANAGEMENT
\nCyber incidents are increasingly expensive
\nand prevention is better than cure.
\nAccordingly to a recent survey by the
\nUK Department for Business, Innovation
\nand Skills, the average cost of the worst
\nsecurity breach of the year is presently in
\nthe region of\/;450,000 to X;850,000 and
\n^35,000 to ;\u00a365,000 for large organisa-
\ntions (>250 staff) and small business (<50\nstaff), respectively.^ The report adds: 'in\ntotal, the cost to UK pic of security\nbreaches is of the order of billions of\npounds per annum \u2014 it's roughly tripled\nover the last year'.\nInformation can be used to enhance the\norganisation's ability to manage its data\nand its defences efficiently and effectively.\nSources of information that an organisa-\ntion can use as part of its incident manage-\nment strategy can be varied, from\nindependent sources of threat analysis (eg\ninformation related to tools, techniques\nand resources being used by attackers to\nbreach cyber defences) and published\nindustry-specific trends to third-party sup-\nplier\/vendor reports of anomalies worthy\nof further review.^\nGiven the increasing dependence on\nthird parties and growing inter-connectiv-\nity, organisations should consider adopting\na more collaborative, 'partner' approach to\nincident management data exchange and\nanalysis.\nThe business operating landscape is\nbecoming more complex to manage\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n \n \n Show entire document\n \n \n \n \n ATTACHMENT PREVIEW\n \n \n Download attachment\n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n22 \nIntellectual Property & Technology Law Journal \nVolume 25 \u2022 Number 12 \u2022 December 2013\nT\noday, you would be hard pressed to find an \norganization that does not use IT systems \nand the Internet to conduct its business. While \ntechnology offers great benefits, it also brings risk. \nAs technology becomes ever more complex, the \nscope and scale of cyber risks are increasing at an \nunprecedented rate. Because responsibility to man-\nage cyber risks rests with each organization, it needs \nto be high on each board\u2019s agenda. It is clear that \nthis is no longer just an issue for the IT department. \nGovernments around the world are trying to \neducate businesses about the risk of cyber crime, \nwhile at the same time equipping law enforcement \nauthorities with the tools to prosecute offend-\ners. The European Union in particular is seeking \nto take a lead in efforts to raise the bar in cyber \ncrime prevention and enforcement, and the United \nKingdom has identified cyber crime as a \u201cTier 1\u201d \nthreat to national security alongside terrorism. \nAlthough it will never be possible for cyber risks \nto be eradicated entirely, there are many steps that \ncompanies can take to address and mitigate cyber \nrisks and to respond appropriately when an attack \noccurs. But evidence suggests that many companies \nare still not putting in place adequate measures to \naddress cyber security. According to the UK govern-\nment, \n1\n\u201cabout 80 percent of known attacks would \nbe defeated by embedding basic information secu-\nrity practices for your people, processes and tech-\nnology.\u201d Indeed, KPMG recently announced \n2\nthat it \nhad been able to collect employee user names, email \naddresses, and sensitive internal file location infor-\nmation about every UK FTSE 350 company using \ndata publicly available on the Internet. This kind \nof data could be used to carry out fraud or obtain \ncompanies\u2019 intellectual property. The research also \nindicated that more than half of the FTSE 350 \ncompanies demonstrated potential vulnerabilities to \nattack because they did not have up-to-date secu-\nrity patches and\/or were using old server software. \nAs the Director of GCHQ (the United Kingdom\u2019s \ncommunications intelligence agency) said in guid-\nance published last year, \n3\n\u201cValue, Revenue and \nCredibility are at stake. Don\u2019t let cyber security \nbecome the agenda\u2014put it on the agenda.\u201d \nBackground \nCyber attacks can be conducted using a variety \nof different methods and technologies, includ-\ning botnets, denial of service attacks, spamming, \npharming, spoofing, malware ( \ne.g.