RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVED
\nIMPLEMENTATION OF PORT STATE
\nCONTROL IN NIGERIA<\/p>\n
Abstract
\nThis dissertation is an appraisal of Port State Control as the concept and practice of
\nmaintaining the seaworthiness of ships calling at ports and focuses on the Nigerian as
\na Port State.
\nThe role of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) in the development of
\nsafety and pollution prevention regulations is highlighted. International legal
\ninstruments promulgated by the IMO and ILO, which regulates Port State Control
\npractices, are enumerated and analysed.
\nThe experiences of the Paris Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and the US
\nCoast Guard on Port State Control in Europe and America are discussed and
\ndocumented. Differences and commonalties in Port State Control inspection
\nprocedures and enforcement practices in both regions are identified and noted.
\nPort State Control practices in West Africa are also analysed using Nigeria as a case
\nstudy. To achieve this end, the composition of the Nigerian Maritime Administration
\n(MARAD) is scrutinised, the inspection procedures and international legal
\ninstruments applied are reviewed and enforcement measures used in correcting
\ndeficiencies or detaining ships are appraised.
\nProblems of finance, planning, training, communication network and corruption
\nwhich militates against an effective Port State Control programme in Nigeria are
\nidentified and isolated. Appropriate recommendations are advanced to address the
\nproblems and improve the implementation of Port State Control in Nigeria.
\nv
\nTABLE OF CONTENTS
\nDeclaration
\nAcknowledgement
\nAbstract
\nTable of Contents
\nLists of Tables
\nList of Figures
\nList of Abbreviations
\nIntroduction
\nInternational Instruments on Port State Control
\n2.1 International Maritime Organisation(IMO)
\n2.2 Port State Control in the IMO Conventions
\n2.2.1 SOLAS 1974\/78
\n2.2.2 LOAD LINES(LL) 1966
\n2.2.3 COLREG 1972
\n2.2.4 MARPOL 1973\/78
\n2.2.5 TONNAGE 1969
\n2.2.6 THE ILO NO. 147 CONVENTION
\n2.2.7 STCW 1978
\n2.2.8 UNCLOS 1982
\n2.3. IMO Resolution A. 481(xii) \u201cPrinciples of Safe Manning\u201d
\n2.4. IMO Resolution A. 787 (19) \u201cProcedures for Port State Control\u201d
\n2.5. ISM CODE 1998 (Res. A. 741 (18) )
\n2.6. The Application of International Instruments on Port State Control
\n3. The Port State Control in Europe and the concepts of Paris MOU on Port State Control
\n3.1. Why the Paris MOU?
\n3.1. The Scope and the Agreement of the Paris MOU
\n3.2. The Relevant Instruments of the Paris MOU
\n3.3. The \u201cNo More Favourable Treatment(NMFT) Clause
\n3.4. Who conducts Port State Control Inspection in European Countries?
\n3.5. Inspection Procedures, Rectification and Detention of sub-standard ships in Europe
\n3.6. Documentation and Port State Control Inspections Reporting system in Europe
\n3.7. The Aide Memoir for Surveyors
\n3.8. Operational Violations in European waters
\n4. Port State Control in the United States of America and the Role of Coast Guard on Safety
\nStandard Vessel Boarding Program
\n4.1. Introduction
\nii
\niii
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\nvi
\n4.2. Definitions used by the Coast Guards in the USA
\n4.3. The Objectives of the Program
\n4.4. Types of Boarding Systems in the USA
\n4.5. Qualifications of Marine Inspectors in the USA
\n4.6. Port State Control Enforcement on non-Convention ships
\n4.7. Carrying the Certificate of Financial Responsibility on board
\n5. Port State Control in West Africa
\n5.1. Introduction
\n5.2. West and Central African States MOU
\n5.3. Port State Control Implementation and Enforcement in Nigeria
\n5.3.1. The Maritime Historical background of Nigeria
\n5.3.2. The Composition of the Nigerian MARADS
\n5.3.3. IMO Safety Conventions Ratified by Nigeria
\n5.3.4. Selecting ships for Inspection and the Inspection Procedures
\n5.3.5. Rectification and Detention of ships
\n5.3.6. Port State Control Inspections\u00b4 Reporting System
\n5.3.7. Treatment of Non-Convention ships
\n5.4. Problems of Port State Control Implementation and Enforcement in Nigeria
\n5.4.1. Inadequate finance
\n5.4.2. Inadequate Research and Planning
\n5.4.3. Inadequate Educated and trained personnel
\n5.4.4. Lack of Maritime Academics
\n5.4.5. Poor PSC Inspection Reporting System
\n5.4.6. Political Instability and Economic Uncertainty
\n5.4.7. Problem of bribery and corruption in the Shipping sector
\n5.4.8. Problem of Government intervention in the affairs of Nigerian MARADS
\n5.4.9. External forces intervention in the Nigerian Shipping Industry\u00b4s affairs
\n5.4.10. The roles of Nigerian Shippers and the mass media in Nigerian shipping
\npolicy decisions
\n6. Conclusion and Recommendations
\nBibliography
\nAppendices
\nAppendix 1 Map of Nigeria
\nAppendix 2 IMO, Resolution A. 481(ix) adopted on 19 November 1981 \u201cPrinciples of
\nSafe Manning\u201d
\nAppendix 3 IMO, Resolution A. 787(19) adopted on 23 November 1995 \u201cProcedures
\nfor Port State Control\u201d
\n44
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\n68
\n!!
\n!!
\n!!
\n!!
\n!!
\n!!
\n!!
\n!!
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\nvii
\nAppendix 4 \u201cMeddelelse om tilbageholdelse af skib-DANMARK\u201d-Format: Notice of
\nDetention of a ship in Denmark
\nAppendix 5 Format: Report of inspection in accordance with Paris MOU on Port State
\nControl (FORM A) Danish Maritime Authority
\nAppendix 6 Format: Report of inspection in accordance with Paris MOU on Port State
\nControl (FORM B) Danish Maritime Authority
\nAppendix 7 Codes of Action taken on ships after Survey or Inspection
\n166
\n168
\n169
\n170
\nviii
\nLIST OF TABLES
\nTable 1 Mean fleet age for selected flags 1973-1980 12
\nTable 2 Mean fleet age for selected flags for 1984 11
\nTable 3 List of flag States with outstanding comments on Deficiency
\nReports as at 1987 16
\nTable 4 Changes in loss rate fir each Member State pre\/post 12 December
\n1982 38
\nTable 5 Ship Deficiencies from 1979-1988 38
\nTable 6 Loss rate for all Member States 1968-1986 39
\nTable 7 Status of Conventions (1-3) 70
\nLIST OF FIGURES
\nFigure 1 Organisational structure of Paris MOU on Port State Control 43
\nFigure 2 Organisational chart: Nigerian Maritime Administration 57
\nFigure 3 Organisational chart: Nigerian MARAD-Policy and Operational
\nprinciples 58
\nFigure4 Organisational chart: National Maritime Authority 59
\nFigure 5 Organisational chart: Maritime Safety Department under NMA 63
\nFigure 6 Port State Control vicious circle chart 86
\nix
\nLIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
\nCEMAC The Communa\u00b4aute econmique et mone\u00b4taire de I\u00b4Afrique Centrale
\nCOC Certificate of Competency
\nCOPO Captain of the Port Office in USA
\nCOTP Coast Guard Captain of the Port in USA
\nDOC Document of Compliance
\nECA Economic Commission for Africa
\nFFA Fire Fighting Appliances
\nFOC Flag of Convenience
\nFSI Flag States Implementation Sub-Committee of the IMO
\nGIS Government Inspectors of Shipping
\nGRT Gross Tonnage
\nIACS International Association of Classification Societies
\nILO International Labour Organisation
\nIMO International Maritime Organisation
\nIOPP International Oil Pollution Prevention Certificate
\nISID International Ship Information Database
\nISM International Safety Management Code
\nLSA Life Saving Appliances
\nMARADS Maritime Administration(s)
\nMID Maritime Inspectorate Division
\nMINCOMAR Ministerial Conference of West and Central African States on
\nMaritime Transport
\nMOU Memorandum of Understanding
\nMSA Maritime Safety Administration
\nMSIS Marine Safety Information System of the US
\nMSO Marine Safety Office of the US
\nNMA National Maritime Authority, Nigeria
\nNMFT No More Favourable Treatment Clause
\nNPA Nigerian Ports Authority, Plc
\nOECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
\nPSC Port State Control
\nPSCO Port State Control Officer
\nPSCI Port State Control Implementation
\nSAR Search and Rescue
\nSMC Safety Management Certificate
\nUNDP United Nations Development Programme
\nVLCC Very Large Crude Oil Carrier Vessel
\n1
\nCHAPTER I
\nIntroduction
\nIn the 1960s, and 1970s, world shipping underwent a period of near unlimited growth.
\nNew maritime nations emerged and existing ones grew. Tonnage shifted between
\nhemispheres and when all this activity finally settled, a number of side effects were left.
\nOne of the most damaging side effects of this spur of activity in the shipping industry
\nwas that of marine pollution and marine casualties involving loss of life, numerous
\ninternational conventions dictating the responsibilities of Flag States in maritime law
\napplications were in force. However, these conventions has solved the problems of
\nmarine pollution and safety of life at sea as required, because some Maritime
\nAdministrations (MARADs) had not efficiently and effectively obliged their
\nresponsibilities in this regard.
\nThe development of the concept of port state control occurred at the time when world
\nshipping, particularly the oil transport trade, was at its lowest social regards. This study
\ntraces the historical development of port state control, identifies current applications
\nand problems, and proposes the rationalisation of port state control enforcement under
\nthe auspices of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) in addition to the legal
\nbasis of port state control and also port state control as a complementary part of flag
\nstate control.
\nAdministrations are responsible for taking the necessary measures to ensure that ships
\nflying their state flags comply with the relevant provisions of the safety conventions
\nsuch as surveys and certification.
\n2
\nThe Historical Development of Port State Control.
\nIn 1967, the world was shocked when the Torrey Canyon spilled 100,000 tons of oil into
\nthe sea. The world governments came together and two years later in 1969 signed the
\nInternational Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage. This Convention
\nonly sought to make amends for disasters, not to correct them. Consequently, on
\nMarch 17, 1978, the world was shocked again when the 123,680 dwt Amoco Cadiz
\nspilled 230,000 tons of oil off the coast of Brittany, thereby polluting some 400
\nkilometres of coastline.
\nThe total economic loss because of the Amoco Cadiz disaster was estimated at about
\n290 million US dollars in 1978. This amount is divided into several parts:
\n(a) the loss of the vessel and cargo, loss of recreational amenities, legal and research
\ncosts, and damage to human hearth;
\n(b) emergency response, clean-up and environmental restoration costs, loss of noncommercial bio-mass and seabirds, loss of income from the business industry, loss
\nof personal property; and
\n(c) Reduced income for local government, secondary effects of reduced outputs in
\nvarious industries, and compensation paid by the national government to claimants for
\nthe costs and losses incurred. There is no doubt that such massive spills have an even
\ngreater impact on the entire world. Consequently, it is not surprising to see remedial
\nactions taken by international bodies, such as the IMO, to avert subsequent
\noccurrences in the future.
\nAnother most damaging side effect of the flurry of activity in the shipping industry
\nconcerns loss of life at sea. This is quantified by the fact that governments ratified the
\nInternational Convention on Safety of Life at Sea as far back as 1948. The problem of
\nloss of the life or safety of life in general is not deeply rooted in the maritime tradition of
\nall established maritime nations. It is a problem, which has always cut across flags,
\nand consequently all maritime nations have to bear some responsibility for alleviating
\nthe problem. Nevertheless, in order to act, the scope of the problem must be first
\nidentified.
