Oil Spill Compensation Scheme from an Oil
\nTanker in Korea : Case Study on the Hebei Spirit<\/p>\n
A dissertation submitted to the World Maritime University in partial
\nfulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of
\nMASTER OF SCIENCE
\nIn
\nMARITIME AFFAIRS
\n(Marine Environment and Ocean Management)<\/p>\n
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
\nFirst, I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Neil Bellefontaine, for his
\nvaluable guidance and advice. He inspired me greatly to study for this dissertation,
\nand taught me how to write academic papers in accordance with the APA system.
\nBesides, I would like to thank Professor Olof Linden for his kind Helpance when I
\nmade a proposal for my dissertation. He encouraged me to study various valuable
\nmarine environmental issues at World Maritime University.
\nA special thanks goes to my English teacher, Helpant Professor Inger Battista for
\nhelping me perfect the writing of this dissertation in English. Her comments and
\ncorrections on my dissertation were of huge help to me.
\nAlso, I would like to thank Professor I.H. Kim, who works at Korea University, for
\nproviding useful books and materials to help my research on the legal approach for
\nthe Hebei Spirit incident.
\nFurther, I would like to thank Mr. Y.W. Lee, CEO of my organization Korea Marine
\nEnvironment Management Corporation, for providing this valuable opportunity and
\nfinancial support for me to study at World Maritime University.
\nFinally, I would like to thank my parents, H.S. Kim and K.H.Yoon, for giving me my
\nlife in the first place and for always believing in me. I also thank my wife, Y.H. Cho,
\nfor encouraging and supporting me to study without any problems in Malmo, Sweden.
\nShe listened to my complaints and frustrations, made me a better student, and had
\nconfidence in me when I doubted myself.
\niii
\nABSTRACT
\nTitle of Dissertation: Oil Spill Compensation Scheme from an Oil Tanker in
\nKorea : Case Study on Hebei Spirit
\nDegree: MSc
\nThis dissertation is a case study of the Korean Oil Spill Compensation Scheme from
\na tanker, examining it through the analysis of the Hebei Spirit incident, which is the
\nlargest oil pollution incident from a ship in the Republic of Korea, occurring on 7
\nDecember 2007.
\nAdditionally, the present International Compensation Schemes including its
\nevolution and domestic compensation schemes of two countries, the United States
\nand Canada, were also investigated briefly in order to compare them with the Korean
\nScheme.
\nThe oil spilled from the Hebei Spirit has affected much of the western coasts,
\napproximately 350km of the Korean coastline. The incident incurred irrevocable
\ndamage to the marine ecological system, mariculture, and various coastal businesses
\nsuch as restaurants and tourism.
\nThe most important issues were how to get compensation for the losses from the
\nHebei Spirit incident because the estimated amounts of loss of damages exceeded the
\nlimitation amounts of compensation under the Korean Oil Spill Compensation
\nSchemes at the moment.
\niv
\nFurthermore, the payments from shipowners and International Oil Pollution
\nCompensation Fund were delayed for various reasons, and victims, such as fishermen,
\nvendors, environmentalists and residents criticized the Korean Goverment.
\nAs a result, the Korean Government enacted a Special Law in March 2008, in order
\nto make speedy payments in the form of advance compensation or loans to claimants.
\nHowever, this Special Law can not alone solve the problems entirely, but the Korean
\nGovernment has also had to shoulder a lot of the financial burden.
\nTherefore, this dessertation will analyze the problems that arose during the
\ncompensation process under the present International and Korean Oil Spill
\nCompensation Schemes and seek any measures to ensure a more effective
\ncompensation to victims who may suffer from economic loss of damages in the
\nfuture.
\nKEY WORDS: Hebei Spirit, Oil Spill, Compensation, International Oil Pollution
\nCompensation Fund, Civil Liability Convention, Fund Convention, Oil Pollution
\nAct 1990, Liability, Limitation
\nv
\nTABLE OF CONTENTS
\nDECLARATION ………………………………………………………………………………………….. i
\nACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ………………………………………………………………………….. ii
\nABSTRACT………………………………………………………………………………………………… iii
\nTABLE OF CONTENTS ……………………………………………………………………………… v
\nLIST OF TABLES…………………………………………………………………………………….. viii
\nLIST OF FIGURES …………………………………………………………………………………….. ix
\nLIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ……………………………………………………………………….. x
\nCHAPTER 1 Introduction ……………………………………………………………………………. 1
\n1.1 Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………………. 1
\n1.2 Objectives of Dissertation ……………………………………………………………………….. 2
\n1.3 Organization of the Dissertation ……………………………………………………………… 3
\nCHAPTER 2 Overview of the Compensation Schemes…………………………………… 4
\n2.1 Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………………. 4
\n2.2 International Compensation Schemes………………………………………………………. 5
\n2.2.1 Civil Liablity Convention and Fund Convention…………………………… 5
\n2.2.2 Supplementary Fund……………………………………………………………………. 8
\n2.2.3 Small Tanker Oil Pollution Indemnification Agreement and Tanker
\nOil Pollution Indemnification Agreement……………………………………………. 10
\n2.2.4 International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund………………………….. 11
\n2.3. Korean Compensation Scheme……………………………………………………………… 14
\n2.3.1 Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage Guarantee Act ……………… 14
\n2.3.2 Korea Marine Environment Management Act…………………………….. 17
\nvi
\n2.3.3 Special Law ……………………………………………………………………………….. 20
\n2.4. Other Schemes……………………………………………………………………………………… 23
\n2.4.1 Introduction ………………………………………………………………………………. 23
\n2.4.2 Oil Pollution Act 1990 of the United States………………………………….. 24
\n2.4.3 Canadian Compensation Scheme………………………………………………… 27
\nCHAPTER 3 The Hebei Spirit Incident ………………………………………………………. 30
\n3.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………….. 30
\n3.2 Overview of the Incident……………………………………………………………………….. 31
\n3.2.1 Impact of the Oil Spill………………………………………………………………… 31
\n3.2.2 Clean-up operations…………………………………………………………………… 33
\n3.2.3 Legal Proceedings………………………………………………………………………. 35
\n3.3 Application of International Compensation Scheme……………………………….. 36
\n3.3.1 Liability and Limitation of Compensation…………………………………… 36
\n3.3.2 Level of Payment ……………………………………………………………………….. 38
\n3.3.3 Compensations Covered by the IOPC Fund………………………………… 39
\n3.3.4 Claim Office ………………………………………………………………………………. 42
\n3.4 Claim Status …………………………………………………………………………………………. 43
\n3.4.1 Estimated Losses………………………………………………………………………… 43
\n3.4.2 Claim Situation………………………………………………………………………….. 44
\nCHAPTER 4 Problems and Consideration of the Development……………………. 51
\n4.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………….. 51
\n4.2 External Problems with IOPC Fund………………………………………………………. 52
\n4.2.1 Absence of Exact Standards for Compensation …………………………… 52
\n4.2.2 Size of the Secretariat of the IOPC Fund…………………………………….. 54
\nvii
\n4.2.3 Role of the Claims Office ……………………………………………………………. 56
\n4.3 Internal Problems in Korea …………………………………………………………………… 57
\n4.3.1 Unreasonable Claims and Poor Evidence ……………………………………. 57
\n4.3.2 Korean Fund ……………………………………………………………………………… 60
\nChapter 5 Conclusions………………………………………………………………………………… 61
\nREFERENCES…………………………………………………………………………………………… 65
\nviii
\nLIST OF TABLES
\nTable 1 Changes of the Limitation Amounts of Compensation per Incident
\nTable 2 Member States of Executive Committee of IOPC Fund 1992 (2009~2010)
\nTable 3 Status of Contribution from Member States in 1992 Fund (2009)
\nTable 4 Changes of Shipowners Liability under OPA 90
\nTable 5 Total Amount of Resources used till Oct. 2008
\nTable 6 Summary of Hebei Spirit Incident
\nTable 7 Estimated Losses Caused by Hebei Spirit Incident
\nTable 8 Claim Situation Caused by Hebei Spirit Incident
\nTable 9 Major Oil Spill Incident in Korea
\nix
\nLIST OF FIGURES
\nFigure 1 The Layers of Compensation
\nFigure 2 Compensation Limits under International Compensation Schemes
\nFigure 3 Limits of Liability and Compensation for Oil Tanker Spills in Canada
\nFigure 4 Location of the Hebei Spirit Incident
\nFigure 5 Map of Shoreline Contamination
\nFigure 6 National Disaster Response Organization for Hebei Spirit incident
\nFigure 7 Rate of assessment by the IOPC Fund based on the number of claims
\nFigure 8 Rate of assessment by the IOPC Fund based on the amount of claims
\nFigure 9 Claims Status (based on the number of claims)
\nFigure 10 Claims Status (based on the amount of claims)
\nFigure 11 Development Claims (based on the amount of claims)
\nFigure 12 Development Claims (based on the number of claims)
\nFigure 13 Current Structure of the IOPC FUND’s Secretariat
\nx
\nLIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
\nCLC International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage
\nCODGA Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage Guarantee Act
\nCRISTAL Contract Regarding a Supplement to Tanker Liability for Oil Pollution
\nCSA Canada Shipping Act
\nEEZ Exclusive Economic Zone
\nFC International Convention on the Establishment of an International
\nFund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage
\nFOSC Federal On-Scene Coordinator
\nGT Gross Tonnage
\nHNS Hazardous and Nuxious Substances
\nHSC Hebei Spirit Center
\nIMCO Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organisation
\nIMO International Maritime Organization
\nIOPC Fund International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund
\nITOPF International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation Limited
\nKCG Korea Coast Guard
\nKOEM Korea Marine Environment Management Corporation
\nKRW Korean Won
\nLLP Liability Limitation Proceeding
\nMARPOL International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
\nMLA Marine Liability Act
\nMLTM Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs
\nMPCF Maritime Pollution Claims Fund
\nMOGASM Ministry of Government Administration and Safety Management
\nMOMAF Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries
\nNPFC National Pollution Fund Center
\nxi
\nOPA 90 Oil Pollution Act, 1990
\nOSLTF Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund
\nPOPs Persistent Organic Pollutants
\nSDR Special Drawing Rights
\nSLQ Stand Last in the Que
\nSOPF Ship-Source Oil Pollution Fund
\nSTOPIA Small Tanker Oil Pollution Indemnification Agreement
\nTOPIA Tanker Oil Pollution Indemnification Agreement
\nTOVALOP Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement concerning Liability for Oil
\nPollution
\nUS United States
\nUSCG United States Coast Guard
\n1
\nCHAPTER 1 Introduction
\n1.1 Introduction
\nOn 7 December 2007, a Hong Kong Flag tanker Hebei Spirit (146,848 GT) was
\nstruck by the Korean Flag crane barge Samsung No.1 while at anchor approximately
\n5 miles off Taean county on the west coast of the Republic of Korea.
\nThe crane barge was being towed by two tugs, when the tow line broke suddenly,
\ncaused by a rough passage. The crane barge was unable to manoeuvre itself, and was
\nsubsequently blown by the strong wind towards the tanker. Consequently, the crane
\nbarge collided with the tanker and the crane on the barge punctured three of the port
\ncargo tanks of the tanker.
\nAfter the collision, around 10,500 tonnes of crude oil from the tanker escaped into
\nthe sea, and the oil affected most of the western shoreline of Korea very quickly due
\nto heavy weather. Finally, the incident incurred irrevocable damage to the marine
\necological system, mariculture, and various coastal businesses, such as restaurants
\nand tourism.
\nThere were many issues such as legal aspects regarding the cause of the incident,
\nleading to marine environmental impact assessment and an oil spill response system.
\nHowever, the most important issue was related to the proper compensation to victims
\nsuffering from huge economic losses.
\nMost of the victims, the maritime authorities and the local government did not have
\nmuch knowledge of the practical application of the compensation schemes under the
\nInternational Convention and Korean Law. That is why research on the practical
\nreview of the compensation scheme is of great interest to the author of this
\ndissertation.
\n2
\n1.2 Objectives of Dissertation
\nThe objective of this dissertation is to identify any problems regarding the current
\nKorean Oil Spill Compensation Schemes through a case study of the Hebei Spirit
\nincident, and to provide advice on how to upgrade the Scheme in the future.
