Analysis of Vessel-Based Marine Accidents and the
\nEconomic Risks to Nigeria<\/p>\n
Abstract: The aim of the study is to evaluate the economic loss of vessel-based marine accidents to Nigeria and the impact
\non marine transport sub-sector output and\/or performance. Time series data of 30 years were gathered from the Central Bank of
\nNigeria (CBN) statistical bulletin, the Nigeria insurance digest, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
\nannual statistical report. The contribution of marine transport to the Gross Domestic Product (Y), shipping accident economic
\nloss (X1), economic losses of offshore oil and gas (O&G) drilling accidents (X2), and marine oil spill accidents economic
\nlosses (X3) were obtained and used as the explanatory(independent) variables. The data was analyzed using multiple regression
\nmethod with Y as the dependent variable. The hypotheses were tested using t-test. The findings of the study indicates that
\nshipping accidents economic losses and economic losses of offshore oil and gas drilling accidents shows significant impact on
\nthe output of the marine transport sub-sector over the period covered by the study. The model expressing the quantitative
\nrelationship between GDPmarine transport (Y), shipping accidents economic loss (X1), economic loss of offshore oil and gas drilling
\naccidents (X2) and marine oil spill accidents loss (X3) is: Y = 332156363.1 + 0.167X1 + 0.837X2 + 0.203X3 + e. it was
\nrecommended that investment in safety policies and standards be improved with greater focus in reducing accidents induced
\neconomic losses in shipping and offshore O&G drilling maritime operations.
\nKeywords: Vessel-Based, Marine, Accidents, Economic – Risks
\n1. Introduction
\nThe concept of marine accident is the occurrence of an
\nevent in a ship or involving any equipment, investment and
\nproperties exposed to the marine environment, that resulting
\nto injuries to persons at sea or in port, and damage to the
\nmarine property or investment [1]. It encompasses accident
\nin the sea or at port, quayside or anchorage, dockyards or
\nshipyards etc. Marine accidents are caused by exposure to
\nrisks, perils and hazards of the marine environment, provided
\nthat the accidental objects are at sea or being harnessed for
\nsea movement, in port or in a dockyards and can be protected
\nby a policy of marine insurance. It is immaterial whether the
\nvessel or object involved in accident is sailing or stationary at
\nthe point and time of accident [2]. Nigeria being a maritime
\nnation is one of the One Hundred and Sixty Nine (169), and
\nthree (3) associate member countries of the International
\nMaritime Organization (IMO) which is an agency of the
\nunited Nations [UN], with the mission of regulating safety
\noperations and instrumentation in the global maritime
\nindustry [3]. With inland water ways of about ten thousand
\nkilometers (10,000km) and extensive coast line of about
\neight hundred and fifty-two kilometers (852km) and
\nterritorial sea based on the United Nations Convention on the
\nlaw of the sea 1982, extending twelve nautical miles or
\ntwenty-two kilometers into the open seas, from the shorelines
\n73 Nwokedi Theophilus Chinonyerem et al.: Moses Ntor-Ue. Analysis of Vessel-Based Marine
\nAccidents and the Economic Risks to Nigeria
\nof the country, falling fully within the country\u2019s exclusive
\neconomic zone [3], [4].
\nReference [5] reports that seaborne container traffic
\n(container throughput) to Nigerian ports in 2013 stood at
\ntwo million, Seven hundred and twenty thousand, four
\nhundred and twenty two TEUS (2,720, 422 TEU\u2019S),
\nrepresenting an average of nine hundred and nine thousand
\nfour hundred and seventy four TEU\u2019S (909,474 TEU\u2019S) per
\nannum between the 2011 to 2013 period. National statistics
\nindicates that the total value of export shipping trade
\n(Export trade by sea) and imports shipping trade (sea borne
\nimport trade) in the year 2013 were fourteen trillion, seven
\nhundred and thirty five billion, nine hundred and seventy
\nseven million, seven hundred and sixty thousand naira
\n(14,735,977,760,000.00) and nine trillion, eighty four
\nbillion, four hundred and fifty four million, seven hundred
\nand thirty thousand naira (9,084,454,730,000.00)
\nrespectively, while the cargo throughput of the Nigerian
\nports excluding crude oil terminals in the same year was
\n76,886,997 million metric tons [6-8]. Further reports from
\nthe Nigerian ports authority (NPA) reveals that in the year
\n2013, 5232 ships transited to the ports of Nigeria while an
\naverage of 2,200 offshore service boats serviced the
\nlogistics needs of the oil and gas (O&G) industry in the
\ncoastal trade [6]. Within the Nigeria coastal regions and
\ninternal waters, runs extensive oil pipeline networks of over
\n7000km extending to the shores and numerous oil
\nexploration and exploitation platforms.
\nThe above statistics represent the economic strengths of
\nthe economy of the Nigeria\u2019s marine transport industry\/subsector and points towards the potentials of the sub-sector to
\ncontribute meaningfully to the Gross Domestic Product,
\neconomic growth and development. Statistics from the
\nCentral Bank of Nigeria (2013) reveals that the average
\ncontribution of maritime transport sub-sector (GDPmarine
\ntransport) to the Gross Domestic Product of the Nigeria
\neconomy in 2013 alone was six billion, two hundred and
\ntwenty million, four hundred and seventy thousand naira
\n(#6,220,470,000.00). The economic contribution of the
\nmarine economy of Nigeria can be maximized given the
\ncapacities of the contributing variables as earlier statistics
\nreveal. it is viewed that the contribution of this sub-sector of
\nthe economy has continually remained limited and below
\nexpected benchmarks and targets each year following high
\ntrend of marine perils and hazards (causal factors of accident)
\nto which the investments are exposed, this equally has
\neconomic and financial costs and implications which
\nconsequently hinder the maximization of the contribution of
\nthe maritime transport sub-sector to the national output
\n(GDP) of Nigeria [9].