\n3
\nSubstantive consideration of questions relating to the scope and nature of port state
\ncontrol in connection with IMO conventions was first undertaken in IMO in 1974,
\nfollowing the submission by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
\nDevelopment (OECD) of a document relating to control of flag-of-convenience ships. At
\nthe time, the Maritime Safety Committee noted that IMO concerns with the control of
\nships was primarily to prevent the operation of substandard ships, regardless of the
\nFlag under which such ships might be sailing. As a first step, the Maritime Safety
\nCommittee developed recommended procedures for the control of ships under the
\nInternational Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1960 (SOLAS 1960) and the
\nInternational Convention on Load Lines (LL1966). The Assembly adopted these
\nprocedures at its ninth regular session in 1975 by Resolution A.321 (IX) dated 16
\nDecember 1975.
\nThese conventions in respect of combating the phenomenon of substandard ships
\ngave the right of contracting parties to inspect all foreign flag ships calling at their ports
\nand to take all measures necessary to eliminate any deficiency aboard posing a clear
\nhazard to safety or health. The convention implies that this right also included ships,
\nthe flag states of which have not ratified the convention.
\nDefinition of the Port State Control.
\nThe port state control is the law, which provides the port state with jurisdiction over
\nforeign vessels in its internal waters. The specific port state power includes: –
\n1. The inspection of ships certificates,
\n2. Physical inspection of the ships
\n3. In addition, if warranted by evidence, detention of the ship.
\nThe port state jurisdictions originated in the IMO convention and to a lesser extent, in
\nthe ILO treaties. In accordance with the principles of international law, territorial
\njurisdiction gives states the right to exercise control over foreign ships within their ports.
\nThis right is qualified both by the concurrent jurisdiction of the port state and by the
\nobligations of the port state stemming from international law.
\n4
\nFrom the historical point of view, the idea of control by the port state over foreign
\nflagged ships has been laid down in international conventions on maritime safety for a
\nsubstantial number of years. The Load Line marks of ships became operational in this
\nrespect. In addition, the International Labour Organisation adopted in 1976 a
\nconvention which also contains a port state control clause: the Merchant Shipping
\n(Minimum Standards) convention. J. Harninga(1976) said: \u201cPort state control, as I see
\nit, is a continuing story indeed which progresses even so slowly, impulses every now
\nand then being given, as they unfortunately must, be spectacular disasters such as
\nthose of the Torrey Canyon and the Amoco Cadiz\u201d.
\nLegal Basis of Port State Control.
\nThe concept of Port State Control has been laid down in a number of conventions
\nconcerning safety of shipping and prevention of pollution for many years, including:
\n– The International Convention on Load Lines 1966(Article 21) (14),
\n– The International Convention for the Safety of life at Sea 1974 (SOLAS
\nChapter 1, Regulation 19) (5),
\n– The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from ships 1973,
\nas modified by the Protocol 1978 relating thereto (Arts. 4, 5, 6 and 7) (6),
\n– The International Convention on Standards for Training, Certification and
\nWatchkeeping for Seafarers STCW 1978 (Arts. X (7),
\n– The Convention Concerning Minimum Standards in Merchant ships 1976
\nregarded as The ILO Convention No 147 (Art. 4) 18.
\nIn addition, IMO has developed resolutions that include provision of the conventions
\nand guidelines of specific control procedures for port state control and in the case of
\nthe Resolution A.542 (13) \u201cProcedures of the control and discharges under Annex 1 of
\nthe International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 1973\/78 These
\nprovisions and guidelines on specific procedures for port and coastal states control of
\nforeign ships visiting their ports or offshore terminals are constituted by IMO
\nResolutions as follows:
\nResolution A.466 (SII) adopted on 19 November 1981 \u201cProcedures for the Control of
\nShips\u201d;
\nResolution A.481 (XII) adopted on 19 November 1981 \u201cPrinciples of Safe Manning\u201d;
\n5
\nResolution A.542 (13) adopted on 17 November 1983 \u201cProcedures for the Control of
\nShips and Discharges\u201d under Annex I of the International Convention for the Prevention
\nof Pollution from Ships, 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto.
\nResolution A. 787 (19) adopted on 23 November 1995. ” Principles of Port State
\nControl” which amalgamates all the previous `Resolutions\u00b4. Most of the countries that
\nhave established their port state control have adopted these instruments.
\nIn related developments, port state control stated in different IMO conventions for
\nsafety and Prevention of Pollution is consistent with the general principles of
\ninternational law. The right of a nation to board and inspect ships in its internal waters
\nis recognised. As F. L. Wiswall JR. 1986, “The essential implementation of all IMO
\nConventions is by Flag State Control. The reason for this is maritime international
\nlaw that ship is held to be a veritable piece of the territory of the state whose flag she
\nflies, in the sense, then each ship is an ambassador of the flag state, and when she is
\nwithin foreign waters, the police powers of the port state with respect to her is limited by
\ncustomary limitations with respect to ambassadors and public ministers of foreign
\nstates. Just as there are international legal rules of governance which authorise a host
\nstate to examine the credentials of foreign ambassadors and public ministers, IMO
\nConventional rules also authorise port states to validate and examine the credentials of
\nforeign ships, and just as improper conduct or criminal conduct may forfeit the limited
\nimmunities of foreign dignitaries, also bad conduct on the part of a foreign ship may
\nforfeit the limited immunities which the port state is otherwise obliged to extend to her.
\nThus, a ship in a foreign port is still governed within herself by the laws of the flag state
\nof the ship and in the absence of a direct, obvious and imminent. To other shipping or
\nto the port itself, safety is also a matter comprehended within the vessel herself, and
\nthus the controlling safety laws are those of the flag state of the ship and not those of
\nvarious port or coastal states. However, the IMO conventions have made some
\nchanges to the extent that safety is no longer a matter entirely within the ship herself,
\nbut is now a partial responsibility of the port state. The execution of some safety
\nconventions are the responsibility of the Flag States, the port state\u2019s role is limited to
\nverification and to a limited degree, enforcement. That is why the issues of ship
\n6
\nnationality, jurisdictions of Flag State and Port State come into play in international
\nsafety conventions.
\nPort State Control as a complementary part of the Flag State Control
\nA ship is traditionally seen and accepted as a part of the country in which she is
\nregistered otherwise as Flag State. Life is forged on board based on the sovereignty
\nand the laws of that country. The ship also flies the Flag of the country of registry
\nhence the word flag state. A flag state administration, therefore, is required to ensure
\nthat ships registered in its territory are seaworthy and properly manned for safety. One
\nof the criticisms levelled against Flag of Convenience (FOC) is to maintain the
\nstandards of ships that are registered under them. This usually results in an
\nunsatisfactory casualty record, posing danger to life and property in addition to the
\nmarine environment.
\nThe efforts of IMO to eradicate sub-standard ships with a view to realising its objectives
\nof \u201csafer ships and cleaner oceans\u201d have made the issues of port state control a
\nsubject of increasing significance. In other words, the state IMO objectives will not be
\nonly with an appropriate implementation and enforcement of all the obligations that a
\ncontracting government assumes as a flag state without the implementation and
\nenforcement of the complementary part as a port state.
\nAs Y. Sasamura (1994) said \u201cAlthough it is the responsibility of Flag State to ensure
\nthat ships flying their flags always comply with the provisions of the conventions, it may
\nsometimes be difficult for flag states to exercise full and continuous control over these
\nships. In order to supplement these functions of flag states, the SOLAS. Load Lines
\nand MARPOL conventions provide for certain procedures the control of ships to be
\nexercised by port states\u201d. The enforcement provisions of conventions by contracting
\nparties are, broadly speaking, divided into two categories, namely: –
\n(1) Enforcement by Administration (i.e., the government of the Flag State) which
\nincludes surveys and certification of ships in respect of design, construction and
\nequipment; and
\n7
\n(2) Enforcement by port states, which includes the control by port state control officers
\nof the construction of ships and equipment and the surveillance and detention of
\ndischarges in contravention of the convention.
\nJ. Courley (1981) said: \u201cIn consideration of arrangements for safety with pollution
\nprevention and control, an administration will be concerned with: –
\n(a) Its own ships (i.e., acting as a Flag State); and
\n(b) Foreign ships visiting its ports (i.e., acting as a port state). In an ideal
\nworld, action as a port state would not be a major consideration as every
\nflag would ensure that its ships are operated at uniformly with standards
\nin accordance with agreed international contentions. However, the
\nconventions dictate what line of action is necessary to take.\u201d
\nConsequently, a Flag State owes the world the primary duty to eradicate the number of
\nsub-standard ships on our seas; port state control acts a safety net as a deterrent.
\nConventionally, port state control is an important element in achieving the eradication of
\nsub-standard ships world-wide since the safety of shipping, and hence the prevention
\nof accidents, is determined not just by establishing appropriate and adequate
\ninternational rules but, above all, by effective implementation and enforcement of those
\nrules. According to MARPOL and SOLAS, countries that are party to the convention
\nreserve the right to inspect ship visiting their ports inorder to ensure compliance to
\ninternational standards. Base on the issues of \u201ccompliance”, the port states have
\nestablished regional co-operation amongst themselves where the exchange of
\ninformation is carried out for enforcement of port state control.
\nPort State Enforcement of IMO Safety Conventions
\nBy becoming a party to a convention in force, the Ports State enters a contract with all
\nflag state co-parties; this contract modifies the sovereign rights of the parties to it,
\nenhancing some and curtailing others. In the IMO, safety and prevention of pollution
\nconventions, the rights of the port states are enhanced because conventional
\ninternational law now establishes a standard procedure whereby they may board and
\nexamine foreign merchant ships for safety and prevention of pollution defects, when
\n8
\nthose ships call at a port or place within the jurisdiction of the state. However, the
\nrights of a port state are also curtailed, because to comply with one conventional law,
\nthey must follow specified procedures such as for examinations like the ones specified
\nin the following IMO conventions.
\nThe convention for safety of life at sea – SOLAS 1974 emphasises \u201cevery ship holding
\na certificate issued under regulation 12 or regulation 13 or Chapter 1 is subject in the
\nports of the other contracting governments to control by officers duly authorised by
\nsuch governments in so far as this control is directed towards verifying that there is an
\nonboard valid certificates, and such certificates shall be accepted unless there are clear
\ngrounds for believing that the conditions of the ship or of its equipment do not
\ncorrespond substantially with the particulars of that certificate. In this case, the officer
\ncarrying out the control shall take such steps as will ensure that the ship shall not sail
\nuntil it can proceed to sea without danger to the passengers or the crew.
\nIn the event of this control giving rise to an intervention of any kind, the officer carrying
\nour the control shall inform the consul of the country in which the ship is registered in
\nwriting forthwith of all circumstances in which intervention was deemed to be necessary
\nand the facts shall be reported to the organisation. Also, it is expressed in the
\nInternational Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from ship 1973\/1978 \u201cA ship
\nrequired to hold a certificate is subject while in the ports or off-shore terminals under
\nthe jurisdiction of a party to inspect the ship by officers duly authorised by the party
\n(port state).\u201d
\nSuch inspection shall be limited to verifying that there is on board a valid certificate,
\nunless there are clear grounds for believing that the conditions of the ship or its
\nequipment does not correspond substantially with the particulars of that certificate. In
\nthat case, or if the ship does not carry valid a certificate, the port state carrying out the
\ninspection shall take such steps as will ensure that the ship shall not sail until it can
\nproceed to sea without presenting an unreasonable threat or harm to the marine
\nenvironment. That party (port state) may, however, grant such a ship permission to
\nleave the port or offshore terminal for the purpose of proceeding to the nearest
\nappropriate repair yard available.