\nTowards this end, the purpose of the research is:
\ni) to review current Korean and International Compensation Schemes when an oil
\npollution incident occurs from a tanker,
\nii) to analyze current claims proceedings of the Hebei Spirit incident under the
\nSchemes in order to find any problems, which occurred during the compensation
\nproceedings,
\niii) to examine the International and Korean Compensation Schemes, and
\n(iv) to provide advice on development of alternatives for the International and
\nKorean Compensation Schemes in the future.
\nFor this objective, the author will review the compensation schemes of the United
\nStates (US) and Canada, which have their own national funds other than the
\nInternational Oil Pollution Compensation Fund. Also, the author will attempt to
\ncompare the claims proceedings with other major oil pollution incidents which have
\nrecently occurred.
\n3
\n1.3 Organization of the Dissertation
\nIn Chapter 2, the author will review three compensation schemes applicable to an oil
\npollution incident from a tanker as follows:
\ni) The evolution of the International Oil Spill Compensation Schemes, which are
\nCivil Liability Convention, Fund Convention, Supplementary Fund, TOPIA and
\nSTOPIA,
\nii) Korean Compensation Schemes including a Special Law enacted for the
\nHebei Spirit incident, and
\niii) The National Compensation Schemes, especially national funds, of the US
\nand Canada.
\nIn Chapter 3, the author will analyse the current claim status and process including
\nwho can make the claims, who will pay, what types of damages are covered, how to
\nmake claims, and how much compensation is available under the International and
\nKorean Oil Spill Compensation Schemes. This case study will provide the basic
\nunderstanding on the practical application of the compensation scheme and Help in
\ncarrying out the claim process efficiently in the future.
\nThen, in Chapter 4, the author will analyze the main problems, especially delay of
\npayments, and the cause of the problems identified during the claim process. The
\ncauses of the problems will be analyzed in two parts, one involving the problems
\nwith the IOPC Fund and the other associated with Korea\u201fs claim process.
\n4
\nCHAPTER 2 Overview of the Compensation Schemes
\n2.1 Introduction
\nIn dealing with compensation for oil pollution damage caused by spills from oil
\ntankers, there are two international conventions, the Civil Liability Convention and
\nthe Fund Convention, elaborated under the auspices of the Iinternational Maritime
\nOrganization (IMO). As a member state of these conventions, the Republic of Korea
\nfollows a similar compensation scheme to that of the international scheme in general.
\nMeanwhile, the United States is not a member state of these international
\nconventions, but it has a different compensation system to that of the international
\nscheme. Therefore, there is a need to study this system in general including the
\ndifferences between it and the international scheme.
\nThis chapter will briefly review three issues. Firstly, it is the evolution of these
\ninternational schemes including the present framework. The CLC 1969 and the FC
\n1971 were the original international framework for the compensation scheme, but
\ntoday they have been developed as the CLC 1992, the FC 1992, and the
\nSupplementary Fund Protocol. Furthermore, on a voluntary basis, there are two
\nagreements, STOPIA 2006 and TOPIA 2006, to address the imbalance created by the
\nestablishment of the Supplementary Fund.
\nTherefore, the original framework and new framework will be examined in this
\nchapter. Secondly, the Korean Compensation Scheme including status of
\nimplementation of the international scheme and the domestic laws will be analyzed.
\nFinally, both the compensation scheme of the US under the Oil Pollution Act 1990
\n(OPA 90) and Canadian Oil Spill Compensation Scheme will be introduced and
\nevaluated.
\n5
\n2.2 International Compensation Schemes
\n2.2.1 Civil Liablity Convention and Fund Convention
\nTraditionally, the maritime law of each country allowed the limitation of liability of
\nshipowners in order to protect their shipowners, and this tendency resulted in the
\ndevelopment of an international convention on 25 August 1924, namely the
\nInternational Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to the
\nLimitation of the Liability of Owners of Sea-going Vessels (Kim, 2009, p.2). This
\nconvention was amended as an International Convention relating to the limitation of
\nthe liability of owners of sea-going ships on 10 October 1957 (Voskuil, 1980, p.101).
\nAt the time, an oil tanker owner was also able to limit his liability in cases of oil
\npollution incidents in principle.
\nHowever, in 1967, the oil tanker Torrey Canyon had stranded itself on rocks off the
\nScilly Isles to the southwest of Great Britain and spilled its cargo of crude oil. The
\ndisputes about liability for compensation and the funds available led the
\nIntergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organisation (IMCO), the forerunner of the
\nInternational Maritime Organization, to consider options to make liability and
\ncompensation more certain (https:\/\/monkessays.com\/write-my-essay\/intertanko.com).
\nAs a result of these deliberations, on 29 November 1969, the International
\nConvention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC) was adopted to ensure
\nthat adequate compensation is available to persons who suffer oil pollution damage
\nin case of oil pollution incidents from oil tankers. Since this international convention
\nneeded a long time to come into effect, tanker owners had created the Tanker Owners
\nVoluntary Agreement concerning Liability for Oil Pollution (TOVALOP) in 1969.
\n6
\nTOVALOP is a voluntary agreement by the shipowners of oil tankers to accept
\nresponsibility up to certain levels that a tanker owner would clean up oil pollution
\nresulting from a casualty of his ship and would compensate victims of the oil
\npollution (Jacobsson, 2003, p.14).
\nFollowing settlement of the tanker owners\u201f contribution to oil pollution response, the
\nfocus turned to the responsibility of the cargo owners. As a result, the International
\nConvention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil
\nPollution Damage (FC 1971) was adopted in 1971 at IMCO, followed by the
\nestablishement of the International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund (IOPC Fund).
\nAt that time, a voluntary agreement, known as the Contract Regarding a Supplement
\nto Tanker Liability for Oil Pollution (CRISTAL) was set up by the oil industry,
\ntopping up compensation provided by TOVALOP, to make voluntary provision until
\nthe FC entered into force on a worldwide basis. The CLC 1969 and the FC 1971
\nentered into force on 19 June 1975 and 16 October 1978 respectively.
\nConsequently, there are two tiered compensation systems: the first tier is
\ncompensated for any loss of damages from the oil pollution by shipowners, and the
\nsecond tier is compensated by cargo owners, namely the oil industry, when the loss of
\ndamage is over the limitation of the liability of shipowners.
\nThese two Conventions were amended in 1992 by two protocols, and these amended
\nConventions are well known as the CLC 1992 and the FC 1992. The major
\namendments to the 1992 Conventions is the increase of the limitation of liability and
\nexpansion of the scope of application. Meanwhile, the 1971 Fund Convention ceased
\nto be in force on 24 May 2002 and does not apply to incidents occurring after that
\ndate.
\n7
\nHowever, the termination of that Convention does not result in the immediate
\nliquidation of the 1971 Fund as the Organisation has to meet its obligations with
\nrespect to pending incidents (https:\/\/monkessays.com\/write-my-essay\/iopcfund.org\/govbodies.htm).
\nCLC has a legal character that is the \u201cprinciple of polluter pay\u201d and \u201cstrict liability\u201d.
\nIt means that shipowners have to compensate all claims for oil spills from their ships
\nwhether they are at fault or not.
\nWhen the Nakhodka incident occurred in Japan in 1997, a number of member states
\nworried that the total amount of compensation under the CLC 1992 and the FC 1992
\nwas insufficient to compensate all victims in full, so it was necessary to significantly
\nincrease the amount of compensation after the Erika incident in France on 12
\nDecember 1999. As a result, the IMO Legal Committee held in 2000, decided to
\nincrease the limits of the compensation amount by some 50% of the 1992
\nConventions and it entered into force on 1 November 2003 (Jacobsson, 2008, p.9).
\nTable 1 shows the summary of changes in the limitation amounts of compensation.
\nTable 1 Changes of the limitation amounts of compensation per incident
\n(unit: million SDR1
\n)
\nCLCs FCs
\nCLC 1969 210 million francs FC 1971 450 million franc2
\n1976 14 1978 60
\nCLC 1992 59.7 FC 1992 135
\n2000 89.77 2000 203
\n2003
\n(Supplementary Fund)
\n750
\nSource: Author (2010)<\/p>\n
1 The unit of account in the CLC 1992 and FC 1992 is the Special Drawing Right (SDR) as defined by
\nthe International Monetary Fund. 1 SDR = US$ 1.527540 or \u20ac 1.163130 based on 10 August 2010.
\n2
\nFranc was used for the unit of account in the CLC 1969 and Fc 1971. 450 million franc was
\napproximately 30 million SDR at the time.
\n8
\n2.2.2 Supplementary Fund
\nA number of member states, especially in the European countries, recognized that the
\nlimits of compensation amount decided by the IMO Legal Committee held in 2000,
\nwas insufficient and that point of view had accelerated from the Prestige incident on
\n13 November 2002 in Spain. Thus, in 2000, the Assembly of the 1992 IOPC Fund
\nestablished a Working Group in order to carry out a general review of the 1992
\nConventions.
\nThe Working Group worked towards the creation of an optional third tier of
\ncompensation and in May 2003, a Supplementary Fund was established at the IMO
\nthrough a Protocol that increased the amount of available compensation to around
\nUS$1 billion, including the amounts paid under the CLC 1992 and the Fund
\nConvention, in countries that are parties to it.
\nThis Protocol entered into force on 3 March 2005 and the Supplementary Fund is
\nfinanced by contributions payable by oil receivers in the Member States. The criteria
\nfor compensation are the same as for the 1992 Conventions, that is, a spill of
\npersistent oil from a tanker within the EEZ of a contracting State (Gonsaeles, 2005,
\npp.85-130).
\nMans Jacobsson, former director of the IOPC Fund, introduced the main contents of
\nthis protocol as follows (Jacobsson, 2008, p.10):
\ni) The protocol established a new intergovernmental organization, the
\nInternational Oil Pollution Compensation Supplimentary Fund, 2003.
\nii) Any State which is a Party to the FC 1992 may become a Party to the Protocol
\nand thereby become a Member of the Supplementary Fund.
\n9
\niii)The protocol applies to pollution damage in the territory, including the
\nterritorial sea, of a State which is a Party to the Protocol and in the exclusive
\neconomic zone (EEZ) or equivalent area of such a State.
\niv)The total amount of compensation payable in respect of any one incident is
\n750 million SDR, including the amount payable under the 1992 Civil Liability
\nand Fund Conventions, 203 million SDR.
\nv) The Supplementary Fund only pays compensation for incidents which occur
\nafter the Protocol has entered into force in the affected State .
\nIn summary, there are currently three tiers for the International Compensation
\nSchemes as shown in Figure 1, and the compensation limit under the International
\nCompensation Schemes is currently up to 750 million SDR, if a State joins the
\nSupplementary Fund as shown in Figure 2.
\nFigure 1 The Layers of Compensation
\nSource: International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation Limited, 2009, p.31.
\n10
\nFigure 2 Compensation Limits under International Compensation Schemes
\nSource: International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation Limited, 2009, p.32.
\n2.2.3 Small Tanker Oil Pollution Indemnification Agreement and Tanker Oil
\nPollution Indemnification Agreement
\nIn principle, the 1992 Conventions were designed to ensure an equitable sharing of
\nthe compensation for the victims by oil pollution between shipowners and oil
\nreceivers. However, an imbalance was created by the establishment of the
\nSupplementary Fund which is financed by the oil receiver. Therefore, in order to
\nsolve this imbalance and to ease the burden on oil receivers, the International Group
\nof P&I Clubs developed two agreements, known as the Small Tanker Oil Pollution
\nIndemnification Agreement (STOPIA 2006), and the Tanker Oil Pollution
\nIndemnification Agreement (TOPIA 2006). These Agreements are on a voluntary
\nbasis, but contractually binding agreements. These agreements entered into force on
\n20 February 2006 (Jacobsson, 2008, p.10).
\nUnder the CLC 1992, the limitation of compensation amount applicable to small
\ntankers not exceeding 5,000 gross tonnage, is just 4.51 million SDR. However, under
\nSTOPIA 2006, the limitation of compensation amount applicable to the tankers up to
\n29,548 gross tonnage, is raised on a voluntary basis to 20 million SDR.
\n11
\nUnder TOPIA, the Supplementary Fund is entitled to reimbursement by the
\nshipowner\/P&I Club to 50% of the amount paid in compensation by the Fund in
\nrespect of incidents involving tankers covered by the agreement (International Tanker
\nOwners Pollution Federation Limited, 2009, p.32).