\nReference [10] explains hazards and perils of the sea as
\nunforeseen occurrences making vessels, underwater
\ninstallation, seaborne cargo, oil and gas drilling rigs and
\nplatforms, and on board-personnel vulnerable to risks of
\nmarine accident with the attendant economic loss. Reference
\n[11] asserts that the prevalence of hazards and perils of the
\nsea, exposes maritime prosperities and investment in ships to
\nrisk of accident and loss of various nature, this necessitates
\nthe application of formal safety assessment (FSA) and other
\nforms of risk assessment methods as well as proper
\nimplementation of other International maritime Organization
\n(IMO) convention instruments to limit the occurrence of
\nmaritime accidents and consequent economic losses
\noccasioned by it.
\nReference [2] further defines a marine accident as one or
\nmore unexpected and undesired marine incident, which
\nresult in death or personal injury to crew, damage or loss of
\nmarine properties and seaborne cargo and harmful to the
\nmarine environment. Safety has always been considered as
\na critical feature in almost all marine operations, safety
\nmust have equal consideration with environmental and
\neconomic impact [12]. Since marine accident is likely to
\nhave serious commercial and financial consequences. It is
\ntherefore important to keep all risks in good control through
\nproactive safety management. This requires the
\nmeasurement of the economic cost of ship-based accidents
\nto properly manage it. The Nigeria Maritime Administration
\nand Safety Agency (NIMASA) Act made provisions for
\ninstitution of an accident investigation committee, to cause
\nan inquiry into the reported accident cases in the maritime
\ndomain of Nigeria and Nigeria flagged vessels. The Act
\nhowever did not note the importance of extending
\ninvestigations to finding the impact of marine accidents on
\nthe economy as it seems to center more on investigating to
\nlimit environmental impact of pollution, accident frequency,
\nfatality (death) rates and injury to onboard personnel and
\npassengers. The implementation of the section of the
\nNIMASA Act dealing with investigation of accident by an
\nappointed committee is equally believed to have been
\npoliticized over the years due to appointment of politicians
\ninto the committee rather than professionals. As a result
\nwhile many coastal nations in boast of serious strives and
\ncertainty achieved in limiting marine accidents and the
\neconomic impacts, through diligent implementation of
\nsafety and loss control measures, as evidenced in the data
\nbases they maintain for marine accident. The same cannot
\nbe said of marine accident investigation, measurement and
\ncontrol in Nigeria, as it remains a game of probability even
\nas there appear to be no reliable public sector ship-based
\naccident database for Nigeria.
\nIn the opinion of reference [13], \u201cYou can\u2019t manage or
\ncontrol it, if you can\u2019t measure it\u201d. To measure and\/or
\nestimate the impact of vessel-based marine accidents losses
\non the economy with precision, marine accident investigation
\nis an important first step. It becomes an equally impossible
\ntask to ascertain the extent of losses caused by marine
\naccidents when there is no professional marine accident
\ninvestigation board, or where the marine safety authority
\nlacks a developed effective and professional accident
\ninvestigation department.
\nIn the views of reference [14], accidents impose various
\ncategories of economic costs which include: property damage
\ncost (damage accident), injury and death cost (injury and
\ndeath accident), cost imposed on economy as a result of
\nJournal of Water Resources and Ocean Science 2017; 6(6): 72-84 74
\naccident induced pollution (spill\/ pollution accident), cost of
\npolice services, court and insurance services, cost of safety
\nmeasures implementation among others. The opinion of [14]
\nreceives support from the opinions of references [15], [16],
\nwhose studies centered on valuation of damage accidents in
\nthe marine industry. Reference [16] identifies the economic
\nlosses of marine damage accidents to include: shipping
\naccident losses, offshore oil and gas (O&G) drilling accidents
\nlosses, and marine oil spill accidents losses. This study will
\ncenter on the economic losses of the various kinds of vesselbased marine damage accidents and the effects on the output
\nof the marine transport sub-sector of Nigeria from 1984 to
\n2013 covering a 30 years period. The contributions of
\nmaritime transport to economic growth and development of
\nNigeria will neither be sustained nor maximized, until the
\neconomic losses of marine accidents in Nigeria is measured
\nwith precision and controlled by use of effective safety
\nmanagement instruments.
\n1.1. Objectives
\nThe main objective of the study is to ascertain the impact
\nof marine accident economic loss on the output of Nigerian
\nmarine transport sub-sector of the economy from 1984 to
\n2013. Other specific objective are:
\n(i) To assess the impact of shipping accidents economic
\nloss on the Nigerian marine transport gross domestic
\nproduct (GDPmarine transport).
\n(ii) To examine the effect of the economic loss of offshore
\noil and gas (O&G) drilling accidents on the output of
\nthe marine transport subsector of Nigeria.
\n(iii)To evaluate the impact of marine oil spill accidents on
\nthe GDPmarine transport
\n(iv) To compare shipping accidents economic loss and
\ninsurance expenditure on shipping accidents loss
\ncontrol and management.
\n1.2. Hypotheses
\nHOa: There is no significant impact of shipping accidents
\neconomic losses on GDPmarine transport over the period covered
\nin the study.
\nHob: Economic losses of offshore O&G accidents has no
\nsignificant impact on GDPmarine transport
\nHoc: marine oil spill accidents losses does not show
\nsignificant impact on the GDPmarie transport
\nHod: There is no significant difference between shipping
\naccidents economic loss and insurance expenditure for the
\ncontrol and management of shipping accidents losses.
\n2. Brief of Related Literature
\n2.1. Conceptual Framework
\nReference [17] explains an accident as unexpected,
\nunplanned and unintentional series of events leading to the
\nphysical injury of a person at work and\/or damage to
\nproperties, equipments and the environment. In a study on
\ntheories of occupational accident, reference [17] opines that
\naccidents occur when workers, properties and equipment are
\nexposed to a danger factor (hazard), such that the worker is
\ninjured and the property is damaged with diminished value.
\nPresenting a study guide on accident investigation and
\ncontrol, reference [18] defines the concept of accident as the
\nfinal event in an unplanned process that results in injury,
\nillness, property damage and possible environmental damage.