\n9
\nThe International Convention on Load Lines 1966 expresses that port state control shall
\nbe limited to the purpose of determining that the ship\u2019s load corresponds with the
\ncertificate and load line. In the International Convention on Standards of Training,
\nCertification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, STCW 1978, port state control is
\noriented towards verification that the proper certificates specified by the convention are
\non board, and \u201csuch certificates shall be accepted unless there are clear grounds for
\nbelieving that certificate has been fraudulently obtained or that the holder of a
\ncertificate is not the person to whom that certificate was originally issued\u201d. It may be
\ndiscovered during the exercise of port state control that a certificate is absent, expired
\nor otherwise invalid, or that conditions do not accord with the particulars of the
\ncertificate. In any of these cases, the convention limit the measure which may be
\nimposed by port states to those which ensure that the vessel obtains a valid certificate
\nor most conditions are brought into at least substantial compliance with the particulars
\nof the certificate. It is the exclusive responsibility of the Flag State of the ship to
\nimpose penalties for violations of IMO safety and prevention of pollution conventions.
\nThus it is clear that port states, which are parties to IMO safety and prevention of
\npollution conventions, have been granted and accepted a limited responsibility for
\nenforcement.
\nThe concept of Sub-Standard Ships
\nOwner and operator maintain ships of varying ages and sizes according to different
\nstandards. Flag States national legislation often varies widely in terms of interpretation
\nand enforcement of safety standards. In the last few years, much effort has been put
\ninto enforcing international regulations regarding construction equipment and manning
\nstandards in the fight against oil pollution damage and safety of life. The term
\n\u201csubstandard ship\u201d has been misunderstood and misinterpreted. It is easier to define a
\nsubstandard ship solely by a list of qualifying defects.
\nIn general, a ship is regarded as \u201csubstandard\u201d if the accommodation, machinery or
\nequipment such as life-saving appliances; radio communication and fire-fighting are
\nbelow the standards required by relevant conventions such as SOLAS, Load Lines,
\nCOLREGS, ILO, etc. Furthermore reference is made to article 4 of the ILO convention
\nNO. 147, Section 3.7 of the Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control
\n10
\n1982, Section III of IMO Resolution A.321 (IX) dated 16 December 1975 and Section 3
\nof IMO Resolution A.466 (SII) dated 19 November 1987. A ship shall be deemed to be
\n\u201csubstandard\u201d if and when she has such deficiencies as are clearly hazardous to
\nsafety, health or the environment on assessment of the non-compliance with relevant
\ntechnical, social or other safety standards applicable to the ship or her crew.
\nIn another development, the failure of ships to meet required safety standards renders
\nthe ship substandard. Substandardness can sometimes be construed in terms of
\nseaworthiness. In maritime law, seaworthiness has been defined as the \u201cdegree of
\nfitness which an ordinary, careful and prudent owner would require his vessel to have
\nas the commencement of her voyage, having regard to all the probable circumstances
\nof it.\u201d A ship must be in good repair, for example, hull, and machinery, sufficiently.
\nBallasted and manned by an efficient and competent crew. To achieve this end,
\nseveral internationally recognised minimum standards have been developed and
\nenforced by various maritime states through conventions and special agreements to
\nachieve global uniformity. A ship is substandard if it fails to meet these minimum
\nstandards.
\nConsequently, the term \u201csubstandard ship\u201d should not be confused with \u201copen registry\u201d
\nor \u201cflag of convenience\u201d ship because the Flag does not make the ship. Some studies
\nconducted on identifying potential polluters and criteria such as flag, age and size have
\nbeen used in the analysis. Of the three, the most commonly connected criteria are that
\nof the Flag. Unfortunately, the Flag is the variable factor in the interpretation of the
\nstatistical information derived. The reason is simple. Vessels do not necessarily remain
\nin the same register throughout their service. If in any significant percentage of the
\ncases, the culprit(s) can change flag, this might obstruct the accuracy of the
\ninformation. The size of the vessel though a constant, can be misleading as well.
\nA poorly managed VLCC is probably just as likely to cause marine pollution as a poorly
\nmaintained feeder tanker. The difference lies in the potential extent of the pollution
\ndamage that could be caused. The age of a vessel, also a constant is by far the
\nsingularly most accurate measure of any likelihood of pollution. Old ships, like any old
\npiece of machinery require constant and careful maintenance in order to perform
\nproperly. The older the vessel, the more accident-prone it is. However, this does not
\n11
\ncause pollution damage. Relatively new tankers have caused some of the major oil
\nspills in recent years. This is usually due to human error. As indicated earlier, one of
\nthe criteria for seaworthiness is proper manning. A duly qualified crew is essential for
\nthe safe navigation of any vessel.
\nTable 1
\nMean fleet age for Selected flags 1984
\nFlag Brazil France Norway Denmark West
\nGermany
\nSweden Spain Liberia World
\nMean age 9.0 9.3 7.4 8.0 6.4 8.1 9.3 9.8 12.1
\n(Source: Lloyd\u2019s Register Annual Casualty Statistical Returns, May 1987).
\nTable 2
\nMean fleet age for selected flags from 1975-1980
\nYear Mean age Year Mean age
\n1975 16.3 1981 18.6
\n1976 18.5 1982 18.5
\n1977 20.0 1983 18.4
\n1978 19.4 1984 18.3
\n1979 19.3 1985 18.4
\n1980 18.6 1986 N\/A.
\n(Source: Lloyd\u2019s Annual Casualty Statistics Returns May
\n1987).
\n12
\nIn most maritime casualties reports human errors are solely responsible for accidents.
\nIf any of the crew cannot carry out his duties as required of the voyage, the ship can be
\nregarded as substandard. However, if it cannot be concluded that a ship is made
\nsubstandard by the wrong judgement of the master or crew. It must follow then, that in
\ncases like that of Amoco Cadiz, Exxon Valdez, Khark V, Torry Canyon and Aragon, the
\nissue is not that of substandard but variables of malfunction (See Table 1). Some
\nmaritime experts categorised substandard ships as follows:
\n(i) The absence of equipment or arrangement required by the international conventions,
\n(ii) Non-compliance of equipment or arrangement with relevant specifications of the
\nconventions.
\nIn any event, statistics have shown that there are thousands of vessels plying the high
\nseas which are either substandard or have potentially serious deficiencies which would
\nrender the vessels substandard. The effort to eliminate substandard ships has taken
\nseveral forms. There are individual remedial and punitive actions, as well as collective
\nactions in the form of conventions and port state control co-operative efforts. These
\nsystems have been described in chapter VI of this thesis.
\nThe elimination of substandard ships is a desirable goal for everyone, particularly in the
\nshipping industry, but the enforcement or the minimum standards is not an easy task.
\nOrdinarily, responsibility for enforcing the rules lies with the Flag States. However, it is
\noften nearly impossible for the Flag State to fully ensure that all its vessels comply with
\nthe international standards. Open registries have often been singled out in this regard
\nbecause most vessels flying the flag of these states rarely call at the home port. The
\nmore accurate explanation is that, most registries with large viable fleets have ships,
\nthat do not call at the home port. Thus, the problem with enforcement of standards
\ndoes not lie in a lack of a \u201cgenuine link\u201d or inadequate inspectorate; it lies in the everchanging movement pattern of ships.
\nNo inspectorate, however large and efficient, can fully enforce standards. This is
\nevidenced by the loss ratio of the Paris Memorandum of Understanding member states,
\nwhich was worse than the world\u2019s average for 1986. This analysis is not meant to
\n13
\ndefend open registries with less than admirable safety standards. It is an attempt to
\nform the non-political, non-economic, non-antagonistic factors surrounding substandard
\nships, and the need to eliminate them.
\nIn Europe, these pivotal groups, namely the shipowners, politicians and the electorate
\nrecognised the need to eliminate substandard ships from European ports. These
\ngroups recognised that a collective effort was needed in view of the above
\nconsideration and identified the following motivating factors for immediate
\nimplementation: –
\n(a) Economic pressure on the European shipping community from more
\nefficient or cheaper competitors;
\n(b) Growing awareness of the detrimental economic and political effects of
\nenvironmental pollution in industrialised countries of Europe;
\n(c) Globalisation of commerce and industry which has intensified and thus
\nforced politics to internationalise too (See Tables 1-3).
\nAn independent assessment of the above factors leads to some rather interesting
\nhypotheses regarding the lucid movements by the European Nations concerted effort to
\nenforce international safety standards. The economic pressure on the European
\nshipping community can be attributed to the competitive cost advantage of flagging out
\nover tonnaging and protectionism. The comparative advantage of flagging out lies in
\nthe lower crew costs and minimal or no taxation and minimum regulation.
\nThe most attractive aspect of such crews lies in the strength of labour organisations.
\nLabour unions in the west are more organised and can pool greater collective
\nbargaining strength than their underdeveloped or developing country\u2019s counterparts.
\nFlagging out gives the shipowner the opportunity to slash his operating cost and avoid
\nconfrontation with powerful unions at the same time. Similarly, by flagging out the
\nowner can avoid high taxes and other operational costs.
\nThe lack of serious competition for many years has led to complacency in European
\nshipping. Suddenly, faced with a major crisis, the European shipowners, unlike the
\n14
\nmarket-oriented Americans, failed to see that shipping today is not so much about
\n\u201ccost-efficiency without sacrificing safety or quality\u201d but rather \u201cthe ability to manage,
\nmarket and finance\u201d that will deter whether a company can survive that market.
\nFollowing numerous incidents of environmental pollution, both land and sea-based,
\nEurope became increasingly aware of the detrimental economic and political effects of
\nenvironmental pollution. Green organisations in 1985 launched impressive antipollution campaigns, states passed numerous anti-pollution legislation and the
\nelectorate preferred environmentally conscious candidates for political office. One of
\nthe industries hit hard by this new anti-pollution fervour was the shipping industry.
\nShipowners were forced by new safety regulations to employ expensive safety and
\nanti-pollution measures that drove their operational costs higher. As indicated earlier,
\nhuman error accounts for a majority of the large-scale marine pollution incidents. Here
\ntoo, technical solutions were found to correct human error.
\nThe third motivation for implementing port state control was the intensification of
\nglobalisation commerce and industry and the resulting internationalisation of politics.
\nHere again, the European shipowner was ill prepared to tackle new rules of the trade.
\nHowever, the European governments were first to recognised this new trend in 1982
\nand went ahead to forge new relationships. What was lacking was innovative ways to
\nreconstruct national structure to effectively compete in the new global market. This
\nwas most evident in European-Far East relationships.
\nIn Europe, the need to eliminate substandard ships was recognised with remarkable
\nsuccess. Although the need was clear and concerted action was necessary, the
\nmotivating factors, which eventually spurred this action, were misguided. The revival of
\nshipping in Europe would not entirely rest on uniformity of rules or applications.
\nEuropean competitors need to reassess their relative position in the market and work
\ntowards improving their competitive edge. The application of technical requirements on
\nshipowners is necessary in so far as the underlying reasons relate solely to the safety
\nof life and property at sea and marine pollution prevention is not a commercial venture.
\nSubstandard ships are still a major concern in the shipping global market because the
\npotential horror of such ships nearly always has far-reaching consequences. The
\n15
\nefforts to eliminate them have taken the right direction in that national governments are
\ntaking the initiative, both collectively and unilaterally, to identify such steps and restrict
\ntheir movements in port states within the scope of the relevant international
\nconventions and IMO regulations. Thanks to IMO, ILO and the likes, in this regard for
\nthe innovations of safety culture in our oceans.