\nConsequently, these two agreements reduced the burden on oil receivers under the
\nSupplementary Fund and was offered by the International P&I Clubs, without any
\namendments to the CLC 1992 (Jacobsson, 2008, p.11).
\n2.2.4 International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund
\nThe International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds (IOPC FUNDs) were
\nestablished to provide compensation for pollution damage to the extent that the
\nprotection afforded by the CLCs is inadequate. In other words, if all the admissible
\nclaims for oil pollution damage cannot be covered by shipowners according to the
\nCLCs, then the IOPC FUNDs will provide the compensation amount according to the
\nFC. There are three IOPC Funds, namely the 1971 Fund, the 1992 Fund, and the
\nSupplementary Fund, in accordance with the Fund Conventions (FCs). These
\norganizations were established in 1978, 1996, and 2005 respectively. Meanwhile, the
\n1971 Fund Convention ceased to be in force on 24 May 2002 and does not apply to
\nincidents occurring after that date.
\nIn case of the 1992 Fund, its organization is mainly composed of an Assembly, a
\nSecretariat headed by a Director (Article 16), and an Executive Committee. The
\nAssembly consists of all Member States and the Executive Committee consists of 15
\nMember States elected by the Assembly every year and the maximum term of
\nappointment is 2 years.
\n12
\nTable 2 shows the Member States of the Executive Committee of the 1992 IOPC
\nFund, which was elected by the Assembly in October 2009. The Assembly is the
\nsupreme organ governing the FC. The function of the Executive Committee is to take
\npolicy decisions concerning the admissibility of compensation claims for oil
\npollution incidents. The Assembly created the Committee in October 1997 by means
\nof a Resolution which sets out the composition and mandate of the Committee
\n(https:\/\/monkessays.com\/write-my-essay\/iopcfund.org ).
\nThe Secretariat is located in London, and currently has 27 staff in three departments:
\nClaims, External Relations and Conference, and Finance and Administration. IOPC
\nFUNDs have a joint Secretariat.
\nTable 2 Member States of Executive Committee of IOPC Fund 1992 (2009~2010)
\nCanada Cameroon Spain China(Hong Kong Special
\nAdministrative Region)
\nLiberia
\nSweden Cyprus Philippines Trinidad and Tobago France
\nGermany Singapore Japan The Netherlands Uruguay
\nRepublic
\nof Korea
\nSource : International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund, Annual Report 2009, p.24
\nMember States to both the CLC 1992 and the FC 1992 are 104 States and 1992 Fund
\nMember States, which are Parties to the Supplementary Fund Protocol, are 26 States
\nas of 10 August 2010. As a result of the Hebei Spirit incident, Korea ratified the
\nSupplementary Fund Protocol in May 2010 and joined the Supplementary Fund with
\neffect from 6 August 2010 in accordance with Article 21 of the Protocol.
\n13
\nThe IOPC Funds are financed by levies on certain types of oil of more than 150,000
\ntonnes carried by sea. The levies are paid by entities which receive oil after sea
\ntransport, and normally not by States. Table 3 shows the major 18 States contributing
\nto the 1992 Fund that are more than one percent of the total contribution.
\nTable 3 Status of Contribution from Member States in 1992 Fund (2009)
\nMember State Contribution Oil (tones) Percents of total
\nJapan 255 144 426 17.13%
\nItaly 129 334 221 8.68%
\nIndia 126 405 239 8.49%
\nRepublic of Korea 119 568 421 8.03%
\nNetherlands 110 103 026 7.39%
\nFrance 98 359 780 6.60%
\nSingapore 92 190 163 6.19%
\nUnited Kingdom 73 071 850 4.91%
\nCanada 70 544 358 4.74%
\nSpain 63 471 950 4.26%
\nGermany 38 722 135 2.60%
\nMalaysia 29 425 638 1.98%
\nSweden 26 860 650 1.80%
\nAustralia 26 838 918 1.80%
\nGreece 23 653 163 1.59%
\nTurkey 23 166 454 1.56%
\nArgentina 15 156 816 1.02%
\nNorway 14 928 387 1.00%
\nSource: International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund, Annual Report 2009, p.18.
\nJapan is the largest contributor with more than 17% of the total contribution to the
\n1992 Fund and Korea is the fourth largest State in the 1992 Fund based on the
\ncontributing rate.
\n14
\nHowever, it is different with the United Nations (UN) assessment system in
\ncalculating the contribution of each State. The UN calculates it based on the relative
\ncapacity of each State to pay, as measured by their Gross National Income (GNI), but
\nthe IOPC Fund does not reflect the relative economic capacity of each State (United
\nNations, 22 December 2006).
\n2.3. Korean Compensation Scheme
\n2.3.1 Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage Guarantee Act
\nThe Republic of Korea (Korea) ratified the CLC 1969 on 18 December 1978. Korea
\nalso ratified the FC 1971 on 8 December 1992 and Compensation for Oil Pollution
\nDamage Guarantee Act (CODGA) was legislated at the same time. This Act reflected
\nall contents of the CLC and FC. On 7 March 1997, Korea ratified the 1992
\nConventions and amended the Act accordingly.
\nThis Act has several different regulations when compared to the 1992 Conventions
\nand they are as follows (Kim, 2009, pp.9-12):
\ni) Liability for Pollution Damage
\nIn Article III of the 1992 CLC, the shipowner shall be liable for any pollution
\ndamage caused by the ship. On the contrary, in Article 2, (4) and 5, (4) of the
\nCODGA, the charterer together with the shipowner, shall be liable for pollution
\ndamage, in cases where a foreign flag ship is chartered by a Korean. This
\nprovision is to protect victims, where ships not covered for their liabilities under
\nthe 1992 Conventions, are chartered by Koreans.
\n15
\nii) Exemption of Liability for Pollution Damage
\nIn Article III, 4 of the 1992 CLC, any charterer, manager or operator shall not be
\nliable for pollution damage unless the damages resulted from their personal act
\nor omission, committed with the intent to cause such damage, or recklessly and
\nwith knowledge that such damage would probably result. Regardless, according
\nto Article 5, (5) of the CODGA, any manager or operator shall not be liable for
\npollution damage and there are no provisions for any exemption on it. Therefore,
\nit can be interpreted that victims can not make claims to manager or operator of a
\nship even though he is at fault, as described in Article III of the 1992 CLC.
\niii)Right of Recourse of the Shipowner against Third Party
\nIn Article III, 5 of the 1992 CLC describes \u201cNothing in this Convention shall
\nprejudice any right of recourse of the owner against third party\u201d. This means that
\nthe shipowner has the right of recourse against their charterer, manager or
\noperator according to a general principle of law on the liability. However,
\naccording to Article 5, (6) of the CODGA, a shipowner is restricted in his right
\nof recourse against their charterer, manager or operator, only when the damages
\nresult from their personal act or omission, committed with the intent to cause
\nsuch damage, or recklessly and with knowledge that such damage would
\nprobably result.
\niv) Scope of Application for Compulsory Insurance
\nAccording to Article 7 of the 1992 CLC, the shipowner of a tanker carrying more
\nthan 2,000 tonnes of persistent oil as cargo has to maintain insurance to cover the
\nliability under the 1992 CLC, but the shipowner of a tanker carrying 200 tonnes
\nof persistent oil as cargo has to maintain proper insurance according to the
\nCODGA.
\n16
\nv) Maritime Lien
\nAccording to Article 51 of the CODGA, indemnity bond for loss of damage
\ncaused by oil pollution from a ship shall be applied maritime lien, but this clause
\nis not in the 1992 CLC. This provision enables victims caused by oil pollution,
\nto recover their loss of damages before other claims.
\nThe shipowner is able to follow the Liability Limitation Proceeding (LLP) under
\nArticle 41 of this Act when the amount of loss caused by an oil pollution incident
\nexceeds the amount of limitation under the CLC. Other than the CODGA, there is a
\nseparate Act called the Liability Limitation Proceeding Act. There are six steps in the
\nLLP under this Act as shown below (Kim, 2009, pp.22-24):
\ni) Application for Commencing the LLP
\nA shipowner has to apply for commencement of the LLP to court having
\njurisdiction of the incident within six months after receiving claims exceeding
\nthe amount of limitation available under the CLC.
\nii) Deposition
\nThe shipowner has to deposit the amount of limitation under the CLC and 6% of
\nthe interest to the court of justice.
\niii)Commencement of the LLP
\nThe court of justice decides when to commence the LLP and then receive claims
\nfrom victims until the designated date.
\niv) Attendance of the LLP
\nVictims have to submit their claims within the designated date and the IOPC
\nFund may also attend the LLP as an interest party.
\n17
\nv) Examination
\nThe court examines detailed contents of each claim submitted by victims. If there
\nare any different views on the claims, the claims may be decided as submitted.
\nvi) Judgement
\nIf there are different views or arguments on the claims, the court decides the
\namount of loss as judgment. If the IOPC Fund or claimants disagree with this
\ndecision, they may bring this matter to court.
\n2.3.2 Korea Marine Environment Management Act
\nThe details of oil pollution prevention and response are regulated in Korea Marine
\nEnvironment Management Act. This Act was formerly known as the Korea Marine
\nPollution Prevention Act, which was registered in 1977, reflecting the MARPOL
\nConvention, but was replaced with the Korea Marine Environment Management Act
\nin 2007, with expansions on various provisions dealing with costal marine
\nenvironmental issues.
\nThis Act has a wide scope and is composed of 13 Chapters and 133 Articles
\nincluding relevant International Conventions, such as MARPOL, Ballast
\nManagement Convention, OPRC, Antifouling Convention, London Conventions and
\nStockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs). The major contents
\nof this Act are as follows:
\n– Chapter 1 General Provision,
\n– Chapter 2 Measures for Conservation and Management of Marine
\nEnvironment,
\n– Chapter 3 Regulation for Prevention of Marine Pollution,
\n– Chapter 4 Regulation for Prevention of Air Pollution in Ocean,
\n– Chapter 5 Inspection of Vessel for Prevention of Marine Pollution,
\n18
\n– Chapter 6 Measures against Marine Pollution Prevention,
\n– Chapter 7 Marine Pollution Effect Investigation,
\n– Chapter 8 Marine Envrionment Business,
\n– Chapter 9 Sea Area Utilization Conference,
\n– Chapter 10 Establishment of KOEM3
\n,
\n– Chapter 11 Supplementary Provisions,
\n– Chapter 12 Penal Provision.
\nIn the Act, there are four main provisions for the oil pollution response regime except
\nfor operational regulations in accordance with MARPOL and they are as follows:
\ni) Principle of Polluter Responsibility (Article 7)
\nA person who has caused damage of marine environment or marine pollution
\nshall take responsibility for the restoration of the damaged and polluted marine
\nenvironment and bear expenses necessary to remedy any damage or pollution of
\nthe marine environment thereof. This provision harmonizes with the \u201eStrict
\nLiability\u201f of the CLC.
\nii) Designation of the Responsible Government Agents (Article 24, 61 and 62)
\nResponsible government agents for oil spill incidents at sea are as follows:
\n– The Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs (MLTM)4
\nshould
\ntake the lead responsibility for the coordination of all the activities in
\nmarine pollution incidents, including international cooperation and
\nsupport on site.<\/p>\n
3 Korea Marine Environment Management Corporation (Formerly, Korea Marine Pollution Response
\nCorporation, KMPRC) is a specialized organization for oil pollution response established in 1997.
\n4
\nFormerly Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (MOMAF); changed the name according to
\namendments of Korean Government Organization Law in Feb.2008.
\n19
\n– The Korea Coast Guard (KCG) should be responsible for commanding oil
\nspill response activities off-shore, setting up a national contingency plan
\nand area contingency plans.
\n– Local governments should be responsible for commanding oil spill
\nresponse activities in their shoreline areas.
\niii) Arrangement of Oil Response Vessels and Equipments (Article 67)
\nAn owner of a ship or oil storage facility falling under any of the following
\nsubsections shall, in order to prepare against marine oil spill accidents, arrange
\nor install oil spill response vessels or prevention equipment.