\nIt is the final effect of multiple causes and an event, that
\nresult in a damage of state of persons and properties involved
\n[18]. From the foregoing, it is observable that the occurence
\nof accident diminishes the economic value and structure of
\nproperties and health states of persons involved. Reference
\n[18] distinguishes between accident and incidents, while
\naccidents are observed to cause injuries and damages,
\nincidents do not cause injuries and damages. Accidents also
\nresult from many factors, simultaneously interconnected,
\ncross-linked events that have interacted in some dynamic
\nway. It identifies that accidents also result from hazardous
\nconditions and unsafe behaviours which represent risks that
\nhave been ignored and tolerated within the safety
\nmanagement system. In the guide for hazard analysis and
\ncontrol in a work environment, it notes that hazards are
\ndangers, unsafe workplace conditions and practices which
\nthreaten physical harms to employees and to property and
\nenvironment. It posits that these hazards (dangers) represent
\nrisks of damages and injuries that could occur with accidents,
\nonce there is exposure to it [18].
\nIn the views of reference [19], an accident is an occurrence
\nthat involves a sequence of events that must encompass
\nunintentional injury or damage. Reference [19] posits that
\naccident phenomenon is distinguished from other phenomena
\nsuch as murder, sabotage, suicide, war, and other willful
\ninjurious event by the singular characteristics of unplanned,
\nunexpected or unintentional injury and\/or damage. Figure 1
\nbelow is a key illustration of the accident phenomenon as
\nillustrated by reference [19] in observing the event in the
\nbeginning and end of accident.
\nSource: Reference [19].
\nFigure 1. Accident is assumed that involve the occurrence of a set of successive events that produce unintentional harm.
\n75 Nwokedi Theophilus Chinonyerem et al.: Moses Ntor-Ue. Analysis of Vessel-Based Marine
\nAccidents and the Economic Risks to Nigeria
\nSource: reference [19].
\nFigure 2. Accident causing events and activities in terms of their chronological relationship.
\nReference [17] supporting the earlier position of [18] notes
\nthat the risk of traffic accident is influenced by the level of
\nexposure to occupational\/traffic related hazards. This agrees
\nwith the position of reference [18], that exposure to risks
\n(hazards) causes accident. Risk is the probability than an
\naccident (event) will occur and adversely affect the
\nachievement of objectives [19]. Reference [20] in reference
\n[21], considers risk as the chance of injury, damage or loss.
\nRisk is further explained as an event where something that is
\nof value to humans (including humans themselves) is at stake
\nand where the outcome is uncertain [21-22].References [23-
\n24] definie risk as the effects of uncertainty on objectives
\nnotes that risk is the possibility that an event will occur and
\nadversely affect the achievement of objectives.
\nA diligent observation of the above definitions of risk
\nshow a synonymous relationship between accident and risk
\nwith the definition of both having common elements of
\nunexpected loss, injury, damage, adverse outcome,
\nuncertainty, probability, severity of consequences, etc. The
\nconcept of accident and risk therefore denotes the likelihood
\nthat employees, properties and investment exposed to hazards
\nand unsafe condition may experience an event\/action, whose
\ncasual factor may be multiple, single or in-chain, that will
\nchange its state by resulting to injury, damage and\/or loss.
\nThe advent of motorized transport, offshore technology,
\nand advancement in industrial technology has led to
\ndevelopment of sea going vessels of various kinds, oil and
\ngas exploration rigs, floating production storage and
\noffloading systems (FPSO\u2019s) and water crafts of various
\nkinds. Advancement in offshore technology and ocean
\nengineering also offers opportunity for development of
\nunderwater exploration and exploitation vehicles, pipeline
\ntechnology system, cargo handling equipments of various
\nkinds and capacity, onshore\/port technology systems, all
\nproduced through the mastering and use of marine\/ocean
\nengineering and offshore technology and put into the sea for
\npurposes of surface sea transportation, (shipping), underwater
\nexploitation, surveillance and hydrographic studies, or
\nstationed permanently at sea or near to enhance the purposes
\nof harnessing the marine resources to the socio-economic
\nbenefit of the state. The concept of marine\/maritime accident
\nis the occurrence of an event\/risks, in a ship or involving
\nequipment, investment and properties exposed to the marine
\nenvironment, that resulting to injuries to person at sea or in
\nport, and damage to the marine property or investment [1]. It
\nencompasses accident in the sea or at port, quayside or
\nanchorage, dockyards or shipyards etc. Maritime accidents
\nare caused by exposure to risks, perils and hazards of the
\nmarine environment, provided that the accidental objects are
\nat sea or being harnessed for sea movement, in port or in a
\ndockyards and can be protected by a policy of marine
\ninsurance. It is immaterial whether the vessel or object
\ninvolved in accident is sailing or stationary at the point and
\ntime of accident [2]. The marine accident casualty
\ninvestigation boards further defines a marine accident as one
\nor more unexpected and undesired marine incident, which
\nresult in death or personal injury to crew, damage or loss of
\nmarine properties and seaborne cargo and harmful to the
\nmarine environment [2]. The study adopted the definition
\ngiven by reference [2] as our definition of marine accident.