\n, viruses, worms, \nTrojan horses, etc.), phishing, and ID theft. \nSuch attacks may be instigated by a wide variety \nof players for different reasons ( \ne.g.,\nemployees acci-\ndentally, through negligence or maliciously; com-\npetitors conducting industrial espionage, sabotage, \nor intellectual property theft; state sponsored actors \nsuch as foreign intelligence services, organized \ncrime gangs, terrorists; cyber criminals intent on \nfraud; and hackers and hacktivists, etc.). \nCyber incidents can be caused by a variety \nof factors including vulnerable IT systems and \nnetworks, insecure email, lost and stolen devices, \nsocial engineering, etc. The inside factor cannot \nbe underestimated. According to Symantec\u2019s recent \nannual Cost of a Data Breach Report, \n4\nemployee \nactions and system errors were the cause of nearly \ntwo thirds of all data security breaches. \nCyber incidents can result in damage to infra-\nstructure, downtime and business interruption, \nloss of commercially sensitive data, theft of intel-\nlectual property, fraud, and liability to third parties. \nAccordingly, the potential harm that can be caused \nto businesses by cyber incidents is substantial and \nmay include: \n\u2022 \nfinancial losses ( \ne.g.\n, loss of money, the cost of \nremediating and rectifying damage, impact on \nshare value, loss of revenue, etc.); \nSusan McLean\nis an of counsel lawyer at Morrison and \nFoerster in London, England, and a member of the Technology \nTransactions group and the Global Sourcing group. She may be \ncontacted at \nsmclean@mofo.com\n. \nBeware the Botnets: Cyber Security \nIs a Board Level Issue \nBy Susan McLean \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n \n \n View the Answer\n \n \n \n \n\nVolume 25 \u2022 Number 12 \u2022 December 2013 \nIntellectual Property & Technology Law Journal \n23\n\u2022 \nreputational damage (damage to brand, loss of \ntrust with customers, etc \n.\n); \n\u2022 \ndamage to business interests ( \ne.g.,\nloss of \nbusiness\/\nclients, impact on potential merger\/corporate \ntransaction, reduced competitive advantage, etc.); \n\u2022 \nlegal and regulatory penalties ( \ne.g.,\nfines, etc.); \nand \n\u2022 \ncompensation to affected third parties. \nLatest Developments: \nUnited Kingdom \nCyber security is high on the UK government\u2019s \nagenda. A Cyber Security Strategy \n5\nwas published \nin November 2011 and various initiatives have \nsince been launched to deal with the issue. Latest \ndevelopments include the following. \n\u2022 \nIn September 2012, the UK government \npublished cyber security guidance for UK \nbusinesses \n6\nexplaining what cyber risks are and \nproviding a 10-step plan for the management \nof cyber risks. However, according to a recent \nsurvey, \n7\nalthough almost all of the companies \nsurveyed thought that their company\u2019s specific \nexposure to cyber risk was increasing, almost 50 \npercent of company boards had not discussed \nthis guidance and 28 percent of boards had not \neven seen it. \n\u2022 \nIn March 2013, the government launched the \nCyber Security Information Sharing Partnership \n(CSIP) \n8\nto help government and industry share \ninformation and intelligence on cyber security \nthreats. The kind of information to be shared \nincludes technical details of an attack, methods \nused in planning an attack, and how to mitigate \nand deal with an attack. The initiative initially \nwill involve 160 private sector organizations. \n\u2022 \nIn April 2013, the government published further \nguidance on cyber security specifically for small \nbusinesses. \n9\n\u2022 \nIn April 2013, the government published its \ndetailed 2013 Information Security Breaches \nSurvey. \n10\nThe survey identified that 93 percent \nof large organizations and 87 percent of small \nbusinesses had experienced at least one security \nbreach in 2012. This was an increase of roughly \n50 percent on 2011 figures. The average worst \nsecurity breach cost large organizations between \n\u00a3450,000 and \u00a3850,000 and small businesses \n\u00a335,000 to \u00a365,000. Eighty-one percent of \nrespondents briefed their board or senior man-\nagement on cyber risk, but the frequency of such \nbriefings varied considerably. \n\u2022 \nIn May 2013, the government published guid-\nance \n11\noutlining the required criteria for a cyber \nsecurity standard for companies. Businesses had \nuntil October 14, 2013 to submit views. \n\u2022 \nIt has been reported \n12\nthat the UK\u2019s intelligence \nagencies MI5 and GCHQ have written to FTSE \n350 companies urging them to carry out cyber \nsecurity health checks. The companies have \nbeen asked to complete a questionnaire identi-\nfying how they protect intellectual property and \ncustomer data. The data will then be aggregated \nanonymously to enable companies to see how \nthey rank compared with their peers. The com-\npanies will then be contacted to discuss where \nthe company may be vulnerable under a second \nstage of the initiative. \nOther industry-specific initiatives have been \nlaunched. For example, in February 2013 it was \nreported in the UK parliament \n13\nthat the Financial \nServices Authority (the UK\u2019s financial regulator \nprior to its replacement by the FCA and PRA in \nApril 2013) is reviewing the cyber practices of 30 \nmajor financial institutions. When the review is con-\ncluded, the regulator intends to publish an updated \nversion of its Business Continuity Management \nPractice Guide and a discussion paper. \nLatest Developments: Europe \nPursuant to the EU\u2019s cyber security strategy, \nin June 2013 the EU\u2019s cyber security agency, \nthe European Network and Information Security \nAgency (ENISA) was formally granted a seven-year \nmandate with an expanded set of duties, and in \nJuly 2013, the Cybercrime Directive was adopted. \nIn addition, the draft Network and Information \nSecurity Directive and the draft Data Protection \nRegulation continues to make progress through the \nlegislative process. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n \n \n Show entire document\n \n \n \n \n ATTACHMENT PREVIEW\n \n \n Download attachment\n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n\nRunning head: CYBER SECURRITY ISSUES\nSummary of Research Findings: Cyber Security Issues\nPtemah Tabati\nUniversity of Maryland University College\n1\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n \n \n View the Answer\n \n \n \n \n\nCYBER SECURITY ISSUES\nArticle #1\nAuthor(s)\nGyunka, Benjamin Aruwa & Christiana, Abikoye Oluwakemi\nPublication year\n2017\nArticle title\nAnalysis of Human Factors in Cyber Security: A Case Study of \nAnonymous Attack on HbGary\nJournal title\nComputing and Information Systems\nFive key terms\nCyber Security, Information Security, Social Engineering, SQL \ninjection, Anonymous\nFocus of study\nThe study used Hbgary, a security firm, to illustrate the risks facing \ninformation systems. The study focuses on the detrimental role played\nby the attackers and most of the times intentionally or unintentionally \nby employees. The study expands on many cyber-attack techniques as \nwell as the extent of their costly consequences. Information systems \nsecurity is at the center of many vulnerabilities often aggravated by \nthe human factor. While it has been always talked about on many \noccasions, the social engineering remains the main trick that never \nfails.\nAuthor conclusions\nThe authors concluded that huge negligence is the main cause of most \ninformation systems security breaches. To circumvent most of those \ndamages to information systems infrastructure, the authors \nrecommend that some staff trainings on standard security principles \nand policies must be conducted on a regular basis.\nPersonal reflections\nThe article studying the case of HbGary makes a critical analysis of \nsocial engineering. HBGary Federal case showed the hypocrisy in \nplace in today\u2019s economy. While working hard to help many \nrenowned companies with securing their network infrastructure, \nHBGary Federal failed to apply its own products to itself to begin \nwith. As sad as it appeared, HBGary Federal failed on the most \nobvious of the social engineering techniques: phishing. The authors, \nselected an appealing case to study for obvious reasons, the company, \nHBGary, was well known for its portfolio and it didn\u2019t survive the \nsuccessful attack of Anonymous. While the extent of damage \nsustained by HBGary was devastating it exposed many dirty and \nsecret operations the company was involved in. The article shows how\neasy it has become today to fail for social engineering techniques \nbecause reverence has strongly gained place within many companies\u2019 \nchain of command.\n2\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n \n \n Show entire document\n<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Analysis of Human Factors in Cyber Security: A Case Study of Anonymous Attack on Hbgary Benjamin Aruwa Gyunka Directorate of Information and… Hello, I need\u2026<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[8827,10099,10540,10536,10892,10538,10539,10537,10891],"tags":[10549,10616,10615,7687,10627,8857,10552,10295,10548,10622,8907],"class_list":["post-130498","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-australia-essays","category-buy-essay","category-cheap-essay-writers","category-get-assignments-done","category-page-paper","category-phd-essay-writers","category-research-paper-writing-service-for-any-topic","category-study-bay-essay","category-write-my-assignment-ireland","tag-ai-plagiarism-free-essay-writing-tool","tag-australian-best-tutors","tag-best-trans-tutors","tag-buy-essay-uk","tag-cheap-dissertation-writer","tag-help-with-writing-an-essay","tag-help-write-my-paper-ai-free","tag-homework-for-you","tag-online-essay-writers","tag-phd-essays","tag-write-my-essay-for-me"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/130498","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=130498"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/130498\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=130498"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=130498"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=130498"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}