\n– A tanker is not less than 500 GT;
\n– A ship other than tanker which is not less than 10,000 GT
\n– Oil storage facility whose capacity is not less than 10,000 kiloliters
\nNormally, this obligation of the owner of a ship or oil storage facility is carried
\nout by KOEM.
\niv) Marine Pollution Effect Investigation (Article 77)
\nPolluter shall execute marine pollution effect investigation through a marine
\npollution effect investigation institution.
\nUnfortunately, the local governments did not have the abilities to carry out their
\nresponsibility during the Hebei Spirit incident. Also, the Korea Coast Guard did not
\ncommand private oil spill response companies on site properly since they did not
\nwant to take responsibility for the costs incurred during their control. As a result of
\nthese problems, recently the MLTM is discussing these issues with relevant parties to
\nconsider the necessary amendments in the Act.
\n20
\n2.3.3 Special Law
\nOn 14 March 2008, the National Assembly legislated a special law, namely \u201eThe
\nSpecial Law for the Support to Residents Suffering Damages from the M\/T Hebei
\nSpirit Oil Spill Incident and Restoration of Marine Environment\u201f (Taean Special
\nLaw), in relation to this incident, so that the local residents of the affected areas may
\nreceive compensation in a speedy and appropriate fashion. The main contents are as
\nfollows:
\ni) Establishment of Special Committee on Oil Pollution Incidents(Article 5, 6).
\nThe Special Committee is comprised of the Prime Minister as the chairperson
\nand its main roles are to:
\n– discuss\/decide on relevant issues regarding the support for compensation to
\nvictims,
\n– discuss\/coordinate relevant issues regarding marine environment restoration,
\n– make decisions on support for areas affected by oil pollution.
\nii) Victim Group (Article 7).
\nResidents who suffered losses from the Hebei Spirit incident may establish
\nvictim groups upon which they have to notify the local government. The victim
\ngroups may then attend the meeting of the Special Committee and present their
\nopinions during the meeting.
\niii) Support for Compensation to Victims (Article 8, 9)
\nThis provision is divided into two types of compensation. Firstly, the Korean
\nGovernment may make advance payments to claimants based on the assessed
\namount of the IOPC Fund, and if the total amount approved by the IOPC Fund
\nexceeds the maximum amount available under the FC 1992, then the Korean
\nGovernment would make payments to cover that excess amount.
\n21
\nAccording to this provision, the Korean Government had made advance
\npayments for 373 applications (KRW31.4 billion) submitted by claimants until
\nthe end of 2009, which were based on the full amounts assessed by the IOPC
\nFund (International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund, June 2010). Secondly, a
\nclaimant, who has not received the assessment results from the IOPC Fund
\nwithin six months from filing a claim, may apply for a loan to the Korean
\nGovernment. The total number of loans executed was 920 (KRW3 billion) as of
\nthe end of 2009, but that figure had increased rapidly to 6,557 (KRW 17 billion)
\nas of the end of May 2010, and is expected to jump higher in the future
\n(International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund, June 2010).
\niv) Designation of Special Marine Environmental Restoration Zone (Article 10).
\nThe Minister of MLTM throughout discussion with the Minister of the Ministry
\nof Environment may designate severely damaged areas and sensitive areas that
\nmay change the ecosystem as Special Marine Environmental Restoration Zones
\n(Special Zones). The Korean Government must set up a Special Marine
\nEnvironmental Restoration Plan for the Special Zones and implement proper
\nmeasures according to the plan.
\nv) Support for Affected Areas by Oil Pollution (Article 11 and 12)
\nThe Korean Government may provide support for medical services, prevention
\nof epidemics, clean-up and collecting wastes. The Korean Government also
\nprovides financial support for residents who had suffered damages from the
\nHebei Spirit incident but could not receive any compensation at all from the
\nIOPC Fund or the shipowner.
\n22
\nIn accordance with the decision rendered by the Taean Special Law, the Korean
\nGovernment declared its decision to stand last in the queue (SLQ) in receiving
\ncompensation for clean up and recovery costs incurred by the central and local
\ngovernments during the 41st session of the Executive Committee of the 1992 IOPC
\nFund held in June 2008 (International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund, June 2008).
\nThe main purpose of the enactment of the Taean Special Law is for the provision of
\nfinancial support to victims. This is because the estimated amount of compensation
\nhad already exceeded the limited amount of compensation in accordance with the
\nCLC 92 and the FC 92, which Korea ratified at the time. There are three main
\nreasons for the enactment of the Taean Special Law (Ministry of Land, Transport and
\nMaritime Affairs, 2010, pp.100-101).
\nFirstly, under the International Compensation Scheme, the CLC 92 and the FC 92,
\nwhich Korea ratified, the limitation amount is 230 millon SDR (KRW321.6 billion),
\nbut losses estimated by the IOPC Fund are around KRW372-424 billion (based on
\nestimated losses until March 2008). Therefore, actual victims can not recover their
\nlosses from the IOPC Fund and the Korean Government has to take measures to
\nsolve this problem.
\nSecondly, a long waiting period of time is required to pay compensations by the
\nIOPC Fund because the claims processing procedure under the Claims Manual is
\nvery complex and the assessing process also takes considerable time. As the first step,
\nclaimants need to prepare detailed relevant documents\/evidence to prove their losses
\nas objectively, scientifically and reasonably as they can. Then, there is a long waiting
\nperiod during which their claims are assessed by the IOPC Fund. If there is some
\ndisagreement on the compensation amount between the claimants and the IOPC Fund,
\nthe claimants can bring this matter up to the courts.
\n23
\nThirdly, under the International Compensation Scheme, there are no considerations
\non the living support of the destitute or small-scale businessmen. Therefore, the
\nTaean Special Law is needed to compliment and address this problem.
\nDue to the Taean Special Law, the above three problems were somewhat solved, but
\nthe Korean Government has had to shoulder a lot of the financial burden.
\n2.4. Other Schemes
\n2.4.1 Introduction
\nOther than the International Compensation Schemes, it is nessesary to study the
\ncompensation scheme of two states, the US and Canada, because they have their own
\nFunds to compensate losses caused by oil pollution from ships.
\nA similar point between these two states is that they have their own funds. However,
\nthe US did not join the International Compensation Scheme and they only apply their
\nown scheme for any compensation action. Regardless, Canada joined the
\nInternational Compensation Scheme and other than the international scheme, they
\nhave their own scheme to complement and address the problems of the international
\nscheme.
\nHereafter, the two compensation schemes will be introduced briefly with regard to
\nthe Assessment of the schemes, and how to operate\/apply and limit amounts of their
\ncompensation.
\n24
\n2.4.2 Oil Pollution Act 1990 of the United States
\nThe US is not a Member State of the CLC and the FC. They have an independant
\ncompensation scheme under the Oil Pollution Act (OPA 90), which was legislated in
\n1990. The background of this Act is founded in the Exxon Vadez oil spill incident,
\nwhich occurred in Prince William Sound, Alaska on 24 March 1989. In this incident,
\napproximately 11 million gallons of crude oil was spilled into the sea, and a huge
\namount of compensation arose including the cost of response activities
\n(https:\/\/monkessays.com\/write-my-essay\/fakr.noaa.gov ).
\nAfter this incident, the US needed to set out a shipowner\u201fs liability and compensation
\nscheme when an oil spill occurs, in order to ensure sufficient compensation to
\nvictims. The US subsequently adopted the Oil Pollution Act in 1990 as their own
\nliability and compensation scheme instead of ratifying the 1984 Protocol of the CLC
\n69 and the FC 71. They amended the Act in 2006 and 2009 and increased the
\nlimitation of the shipowner\u201fs liability and applied different limitations between a
\nsingle hull tanker and a double hull tanker as shown in Table 4.
\nUnder OPA 90, there are also two tiers for compensation. The first tier is that the
\nshipowner\u201fs liability is the same as the CLC, and the second tier is the Oil Spill
\nLiability Trust Fund (OSLTF), which was established by the OPA 90. It may seem
\nthat there is no liability of oil receivers, but they have to pay a five-cent per barrel tax
\nto the OSLTF eventhough there are some conditions. In 1991, the United States
\nCoast Guard (USCG) created the National Pollution Fund Center (NPFC) to
\nadminister the OSLTF, and to ensure effective response and recovery
\n(https:\/\/monkessays.com\/write-my-essay\/uscg.mil\/ccs\/npfc\/About_NPFC\/default.asp).
\n25
\nTable 4 Changes of Shipowners Liability under OPA 90
\nShip size Before 2006 Amendment 20065 Amendment 20096
\nGreater than
\n3,000GT
\nThe greater of
\n$1200\/ton or
\n$10 million
\nSingle hull Single hull
\nThe greater of
\n$3000\/ton or
\n$22 million
\nThe greater of
\n$3200\/ton or
\n$23.496 million
\nDouble hull Double hull
\nThe greater of
\n$1900\/ton or
\n$16 million
\nThe greater of
\n$2000\/ton or
\n$17.088 million
\nLess than or
\nequal to 3000GT
\nThe greater of
\n$1200\/ton or
\n$2million
\nSingle hull Single hull
\nThe greater of
\n$3000\/ton or
\n6 million
\nThe greater of
\n$3200\/ton or
\n$6.408 million
\nDouble hull Double hull
\nThe greater of
\n$1900\/ton or
\n4 million
\nThe greater of
\n$2000\/ton or
\n$4.272 million
\nAny other than
\ntanker
\nThe greater of
\n$600\/ton or
\n$0.5million
\nThe greater of
\n$950\/ton or
\n$800,000
\nThe greater of
\n$1000\/ton or
\n$854,400
\nSource : Adopted by Author from Federal Register \/ Vol. 74, No. 125 (1 July 2009) and from
\nSteamship Mutual web site (https:\/\/monkessays.com\/write-my-essay\/simsl.com)<\/p>\n
5 Amendment of 2006 : effected on 11 July 2006, for tanker, effected on 9 October 2006
\n6 Amendment of 2009 : effected on 31 July 2009
\n26
\nAccording to the explanation of the NPFC, the OSLTF is funded in the following
\nways (https:\/\/monkessays.com\/write-my-essay\/uscg.mil\/npfc\/About_NPFC\/osltf.asp ):
\n– Investment interest on the Fund’s principal,
\n– Costs recovered from responsible parties,
\n– Civil penalties from responsible parties,
\n– Barrel tax on domestic and imported oil, and
\n– Transfers from other legacy pollution funds.
\nThe OSLTF has two major components. One is the Emergency Fund that is:
\n\u201cavailable for Federal On-Scene Coordinators (FOSCs) to respond to
\ndischarges and for federal trustees to initiate natural resource damage
\nassessments. The Emergency Fund is a recurring $50 million available to the
\nPresident annually\u201d. The other one is \u201cthe remaining Principal Fund balance
\nthat is used to pay claims and to fund appropriations by Congress to Federal
\nagencies to administer the provisions of OPA and support research and
\ndevelopment\u201d (https:\/\/monkessays.com\/write-my-essay\/uscg.mil\/npfc\/About_NPFC\/osltf.asp ).
\nNow, the largest source of income for the Fund has been from the five cent\/barrel tax
\non imported and domestic oil. This tax was discontinued on 31 December 1994; but
\nthe Energy Policy Act of 2005 re-instated the tax beginning in April 2006. If the
\nbalance of the OSLTF reaches US$2.7 billion, the tax will no longer apply, until and
\nunless the Fund balance later drops below US$2 billion. The tax will be discontinued,
\nregardless of the Fund balance, on 31 December 2014.
\nThe second largest source has been transferred from other legacy pollution funds, but
\nthese transfers are now complete. The largest of the fund transfers was US$334.7
\nmillion from the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Liability Fund.
\n27
\nThe OSLTF comes into operation when the responsible party denies a claim or fails
\nto settle it within 90 days, or when the first level of liability is insufficient to satisfy
\nall admissible claims for compensation. Further, the OSLTF will recover the costs
\nfrom the responsible party such as the polluter. The maximum amount of
\ncompensation by OSLTF is US$1 billion per incident.
\n2.4.3 Canadian Compensation Scheme
\nCanada adopted the International Compensation Scheme as a Member State of the
\nCLC, the FC and the Supplementary Fund contrary to the National Compensation
\nScheme of the US. However, Canada simultaneously operates its own national fund,
\nnamely the Ship-Source Oil Pollution Fund (SOPF) to compensate any losses caused
\nby oil pollution from ships.