\nThe concept of maritime accident according the marine
\naccident and casualty investigation boards is one or more
\nunexpected and undesired marine incident, which result in
\ndeath or personal injury to crew, damage or loss of marine
\nproperties or seaborne cargo, and harmful to the marine
\nenvironment. Marine incident on the other hand was defined
\nas undesired abnormal events occurring in the course of a
\nmarine adventure and likely to cause danger to man, ship\u2019s
\narchitecture work or environment [2]. References [2] and
\n[25] opines that marine accident may not be limited to
\naccident involving sea-going vessels and inland water boats
\nbut includes onshore mishaps such as crane cargo\/handling
\naccident in ports, accident involving oil exploitation
\nplatforms and mobile drilling units, accident in dockyards,
\ncollision leading to actual or pressurized loss of ship, her
\nabandonment, material damage to her or disablement. While
\nvessel accident is an unintended happening, its severity may
\nvary from no vessel damage to loss of entire cargo, and crew
\ninjury to death [26]. However, the code for marine accident
\nand casualty investigations distinguishes between \u201cvery
\nserious\u201d and \u201cserious\u201d casualties. Very serious means a
\ncasualty to a ship which involves the total loss of ship and its
\ncargo, loss of life or severe environmental pollution or
\ndamage. Serious casualty means a casualty which does not
\nquality as a very serious casualty and which involves fire
\nexplosion, grounding, contact, heavy weather damage, ice
\ndamage, hull cracking or suspected hull defect resulting in
\nstructural damage rendering the ship unseaworthy such as
\nJournal of Water Resources and Ocean Science 2017; 6(6): 72-84 76
\npenetration of the hull underwater, immobilization of main
\nengines, extensive accommodation damage, pollution and \/or
\nbreakdown necessitating towage or shore Helpance [2], [27],
\n[16]. Reference [28] opines that the main legal basis that
\nformed the international background for maritime accident
\ninvestigation lies in the United Nation convention on the law
\nof the sea (UNCLOS), which states in article 9A that it is the
\nresponsibility of the flag state to institute an inquiry
\n(investigation) into accidents on the high sea. Accidents
\noccurring elsewhere, such as in coastal and inland waters are
\nnot covered by the UNCLOS, though the right of the coastal
\nstate to extend investigation to accident on such waters is not
\nin contention and has been viewed as important in
\ndetermining economic cost of marine accidents and their
\ncontrol measures [28].
\nReference [29] in a study on analysis of maritime
\ntransportation risk factors grouped maritime accident into the
\nfollowing groupings:
\na. Foundering
\nb. Missing
\nc. Fire explosion
\nd. Grounding
\ne. Collision \/ contact
\nf. War loss \/ hostilities
\ng. Mechanical fault \/ problem
\nh. Hull problem
\ni. Navigational problem
\nj. Other problems not specified above.
\nThe study further observed that accident in the marine
\nindustry are further identified by the data-bases of maritime
\ncasualty maintained and published by organizations that
\nconduct accident investigation and analysis and regular
\nstatistical data updates, such organization include Lloyds
\nmaritime information services (LMIS), UK department of
\ntransport maritime accident investigation branch (MAIB),
\nInstitute of London underwriters (ILU), classification
\nsocieties such as Det Norske Veritas (DNV), American
\nBureau of shipping (ABS), United States Coast Guard
\n(USCG), The International Association of classification
\nsocieties (IACS), and the Maritime Accident Investigation
\nBoard (MAIB) of various maritime states [29].
\n2.2. Theoretical Framework
\nTheoretically, the economic loss and impact of marine
\naccident on the economy can be estimated based on the
\ntheories of accident causation, accident investigation and
\naccident\/risk management and loss control. These include the
\ndomino theory, the theory and principles of marine insurance,
\nhuman capital theory (Gross Output Model) and the
\neconomic theory of natural resource damage assessment
\nbased on total revenue, price and quantity, (output)
\nrelationship, among others [11], [30], [14] and [16].
\n2.2.1. Accident \/ Loss Causation Theories
\nThere exist many theories which seek to explain the causal
\nfactors of accident and the accident loss. The reason for many
\nof the theories is to lay sound foundation for the
\nunderstanding of the key accident causal factors, to enable
\napplication of control and management measures, to
\neliminate or reduce accident occurrence [31]. Reference [13]
\nopines that accident theories support the valid opinions that
\naccident are not always Acts of God and misfortunes to be
\nsuffered by people not at peace with gods, as believed until
\nthe 19th century when accident theory began to explain the
\ncausal factors of accidents. Thus accident theories provide
\nexplanation for occurrences of accidental losses and lay basic
\nfoundational steps for effective accidental damage and loss
\ncontrol and management. Some of the classical accident
\ncausation theories reviewed in this work include; the Domino
\ntheory, The Human Factor Theory (HFT), the Accident
\nIncident Theory (AIT), Epidemiological Theory, the systems
\ntheory, the Accident Proneness Theory (APT), the
\ncombination theory of accident causation, Behaviour Theory
\n(BT), the Energy Release Theory (ERT), energy damage
\nmodel [32]. Each of the accident causation theories attempts
\nto predict accident and thus prevent its occurrence.
\n2.2.2. The Domino Theory
\nReference [33] observes that the domino theory was
\ndeveloped and advanced by Heinrick in1959. In developing
\nthe domino theory, Heinrick conducted a research on
\nindustrial accident and concluded that 88% of accidents are
\ncaused by unsafe acts committed by people, 10% by unsafe
\ncondition and 2% by acts of God. The 2% caused by acts of
\nGod, he termed unavoidable accident. Thus the domino
\ntheory views that 98% of accident can be avoided by
\navoiding the causal factors [34].The domino theory explained
\nthat injury \/ loss results from series of events one of which is
\nthe accident itself. An accident it explains only result from an
\nunsafe acts committed by someone and \/ or a physical
\nhazard. Essentially, removal of the unsafe act or the unsafe
\ncondition prevents loss and damage. The theory states that
\nwhile most accident result from peoples unsafe behavior and
\nunsafe conditions, unsafe behaviours and conditions do not
\nalways immediately result in accident [35]. Therefore finding
\nthe reason why people commit unsafe behavior can guide in
\nadopting corrective measures. According to domino theory,
\nthe severity of an accident loss or damage is by chance rather
\nthan design and the accident that cause the loss and \/ or
\ndamage is preventable. The opinion of the domino theory is
\nthat management ought to take responsibilities for safety with
\nthe supervisor being the key person in the prevention of
\noccupational and industrial accidents seeing as there were
\nindirect losses incurred besides direct ones [34]. Explaining
\nthe Domino theory, references [34] and [35] proposed a
\nsequence consisting five factors that followed sequentially,
\nthat is, one factor resulting in the next. The first was ancestry
\nand social environment which explains that negative traits
\ncausing people to commit unsafe actions may be inherited or
\nacquired from the environment one was socialized. The
\nsecond factor is fault of a person which explains that people
\nact in unsafe manner as a result of the negative traits they
\nacquired. The third factor is unsafe act or physical hazard \/
\nunsafe condition which directly result to accident. The fourth
\n77 Nwokedi Theophilus Chinonyerem et al.: Moses Ntor-Ue. Analysis of Vessel-Based Marine
\nAccidents and the Economic Risks to Nigeria
\nfactor is accident which results in injury, damage and \/ or
\nloss. The fifth and last factor is injury, damage and \/ or loss
\nwhich is the consequence of accident. The figure below is an
\nillustration of accident and loss occurrence by the domino
\ntheory.