\n17
\nCHAPTER II
\nInternational Instruments on Port State Control
\nWhen talking about \u201cPSC\u201d, we often think that it is a new invention coming into being
\nwith an IMO Resolution A.466 (XII) \u201cprocedures for the control of ships\u201d, now
\nrevoked by IMO Resolution A.787 (19) \u201cProcedures for Port State Control\u201d, and in
\nEurope with the implementation of the \u201cMemorandum of Understanding on port state
\ncontrol\u201d. However, as we have had SOLAS Conventions for more than 50 years and
\nsince the \u201cChapter I\u201d in principle in all the conventions is and has been the same, we
\ncan see that ships have been subject to port state control for many years. (See
\nRegulation 19 in Chapter I of SOLAS 1974 as amended). In addition to SOLAS,
\nthere are many other instruments, which may be used in connection with port state
\ncontrol. These international instruments are for the promotion and improvement of
\nmaritime safety, prevention of pollution and seafarers social welfare, security. They
\nare used as a framework when carrying out port state control.
\nThe 1974 SOLAS (Entered Into Force In Its Original Version 25 May, 1980)
\nSOLAS (Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea) 1978 protocol and later,
\namendments to SOLAS 1974, laid down a comprehensive range of minimum
\nstandards for the safe construction of ships and for the basic safety equipment (e.g.
\nfire protection, navigational, life-saving and radio) to be carried on board. The
\nconvention also contains operational instruments, particularly on emergency
\nprocedures, and proves for regular surveys and certificates of compliance.
\nApplication:
\nIt applies to the passenger ships irrespective of size and all cargo ships of a 500
\ngross tonnage and above engaged in international voyages. In everyday language
\nthese ships are called \u201cconvention ships\u201d. However, the convention does not apply
\nto:
\n18
\n1. Warships or troop ships,
\n2. Cargo ships with a gross tonnage less than 500.
\n3. Ships not propelled by mechanical means,
\n4. Wooden ships of primitive build,
\n5. Pleasure yachts not engaged in trade,
\n6. Fishing vessels
\nChapters IV & V \u201cSafety of Navigation\u201d, however, apply to all ships, Chapter VI
\n\u201ccarriage of cargoes\u201d applies to all ships, and Chapter VII \u201ccarriage of dangerous
\ngoods\u201d applies also to ships with a gross tonnage less than 500. Further, Chapter
\nVIII \u201cNuclear Ships\u201d applies to all nuclear ships.
\nThe SOLAS port state control regulation
\nRegulation 19 of Chapter I contains a right, but not an obligation, for Port State
\nControl officers to verify that there are valid safety certificates on board ship. The
\ncertificates should be accepted unless there are clear grounds for believing that the
\ncondition of a ship or of its equipment does not correspond substantially with the
\nparticulars of the relevant certificate. A \u201cNo More Favourable Treatment Clause\u201d
\n(NMFT clause) is not contained in regulation 19, but it can be found in Article 11(3)
\nof the 1978 Protocol.
\nIn SOLAS, Chapter I, regulation 6(c) it is stated that an Administration nominating
\nsurveyors or recognising organisations to conduct inspections and surveys as
\nstipulated in the SOLAS convention shall, as a minimum, empower them to require
\nrepairs to a ship and carry out inspections and surveys if requested by appropriate
\nauthorities of a port state. For many years there has been a dispute between
\nadministrations and organisations (classification societies) about how to act when a
\nship is detained in port or if a port state intervenes in some way or another. The
\nauthor wishes to emphasise this in this paragraph because it contains the relevant
\ninstruments for administration and Classification Societies in connection with
\n\u201cDelegation\u201d.
\nThis means that if ones own administration nominates a classification society to
\ncarry out inspection on your behalf, it must give the authority to the organisation to
\nrequire rectification. If a Port State notifies for instance the classification society for
\nship survey, this organisation must come on board immediately without waiting for
\n19
\norders from the master or owner or even the Flag State. This is misinterpreted by
\nmany. Another regulation, which shall be mentioned here, is Regulation II, Chapter I
\nof the SOLAS convention \u201cMaintenance of condition after survey\u201d. In this regulation,
\nit is stated that \u201cthe condition of the ship and its equipment shall be maintained to
\nconform with the provisions of the present regulations to ensure that the ship in all
\nrespects will remain fit to proceed to sea without danger to the ship or persons on
\nboard\u201d. This means that the shipowner himself, or through the master, must ensure
\nthat the ship always complies with all regulations. It is also stated that whenever an
\naccident occurs to a ship or a defect is discovered, the master or owner of the ship
\nshall report at the earliest opportunity to the administration or the recognised
\norganisation responsible for issuing the relevant certificate. It is unacceptable if a
\nship comes into a port and afterwards the ship is found to be unseaworthy, the
\ncertifying authority, often the classification society is reproached for not having
\nfulfilled their obligation. In this connection, it must be emphasised that at first it is the
\nshipowner, who is responsible for the ship\u2019s maintenance etc. Further, the owner is
\nto ensure that the ship in all respects always complies with all the regulations and
\nthat it is always fit to proceed to sea without danger to the ship or persons on board.
\nSecondly, responsibility falls on the Flag State, but as Flag States can not control
\neverything, such implementation are more or less only \u201cpseudo responsible\u201d. The
\nFlag States of course, are responsible for the certification, which have been issued,
\nespecially just after inspection. It is the inspection body who must see to it that the
\nshipowner has ensured that everything is in order. If during the inspection, the
\ninspection body does not observe a deficiency then it can be blamed for not having
\nseen it but the owner is responsible if something is wrong. It is therefore, in the
\nauthor\u2019s opinion, when talking about Port State Control very important that any party
\ninvolved is fully aware of what the regulations are supposed to cover.
\nThe International Convention on Load Lines (ILC) 1966 (entered into force 21
\nJuly 1968)
\nThe ILC 1966 Annex I \u201cRegulations for determining Load Lines\u201d established uniform
\nprinciples and rules with respect to the limits to which ships or international voyages
\nmay be loaded. Concerning, the structural strength of the ship Annex I regulation 1
\nrefers to the requirements of the classification societies. A similar reference entered
\ninto force in the SOLAS Convention on 1st July 1998.
\n20
\nApplication:
\nThe convention applies to all ships except:
\na) Ships of war,
\nb) New ships less than 24 meters in length,
\nc) Existing ships of a gross tonnage less than 150,
\nd) Pleasure yachts not engaged in trade, and
\ne) Fishing vessels.
\nCOLREG 1972\/1981 (entered into force 15 July 1983).
\nConvention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972,
\nand the 1981 amendments (COLREG 1972\/1981). In everyday language, COLREG
\nlays down the basic \u201cRules of the Road\u201d governing traffic at sea, including rights of
\nway, safe speeds, action to avoid collision, procedures to be observed in narrow
\nchannels and in restricted visibility, and signals to be used to warn of manoeuvres. In
\nthe annex to COLREG, requirements are laid down for:
\n\u2022 positioning and technical details of lights and shapes,
\n\u2022 additional signals for fishing vessels, fishing in close proximity,
\n\u2022 technical details of sound signal appliances, and
\n\u2022 distress signals.
\nApplication
\nThe Rules apply to all vessels on the high seas and in all waters navigable by seagoing vessels. As regards the COLREG control regulation, there are no articles or
\nregulations on control in COLREG. However, the carriage requirements are checked
\nwithin the framework of SOLAS (see SOLAS regulations 1\/7 and 8).
\n21
\nInternational Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973
\n(MARPOL) and the 1978 Protocol related thereto- (MARPOL 73\/78).
\nThe convention covers all the technical aspects of pollution from ships, except
\ndisposal of land generated wastes into the sea by dumping. This is covered by a
\nseparate convention. It applies to ships of all types including High Speed Craft, and
\nsubmersible, floating craft and fixed or floating platforms operating in the marine
\nenvironments.
\nThe convention consists of six Annexes (Annex Six is yet to enter into force as at
\nSeptember 1999), two protocols dealing respectively with reports on incidents
\ninvolving harmful substances and arbitration. These Annexes include:
\nAnnex I: Regulations for the prevention of Pollution by Oil. (Entered into force 2
\nOctober 1983).
\nAnnex II: Regulations for the control of Pollution by Noxious liquid substances in
\nbulk (Entered into force 6 April 1987).
\nAnnex III: Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution by Harmful substances carried
\nby sea in Packaged forms, or in Freight containers, Portable tanks or
\nRoad and Rail Tank Wagons. (Entered into force 1 July 1992).
\nAnnex IV: Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution of Sewage from ships.
\nNote: The countries around the Baltic Sea put this Annex into force
\nsince 3 May 1990, at Helsinki, Finland (Helcom Agreement).
\nAnnex V: Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution by Garbage from ships.
\n(Entered into force 31 December 1988).
\nAnnex VI: Regulations for the control of air pollution. (Yet to enter into force).
\nApplication:
\nThe MARPOL Convention applies to all ships with the following modifications: The
\nconvention shall not apply to any warship, naval auxiliary or other ships owned or
\noperated by a state and used, for the time being, only on government noncommercial service. However, each party shall ensure by the adoption of
\nappropriate measures not impairing the operations or operational capabilities of such
\nships owned or operated by it that such ships act in a manner consistent, so far as is
\nreasonable and practicable, with the present convention. (External from Article 3 in
\nthe MARPOL 1973 convention).
\n22
\nThe MARPOL control regulation.
\nArticle 5 of the Convention authorises port states to verify that there are valid
\ncertificates and other relevant Documents on board ships in ports or offshore
\nterminals. The\u201c No More Favourable Treatment (NMFT)\u201d can be found in Article 5(4)
\nin the MARPOL Convention).
\nThe International Convention on Tonnage Measurement of Ships, 1969
\n(Tonnage \u00b469) (entered into force 18 July 1982 for new ships and 18 July 1994
\nfor existing ships).
\nThe text of the Annex of the Convention establishes a universal system of tonnage
\nmeasurement for ships particularly Articles 4 & 6 respectively. Tonnage \u00b469 includes:
\na) Regulations for determining Gross and Net Tonnage of ships.
\nb) International Tonnage Certificate.
\nApplication:
\nIt applies to ships engaged on International voyages except for:
\na) War ships, and
\nb) Ships of less than 24 meters (79 feet ) in length,
\nFor more detailed description of the application and the exceptions, Articles 3 & 4 of
\nthe Convention are explicit enough for that purpose.
\nThe Tonnage Control Regulation
\nThis section is intended as additional information only. The \u201cinspection\u201d article is in
\nArticle 12. However, it must be remembered that this convention is not a \u201cSafety
\nConvention\u201d, and TONNAGE\u00b469 is seldom mentioned and used in connection with
\nPort State Control. However, that the transitional period of 12 years for the
\napplication of the convention on existing ships expired on 18 July 1994.
\nAs ship gross tonnage is the key for the surveyor to establish which requirements
\nare applicable to the ship, logically it is one of the first certificates, requested in
\nconnection with the Port State Control inspection. In the period, just after 18 July
\n1994, many ships encountered problems in the ports, especially those built before
\n23
\n1982 and those built after 1982, which have been measured in accordance to the
\nprinciples laid down in IMO resolution A.494 (XII). Ships continue to run into
\nproblems (March 1999) around the world due to lack of proper information (training).
\nIn this resolution, it has been possible to continue to measure ships in accordance to
\nthe existing or old rules. It means that ships built before 18 July, 1994 continue, if
\nthey are of a gross tonnage less than 1600, to be equipped and built in accordance
\nwith the regulations applicable to a ship of that particular size under the old tonnage
\nrules. It will often be the ships with a gross tonnage of 499 and 1599, in the socalled paragraph ships, which give problems. It is therefore, very important in
\nconnection with Port State Control that inspectors use their common sense and
\nsolve the problems in a pragmatic way.