\nThe SOPF was established by Part XVI of the amended Canada Shipping Act (CSA)
\non 24 April. The SOPF succeeded the Maritime Pollution Claims Fund (MPCF),
\nwhich had existed since 1973 and the accumulated amount of 149,618,850 Canadian
\nDollars (C$) in the MPCF was transferred to the SOPF (https:\/\/monkessays.com\/write-my-essay\/tc.gc.ca).
\nThe International Compensation Scheme applies only to spills of persistent oil from
\ntankers, but SOPF is available to pay compensation for spills of all kinds of oil
\nincluding non-persistant oil from all kinds of ships. This compensation scheme is
\ngoverned by Part 6 of the Marine Liability Act (MLA) (https:\/\/monkessays.com\/write-my-essay\/tc.gc.ca).
\nThe main financial source of the MPCF was a levy of 15 cents per tonne from 15
\nFebruary 1972 to 1 September 1976. MPCF collected a total of C$34,866,459 during
\nthat period. On 1 April 2009, the Minister of Transport imposed a levy of 46.29 cents
\nper metric tonne of contributing oil imported into or shipped from a place in Canada
\nin bulk as cargo on a ship (https:\/\/monkessays.com\/write-my-essay\/tc.gc.ca).
\n28
\nBased on 1 April 2009, the maximum liability of the SOPF is C$154,392,072 for all
\nclaims per one oil spill incident and this amount is indexed annually (Ship-Source
\nOil Pollution Fund , 2009).
\nThe SOPF is very useful in two cases. Firstly, the SOPF pays claims to the extent
\nclaimants have been unable to obtain full payment of their claims from the shipowner
\nor any other party. The SOPF is also available to provide additional compensation as
\na third layer in the event that funds under the CLC 92 and the FC 92, with respect to
\nspills in Canada from oil tankers, are insufficient to meet all established claims for
\ncompensation. In other words, if the amount of compensation is over the limitation of
\namount of FC 92 (203 million SDR, around C$382 million7
\n), the SOPF may provide
\nadditional compensation up to C$154 million to claimants as shown in Figure 3. As a
\nconsequence, Canada may compensate total amounts of C$537 million including
\namounts available under the CLC 92 and the FC 92 based on 1 April 20098
\n.
\nSecondly, claimants may file their claims directly with the SOPF and when the
\nadministrator of the SOPF pays a claim, he is subrogated to the rights of the claimant
\nand is obligated to take all reasonable measures to recover the amount of
\ncompensation paid to claimants from the shipowner, or the IOPC Fund, or any other
\nliable person. The administrator also has the responsibility to legally prove claims
\nagainst them. Under the Canadian compensation scheme, victims can recover their
\nlosses of damage from the SOPF speedily because the SOPF has its own assessment
\nprocedure and assessor.<\/p>\n
7
\n1 SDR=C$1.8856 based on 1 April 2009.
\n8 Canada did not join the Supplementary Fund at the time.
\n29
\nFigure 3 Limits of Liability and Compensation for Oil Tanker Spills in Canada
\nSource: Ship-Source Oil Pollution Fund (2009). Annual Report 2008-2009. p.4
\n30
\nCHAPTER 3 The Hebei Spirit Incident
\n3.1 Introduction
\nThe Hong Kong registered tanker Hebei Spirit which was laden with about 209,000
\ntonnes of four different crude oil was struck by the crane barge Samsung No 1 while
\nat anchor about five miles off Taean on the West Coast of Korea (see Figure 4), and
\naprroximately 10,900 tonnes of crude oil escaped into the sea from the tanker.
\nThe crane barge was being towed by two tugs, Samsung T-5 and Samho T-3, when
\nthe tow line broke. Weather conditions were poor and it was reported that the crane
\nbarge was blown by the strong winds into the tanker, puncturing three of its port
\ncargo tanks No.1, 2 and 3.
\nThis incident is recorded as the most catastrophic oil pollution incident in the history
\nof Korea in terms of the amount of oil leaked and scale of damage. The Korean
\nGovernment declared the areas affected by oil as National Disaster Zones according
\nto the relevant Act.
\nFigure 4 Location of the Hebei Spirit Incident
\nSource: Author
\n31
\nThis chapter attempts to describe the incident of the Hebei Spirit incident including
\nthe cleanup operations, impacted areas, and then attempts to apply the FC 1992
\nregarding compensation for the victims.
\n3.2 Overview of the Incident
\n3.2.1 Impact of the Oil Spill
\nAs a result of this incident, the areas affected by the spill along the western coasts of
\nthree provinces, Chungchongnam-Do, Chollanam-Do and Chollabuk-Do, of Korea
\nhave around 350 km of coastline, 101 islands, 15 beaches and 35,000 hectares of
\naquaculture farms and other facilities, and including the total number of households
\naffected of approximately 40,000 units as shown in Figure 5 (International Oil
\nPollution Compensation Fund, 22 June, 2008). This means much of the western coast
\nwas affected by the oil spill.
\nThe west coast of Korea is a very important area for aquaculture in Korea because
\nthere are large numbers of mariculture facilities including seaweed, shellfish
\ncultivation and large-scale hatchery production. The area is also exploited by small
\nand large-scale fisheries.
\nThe oil affected a large number of these mariculture facilities, as it passed through
\nthe supporting structures, contaminating buoys, ropes, nets and the produce.
\nImmediately after the Hebei Spirit incident, the Korean Government declared a fishing
\nban on the affected areas by the oil spill and restricted all harvest and capture of
\nmarine products from the affected areas, in order to protect the public health against
\nany potential negative effects from the sale and distribution of contaminated fisheries
\nproducts.
\n32
\nFigure 5 Map of shoreline contamination
\nSource: International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation (Feb. 2008). News & Events:The
\nEnvironmental Impact of the Hebei Spirit Oil Spill, Taean, South Korea. p.3
\n33
\nAs of 18 April 2008, in consideration of the progress of the clean-up operations
\nundertaken in the affected areas, and the results of the marine environmental study
\nand fisheries product safety test, the Korean Government lifted restrictions on fishing
\nactivities for the first time. Thereafter, since 3 September 2008, all types of fishing
\nactivities were resumed in all the affected waters and coasts.
\nThe oil has also impacted amenity beaches and other areas of the Taean National
\nPark. The Taean peninsula is a favourite tourist destination for visitors from the
\nSeoul metropolitan area, with an estimated 20 million visitors every year, mostly
\nduring the months of July and August.
\n3.2.2 Clean-up operations
\nTwo plans, the National Contingency Plan prepared by KCG and the National
\nDisaster Prevention Master prepared by the Ministry of Government Administration
\nand Safety Management (MOGASM), were applied to coordinate all the measures to
\ncombat the oil spill. According to those plans, a National Disaster Response
\nOrganization was established as illustrated in Figure 6.
\nAs mentioned earlier in Chapter 2, the MLTM has overall responsibility for marine
\npollution response in the waters under the jurisdiction of Korea, and the KCG has
\nresponsibility for control\/command of all the response activities at sea and local
\ngovernments have the responsibility to control shoreline clean-up.
\nThe KCG mobilized their response vessels and various equipment on site and
\neffectively controlled the response activities carried by KOEM and private companies
\nat sea. However, it was very difficult to collect oil at sea due to heavy weather even
\nthough large numbers of specialized response vessels were launched.
\n34
\nFigure 6 National Disaster Response Organization for Hebei Spirit incident
\nSource : Author
\nThe oil slick also affected the shoreline very quickly since the site of the spill
\nincident was so close (around 10 km) to the shoreline and the local currents were
\nvery strong and fast. Therefore, the use of oil booms to contain oil and skimmers to
\ncollect oil were very restricted. Consequently, most of the clean-up operations were
\ncarried out on the shoreline. At the same time, the use of oil booms was a very
\neffective measure in protecting the sensitive areas, such as entrance areas of the
\nintake water of power plants and fish farms inside several important bays.
\nClean-up operations at sea were carried out by the KCG, the KOEM and local
\nfishermen and the shoreline clean-up was carried out by more than 1.2 million
\nvolunteers, local residents, the military and private clean-up companies. Most of the
\nclean-up operations were finalized by 10 October 2008, but additional clean-up
\n35
\noperations had to be conducted in the first half of 2009 as more traces of oil were
\nfound, particularly tar balls in some of the islands and marine aquaculture farms
\n(International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund, 9 March 2009).
\nA huge number of volunteers from other cities helped cleaning oil on several beaches
\naffected during the early stages. Human resources and the main response equipment
\nand materials used until October 2008 are as shown in Table 5.
\nTable 5 Total Amount of Resources used till October 2008
\nPersonnel
\n(Volunteers)
\nVessels
\n(unit)
\nOil Boom
\n(Km)
\nAbsorbant
\n(tonnes)
\nDispersant
\n(\u3398)
\nTotal 2,132,322
\n(1,226,730) 19,864 46.77 493 298
\nSource: Iinternational Oil Pollution Compensation Fund (29 May 2009). 92FUND\/EXC.45\/6\/2.
\n3.2.3 Legal Proceedings
\nIn the case of criminal proceedings, the Director of the IOPC Fund reported that
\nin April 2009, the Korean Supreme Court overturned the decision by the
\nCourt of Appeal, which had held that the Master of one of the towing tugs
\nand of the crane barge and the Master and Chief Officer of the Hebei Spirit
\nwere liable for the destruction of the Hebei Spirit, and sent back the case to
\nthe Court of Appeal for a retrial. The Supreme Court in its judgement also
\nannulled the Court of Appeal’s decision to imprison the crew members of the
\nHebei Spirit. The Supreme Court, however, upheld the decision to imprison
\nthe Master of one of the towing tugs and of the crane barge and confirmed the
\nfines imposed by the Court of Appeal (International Oil Pollution
\nCompensation Fund, 16 June 2010).
\n36
\nRegarding the Liability Limitation Proceeding (LLP) by the owner of the Hebei Spirit,
\nthe Director of the IOPC Fund reported (International Oil Pollution Compensation
\nFund, 16 June 2010) as follows:
\n– February 2008: the owner made an application to commence LLP before the
\nLimitation Court.
\n– February 2009: the Limitation Court rendered an order for the commencement
\nof the LLP
\n– 126,316 claims totalling KRW 3,597 billion have since been submitted to the
\nLimitation Court.
\n– The Limitation Court appointed a Court Administrator to deal with the claims
\nand indicated its intention that the Court Administrator review the assessments
\nby the Club’s and the Fund’s experts and by the claimants’ experts rather than
\nappoint his own experts.
\n– At the same time, in March 2009, the Limitation Court rendered the order for
\nthe commencement of the limitation proceedings for the Samsung Heavy
\nIndustry, the bareboat charterer of the two towing tugs and of the crane barge,
\nand set the limitation fund, together with legal interests, at an amount of
\nKRW5,600 million.
\n3.3 Application of International Compensation Scheme
\n3.3.1 Liability and Limitation of Compensation
\nAs mentioned in Chapter 2, Korea is a party to the CLC 1992 and a Member State of
\nthe Fund 1992, but not a Member State of the Supplementary Fund at the time.
\n37
\nSince the CLC 1992 is based on strict liability, the shipowner of the Hebei Spirit was
\nliable to pay the compensation to victims eventhough the ship was not at fault in this
\npollution incident according to the CLC 1992. Furthermore, if the total amount of
\ndamages was to exceed the limitation amount applicable under the CLC 1992, the
\nFund 1992 would be liable to pay compensation to the victims of the spill. The
\ntonnage of the Hebei Spirit (146,848 GT) is in excess of 140,000 GT. The limitation
\namount applicable is, therefore, the maximum of 89.77 million SDR available under
\nthe 1992 CLC, and the total amount available for compensation under the 1992 CLC
\nand the 1992 Fund Convention is 203 million SDR. Table 6 provides the summary of
\nthe incident including the maximum available compensation amounts by the
\nshipowner and the IOPC Fund.