\nFigure 3. Heinrich’s Domino Model of Accident Causation.
\nSource: Adopted from Disaster Management Institute, Bhopal, Online
\nExplanation of Domino theory.
\n2.2.3. Accident Investigation Theories
\nReference [36] defines accident investigation (AI) as the
\nstructural process of uncovering the sequence of events that
\nproduced or had the potential to produce injury, death,
\nproperty damage and\/or loss, to determine the causal factors
\n(root and surface causes), impacts and corrective action while
\nreference [32] proposes that the idea of accident investigation
\nis to apply analytical techniques to find the cause and
\nconsequences of accident. Investigation employs test of
\nengineering experiments to discover the rate of accident root
\ncauses and consequences while answering the question of
\nwhy the accident happened [32] The American Bureau of
\nShipping [37] asserts that the role of the accident
\ninvestigation process is to provide proper safeguard to
\nprevent and mitigate accident effects. If adequate safeguards
\nare in place, any losses that occur will be acceptable losses.
\nReference [37] notes that individual organizations and states
\nmay however have other objectives to achieve with accident
\ninvestigation (AI) which may include:
\na. To protect the safety and health if workers particularly
\nthe human resources of the maritime industry.
\nb. To preserve the organization\u2019s human capital and labour
\nresources.
\nc. To fulfill the legal and statutory obligations of the state
\nwith regards to implementation of the IMO instruments
\nparticularly the United Nations Conventions on Law of
\nthe Seas (UNCLOS) which require coastal states to
\nconduct an inquiry and investigation into accidents in
\ntheir maritime jurisdiction and involving their flag
\nships.
\nd. Improve quality reliability, output and productivity of
\nthe sub-sector
\ne. Ensure continual and sustenance of service to clients
\nand customer
\nf. Comply with national regulatory and insurance
\nrequirements
\ng. Educate management staff and employees
\nh. Control losses imposed by accident.
\ni. Demonstrate management concern and employee
\ninvolvement
\nj. Advice others of unrecognized risk and or more
\neffective risk management strategies
\nk. Comply with organizational and industry policy
\nl. Classify accidents and generate data.
\nIt was reported by reference [37-38] that accident
\ninvestigation theories (AIT) aims to aid accident
\ninvestigation (AI) to fulfill investigation roles and therefore
\ncannot serve to merely explain proximate causal factors, as
\naccident cause theories do. Accident investigators employ
\nanalytical, structural and scientific processes, dealing with
\ndifferent levels of analysis to ascertain the root causes and
\nconsequences of an accident, thus, while the cause theories
\nare good at explaining the accident phenomena, they do not
\npossess the dept of structural analysis needed to guide
\ninvestigation processes [37].
\nWhile the accident causation theories (ACT) may explain
\nthe proximate causes of accident and the nearest intermediate
\ncause, there may exist serial (connected more than one)
\nintermediate cause and root causes, also connection often
\ntimes exist between and\/or among the root, intermediate and
\nproximate causal factors which only thorough accident
\ninvestigation can reveal. These forms the basic reason for
\nspecific accident investigation theories (AIT), to structurally,
\nanalytically, and scientifically guide accident investigators
\n(AI\u2019s) and investigation processes [39], [37]. Reference [33]
\nnotes that among the accident investigation theories are; the
\nsingle event theory, the chain-of-events theory, the branched
\nevent chain theory, and the multi-linear sequences (process)
\ntheory.
\n2.2.4. The Single Event Theory
\nThe single event accident investigation theory assume that
\nevery accident consist of a single event that has a cause.
\nAccording to the theory, the investigative task is therefore
\ngeared towards finding the single cause and correcting it. The
\ntheory often relieves the victim of blame and is notorious for
\nblaming it on the factor beyond the victims control such as
\nfate, acts of God or ill luck. Thus it discourages further
\nexamination\/investigation into the accident phenomenon in
\nan attempt to forestall a reoccurrence of the same [40], [33]
\n[41]. The theory assumes reliability of accident phenomenon,
\nopining that someone or something failed, was at fault or to
\nblame. Otherwise accident is an act of God [41].
\n2.3. Accident\/Risk Management Principles and Loss
\nControl Theories
\nRisk is defined as the effect of uncertainty on objectives
\n[42]. Reference [43] opines that risk is the likelihood or
\nprobability that an event (incident) will occur and adversely
\naffect the achievement of an objective function. Risk itself
\nJournal of Water Resources and Ocean Science 2017; 6(6): 72-84 78
\nhas uncertainty [43]. According to [44] risk management is
\nthe identification, assessment prioritization and response,
\nfollowed by coordinated and economical application of
\nresources to minimize, monitor, and control the probability
\nand impact of unfortunate events (accidents\/risk) and to
\nmaximize the realization of goals, objective function and
\nopportunities. The objective of risk management is to assure
\nthat uncertainty does not deflect the endeavor from the
\nbusiness goals [44]. Reference [45] views risk management
\nas the process that attempts to manage the uncertainty that
\ninfluences the achievement of objectives, with the goals of
\nreaching the objectives and thus creating value for the
\norganization in which it is applied.
\nIt was observed by reference [43] that the theory and
\nprinciples of risk management processes, methods and
\ncontrol are safety tools and devises which organizations and
\nsafety managers must adopt to have good control over risks.
\nHowever professionals note that risk control and
\nmanagement methods enunciated in the risk management
\ntheory have certain key components in common which
\nincludes: Internal environment, objective setting, risk
\nidentification, risk assessment, risk response, information and
\nmonitoring [43-46]. Reference [19], supporting the views of
\n[46] opines that risk management follows six (6) basic
\nprocess as depicted in figure 4 below.
\nFigure 4. Risk Management process.