\nOf course, no one must accept a certificate issued fraudulently. If this is the case,
\nthe issuing authority must be informed immediately that the port state will not accept
\nthe certificate and the reason why the certificate is not accepted. Note that a ship,
\nwhich has been measured in accordance to the \u2018older\u2019 rules, must have the following
\ntext written on the ship’s entire \u201csafety and pollution prevention\u201d certificate: \u201cThe
\nabove Gross Tonnage is according to the measurement system previously in force in
\nthe International convention of Ships, 1969\u201d. (For further clarification read the remark
\ncolumn of the Valid International Tonnage Certificate (1969).
\nFurthermore, the new tonnage certificate should have the following text written
\nunder the heading \u201cRemarks\u201d. The ship is re-measured according to article 3(2)(d)
\nof the 1969 Tonnage convention. The Gross Tonnage according to the
\nmeasurement system previously in force is 24 GRT (CF IMO Resolution A.758 (18),
\nif the ship is built before 18 July 1982. The ship is additionally measured according
\nto resolution A.494 (XII). However, Article 6 says, \u201cthe determination of gross and
\nnet tonnage shall be carried out by the Administration which may entrust such
\ndetermination either to persons or organisation recognised by it\u201d. In any case, the
\nAdministration concerned shall accept full responsibility for the determination of
\ngross and net tonnage.
\nThe International Labour Organisation (Ilo) 147 Convention (Merchant
\nShipping Minimum Standards Entered Into Force 28 November 1981).
\n24
\nILO 147 Convention required administrations to have effective legislation on safe
\nmanning standards, hours of work, seafarers\u2019 competency, and social security in
\naddition to employment standards equivalent to those contained in a range of ILO
\ninstruments. For example, the minimum age, accident prevention, crew
\naccommodation, repatriation, social security, training. The convention is primarily a
\nFlag State instrument but it also includes Port States responsibilities.
\nApplication:
\nThe convention applies to every sea-going ship, whether publicly or privately owned
\nwhich is engaged in the transport of cargo or passengers for the purpose of trade or
\nis employed for any other commercial purposes. However, National laws or
\nregulations shall determine when ships are to be regarded as sea-going ships for
\nthe purpose of this convention. The convention applies to sea-going tugs, but does
\nnot apply to:
\na) Ships primarily propelled by sail, whether or not they are filled with
\nauxiliary engines,
\nb) Ships engaged in fishing or in whaling or in similar pursuits, and
\nc) Small vessels and vessels such as oil rigs and drilling platforms when not
\nengaged in navigation. The decision as to which vessels are covered by
\nthis sub-paragraph to be taken by the competent authority in each
\ncountry in consultation with representative organisations of shipowners
\nand seafarers.
\nIn everyday language, it is said that the convention applies to merchant ships.
\nThe ILO 147 control regulation:
\nThe control regulation is in Article 4.states:
\nGenerally it can be said that it allows an administration to apply its provisions
\n(including the power of detention) to any ship which calls at its ports, whether or not
\nthe ships Flag State has ratified the convention. This is in view of the application of
\nNo More Favourable Treatment to non-Convention ships.
\nThe appendices to ILO 147 include the following:
\n25
\n1. Conventions relevant for the inspection on board (the \u201chard ware\u201d
\nconventions).
\na) The minimum age convention, 1975 (no. 138), or
\nThe minimum age (Sean) convention (revised), 1936 No. 58, or
\nThe minimum age (Sean) convention 1920 (no. 7).
\nb) The Medical Examination (seafarers) convention, 1946 (no. 73).
\nc) The Prevention of Accidents (seafarers) convention, 1970 (no. 134)
\n(Articles 4 and 7).
\nd) The Accommodation of crews convention (revised), 1949 (no. 92);
\ne) The food and catering (ship crews) convention, 1946 (no. 68) (Article 5);
\nf) The officers competency certificates convention, 1936 (no. 53) (Articles 3
\nand 4).
\n2. Conventions relevant in the framework of the provisions for PSC. (the \u201csoft
\nware\u201d):
\na) The seamen\u2019s article of agreement convention, 1926 No.22;
\nb) The repatriation of seamen convention, 1926 (no.23);
\nc) The shipowner\u2019s liability (sick and injured seamen) convention, 1936
\n(no.53); or the medical care and sickness benefits convention, 1960 (no.
\n130);
\nd) The freedom of association and protection of the right to organise
\nconvention, 1948 (no. 87);
\ne) The right to organise and collective bargaining convention, 1949 (no. 98).
\nAs the merchant Shipping (minimum standards) Convention primarily is a Flag State
\ninstrument only those conventions mentioned under No. 1 above, will be applied on
\nboard in connection with Port State Control. However, those mentioned under No.2,
\nwill be used in the framework of the provisions of a PSC complaint report received
\nfrom the Flag State, which is supposed to investigate such matters.
\n26
\nThe STCW 1978 Convention (Entered Into Force 28 April 1984) & (The 1995
\nAmendments Entered Into Force 1 February 1997)
\nSTCW (Convention on Standards of Training and Watchkeeping for Seafarers)
\n1978, lays down extensive certification and qualifications requirements (including
\nsyllabuses and sea time) for senior officers; all officers in charge of watches in the
\ndeck, engine and radio departments and ratings forming part of a watch. All
\nseafarers will be required to have a certificate endorsed in a uniform manner. It
\nalso specifies basic principles to be observed in keeping deck and engine watches
\nand special qualification requirements for personnel on oil, chemical and liquefied
\ngas tankers.
\nThe 1995 amendments to the International Convention on Standards of Training,
\nCertification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) 1978 entered into force on 1
\nFebruary 1997. One of the major features of the amendments is the adoption of a
\nnew STCW Code, to which many technical regulations have been transferred. Part
\nA of the Code is mandatory while part B is recommended. Dividing the regulations
\nup in this way makes administrations easier and it will also make the task of revising
\nand updating them more simples. For procedural and legal reasons there is no
\nneed to call a full conference to make changes to the code(s).
\nOne important amendment adopted by the 1995 conference concerns chapter 1
\n(General provisions). It includes enhanced procedures concerning the exercise of
\nPort State Control, which have been developed to allow intervention in the case of
\ndeficiencies deemed to pose a danger to persons, property or the environment.
\nMeasures have also been introduced for watchkeeping personnel to prevent fatigue.
\nUntil 1 February 2002, however, parties may continue to issue, recognise and
\nendorse certificates, which applied before date in respect of seafarers that began
\ntraining or seagoing service before 1 August 1998.
\nApplication
\nThe convention applies to seafarers serving on board seagoing ships entitled to fly
\nthe flag of a party except to those serving on board:
\na) Warships, etc.,
\n27
\nb) Fishing vessels,
\nc) Pleasure yachts not engaged in trade, or
\nd) Wooden ships of primitive built.
\nThe STCW Control Regulation:
\nThe control regulation is in Article X, and the \u201cNMFT clause\u201d is in the same Article.
\nNote: that parties to the convention will be required to submit proved detailed
\ninformation to IMO concerning administrative measures taken to ensure compliance
\nwith the convention.
\nThe Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), IMO’s Senior Technical Body, will use this
\ninformation, to identify parties that are able to demonstrate that they can give full
\nand complete effect to the convention. Other parties will then be able to accept that
\ncertificates issued by these parties are in compliance with the convention. This
\nregulation is regarded as particularly important because it means that governments
\nwill have to establish that they have the administrative, training and certification
\nresources necessary to implement the convention.
\nThe United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS\u00b4 82)
\nOn 10 December 1982 the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea was
\nopened for signature at Montego Bay, Jamaica. More than 150 countries
\nrepresenting all regions of the world participated. These countries convened for the
\npurpose of establishing a comprehensive regime \u201cdealing with all matters relating to
\nthe Law of the sea bearing in mind that the problem of ocean space are closely
\ninterrelated and need to be considered as a whole\u201d.
\nThe convention is multi-faceted and represents a monument to international cooperation in the treaty making process. The need to elaborate a new and
\ncomprehensive regime for the law of the sea was perceived and the international
\ncommunity expressed its collective will to co-operate in this effort on a scale the
\nmagnitude of which was unprecedented in treaty history. The law comprises 320
\narticles and nine annexes, governing all aspects of ocean space delimitation to
\nenvironmental control, scientific research, economic and commercial activities,
\ntechnology and the settlement of disputes relating to ocean matters.
\n28
\nArticle 218 \u201cEnforcement by Port States\u201d allows a state to undertake investigations
\non any vessel within its port or at an off-shore terminal, where the evidence so
\nwarrants, institute proceedings in respect of any discharge from the vessels outside
\nthe internal waters, territorial sea or exclusive economic zone of that state in
\nviolation of applicable international rules and standards established through the
\ncompetent international organisations or general diplomatic conferences.
\nArticle 226- \u201cInvestigation of Foreign Vessels.
\nStates should not delay a foreign vessel longer than is essential for purposes of the
\ninvestigations provided for in articles 216, 218 and 220. Any physical inspection of
\na foreign vessel shall be limited to an examination to such certificates, records or
\nother documents as the vessel is required to carry by generally accepted
\ninternational rules and standards or of any similar documents which it is carrying,
\nfurther physical inspection of the vessel may be undertaken only after such an
\nexamination and only when:
\n(a) There are clear grounds for believing that the condition of the vessel or its
\nequipment does not correspond substantially with the particulars of those
\ndocuments;
\n(b) the contents of such documents are not sufficient to confirm or verify a
\nsuspected violation; or
\n(c) The vessel is not carrying valid certificates and records.
\n(d) If investigation indicates a violation of applicable laws and regulations or
\ninternational rules\/standards for the protection and preservation of the marine
\nenvironment, release shall be made promptly subject to reasonable procedures
\nsuch as bonding or other appropriate financial security.
\nThe IMO Resolution A.481 (XII): \u201cPrinciples of Safe Manning\u201d:
\nSafe manning is a function of the number of qualified or experienced seafarers
\nnecessary for the safety of the ship, crew, passengers, cargo and property and for
\nthe protection of the marine environment. In other words, and according to ILO
\n109, Art. 21and SOLAS Chapter V states that: \u201cEvery ship. Must be sufficiently,
\nefficiently and safely manned”. However, IMO Resolution A.481 (XII) was adopted
\non 19 November 1981 and contains two annexes.
\n29
\nAnnex 1. Contents of Minimum Safe Manning Document.
\nAnnex 2. Guidelines for the application of principles of Safe Manning, in particular
\na catalogue of certain capabilities necessary for keeping an orderly
\nnavigational or engine room watch.
\nThe resolution calls upon member governments to ensure that every ship to which
\nthe 1978 STCW convention applies, will carry on board at all times a Minimum Safe
\nManning Document, issued by the Flag State Administration specifying the
\nminimum safe manning required for the ship concerned. Furthermore, member
\ngovernments are urged, when exercising port state control functions in respect of
\nforeign flagships, to consider conforming of the actual circumstances aboard with
\nthe information given in the Ship\u2019s Minimum Safety Manning Documents as
\nevidence that the ship is safely manned.
\nThe IMO Resolution A.787 (19) \u201cProcedures for Port State Control\u201d adopted
\non 23 November 1995
\nThis resolution provides basic guidance on the conduct of port state control
\ninspections and affords consistency in the conduct of these inspections, the
\nrecognition of deficiencies of a ship, its equipment, or its crew, and the application
\nof control procedures. These procedures apply to ships which come under the
\nprovisions of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as
\namended (SOLAS 74), the International Convention on Load Lines, 1966 (Load
\nLines 1966), the International Convention for the Regulation of Pollution from ships,
\n1973 as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto, as amended (MARPOL
\n73\/78), the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and
\nWatchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978, as amended (STCW 78), and the International
\nConvention on Tonnage Measurement of Ships, 1969 (ITC 69). Ships of nonparties or below convention size shall be given no more favourable treatment as
\nstated earlier.