\nTable 6 Summary of Hebei Spirit Incident
\nShip\u201fs name Hebei Spirit
\nDate of incident 7 December 2007
\nPlace of incident 10 km off Taean county
\nCause of incident Collision
\nQuantity of oil spilled 10,900 tonnes (12,547\u3398)
\nFlag State of Ship Hong Kong
\nGross tonnage 146,848 tonnes
\nP&I Insurer China Shipowners Mutual Insurance Association (China P&I)
\nAssuranceforeningen Skuld (Gjensidig) (Skuld Club)
\nCLC Limit 89.77 million SDR (KRW187 billion)
\nFund Limit 203 millon SDR (KRW322 billion)
\n9
\nSource: Iinternational Oil Pollution Compensation Fund, 16 June 2010<\/p>\n
9 The 40th Exacutive Committee of the 1992 IOPC Fund decided that the conversion of 203 million
\nSDR into Korean Won would be made on the basis of the value of that currency vis-a-vis the SDR on
\n13 March 2008 at the rate of 1SDR=KRW1,584.330. When coverted, KRW322 billion is
\napproximately US$310 million.
\n38
\nUnfortunately, the Korean government as well as most of the victims expected that
\nthis maximum amount was not sufficient to recover the total loss of costs from this
\nincident.
\nAs a result of this problem, local residents demanded a more satisfactory solution
\nfrom the Korean Government and the national assembly legislated a Special Law.
\nHowever, the Special Law brought forward a large number of claims from victims, so
\nthe Korean Government shouldered the financial burden for the payments to the
\nvictims.
\n3.3.2 Level of Payment
\nArticle 5 of FC 1992 mentions \u201cthe amount available shall be distributed in such a
\nmanner that proportion between any established claim and the amount of
\ncompensation actually recovered by the claimant under this Convention shall be same
\nfor all claimants.\u201d In other words, if the total amount of compensation payable
\nexceeds the limitation of amount of the FC 1992, the IOPC Fund should decide the
\nlevels of payment through a manner of proportion to make equivalent compensation
\nto all victims.
\nConsequently, when the total amount of compensation payable exceeds the limitation
\nof amount of the FC 1992, victims cannot recover the whole compensation from the
\nIOPC Fund eventhough their claims were accepted by the IOPC Fund. In this case,
\nthere are no solutions to recover full payments for victims under the International
\nCompensation Scheme.
\nIn the case of the Hebei Spirit, the IOPC Fund expected the total estimated amount of
\nlosses arising from the incident could exceed the Fund\u201fs maximum amount of the
\nlimitation for compensation.
\n39
\nThe IOPC Fund estimated the amount was between KRW352 billion and KRW424
\nbillion (267 million SDR) on the basis of the limited information available as of 26
\nFebruary 2008. Therefore, the IOPC Fund initially decided the level of payments as
\n60% of the amount of the damage actually suffered by the respective claimant as
\nassessed by the Fund\u201fs experts in the 40th Executive Committee held on 26 Febuary
\n2008 International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund, 26 February 2008).
\nThereafter, the 42nd Executive Committee held in June 2008 decided to reduce the
\nlevel of payment to 35% of the established claims because of the increased
\nuncertainty as to the total amount of the potential claims (International Oil Pollution
\nCompensation Fund , 27 June 2008).
\n3.3.3 Compensations Covered by the IOPC Fund
\nThere are no detailed descriptions for types of damages covered by the IOPC Fund in
\nthe FC 1992, but the IOPC Fund published a Claims Manual to guide claimants by
\ngiving an overview of the IOPC Fund\u201fs obligation to compensation in accordance
\nwith the FC 1992. This Manual was adopted by the Assembly of the 1992 IOPC
\nFund in October 2004, and several amendments were made in December 2008.
\nHowever, it is only a practical guide, presenting claims against the IOPC Fund, but it
\nis not a legally binding document.
\nAccording to this Manual, in general, the IOPC Fund may compensate any loss of
\ndamage arising from the incident in five main types, namely clean-up costs and
\npreventive measures, property damages, consequential losses, pure economic losses
\nand environmental damages.
\n40
\ni) Clean-up and preventive measures
\nIn principle, the IOPC Fund is payable for the cost of clean-up operations at sea
\nand shoreline (Claims Maual, 2008, p.12). However, compensation is only
\npayable for the cost of reasonable measures. The interpretation of the word
\n\u201ereasonable\u201f is unclear, but claimants must prove that all clean-up measures
\noperated by them were necessary activities for effective operations. In practice,
\nthere are a number of gaps between claimants and the experts appointed by the
\nIOPC Fund and shipowners to assess the cost of clean-up operations. For
\nexample, the KCG used a number of chemical dispersants by airplane after a
\nweek had passed from the date of the Hebei Spirit incident, so the experts of the
\nIOPC Fund and shipowners expressed doubts about the effects of the dispersants.
\nTherefore, the KCG must show scientific evidence to prove the effects of the
\ndispersant in order to recover costs, such as rental cost of airplanes and cost of
\ndispersants. According to Article 3(b) of FC, the IOPC Fund may compensate
\nthe cost for preventive measures in the territorial waters of a State which is not a
\nParty to the Convention. However, this case did not occur in the Hebei Spirit
\nincident because the spilled oil did not reach any other States such as China and
\nJapan.
\nii) Property Damage
\nThe IOPC Fund is payable for reasonable costs of cleaning, repairing or
\nreplacing property that has been contaminated by oil (Claims Manual, 2008,
\np.12). There are a number of claims for the cleaning and replacing of fishing
\ngears such as nets and equipment of fish farms in the Hebei Spirit incident
\nbecause a number of fish farms were affected by oil. There were also cleaning
\ncosts of various types of ships in berth at ports affected by the oil.
\n41
\niii)Consequential Loss
\nThis refers to \u201closs of earnings suffered by the owners of property
\ncontaiminated by oil\u201d (Claims Manual, 2008, p.12). In other words, if a
\nfisherman has loss of income because his fishing nets were contaiminated by
\noil and he could not fish until the cleaning of the nets, he can claim his loss of
\nincome during that time to the IOPC Fund. However, again it only applies to
\nreasonable costs.
\niv) Pure Economic Loss
\nThis refers to the \u201closs of earnings caused by the oil pollution suffered by
\npersons whose property has not been polluted\u201d (Claims Manual, 2008, p.13).
\nThere are a number of claimants who had suffered pure economic loss in the
\nHebei Spirit incident. Fishermen could not catch any fish during the
\ndesignation of the fishing ban by the Korean Government. Therefore, they had
\nto claim loss of earnings to the IOPC Fund. However, the Korean Government
\nmust prove to the IOPC Fund that the fishing ban was a necessary measure at
\nthe time in order to recover the loss from the IOPC Fund. The owners of
\nrestaurants, hotels, and tourisms living in the affected areas by the oil submitted
\na huge number of claims to the IOPC Fund, but most of them had inadequate
\nevidence for their losses. Furthermore, there were a number of claims from fish
\nmarkets.
\nv) Environmental Damage
\nThe IOPC Fund may pay for \u201cthe cost of reasonable reinstatement measures
\naimed at accelerating natural recovery of environmental damages\u201d (Claims
\nManual, 2008, p.13). However, the case of recovery of the cost for
\nenvironmental damages from the IOPC Fund is very rare in practice because it
\nis very difficult to prove the direct relationship between the incident and the
\ncost of reinstatement measures.
\n42
\nIn summary, the types of compensations covered by the IOPC Fund in accordance
\nwith the Claims Manual are divided into five types in principle. In most of the oil
\npollution incidents, it is relatively easy to provide actual evidence of the costs for
\nclean-up, preventive measures, property damages and consequential loss, but for the
\ncosts of pure economic loss, it is very difficult to calculate the actual loss of damages
\nbecause there are no detailed standards for such calculations.
\nTherefore, big gaps may usually occur in assessing the damages between claimants
\nand the IOPC Fund, and these problems may be brought to court and result in the
\ndelay of settlements of compensation.
\n3.3.4 Claim Office
\nOn 24 December 2007, the KOEM arrested the Hebei Spirit in order to ensure
\ncompensation for huge costs of clean-up operations, losses and damages from the oil
\nspilled from the ship (Ministry of Land, Tranport and Maritime Affairs, 2010, p.22).
\nMeetings to discuss compensation issues between MLTM\/KOEM and the
\nowner\/Skuld P&I Club were held several times and a Coorperation Agreement was
\nmade on 5 January 2008.
\nIn this agreement, each party confirmed that the arrest of the ship was unnecessary in
\nview of the compensation guaranteed in accordance with the international law,
\nnamely the CLC 1992 and the FC 1992, and agreed to set-up a Receipt Office for the
\nreceipt of claims under the CLC and the FC. As a result of this agreement, the ship
\nwas allowed to sail from Korean waters on 7 January 2008.
\n43
\nThereafter, throughout consultation with the MLTM, the 1992 Fund and the Skuld
\nClub, the Hebei Spirit Centre was established in Seoul to Help claimants in the
\npresentation of their claims for compensation. The Centre has a manager and two
\nsupporting staff members. The office became fully operational on 22 January 2008
\n(International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund, 21 February 2008).
\nOn 1 July 2008, a second Cooperation Agreement was concluded between the
\nowners\/Skuld P&I Club and the MLTM. In accordance with this Agreement, the
\nSkuld P&I Club undertook to pay claimants 100% of their claims as assessed by the
\nFund and the Skuld P&I Club up to the CLC limit.
\nIn return, the Korean Government undertook to compensate in full all claims as
\nassessed by the Club and the 1992 Fund as well as the judicial settlements in excess
\nof the IOPC Fund’s limit to ensure that all claimants would eventually receive full
\ncompensation. The Korean Government further ensured that the Skuld P&I Club
\ndeposit in the Court the balance between the payments already made by them and its
\nlimit under the 1992 CLC (International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund, 9
\nSeptember 2008).
\n3.4 Claim Status
\n3.4.1 Estimated Losses
\nThe IOPC Fund presented their estimated losses to each Executive Committee as
\nshown in Table 7. The estimated losses for the clean-up operation were increased
\ncontinuously because additional clean-up had to be conducted until the first half of
\n2009. The estimate of the expected admissible costs for the at-sea and onshore cleanup, consequent disposal of waste and for environmental restoration and monitoring as
\na result of the incident totals KRW186,870 million.
\n44
\nThe estimated losses for fisheries and mariculture were increased up to KRW209
\nbillion until June 2009, but decreased to approximately KRW166 billion in June
\n2010 because the experts found many excessive claims through assessment. The
\nestimated losses for tourism were also decreased due to lack of evidence.
\nSource : Adapted by Author from IOPC Fund Executive Committee Papers.
\nIn June 2010, the IOPC Fund estimated total losses of damages caused by the Hebei
\nSpirit was approximately KRW453 billion, but big gaps remained with the claims
\namount of KRW1,978 billion submitted by claimants.
\n3.4.2 Claim Situation
\nAccording to the report of the Director of the 1992 IOPC Fund (International Oil
\nPollution Compensation Fund, 16 June 2010), as of 1 June 2010, a total of 19,025
\nclaims had been submitted on behalf of 117,636 claimants. Of the claims registered
\nin the HSC, 228 claims had been submitted by fishery cooperatives or committees on
\nbehalf of 98,839 small-scale fishermen affected by the oil spill.
\nTable 7 Estimated Losses Caused by the Hebei Spirit Incident
\nEstimated losses(unit:billion KRW)
\n2008 2009 2010
\nMarch June October March June October June
\nClean-up 110 134.5 162.3 163.3 173 195 186.9
\nFisheries\/
\nMariculture
\n190 206 206 206.0 209 149 166.2
\nTourism 72~
\n124
\n198~
\n233
\n198~
\n233
\n198~
\n233
\n198~
\n233
\n198~
\n233
\n100
\nTotal 372~
\n424
\n538.5~
\n573.5
\n566.3~
\n601.3
\n567.3~
\n602.3
\n580~
\n615
\n542~
\n577
\n453.1
\n45
\nThe remaining 18,797 claims, mostly in aquaculture and tourism sectors, had been
\nregistered and are being assessed individually. A total of 6,163 claims had been
\nassessed and of these, 4,307 had been rejected.
\nA total of 1,654 claims, totalling KRW102,516 million have been paid by the Skuld
\nClub. These payments also include a number of subrogated claims submitted by the
\nKorean Government.
\nTable 8 provides an update of the claims registered in the HSC as at 1 June 2010.