\nSource: Risk Management process presented as a cycle based on the design
\nby At de Wild (Versilusi, 2014)
\nThe first step is to clearly state the objective (goal) to be
\nachieved which also helps to derive exactly what is exposed
\nto risk. This is followed by risk identification which
\nidentifies the events (risks) that form the hazards\/threats to
\nthe objectives. The result of the risk identification process is
\na register, (list) containing internal and external risks that
\nform threat to the maritime property, persons or investment.
\nThis is followed by the third (3) step which is assessment of
\nthe likelihood of occurrence and impact of each identified
\nrisk. Risk assessment can be done with either qualitative or
\nquantitative way. It is expected that the impact be expressed
\nin monetary quantities or magnitude of economic loss
\n(damages) and injuries. Both risk identification objective
\nsetting and risk assessment are done using tools and methods
\nwhich were later discuss under formal safety assessment
\n(FSA).
\nThe fourth process of risk prioritization is done by
\ncomparing individual risk, frequently used methods here
\ninclude the expected value method, which ranks risks
\naccording to the product of a risk probability and impact
\n(consequence) and plotting risks on a risk matrix which
\noffers a visual aid to compare risks. See figure 4, below in
\nrisk matrix.
\nSource: Authors drawing
\nFigure 5. Ranking and comparing of Hazards\/risk.
\nWhen risks have been prioritized an appropriate risk
\nresponse or management method is applied to mitigate,
\nmanage or deal with risk. This include risk avoidance, risk
\nreduction, risk retention and risk transfer [19], [42], [46]. The
\nlast process in the risk management process is monitoring to
\nensure that the risk does not constitute threat anymore. Reassessment can often or periodically be done depending on
\nresidual risk severity. This monitory step is the final step in
\nthe risk assessment process and serve as a feedback
\nMechanisms that closes as well as continuously sustain the
\nrisk management process. References [45-46] agree that the
\nrisk management theory identifies four strategic principles of
\nrisk management for industrial risk management to include
\nrisk avoidance\/risk prevention, risk reduction, risk retention
\nand risk transfer (insurance).The adoption of either of the
\nabove risk management strategies\/principle or a combination
\nof strategies by organizations will however depend on the
\nexpected utility to be derived from such. Decision theory is
\nrequired for choice making so that the risk management and
\ncontrol principle that maximizes utility is preferred.
\nReferences [47-48] upheld the choice of risk management
\ntool based optimal utility criteria as best.
\ni. Risk Avoidance\/Termination or Prevention
\nReferences [45], [49-50] agrees that risk avoidance as a
\nrisk management option involves the termination,
\nelimination, prevention and\/or shutting off of all activities
\nthat causes the risk to exist. Risk avoidance may seem the
\nanswer to all accident risks, but avoiding risks because of the
\nlikelihood of accident also imposes a new risk of losing out
\non the potential gain that acceptance of the risk prone activity
\n79 Nwokedi Theophilus Chinonyerem et al.: Moses Ntor-Ue. Analysis of Vessel-Based Marine
\nAccidents and the Economic Risks to Nigeria
\nor operation may have offered. Declining to invest in a
\nseaborne trade and maritime business venture to avoid the
\nrisk of accident related loss will certainly also avoid the
\npossibility of earning profits [51].
\nii. Risk Reduction
\nSince it is impossible to avoid an activity involving risk of
\naccident and still gain the potential and opportunities offered
\nby the avoided risk prone activity, and since marine business
\nenterprises themselves are exposed naturally to a pool of
\nmarine perils\/risk which an entrepreneur must have to
\ncontend with (reasonably accept) in other to gain profit
\nand\/or achieve objectives. It follows that risk reduction
\nstrategies as a principle of risk management offers a better
\noption for industrial risk management than avoidance as it
\nseeks to mitigate risk, while still retaining\/offering the
\nopportunity to gain from the potentials offered by such risk
\nprone operation [52]. Reference [53] explains that risk
\nreduction is risk optimization, which involves reducing the
\nseverity of the loss or the likelihood of the loss from
\noccurring. For example, sprinklers are designed to put out a
\nfire to reduce the risk of loss by fire onboard. This strategy
\nmay impose prohibitive cost and in some cases, the
\nmitigation strategy itself may create room for more loss by
\nimposing \/creating a new risk dimension [54-54].
\nAcknowledging that risk can be positive or negative,
\noptimizing risks of economic losses means finding a balance
\nbetween negative risk and the benefit of the operation or
\nactivity; and between risk reduction effort applied. Thus
\nreduction or optimization of risk of economic losses will
\nachieve levels of residual risks mitigated from non-tolerable
\nregions to tolerable or acceptable regions [56].
\nThis implies that by risk reduction leading to risk
\ntolerance, the organization still bears the impact of the
\neconomic losses, damages and injuries imposed by the
\noccurrence of the risk.
\niii. Risk Retention
\nReference [57] opines that risk retention involves
\naccepting the loss, or benefit from a risk when it occurs. True
\nself-insurance falls in this category. In the opinion of
\nreference [58-59] risk retention is risk tolerance, which
\ninvolves leaving the risk as it were without taking any action
\nof working to transfer\/insure the risk of loss. This is possibly
\nobtainable where a risk of economic loss is of negligible size
\nand is considered an acceptable risk level either before or
\nafter the implementation of other risk responses, and cannot
\nbe further responded to. Furthermore, a risk of substantial
\nimpact can be tolerated if the presence of the risk is vital for
\nthe existence and continuity of an organization. Such risks
\nretained or tolerated must be subjected to monitoring to deter
\nit evolving from tolerably acceptable risk regions to
\nunacceptable risk regions.
\nReference [60] observes that risk retention serve as a
\nviable strategy for small risk, where the cost of insuring
\nagainst the risk would be greater over time than the total
\nlosses sustained. Reference [61] further reveal that all risk
\nthat are avoided or transferred is retained by default. This
\nincludes risks that are so large or catastrophic that they
\ncannot be insured against or the premium would be
\nimpossible to be met. Risk retention may also be acceptable
\noption if the chance of a very large loss is small or if the cost
\nto insure for greater coverage amount is so great it would
\nhinder the goals of the organization too much.