\nIn exercising Port State Control, parties will only apply those provisions of the
\nconventions which are in force and which they have accepted. If a Port State
\nexercises port state control based on the International Labour Organisation (ILO)
\nNo. 147, \u201cMerchant Shipping (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1976\u201d, guidance on
\nthe conduct of such control inspections is given in ILO publication, \u201cInspection of
\nLabour Conditions on Board Ships: Guidelines for Procedures\u201d. Under the
\n30
\nprovisions of the applicable conventions noted above, the Administration (Flag
\nState) is responsible for promulgating laws and regulations and for taking all other
\nsteps which may be necessary to give the applicable conventions full and complete
\neffect so as to ensure that, from the point of view of safety of life and pollution
\nprevention, a ship is fit for the service for which it is intended and seafarers are
\nqualified and fit for their duties.
\nIn some cases it may be difficult for the administration to exercise full and
\ncontinuous control over some ships entitled to fly the flag of its state, for instance
\nthose ships which do not regularly call at a port of the Flag State. The problem can
\nbe, and has been, partly overcome by appointing inspectors at foreign ports and\/or
\nauthorising recognised organisations to act on behalf of the flag state
\nadministration. These control procedures should be regarded as complementary to
\nnational measures taken by administrations of flag states in their countries and
\nabroad and are intended to provide Helpance to Flag State administrations in
\nsecuring compliance with convention provisions in safeguarding the safety of crew,
\npassengers and ships, and ensuring the prevention of pollution. In other words, flag
\nstate control must be self-sustainable here. The authorities of port states should
\nmake attentive use of adequate provisions for the purpose of identifying
\ndeficiencies, if any, in such ships which may render them substandard by ensuring
\nthat remedial measures are taken (See Appendix 3: IMO Resolution A. 787 (19)-
\nSection 4.1 for more details).
\nApplication of International Instruments
\nElaboration has been done on a number of international conventions, which are
\nused in connection with PSC. It is obvious that PSC, with reference to a certain
\nconvention, is only possible if the Port State itself is party to it and has fully
\nimplemented the conventions in related thereto. However, it is relevant to recall that
\ninternational conventions are only binding on member states which ratify them, and
\nwhich by national legislation give effect to such conventions. Nevertheless, there
\nhas been a tendency to consider that multilateral treaties have a higher legal validity
\nthan bilateral treaties. Multilateral Treaties sometimes are regarded as \u201clawmaking\u201d.
\nThere is of course also a certain psychological pressure on States, if they are
\namongst only a few, who have not ratified a certain convention. Often ships flying
\n31
\nthe flag of a state that is not a party to a certain convention comply with the
\nrequirements in the convention in any case in order to avoid trouble in the ports of
\nmember states where the \u201cNMFT clause\u201d is put into force.
\nShip owners of ships flying \u201cnon-party flag\u201d often make a request to a classification
\nsociety with the purpose of getting a document issued which states that the ship
\ncomplies with certain requirements; let us say MARPOL for example. Such a
\ndocument is called a \u201cletter of compliance\u201d. However, as the conventions become
\nmore and more global the above example will be rare in the future. There is a trend
\nthat in the future such \u201cletters of compliance\u201d will not be accepted irrespective of the
\nmatter is dealt with in chapter 1.5 of IMO Resolution A.787 (19) \u201cProcedures for Port
\nState Control\u201d. Even if we all agree upon the importance of what is covered in the
\nexpression: Safer ships and Cleaner oceans, we have to admit (if we are objective)
\nthat the previous mentioned pressures do produce what can be called a Creeping
\nJurisdiction.
\nThis means that after a maritime convention has entered into force, then, even if it
\nis not a requirement from a ship\u2019s Flag State, almost all ship owners try to
\nimplement the requirements in question so as to avoid trouble due to the \u201cNMFT
\nclauses\u201d. A \u201cNo More Favourable Treatment Clause\u201d (NMFT Clause) has
\nsometimes been subject of discussion, as to whether the clause is in accordance
\nwith the principles of \u201cInternational Law\u201d. The author\u2019s opinion is that, if a port state
\nmakes use of or makes reference to the \u201cNMFT clause\u201d, then, such a state should
\nhave legislation, which explicitly permits the relevant steps to be taken. A \u201cNMFT
\nclause\u201d should never be used if it is implemented within the framework of a
\ntechnical standard by secondary legislation only.
\n32
\nCHAPTER III
\nThe Port State Control in Europe and the Paris
\nMemorandum of Understanding on Port State Control.
\nThe Agreement of the Memorandum of Understanding
\nIn Western Europe on January 26, 1982 after the sad fact of the founded AMACO CADIZ in
\nMarch 1978, more stringent commitments on Port State Control were felt to be necessary
\nover the first step to a co-ordinated and harmonised Port State Control, resulting in the MOU
\nof 1978 with respect to the Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control in Europe.
\nThe new Memorandum had to cover these main themes.
\n– Safety at sea
\n– Prevention of pollution by Ships
\n– Living and co-ordination on board.
\nIt is said: “The main underlying reason for the MOU\u2019s birth was of course that we cannot
\nafford substandard shipping threatens our ports and the environment.\u201d Therefore, on this
\ndate of January 26 1982, the maritime countries of 14 European nations reached in
\nunderstanding which came into effect in July 1982 that each would maintain an effective
\nsystem of Port State Control with a view to flag, foreign merchant ships visiting the ports of
\nits state comply with instruments laid down in various international conventions.
\nAs Iain Sproat(1982) said “The Paris Memorandum, signed by fourteen European Maritime
\nAuthorities established with effect from 01 July 1982, a harmonised and co-ordinated system
\n33
\nfor inspection of 25% of foreign ships calling at European ports, in short, discrimination as
\nto flag, for the purpose of detecting which fail to meet standards laid down in international
\nconventions on safety, manning and pollution prevention, securing the verifications of
\ndeficiencies one discouraging the operation of sub-standard vessels”. The charter of the
\nMemorandum of Understanding is the agreement on a number of commitments and
\nprocedures that are directly related to the internationally adopted instruments.
\nWhat has been laid down in International Convention as a right for Port State Control is,
\nnamely, to inspect foreign flagships on the basis of the convention which has been taken up
\nas a commitment, but is to be applied in a harmonised way. An effective information system
\nmust take care of information on inspections made by each authority in order to avoid
\nrepetition. As A. J. Cowley puts it “The Memorandum of Understanding on Port States,
\nwhich has concluded in Paris in January 1982, is a followship to the earlier discussions on
\nharmonised Port State Control, which stated in 1976. The authorities concerned decided to
\naccept stranger and clearly defined commitments on the number of inspections of Foreign
\nFlag Ships by each of the participating maritime authorities and to pay much greater
\nattention to the mutual exchange of information on inspected ships in order to avoid
\nduplication of inspections. Furthermore, the authorities decided to apply only those
\nconventions which have been ratified by the Port State Control involved and which have
\nentered into force”.
\nBecause the information system about inspections is important in the Port State Control
\nunder the MOU, the ship receives a Port State inspection report after inspection. If there is
\nno obvious inspections in the region, there could be duplications on inspections. This shows
\nthe importance of the Port State information system in MOU in which results of inspections
\nare stored without delay, and in which ships\u00b4 names are deleted after a six month period until
\nanother inspection of the ship is made. The MOU stated “each authority will consult, cooperate and exchange information with the other authorities in order to further the aims of
\nthe Memorandum”. The aim of the MOU was initially to achieve an annual inspection rate
\nof 25% of the individual ships entering a country.
\nAccording to the text of MOU the partners should have each achieved, by 01 July 1985, an
\nannual total of inspections corresponding to 20% of the estimated number of individual
\n34
\nforeign merchant ships which entered their ports in a year. The ship that has been inspected
\nin another Port State Control partner’s port according to the text of the MOU, should in
\nprinciple, be left alone for six months. The MOU stated “the Authorities will seek to avoid
\ninspecting ships which have been inspected by any of the other Authorities within the
\nprevious six MOUs, unless they have clear ground for another inspection”. Taken into
\nconsideration that most of the ships in the region enter more than one port and more than one
\nregional state within the size MOU\u00b4s period, most of the ships visiting the region will be
\ninspected by a Port State Control at least once a year.
\nRelevant Instruments of Memorandum of Understanding
\nIn order to maintain an effective system of Port State Control with a view to ensuring that,
\nwithout discrimination of flag, foreign merchant ships visiting the ports of its state comply
\nwith instruments laid down in the various international conventions; that was why the 14
\nEuropean nations signed the MOU. Those instruments are as follows:
\n– The International Convention on Load Lined, 1966
\n– The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974
\n– The Protocol of 1978 relating to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at
\nSea, 1974;
\n– The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as
\nmodified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto;
\n– The International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978;
\n– The Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972;
\n– The Merchant Shipping (Minimum Standard) Convention, 1976 (ILO Convention 147).
\nIt was also stated in the Memorandum that each authority would apply those relevant
\ninstruments which are in force and which its state has accepted. An instrument so amended
\nwould then be considered to be the “relevant instrument” for that authority.
\nAs J. Cowley (1985) said “It is important to note that the Memorandum is thus in no way
\ncontradictory to the contents of internationally agreed maritime conventions in IMO and
\nILO. The authorities only implement the standards and procedures of those Conventions in a
\n35
\nharmonised way. It is believed that such harmonisation is important not only for the
\nshipping of the region states but also for the International Shipping Community”.
\nThe \u201cNo More Favourable Treatment (NMFT) Clause
\nIt is stated in the relevant instruments SOLAS Protocol (article II-3), MARPOL 1973\/78
\n(article 5-(4)), and STCW 1978 (article 5), the clause of no more favourable treatment. In
\nthe STCW Convention it is stated that \u201cNo More Favourable Treatment\u201d shall be given to
\nships entitled to fly the flag of a non-party than is given to ships entitled to fly the flag is a
\nParty\u201d. In a MARPOL 1973\/78 it is stated that \u201cwith respect to the ships of non-parties to
\nthe convention, Parties shall apply the requirements of the MARPOL 1973\/78 Convention as
\nmay be necessary to ensure that no more favourable treatment is given in such ships\u201d.
\nIn the Memorandum of Understanding this clause is also stated and it has agreed that \u201cIn
\napplying a relevant instrument for the purpose of Port State Control, the authorities will
\nensure that no more favourable treatment is given to ships entitled to fly the flag of the state
\nwhich is no Party to that instrument\u201d. In this respect, J. Cowley emphasised that \u201cthe no
\nmore favourable treatment clause is like wise based upon the internationally agreed
\ninstruments. The committee it unanimously of the opinion that the \u201cno more favourable
\ntreatment clause\u201d should only apply with respect to those instruments which themselves
\ncontain such provision, notably in and only in SOLAS and its Protocol 1978, MARPOL
\n1973\/78 and STCW 1978. It is a condition that these instruments are in force and have been
\nratified by the Port State exercising the inspection. But, the ships of non-parties to the
\nrelevant international conventions would thus be treated no differently nor more severely
\nthan by any other individual party to the convention\u201d.
\nWho conducts Port State Control Inspection in the European
\nCountries?