\nTable 8 Claim Situation caused by the Hebei Spirit Incident
\nClaimed
\nbut not yet assessed
\nAssessed
\nbut not yet paid10
\nPaid
\nNo.of
\nClaims
\nAmount
\n(million
\nKRW)
\nNo.of
\nClaims
\nAmount
\n(million
\nKRW)
\nNo.of
\nClaims
\nAmount
\n(million
\nKRW)
\nClean-up\/Preventive
\nMeasures
\n56 105,505 50 9,459 165 78,790
\nProperty Damage 11 2,603 5 94 6 345
\nFisheries\/Mariculture 5,638 1,468,548 429 1,005 145 9,342
\nTourism and other
\nEconomic Damage
\n7,067 285,476 4,114 1,348 1,338 14,037
\nEnvironmental
\nDamage
\n1 2,195 – – –
\nTotal 12,773 1,863,327 4,598 11,906 1,654 102,516
\nSource: International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund , June 2010. (IOPC\/JUN10\/3\/5).<\/p>\n
10 The number of assessed claims includes rejections.
\n46
\nThrough simple analysis of Table 8, two significant problems can be found in the
\nclaims process of the IOPC Fund. Firstly, the assessment proceeding by the IOPC
\nFund is much too slow. Despite two and a half years having passed from the date the
\nincident occurred, 12,773 claims among the total of 19,025 claims have not yet been
\nassessed by the IOPC Fund. In other words, the assessed rate based on the number of
\nclaims is less than 33%, and approximately 67% of the claims have not yet been
\nassessed as shown in Figure 7.
\nFigure 7 Rate of assessment by the IOPC Fund based on the number of claims
\nSource : Author
\nLooking at the calculation of the assessment rate based on the amount of claims, it is
\nmore significant. Approximately KRW1,863 billion from the total of KRW1,978
\nbillion claimed by victims have not been assessed and the assessed rate is less than
\n6%. In other words, 94% of claims have not yet been assessed as shown in Figure 8.
\n47
\nFigure 8 Rate of assessment by the IOPC Fund based on the amount of claims
\nSource: Author
\nSecondly, payment by the shipowners and the IOPC Fund to victims is also very slow.
\nBased on the number of claims, 1,654 claims among the total of 19,025 were paid
\nwhich brings the payment rate to less than 9% . Based on the amount of claims,
\naround KRW103 billion from the total of KRW1,978 billion claimed by victims were
\npaid and the payment rate is approximately 5%.
\nEventhough the total number of claims submitted by victims is not the exact amount
\nto be paid to them at the moment, the proceeding of the assessments and payments is
\ntoo slow. In a general point of view, the main reason for these problems seems to be
\nlack of experts or staff at the IOPC Fund to assess the huge number of claims.
\nLooking at Figures 9 and 10, these problems can clearly be seen. Furthermore,
\nFigures 11 and 12 show the development of claims from March 2008 to June 2010
\nand the delay of assessment and payment by the IOPC Fund can also be seen clearly.
\n48
\nFigure 9 Claims Status (based on number of claims)
\nSource: Author
\n49
\nFigure 10 Claims Status (based on the amount of claims)
\nSource: Author
\n50
\nFigure 11 Development of Claims (based on the amount of claims)
\nSource: IOPC Fund (2010, June 16). IOPC\/JUN10\/3\/5.
\nFigure 12 Development of Claims (based on number of claims)
\nSource: IOPC Fund (2010, June 16). IOPC\/JUN10\/3\/5.
\n51
\nCHAPTER 4 Problems and Consideration of the Development
\n4.1 Introduction
\nThe International Compensation Scheme is very useful especially in the case of huge
\noil spill incidents throughout the world. However, several problems relating to claim
\nprocedures taken by the IOPC Fund, such as assessment and payment continuously in
\npractice were pointed out by each Member State.
\nThe most significant problem is the delay of payments for compensation. For
\nexample, in the case of the Erica incident, it took approximately 18 months after the
\nincident to pay the amount of shipowners\u201f limitation to claimants, a further 4 years
\nafter the incident, around 30% of total amount of limitation of the FC 92 was paid by
\nthe IOPC Fund and 9 years after the incident, approximately 70% of the total amount
\nwas paid (Morandeira, 2008).
\nAt the same time, looking at past experiences in Korea, the average amount
\nrecovered from the IOPC Fund was less than 14% of the claimed amounts. There are
\nvarious reasons in the low percentage of recovered amounts from the IOPC Fund, but
\nthere is a need to analyze this issue further in order to recommend corrective
\nmeasures.
\nThis Chapter will discuss several problems, especially the delay of payments that
\noccurred during the claims proceedings with the IOPC Fund throughout the Hebei
\nSpirit incident and other large oil spill incidents, and the author will consider
\neffective solutions to these problems. For this objective, the chapter will be divided
\ninto two parts, one involving the problems with the IOPC Fund and the other
\nproblems associated with Korea\u201fs claims process.
\n52
\n4.2 External Problems with IOPC Fund
\n4.2.1 Absence of Exact Standards for Compensation
\nAs mentioned earlier in Chapter 3, there is no detailed information or guidelines in
\ndeciding whether the IOPC Fund should pay for claims submitted by various
\nclaimants.
\nThere is only a Claims Manual, which was published by the Fund, to refer to claims
\nprocedures of the Fund, but it only offers a general overview of the obligations of the
\nFund to pay compensation. The Manual does not include three main significant
\nmatters, such as legally-binding elements, nor detailed standards for assessment of
\nclaims, and no designation of time periods for assessment by the Fund.
\nFirstly, it is an important issue whether the Manual is legally binding or not. Most of
\nthe Member States of the Fund have their own guidelines based on the Manual, and
\nKorea also made investigation guidelines for oil pollution damage after the No.5
\nKum Dong incident which occurred in 1993. These guidelines introduced various
\nrequirements including how a claim should be presented, what document a claim
\nshould contain, methods of calculating the cost of damages, and the procedures of
\nclaim assessment and payment.
\nHowever, it is just a general guideline in making claims to the Fund, and it does not
\ninclude detailed information or standards in accordance with the Claims Manual.
\nAlso, the Claims Manual and various guidelines made by each State do not have any
\nlegally binding power.
\n53
\nThe Manual describes \u201cit does not address legal issues in detail and should not be
\nseen as an authoritative interpretation of relevant to the international Conventions\u201d
\n(Claims Manual, 2008, p.5). Therefore, any significant issues caused by every
\nincident have to be decided by the Executive Committee of the Fund because there
\nare no clear provisions in the Conventions.
\nFurthermore, when claimants do not agree with the decisions of the Committee, they
\nwill bring actions against the Fund, which will then cause a delay in the payments for
\nseveral more years until final decision is made by the court or the supreme court. On
\nthe contrary, it is very difficult to make unified guidelines to apply to every State
\nbecause each State has different situations, laws, and customs. Also, all final
\ndecisions can be made only by the Courts of Contracting States in accordance with
\nArticle IX of CLC and Article 7 of the FC.
\nSecondly, the Manual, in section 2, gives general information on various types of
\ndamage covered by the Fund in accordance with Article I, 6. According to the
\nManual, the main types of pollution damage covered are described as six types:
\ni) clean-up and preventive measures,
\nii) property damage,
\niii) consequential loss,
\niv) pure economic loss,
\nv) environmental damage, and
\nvi) use of advisers.
\n54
\nBesides general information, it does not give any detailed information for a standard
\nor methods of their assessment. Consequently, claimants or experts appointed by the
\nFund may interprete it themselves, and these interpretations may cause a lot of
\narguments between claimants and the Fund. Therefore, it is necessary to develop
\nmore detailed criteria or standards for the assessments by the Fund in order to avoid a
\nlot of arguments in future.
\nFinally, the Manual describes very detailed information on the period that a claim
\nshould be made, which is as follows:
\n\u201cClaimants will ultimately lose their right to compensation under the 1992
\nFund Convention unless they bring court action against the 1992 Fund within
\nthree years of the date on which the damages occurred, or make formal
\nnotification to the 1992 Fund of a court action against the shipowner or his
\ninsurer within the three years period\u201d (Claims Manual, 2008, p.19).
\nHowever, there is no mention as to the exact period to assess and pay claims, but
\nthere are only general provisions as follows:
\n\u201cThe 1992 Fund and the P&I Clubs try to reach agreement with claimants and
\npay compensation as promptly as soon as possible\u201d (Claims Manual, 2008,
\np.20).
\nIn order to facilitate a speedy assessment and payments to claimants, a provision for
\nthe exact period to assess and pay compensation is recommended to be included.
\n4.2.2 Size of the Secretariat of the IOPC Fund
\nThere are currently a very small number of staff of 27, including a Director in the
\nSecretariat of the Fund, and they work on the investigations and assessments of
\nclaims caused by the oil pollution incidents across the world.
\n55
\nThe main role for the assessment of claims seems to be undertaken by 10 persons
\nworking in the Director\u201fs office and Claims Department as shown in Figure 13.
\n*One person has combined role as technical advisor and claims manager
\n*Deputy Director and one claims manager is vacant
\n*( ) : number of persons
\nThis small size of the Secretariat of the Fund may be considered as a significant
\nfactor for the delay of the payments. There are several reasons for increasing the staff
\nof the Secretariat of the Fund in order to make more speedy payments. Recently,
\nMember States of the 1992 Fund were increased and the limitation amount of
\ncompensation of the Fund based on the Supplementary Fund was increased up to
\nmore than 25 times compared to the limitation amount of the FC 71. Furthermore, oil
\nspill incident trends are currently towards bigger and bigger spills than in earlier
\nyears and the claims are also more complex than in past years. Therefore, the
\nworkload of the Secretariat of the IOPC Fund was increased and they need to
\nincrease the staff accordingly.
\nDirector
\nDirector\u201fs
\nOffice*
\n(4)
\nClaims Dept.*
\n(6)
\nExternal Relations &
\nConference Dept.
\n(6)
\nFinance &
\nAdministration
\nDept.
\n(11)
\nFigure 13 Current Structure of the IOPC FUND’s Secretariat
\nsource : Adopted by Author from https:\/\/monkessays.com\/write-my-essay\/iopcfund.org
\n56
\nAccording to the Claims Manual, \u201cthe fund usually appoints experts to monitor
\nclean-up operations, to investigate the technical merits of claims and to make
\nindependant assessments of the losses\u201d (Claims Manual, 2008, p.19). The Fund
\nusually depends on the advice of the International Tanker Owners Pollution
\nFederation Ltd (ITOPF).
\nHowever, the Fund has to make decisions as to whether to approve or reject a
\nparticular claim, and the Fund should have sufficient staff capacity in order to meet
\nthis principle. This issue was discussed at the Assembly of the 1992 Fund held in
\nOctober 2009, but the Fund had objections to this matter (Iinternational Oil Pollution
\nCompensation Fund, October 2008). However, the Fund should consider taking this
\nmatter into account in the future.
\n4.2.3 Role of the Claims Office
\nThe IOPC Fund and the P&I Club, occasionally, establish a local claims office in the
\ncase of an incident where a large number of claims arose, in order for the claims to be
\nprocessed efficiently (Claims Manual, 2008, p.17). In the case of the Hebei Spirit
\nincident, the Fund and Skuld P&I Club established the Hebei Spirit Center in Seoul
\nas mentioned in the previous chapter. The local claims office is very useful for
\nclaimants to submit claims.
\nOn the other hand, it may cause delay of payments of compensation because the
\noffice does not have the authority to make any decisions on whether or not claims
\nqualify for compensation.
\nThe main role of the office is to transfer claims submitted by claimants to the Fund.
\nThere is an opinion that if the office has the authority to assess claims, then the
\n57
\nclaims procedure may be speedier than the present procedure (Choi D. H. & Choi J.
\nS., 1997, p.75).
\nIn the case of the Sea Prince incident, which occurred in 1995, claimants were able to
\nsubmit their claims to a local law firm designated by the Fund and claimants were
\ninformed of the status of their claims proceeding from the law firm directly because
\nthe law firm was handling the claims. In contrast, in the case of the Hebei Spirit, not
\nonly did the local office not have any information on the handling of the claims, but
\nthey also did not have any authority to discuss the claims.
\n4.3 Internal Problems in Korea
\n4.3.1 Unreasonable Claims and Poor Evidence
\nThe average percentage of the actual amount compensated by the Fund among the
\ntotal amount claimed in several incidents which occurred from 1993 to 2003 in Korea
\nis less than 14% as shown in Table 9.