\niv. Risk Transfer (Insurance)
\nRisk transfer is viewed as sharing with another party (third
\nparty) the burden of loss or the benefit of gain, from a risk,
\nand the measure to reduce the risk [54], [45]. Reference [19]
\nopines that risk transfer is fully or partially reducing the
\nimpact or severity of loss or damage imposed by risk of
\naccident occurrence using risk sharing, made possible by
\npurchase of insurance policy to cover the property from risk
\nof loss. Thus purchase of an insurance contract is often
\ndescribed as risk transfer. However, technically speaking, the
\nbuyer of the insurance contract generally retains legal
\nresponsibility for losses transferred. This means that
\ninsurance may be defined more accurately as post-event
\ncompensatory mechanisms. The risk still lies with the policy
\nholder, the insurance policy simply provides that ifan
\naccident (the event) occurs, involving the policy holder, then
\nsome compensation (indemnity) may be payable to the policy
\nholder that is commensurate with the loss\/damage [62]. In the
\nmarine industry, the practice of marine insurance serve as a
\nrisk transfer mechanisms for marine risks\/accident
\nmanagement and control.
\n3. Methodology
\nThe study adopted an analytical method in which time
\nseries data of 30 years period (1984 to 2013) on the
\neconomic losses of three categories of damages\/losses
\nimposed by accidents in the marine industry were collected
\nfrom Nigerian Insurers Digest 2003, 2008 and 2014 editions
\nand Central Bank of Nigeria annual financial statistical
\nbulletin, various editions and Nigerian national Petroleum
\nCorporation statistical report. Data on the Gross Domestic
\nProduct of marine transport over the period from1984 to
\n2013 was also obtained to represent the output of the marine
\nindustry and denoted by (Y) as the dependent variable. The
\nmultiple regressions analysis statistical model was used to
\nanalyze the time series using SPSS software. The GDPmarine
\ntransport was used as the dependent variable Y and the
\neconomic losses of shipping accidents, offshore oil and gas
\ndrilling accidents, and marine oil spill accidents denoted with
\nX1, X2, and X3 respectively, forming the independent
\nvariables. Using the method, the relationship among the four
\nvariables is as modeled below:
\nY =a + b1X1 + b2X2 +b3X3 + e (1)
\nWhere Y = GDPMarine transport
\na = constant term
\nX1 = Shipping accident economic loss
\nX2 = Offshore oil and gas drilling accident economic loss
\nX3 = Economic loss of marine oil spill accident
\nJournal of Water Resources and Ocean Science 2017; 6(6): 72-84 80
\nb1\u2026.b3 = coefficients of terms.
\ne = error term
\n3.1. Discussion of Result and Findings
\nThe findings from the result indicates that average output
\nof marine transport sub-sector measured by the Gross
\nDomestic Product within the period of the study is
\n907,203,000.00 naira, representing the mean contribution of
\nthe marine transport sub-sector to the national output relative
\nto the investment made in the subsector within the period.
\nThe result indicates mean shipping accidents, offshore O&G
\ndrilling accidents and marine oil spill accident economic
\nlosses of 1,633,633,300.00 naira, 916,041,733.00 naira and
\n138,561,582.80 naira respectively per annum from 1984 to
\n2013. This implies that loss control and safety management
\nmeasures (safety measures) has not achieved acceptable
\nresults and\/or targets particularly as it relates to shipping
\naccidents and offshore O&G drilling accident. This is
\nbecause comparisons of their mean losses over the period to
\nmean output of the industry in the same period shows higher
\nmean marine (shipping and offshore O&G) accidents losses
\nthan mean output of the marine industry. See table 1 below:
\nTable 1. Descriptive Statistics.
\nMean Std. Deviation N
\nGDP Maritme 907203000.0000 1085000877.60699 30
\nShip Accident Loss 1633633300.0000 2627483675.13462 30
\nOil Spill Loss 138561582.8037 161752904.39467 30
\nOffshore O & Gas accident Loss 916041733.3333 2087199695.60681 30
\nAggregate marine accident loss 2688236615.08 30
\nSource: Authors computation.
\nThe aggregate mean marine accident economic loss based
\non the result as shown in the table1 above is 2688236615.08
\nnaira per annum. The implication is that more is lost in the
\nmarine transport sub-sector economy to marine damage
\naccidents each year than the annual contribution of the
\nsubsector to national output. The ratio of average aggregate
\nmarine accidents economic loss to average output of the
\nsubsector is 3:1, proving further the non acceptability of and
\nfailure of present safety management and loss control
\nmeasures. There is no doubt that risk transfer may have
\nplayed a key role in the indemnification of these losses,
\nhowever, other loss control and safety tools could not limit
\nmarine accident risk levels to acceptable regions (see risk
\nmatrix in figure 4), considering the output (GDPmarime) of the
\nsubsector. If the present trend continues, it is obvious that
\neconomic sustainability of marine operations and seaborne
\ntrade cannot be guaranteed.
\nTable 2. Modeling The Impact Of Marine Accidents Economic Losses On Gdpmarine transport and Test of Model Significance.
\nModel R R Square Adjusted R
\nSquare
\nStd. Error of the
\nEstimate
\nChange Statistics
\nR Square Change F Change df1 df2 Sig. F Change
\n1 .798a
\n.637 .609 759982372.85481 .637 11.036 3 26 .000
\nSource: Authors computation.
\nThe table 2 above shows that the multiple R indicating the
\ndegree of association between the output of the marine subsector and marine accidents economic loss is 0.798. The
\nindication is that approximately 80 percent degree of
\nassociation exists between the dependent (marine transport
\noutput) and independent variables (shipping accidents, O&G
\ndrilling accidents and marine oil spill accidents economic
\nlosses). The R square is 0.637. The R square value shows that
\n63.7 percent variation in the Gross Domestic Product of the
\nmarine transport economy over the years covered by the
\nstudy is explained by the economic losses of maritime
\naccident. Thus the model is highly significant.