\nThe Port State Control inspection \u201cin European countries is conducted by the same persons
\nwho conduct national inspections that constitute part of the national shipping inspection
\nservice in their country. So apart from conducting inspections on their national ships, they
\n36
\nalso conduct Port State inspections, which by definition is only done on foreign ships\u201d. The
\nMOU states that \u201cInspections will be carried out by properly qualified persons authorised for
\nthat purpose by the authority concerned and acting under its responsibility\u201d. Port State
\nControl surveys must have no direct commercial interest vested in either the ports, or the
\nships where inspections in accordance to the IMO instruments are carried out. The IMO
\nResolution A.787 (19), chapter 2.5 deals with these requirements.
\nInspections Procedures, Rectification and Detention
\nIn selecting the ships for inspection, the surveyor is Helped by the daily list of incoming
\nships (issued by the port authorities) and the MOU list of ships which have been inspected
\nduring the previous six months. This is made by means of an online terminal from the
\ndistrict to the MOU computer centre in France in due time. After comparison of these two
\nlists the choice of ships to be inspected is regardless of flag or owner. As indicated in the
\nMOU, special attention is also paid to ships, which may present a special hazard, for instance
\noil tankers and gas and chemical carriers; and also ships that have had several records of
\ndeficiencies.
\nWhen conditioning an inspection under the terminal of the MOU, the surveyors first check
\nthe ship\u2019s documentation. If the ship\u2019s certificates are invited or incomplete, or if the
\nsurveyor has clear grounds for believing the conditions of the ship and its equipment do not
\ncorrespond substantially with the particulars on the certificate, he will use his professional
\njudgement in deciding whether, clear grounds Help to conduct a more detailed inspection.
\nThe Memorandum of Understanding stated as \u201cclear grounds\u201d inter alias the following:
\n– a report or notification by another authority;
\n– a report or complaint by the master, a crew member, or any person or organisation of the
\nship, shipboard living and making conditions or the prevention of pollution, unless the
\nauthority concerned deems the report or complaint to manifestly impounded;
\n– Other indications of serious deficiencies\u201d.
\nIf after the detailed inspection it is discovered that the ship does not comply with the
\nappropriate international standards, steps are taken to rectify the deficiencies. In the case of
\n37
\nserious deficiencies, which are clearly hazardous to safety, health or environment, the ships
\nmay be delayed or detained until they are corrected. The MOU stated further that \u201cin the
\ncase of deficiencies which are clearly hazardous to safety, health or environment, the
\nauthority will ensure that the hazard is removed before the ship is allowed to proceed to sea
\nand for this purpose will take appropriate action, which may include detention. The
\nAuthority will, as soon as possible, notify the Flag State through its consul or, in his absence,
\nits nearest diplomatic representative or its maritime authority of the action taken\u201d.
\nAfter the inspection, a report is always left on board as information to the master and as
\nproof that the ship has been inspected, also in the case of deficiencies that led to the
\ndetainment of the ship. The details of every inspection are directly sent to the computer in
\nFrance by telex, in order that the MOU has the inspection list as up to date as possible. This
\ncomputerised regional information system for the rapid exchange of information and for
\nstatistical purposes considerably reduces the chances of duplication of inspections.
\nThe Memorandum also established that where deficiencies cannot be remedied in the port of
\ninspection, the authority may allow the ship to proceed to another port, subject to any
\nappropriate conditions determined by the authority with a view to ensuring that ships can so
\nproceed without an unreasonable danger to safety, health or environment. In such
\ncircumstances the authority will notify the competent authority of the Region State where the
\nnext port of call of the ship is situated, the parties mentioned in 3.7 of the MOU, and any
\nother authority as appropriate.
\nThe Memorandum stated that \u201cwhen exercising control under the Memorandum, the
\nauthorities will make all possible efforts to avoid unduly detaining or delaying a ship\u201d, and
\nalso stated that nothing in the Memorandum affects rights created by provisions of relevant
\ninstruments relating to compensation for under detention or delay\u201d.
\n38
\nTable 4:
\nChanges in loss rate for each Member State
\nPre\/Post December 12, 1982
\nMember State Loss rate 1968-
\n1982
\nLoss rate 1983-
\n1986
\nAbsolute
\nChange
\nRelative
\nChange (%)
\nB 0.04 0.00 -0.04 -100
\nDK 0.16 0.03 -0.13 -81
\nSF 0.19 0.06 -0.13 -68
\nF 0.10 0.03 -0.07 -70
\nD 0.12 0.06 -0.06 -50
\nGR 0.98 1.11 +0.13 +13
\nIRL 0.17 0.01 -0.16 -94
\nI 0.30 0.11 -0.19 -63
\nNL 0.21 0.05 -0.16 -76
\nN 0.14 0.21 +0.07 +50
\nP 0.28 0.02 -0.26 -93
\nE 0.46 1.12 -0.66 +143
\nS 0.10 0.01 -0.09 -90
\nGB 0.11 o.27 +0.16 +145
\n(Source: Lloyd\u2019s Register Annual Returns for the years 1968-1985, Monthly Shipping
\nStatistics, May 1987 for the year 1986 [51]).
\nTable 5
\nDEFICIENCIES FROM 1979 TO 1988
\nPERIOD
\nNO. OF REPORTS PARIS
\nMEMBERS
\nOUTSTANDING
\nREPORTS
\nNov. 1978-Mar. 1979 43 28 6
\nApr. 1979- Dec. 1979 84 58 1
\nJuly 1980-Sept. 1980 18 10 9
\nOct.1980-Oct. 1981 194 170 9
\nOct. 1981-Dec. 1982 438 413 37
\nJan. 1983-Oct. 1983 281 236 40
\nJuly 1984-June 1985 186 157 18
\nSept. 1985-Nov. 1986 179 163 _
\nTOTAL 1610 1375 129
\n(Source: IMO, MSC Annual Report 1987.London: IMO).
\nNote that the information provided in this table shows that the 14 European State Members
\nof the Paris Memorandum of Understanding (PARIS MOU) are working towards the
\nenforcement of marine pollution prevention conventions at that time.
\n39
\nTable 6
\nLoss rates for all Member States 1968-1986
\nYear GRT Lost (\u00b4000) GRT Registered
\n(\u00b4000)
\nGRT Lost + 100
\nover GRT
\nRegistered
\n1968 263.391 86 943 0.30
\n1969 382.044 92 311 0.41
\n1970 213.831 98 123 0.22
\n1971 429.279 107 231 0.40
\n1972 201.145 114 357 0.18
\n1973 246.780 121 765 0.20
\n1974 314.969 129 617 0.24
\n1975 300.002 139 098 0.22
\n1976 229.644 147 373 0.16
\n1977 307.659 151 655 0.20
\n1978 905.175 154 965 0.58
\n1979 696.932 149 237 0.47
\n1980 667.356 149 147 0.45
\n1981 521.176 147 593 0.35
\n1982 450.801 142 070 0.32
\n1983 608.720 129 815 0.47
\n1984 677.153 115 447 0.59
\n1985 375.159 98 010 0.38
\n1986 416.100 90 717 0.46
\n(Source: Lloyd\u2019s Register Annual Casualty Reports for the years 1968-1985,
\nMonthly Shipping Statistics, May 1987 for the year 1986).
\nNote that, the years 1968-1973 and 1976-1980 respectively, no data were available
\nfor IRL. Therefore, GRT lost and GRT registered for these years are exclusive of
\nIRL.
\n40
\nApplication of the MOU to ships below 500 gross tonnage
\nIt was agreed in the Memorandum of understanding (MOU) about the application for ships
\nbelow 500 gross tonnage that in the case of these kinds of ships \u201cthe authorities will apply
\nthose requirements of the relevant instruments which are applicable and will to the extent
\nthat a relevant instruments does not apply, taken such actions as may be necessary to ensure
\nthat those ships are not clearly hazardous to safety, health or environment. Furthermore, as a
\nresult of recent agreements between MOU partners, a List of items to which surveyors
\nshould pay special attention when inspecting small ships below the size covered by
\nMARPOL 73\/78, has been included in Annex 1 of the original Memorandum of
\nUnderstanding. Also measures have been agreed for situations in which a ship\u2019s equipment
\nfor the protection of the marine environment is in operative.
\nWhy Memorandum of Understanding?
\nAfter the international convention for the Prevention of Pollution from ships, 1973 as
\nmodified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto, MARPOL 73\/78 entered into force on 02
\nOctober 1983. The IMO procedures for the control of ships and discharges under Annex I of
\nMARPOL 73\/78 by the IMO Assembly (Resolution A.542 (13) and (32)) have been included
\nin Annex I of the MOU (Guidelines for Surveyors). After the International Convention on
\nStandards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for seafarers, 1978(STCW) entered
\ninto force on 28 April 1984, the procedures for control of manning and certification, that had
\nbeen laid down in the Annex I of the Memorandum of Understanding have been up dated in
\norder to cover the new situation after STCW entered into force.
\nLetters of Warning- Also the Nations partners of the MOU have decided to issue letters of
\nwarning to the master of ships from states that are not party to the MARPOL 73\/78 and
\nwhich do not comply with MARPOL 73\/78 standards. In this letter of warning the master is
\ninformed that during future calls of ports in the 14 port state countries that signed the MOU,
\nhis ship may be subject to extensive inspections and\/or denial of port entry unless one of the
\nfollowing documentation of his ship can be shown:
\n41
\n– A wide IOPP certificate in case the Flag State of his ship has become a Party to
\nMARPOL 73\/78, or
\n– A declaration of Compliance, stating that the ship has been surveyed and that the
\nsurvey should that the structure, equipment, systems, fittings, arrangements and
\nmaterial of the ship and the conditions thereof more in all respects satisfactory
\nand that the ship compiled with the applicable requirements of Annex I to
\nMARPOL 73\/78; or
\n– A declaration showing that an application for IOPP certificate or Declaration of
\ncompliance has been filled, and that the survey and inspections necessary for the
\nissue of the said documents will take place as soon as possible. It states thus: \u201cIt
\nis also decided that the ships that do not comply with MARPOL requirements
\nwill receive a letter of warning and may be denied entry into ports in the
\nMemorandum of Understanding region. All MOU partners will be informed
\nthrough their computerised information system of the action taken\u201d.
\nIn addition, the master of the ship is informed that, the Port State Control officer carrying out
\ninspections on ships, may take such steps as will ensure that the ship shall not sail until it can
\nproceed to sea without presenting an unreasonable threat or harmful to the marine
\nenvironment. These steps may include the ship being obliged to discharge all its oily wastes
\nto port reception facilities before permission is granted to leave the port.
\nDocuments established and used for the purpose of the Paris MOU on
\nPort State Control
\nThe Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control in its annexes has established
\ndifferent documents for use for the purpose of Port State Control, such as the following:
\n– Telex form, in case of deficiencies not fully verified or only provisionally repaired. This
\ntelex shall be sent to the competent authority of the region state where the next port of
\ncall of the ship is situated;
\n– Report form on inspection in accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding on
\nPort State Control;
\n– Information system on inspections;
\n42
\n– Information system on inspections; and
\n– Telex form for ships inspected.
\nAlso the letter of warning is established for the masters of the ships from states that are not
\nparty to MARPOL 73\/78 and which do not comply with MARPOL 73\/78 standards.
\nThe Aide Memoir for Surveyors
\nTo Help surveyors in keeping track of all provisions and amendments thereto of the relevant
\nconventions a so-called \u201cAide-Memoir\u201d was issued to them. It contains, inter alia, reference
\nto convention provisions, sections and articles of the MOU and codes for the information
\nsystem.