\nThe main reason for this result may be due to a lot of unreasonable claims submitted
\nby fisheries groups eventhough their claims did not have sufficient close link to
\ncausation between the contamination and the loss or damage.
\nIn addition, this problem occurred occasionally because most surveyors or law firms
\nappointed by owners of fisheries did not fully understand the policy for the
\ncompensation of the Fund.
\n58
\nTable 9 Major Oil Spill Incidents in Korea
\nDate Ship\u201fs name
\nClaimed
\namount
\n(million
\nKRW)
\nCompensated
\namount
\n(million
\nKRW)
\nCompensation
\nrate
\n(%)
\n27 Sept, 1993 Keumdong No.5 93,132 8,718 9.4
\n23 July, 1995 Sea Prince 68,812 19,836 28.8
\n3 Aug, 1995 Yeo Myung 20,247 600 2.9
\n21 Sept, 1995 Yuil No.1 36,889 7,960 21.6
\n17 Nov, 1995 Honam Sapphire 49,923 1,112 2.2
\n3 April, 1997 Osung No.3 1,125 69 6.1
\n22 April, 2003 Buyang 3,611 319 8.8
\n13 May, 2003 Hana 1,589 91 5.7
\n12 Sept, 2003 Duck yang 696 46 6.6
\n12 Sept, 2003 Kyung Won 2,800 310 11.1
\n23 Dec, 2003 Jeong Yang 1,064 76 7.1
\nTotal 279,888 39,137 13.98
\nSource : Cho (2008).
\nThese unreasonable claims may result in more delay of compensation for the actual
\nvictims and a drop in the credit of overall claims against the IOPC Fund. Furthermore,
\nthe initial level of payment decided by the Fund may be lowered because of those
\nexcessive claims and actual victims may suffer as a result. Therefore, the Korean
\nGovernment and Fisheries Associations should carry out proper education for
\nfishermen and the owners of fisheries in order to prevent unreasonable claims or
\nexcessive claims without relevant evidence.
\n59
\nAnother important reason for the low compensation rate is caused by inadequate
\nevidence in proving loss or damage of claimants. According to the Claims Manual,
\n\u201cthe assessment of claims for economic loss in the fisheries, mariculture and
\nprocessing sectors is based on a comparison between the actual financial results
\nduring the claim period and those for previous period\u201d (Claims Manual, 2008, p.30).
\nIn the case of the Hebei Spirit incident, it is expected that the compensation rate is
\nvery low because there are big gaps between the estimated amount of KRW453
\nbillion of damage by the IOPC Fund and the submitted claims amount of KRW1,977
\nbillion as shown in Tables 7 and 8 in Chapter 3.
\nThe main reason for these problems is caused by false income tax returns of
\nfishermen. Furthermore, small-scale fishermen and bare-hands fisheries (or capture
\nfisheries) do not have any objective evidence to support their income claims nor any
\nincome tax returns. As a result, several figures regarding productions of various
\nfisheries published by the Korean Government are different from the actual
\nproduction statistics of the fisheries.
\nFor example, in the case of the Nahodka incident which occurred in 1997, since a
\nlocal government in Japan has recorded the actual production of fish and shellfish in
\ntheir region every year during the past 30 years, fisheries could recover the actual loss
\ncaused by the incident against the Fund without any problems (Kim, 2009, p.64).
\nTherefore, the Korean Government should introduce mandatory measures for various
\nfisheries and fishermen to implement their obligation of income tax return following
\nrelevant Acts, and try to ascertain the exact production of fisheries in the future.
\n60
\n4.3.2 Korean Fund
\nThe Taean Special Law was legislated to support victims who suffered from the
\nHebei Spirit incident temporarily as mentioned earlier in Chapter 2. However, there
\nis a need to consider a permanent solution to help with speedy compensation to
\nvictims in the case of huge oil pollution incidents in the future.
\nEventhough Korea ratified the Supplementary Fund shortly after the Hebei Spirit
\nincident, the delay in compensation can not be solved. Therefore, the application of
\nan additional compensation scheme is essential. One solution is to establish a Korean
\nFund similar to that of the Canadian Compensation Scheme. The main problem with
\nthis solution is financial sources.
\nThe SOPF in Canada imposes a levy on oil importers, but this measure is not easy for
\nthe Korean Government to implement at the moment. This is because the oil industry
\nin Korea has already undertaken a financial burden from joining the Supplementary
\nFund. The Korean oil industry is different from that of Canada and the US because
\nthere are no major oil companies to create much benefit from their business in Korea.
\nKorea does not have oil resources on land, so they depend only on imported oil. As a
\nresult, Korea is currently the fourth largest contributor to the 1992 IOPC Fund as
\nshown in Table 3. Recently, the MLTM indicated it is planning to research this
\nmatter through an institutional review.
\n61
\nChapter 5 Conclusions
\nAfter the Torrey Canyon incident in 1967, the International Scheme for the
\ncompensation of pollution damage caused by oil spills from tankers was based on
\ntwo sets of International Conventions, the CLC 1969 and FC 71. The international
\ncommunity reaffirmed its commitment to this system widely in 1992 and in 2003,
\nand kept the levels of compensation up-to-date as mentioned in this paper.
\nBefore the Erica (1999), Prestige (2002), and Hebei Spirit (2007) incidents, most of
\nthe Member States of the IOPC Fund focused on increasing the limitation amount,
\nbelieving that the levels of compensation are enough for victims suffering from oil
\nspills from tankers. There is no doubt that it is a fact that the most important issue
\nregarding compensation to victims is the limitation amount which could help recover
\ntheir losses for damages caused by oil spills.
\nHowever, a speedy and fair compensation also became another significant issue for
\nvictims in practice after the above three large oil pollution incidents. There is an
\nimportant point of similarity in the three incidents unlike previous incidents, namely
\nthe positive intervention of the Government of each State dealing with the
\ncompensation proceedings between the victims and the shipowner\/IOPC Fund. The
\nmain reasons are not only the estimation for exceeding the limitation amount of the
\nInternational Compensation Scheme, but also the delay of assessment and payments
\nto victims.
\nIn the case of the Prestige incident, the Spanish Government enacted a Special Law,
\nRoyal Decree Laws, in order to establish a system of advance payment to the Spanish
\nclaimants, because the IOPC Fund pays the compensation only after assessment of
\nclaims, which takes more than a year (Morandeira, 2008). This advance payment was
\n62
\nconducted by their own assessment, similar to that of the US and Canadian
\ncompensation schemes.
\nIn the case of the Erika incident, the French Government did not enact any Special
\nLaw, but they used a huge amount of their government budget to enable speedy
\npayments to victims before the assessment by the IOPC Fund. Then, the French
\nGovernment declared that they would stand last in the queue in recovering the
\namount for the advance payments from the 1992 Fund. This is the first case where
\nthe government declared that they would stand last in the queue in recovering the
\ngovernment budget used earlier to compensate victims from the IOPC Fund in the
\nworld (Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs, 2010, p.425).
\nThe Hebei Spirit incident, which is the largest oil spill incident in Korea, brought
\nabout many economical, social, environmental and political issues. The most
\nimportant issue was speedy and fair compensation to actual victims suffering from
\nthe incident. Therefore, the Korean Government enacted a Special Law and also
\nconducted advance payments from the Government budget to some of the victims.
\nThe Korean Government also declared it would stand last in the queue in recovering
\nthe Government budget used to compensate victims from the IOPC Fund, the same
\nas the French Government. Unfortunately, the advance payments to victims were
\nvery slow because the payments were conducted based on the results of the IOPC
\nFund\u201fs assessment.
\nIt is important that the IOPC Fund make changes in their administration to improve
\nefficiency. Although the Fund is opposed to increasing staff, this is something that
\nshould be looked into seriously because the assessment periods for the claims became
\nlonger leading to longer delays in payments made out to claimants, as can be seen
\nfrom the Erica, Prestige, and Hebei Spirit incidents. From looking at the current
\nInternational Oil Pollution Compensation Scheme, although the compensation
\n63
\namounts seem sufficient due to the Supplementary Fund, problems relating to delay
\nin payments will constantly occur in the future.
\nDue to victims suffering from the delay in payments, Member States of the IOPC
\nFund need to enforce a separate national compensation scheme. Moreover, with the
\nHNS Convention coming into effect shortly, the work load of the Fund will increase
\neven more. Therefore, it will not be a matter of the staff concentrating on the problem
\nof the compensation amount, but making sure that speedy compensations to victims
\ncan take place efficiently in cases of oil spill incidents. For this to take place,
\nincreasing the number of staff in the Fund should be looked into.
\nThe current claims manual should also be supplemented. This is because there is a
\nneed to state the assessment standards of claims in detail to avoid different
\ninterpretations. When an accident occurs, the Fund will call ITOPF and local experts
\nfrom every Member State to decide the assessment standards, but this may lead to
\ndifferent assessment standards every time an accident takes place because every
\nexpert has different ways of interpreting. Furthermore, there is a need to state the
\nassessment periods of claims by the IOPC Fund. This way experts employed by the
\nFund can follow the assessment proceedings in a timely and speedy manner.
\nThrough this incident, what does the Korean Government need to do in the future?
\nThe Korean Government need to concentrate on enacting a law on the detailed
\nstandards of the assessment for various types of claims, following the general
\nstandards of the assessment by the IOPC Fund in order for fair compensation to take
\nplace. Therefore, all related organizations including Government officials need to be
\neducated and trained thoroughly and a group of Korean experts also needs to be
\nformed and trained. For example, the KCG or local governments need to be able to
\ncommand the cleaning operations reasonably, and government officials at the
\nfisheries departments need to follow scientific evidence instead of political reasons
\n64
\nwhen declaring a fishing ban, so that no problem will arise during compensation.
\nSufficient training and publicity are also required in stopping excessive claims from
\ntaking place because the excessive claims prevent speedy compensations from taking
\nplace.
\nMonitoring of unlicensed and illegal fishing is necessary, so the government should
\nstrongly enforce the implementation of relevant Acts on fisheries accordingly.
\nFurther, the government should maintain all of the income tax returns against all
\nkinds of business in fisheries to present a clear record of their production in order to
\nprovide proper evidence for loss of damages from oil spill incidents.
\nThe Korean Government also joined the Supplementary Fund shortly after this
\nincident. Therefore, in the future, there is no need to worry about the limitation
\namount because by joining the Supplementary Fund, the limitation amount has been
\nraised. However, how can the actual compensation process become more timely,
\nconsidering the total number of claims is over 190,000 in the case of the Hebei Spirit
\nincident? The delay of payments by the IOPC Fund can not be solved unless the
\nclaims processing of the Fund is changed as shown not only in the Hebei Spirit
\nincident but also in the other incidents. To solve this problem, the Korean
\nGovernment needs to secure financial resources to make advance payments to
\nvictims, and develop its own national assessment system on various claims caused by
\noil pollution from ships.
\nIn conclusion, the Secretariat of the IOPC Fund and the Korean Government should
\ndevelop their current Compensation Schemes as mentioned above in order to make
\nspeedy and fair compensations to victims suffering from oil pollution from ships in
\nthe future, taking into account the goal of the International Compensation Schemes.
\n65
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Oil Spill Compensation Scheme from an Oil Tanker in Korea : Case Study on the Hebei Spirit A dissertation submitted to the World Maritime University\u2026<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[8827,10099,10540,10536,10892,10538,10539,10537,10891],"tags":[10549,10616,10615,7687,10627,8857,10552,10295,10548,10622,8907],"class_list":["post-132275","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-australia-essays","category-buy-essay","category-cheap-essay-writers","category-get-assignments-done","category-page-paper","category-phd-essay-writers","category-research-paper-writing-service-for-any-topic","category-study-bay-essay","category-write-my-assignment-ireland","tag-ai-plagiarism-free-essay-writing-tool","tag-australian-best-tutors","tag-best-trans-tutors","tag-buy-essay-uk","tag-cheap-dissertation-writer","tag-help-with-writing-an-essay","tag-help-write-my-paper-ai-free","tag-homework-for-you","tag-online-essay-writers","tag-phd-essays","tag-write-my-essay-for-me"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/132275","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=132275"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/132275\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":132425,"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/132275\/revisions\/132425"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=132275"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=132275"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=132275"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}