\nThe coefficient of terms of marine accidents economic
\nlosses formodeling the quantitative relationship and impacts
\nis as shown the table below:
\nTable 3. Parameter coefficients of marine accidents Losses.
\nModel
\nUnstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients
\nT Sig.
\nB Std. Error Beta
\n1
\n(Constant) 332156363.041 191967632.244 1.730 .095
\nShip Accident Loss .167 .067 .405 2.480 .020
\nOil Spill Loss .837 .918 .125 .912 .370
\nOffshore Accident .203 .082 .391 2.478 .020
\nSource: Authors computation based on collected data
\nFrom the table3, the model showing the quantitative
\neffects of shipping accidents economic loss, economicloss of
\noffshore O&G accidents, and marine oil spill accidents loss
\non the output of the marine transport subsector is: Y =
\n81 Nwokedi Theophilus Chinonyerem et al.: Moses Ntor-Ue. Analysis of Vessel-Based Marine
\nAccidents and the Economic Risks to Nigeria
\n332156363.1 + 0.167X1 + 0.837X2 + 0.203X3 + e
\nTable 4. Comparative Analysis On Shipping Accidents Economic Loss And Insurance Expenditure On Shipping Accidents Loss Control.
\nMean N Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
\nPair 1
\nShipping Accident 1633633300.0000 30 1085000877.606 1467552320.82308 Insurance expenditure on losss control and management.
\n6449734181290.3220 30 8848993990966.45300 1589326238380.64580
\nSource: Authors computation.
\nAs indicated in the table, the mean shipping accident
\neconomic loss over the period covered in the study amounts
\nto 1633633300.00 naira while mean insurance expenditure on
\nshipping accident loss management is 6449734181290.32
\nnaira. The difference of the two means is
\n5342691905064.5naira in favour of insurance expenditure on
\nshipping accidents loss management. The result shows that
\nmore has been expended in management of shipping
\naccidents than average economic losses over the period.
\n3.2. Test of Hypotheses
\nTable 5. Hypothesis Ho1: T-statistic on significance of impact of shipping accidents economic loss on marine transport GDP.
\nHypothesis t-score t-critical p-value Sig.(p < 0.05) Decision
\nHo1 2.48 1.701 0.020 Yes Reject Ho1
\nSource: Authors own computation based on data collected.
\nThe result shows that shipping accidents economic loss has significant impact on the output of the marine transport
\nsubsector. Thus we reject the null hypothesis that shipping accidents economic loss has no significant impact on marine
\ntransport subsector output to accept the alternate.
\nTable 6. Hypothesis Ho2; T-statistic on significance of impact of economic loss of off shore O&G accidents on marine transport subsector output.
\nHypothesis t-score t-critical p-value Sig.(p < 0.05) Decision
\nHo2 2.50 1.701 0.020 Yes Reject Ho2
\nSource: Authors own computation based on research data.
\nThe result shows a rejection of null hypothesis Ho2 and the acceptance of the alternate that economic loss of offshore O&G
\naccidents has significant impact marine transport subsector output.
\nTable 7. Hypothesis Ho3: T-statistic on significance of impact of marine oil spill accidents economic loss on marine transport output.
\nHypothesis t-score t-critical p-value Sig.(p < 0.05) Decision
\nHo3 0.912 1.701 0.370 No Accept Ho3
\nSource: Authors own computation based on research data.
\nThe analysis shows the acceptance of null hypothesis Ho3. Thus, marine oil spill accidents economic loss has no significant
\neffects on the output of the marine transport subsector.
\nTable 8. Hypothesis Ho4: T-statistic on difference between shipping accidents economic loss and insurance expenditure on shipping accidents loss control.
\nHypothesis t-score t-critical p-value Sig.(p < 0.05) Decision
\nHo4 4.057 1.701 0.000 Yes Reject Ho4
\nSource: Authors own computation based on research data.
\nThe result reveals that there is a significant difference
\nbetween shipping accidents loss and insurance expenditure
\non shipping accidents loss management and control. More
\ninsurance expenditure has been made than actual losses
\nsuffered over the period.
\n4. Conclusion
\nFrom the foregoing, the average aggregate marine
\naccidents economic losses in the period covered in the study
\nis 2,608,236,616.013 naira. Shipping accidents economic
\nloss, and economic loss of offshore O & G drilling accidents
\nshows significant impacts on the output (GDPmarine transport) of
\nthe marine transport sub-sector. However, marine oil spill
\neconomic loss failed to show any significant effects on the
\noutput of the subsector. Moreover, significant difference
\nexists between shipping accidents economic loss and
\ninsurance expenditure on management of shipping accident
\nlosses. On the average, more financial cost has been
\nexpended on risk transfer as a loss control mechanism than
\nJournal of Water Resources and Ocean Science 2017; 6(6): 72-84 82
\nactual losses suffered.
\nRecommendation
\nBased on the findings of the study, in order to optimize the
\neconomic losses imposed by accidents in the marine industry,
\nsafety management measures and loss control tools should be
\nfocused more on shipping accidents and offshore O&G
\ndrilling accidents which impact very significantly on the
\noutput of the subsector.
\nMoreover, since Nigeria as an International Maritime
\nOrganization (IMO) member country has over the years
\nadopted and ratified majority of the IMO Convention
\ninstruments for Safety regulation, such as the safety of life at
\nsea (SOLAS) 1974 as amended, standards of training
\ncertification and watch keeping (STCW) 1995 as amended,
\ninternational regulations for the control of marine pollution
\nfrom ships (MARPOL) 73\/78, the load lines (LL) convention
\nof 1966, the regulations for the control of vessel collision at
\nsea (COLREGS) 1972,the international convention on
\nmaritime search and rescue (SARS) 1979 as amended, the
\ninternational ship and port facility security (ISPS) code, Port
\nStates control (PSC) etc, diligent implementation of these
\nsafety instruments will help to minimize the high degree and
\nincrease in trend of marine-accident induced output losses in
\nthe subsector. This will subsequently impact on the high
\nexpenditure on marine insurance being made at present in
\nmanaging marine accidents by ensuring lowered costs of
\ninsurance premium.
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