\nOperational Violations
\nRegarding the operational violations, the entry into force of MARPOL 73\/78 has caused the
\nPort State Control partners to decide that this section should be further developed. The
\nsection 5 of the Memorandum of Understanding stated that the authorities will upon the
\nrequest of other authorities endeavour to secure evidence relating to suspected violations of
\nthe requirements on operational matters of rule 10 of the International Regulations for
\nPreventing Collisions of Sea, 1972(COLREG) and the International Convention for the
\nPrevention of Pollution at sea, 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978, (MARPOL 73\/78)
\nrelating thereto. In case of \u201csuspected violations involving the discharge of harmful
\nsubstances, the authority will, upon the request of another Authority, visit in port the ships
\nsuspected of such a violation in order to obtain information and where appropriate to take a
\nsample of any alleged pollutant\u201d. In this respect, the partners of the MOU will establish a
\nnetwork of liaison officers in the 14 countries to be contacted should violations of discharge
\nprovisions be carried out. Furthermore, the partners are examining whether telexes and
\nforms used for investigation and reporting purposes should be further harmonised.
\nHowever, the Paris Memorandum of Understanding (Paris-MOU) on Port State Control is an
\ninitiation between European Maritime Authorities and Canada. It consists of Agreements
\nand a number of Annexes including guidelines for surveyors in Annex I, which now serve as
\na yardstick for international Port State Control inspection globally (See Tables iv-vi).
\n1
\nCHAPTER IV
\nThe Port State Control in Europe and the MEMORANDUM of understanding
\non Port State Control.
\nThe Agreement of the Memorandum of Understanding
\nIn Western Europe on January 26, 1982 after the sad fact of the founded AMAKOCADIZ in
\nMarch 1978, more stringent commitments on Port State Control were felt to be necessary over
\nthe first step to a co-ordinated and harmonised Port State Control, resulted in the MOU of
\n1978 with respect to the Memorandum of understanding on Port State Control in Europe. The
\nnew Memorandum had to cover these main themes.
\n– Safety at sea
\n– Prevention of pollution by Ships
\n– Living and co-ordination on board.
\n– And also it is said, “The main underlying reason for the MOU\u2019s birth was of course that
\nwe cannot afford that substandard shipping threatens our ports and the environment
\nThus, on this date of January 26, 1982 the maritime countries of 14 European nations
\nreached in understanding which came into effect in July 1982 that each would maintain
\nan effective system of Port State Control with a view to flag, foreign merchant ships
\ninsisting the ports f its state comply with instruments laid down in various international
\nconventions.
\nAs Iain Sproat said “The Paris Memorandum, signed by fourteen European Maritime
\nAuthorities established with effect from 01 July 1982, a harmonised and co-ordinated system
\nfor inspection of 25% of foreign ships calling at European ports, in short, discrimination as to
\nflag, for the purpose of detecting which fail to meet standards laid down in international
\nconventions on safety, manning and pollution prevention, securing the verifications of
\ndeficiencies one discouraging the operation of sub-standard vessels”. The charter of the
\nMemorandum of understanding is the agreement on a number of commitments and
\nprocedures that are directly related to the internationally adopted instruments.
\nWhat has been laid down in International con Convention as a right for Port State Control,
\nnamely, to inspect Foreign Flagships on the basis of the convention in question has been
\ntaken up as a commitment, towards each after to do so in practice in a harmonised way?
\nBesides, ships should only be inspected in one of the region ports once every six months in
\norder to avoid an necessary inspections. An effective information system must take care of
\ninformation on inspections made by each authority in order to avoid duplication of the work.
\nAs A.J. Cowley said “The Memorandum of understanding on Port State Control, which has
\n2
\nconcluded in Paris in January 1982, is a followship to the earlier discussions on harmonised
\nPort State Control, which stated in 1976. The authorities concerned decided to accept stranger
\nand clearly defined commitments on the number of inspections of Foreign Flag Ships by each
\nof the participating maritime authorities and to pay much greater attention to the mutual
\nexchange of information on inspected ships in order to avoid duplication of inspections.
\nFurthermore, the authorities decided to apply only those conventions which have been ratified
\nby the Port State Control involved and which have entered into force”.
\nBecause the information system about inspections is important in the Port State Control under
\nthe MOU, the ship receives a Port State inspection report after inspection. If there is no
\nobvious inspections in the region, there could be duplications on inspections. This shows the
\nimportance of Port State information system in MOU in which results of inspections are
\nstored without delay, and in which ships names are deleted after a six months period until
\nanother inspection of the ship is made. The MOU stated “each authority will consult, cooperate and exchange information with the other authorities in order to further the aims of the
\nMemorandum”. The aim of the MOU was initially to achieve an annual inspection rate of
\n25% of the individual ships entering a country.
\nAccording to the text of MOU the partners should have each achieved, by 01 July 1985, an
\nannual total of inspections corresponding to 20% of the estimated number of individual
\nforeign merchant ships which entered their ports in a year. The ship that has been inspected in
\nanother Port State Control partner’s port according to the text of the MOU should in principle
\nbe left alone for six months. The MOU stated “the Authorities will seek to avoid inspecting
\nships which have been inspected by any of the other Authorities within the previous six
\nMOUs, unless they have clear ground for another inspection”. Taken into consideration that
\nmost of the ships in the region enter more than one port and more than one regional state
\nwithin the size MOU\u00b4s period, most of the ships visiting the region will be inspected by a Port
\nState Control at least once a year.
\n4.2. Relevant Instruments of Memorandum of understanding
\nIn order to maintain an effective system of Port State Control with a view to ensuring that,
\nwith out discrimination of flag, foreign merchant ships visiting the ports of its state comply
\nwith instruments laid down in the various international conventions; that was why the 14
\nEuropean nations signed the MOU. Those instruments are as follows:
\n– “The International convention on Load Lined, 1966
\n– The International convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974
\n3
\nThe Protocol of 1978 relating to the international Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea,
\n1974;
\n– The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from ships, 1973, as
\nmodified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto;
\n– The International Convention on Standards of Training, certification one Watch-keeping
\nfor seafarers, 1978;
\n– The Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972;
\n– The Merchant Shipping (Minimum Standard) Convention, 1976 (ILO Convention 147).
\nIt was also started in the Memorandum that each authority would apply those relevant
\ninstruments which are in force and which its state has accepted. An instrument so amended
\nwould then be considered to the “relevant instrument” for that authority.
\nAs J. Cowley said “It is important to note that the Memorandum is thus in no way
\ncontradictory to the contents of internationally agreed maritime conventions in IMO and ILO.
\nThe authorities only implement the standards and procedures of those Conventions in a
\nharmonised way. It is believed that such harmonisation is important not only for the shipping
\nof the region states but also for the International Shipping Community”.
\nThe \u201cNo More Favourable Treatment Clause (NMFT Clause)
\nIt is stated in the relevant instruments SOLAS Protocol (article II-3), MARPOLE 1973\/78
\n(article 5-(4)), and STCW 1978 (article 5), the clause of no more favourable treatment. In the
\nSTCW Convention it is stated that \u201cNo More Favourable Treatment\u201d shall be given to ships
\nentitled to fly the flag of a non-party than is given to ships entitled to fly the flag is a Party\u201d.
\nIn a MARPOL 1973\/78 it is stated that \u201cwith respect to the ships of non-parties to the
\nconvention, Parties shall apply the requirements of the MARPOL 1973\/78 Convention as nay
\nbe necessary to ensure that no more favourable treatment is given in such ships\u201d.
\nIn the Memorandum of Understanding this clause also is stated and it has agreed that \u201cInn
\napplying a relevant instrument for the purpose of Port State Control, the authorities will
\nensure that no more favourable treatment is given to ships entitled to fly the flag of the stat4e
\nwhich is no Party to that instrument\u201d. In this respect J. Cowley said \u201cthe no more favourable
\ntreatment clause is like wise based upon the internationally agreed instruments. The
\ncommittee it unanimously of the opinion that the \u201cno more favourable treatment clause\u201d
\nshould only apply with respect to those instruments which themselves contain such provision,
\nnotably in and only in SOLA Protocol 1978, MARPOL 1973\/78 and STCW 1978. It is a
\ncondition that these instruments are in force and have been ratified by the Port State
\n4
\nexercising the inspection. But, the ships of non-parties to the relevant international
\nconventions would thus be treated no differently nor more severely than by any other
\nindividual party to the convention\u201d.
\nWho conducts the inspection for Port State Control in European Countries?
\nThe Port State Control inspection \u201cin European countries are conducted by the same persons
\nwho conduct national inspections. They for part of the national shipping inspection service in
\ntheir country. So apart from conducting inspections on their national ships, they also conduct
\nPort State inspections, which by definition is only done on foreign ships\u201d. The MOU stated
\nthat \u201cInspections will be carried out by properly qualified persons authorised for that purpose
\nby the authority concerned and acting under its responsibility\u201d. Port State Control surveys
\nmust have no direct commercial interest vested in either the ports, or the ships where
\ninspections in accordance to the IMO instruments are carried out. The IMO Resolution A.787
\n(19), chapter 2.5 deals with these requirements.
\nInspections Procedures, Rectification and Detention
\nIn selecting the ships for inspection, the surveyor is Helped by the daily list of incoming
\nships (issued by the port authorities) and the MOU list of ships which have been inspected
\nduring the previous six months. This is made by means of an online terminal from the district
\nto the MOU computer centre in France in due time. After comparison of these two lists the
\nchoice of ships to be inspected is regardless of flag or owner. As indicate in the MOU, special
\nattention is also paid to ships, which may present in a special hazard, for instance oil tankers
\nand gas and chemical carriers; and also ships, which have had several recent deficiencies.
\nWhen conditioning an inspection under the terminal of the MOU, the surveyors first check the
\nship\u2019s documentation. If the ship\u2019s certificates are invited or incomplete, or if the surveyor
\nhas clear grounds for believing the conditions of the ship and its equipment do not correspond
\nsubstantially with the particulars on the certificate, he will use his professional judgement in
\ndividing whether, clear grounds Help to conduct a more detailed inspection.
\nThe Memorandum of understanding stated as \u201cclear grounds\u201d inter alia the following:
\n– \u201ca report or notification by another authority;
\n– a report or complaint by the master, a crew member, or any person or organisation of the
\nship, shipboard living and making conditions or the prevention of pollution, unless the
\nauthority concerned deems the report or complaint to manifestly impounded;
\n– Other indications of serious deficiencies\u201d.
\nIf after the detailed inspection it is discovered that the ship does not comply with the
\nappropriate international standards, steps are taken to rectify the deficiencies. In the case of
\n5
\nSerious deficiencies, which are clearly hazardous to safety, health or environment, the ships
\nmay be delayed or detained until they are corrected. The MOU stated further that \u201cin the case
\nof deficiencies which are clearly hazardous to safety, health or environment, the authority will
\nensure that the hazard is removed before the ship is allowed to proceed to sea and for this
\npurpose will take appropriate action, which may include detention. The Authority will, as
\nsoon as possible, notify the Flag State through its consul or, in his absence, its nearest
\ndiplomatic representative or its maritime authority of the action taken\u201d.
\nAfter the inspection, a report is always left on board as information to the master and as a
\nproof that the ship has been inspected, also in the case of deficiencies which led to the
\ndetainment of the ship. The details of every inspection are directly sent to the computer in
\nFrance by telex, in order that the MOU has the inspection list as up to date as possible. This
\ncomputerised regional information system for the rapid exchange of information and for
\nstatistical purposes considerably reduces the chances of duplication of inspections. The
\nMemorandum also established that where deficiencies cannot be remedied in the port of
\ninspection, the authority may allow the ship to proceed to another port, subject to any
\nappropriate conditions determined by the authority with a view to ensuring that ships can so
\nproceed without un reasonable danger to safety, health or environment. In such circumstances
\nthe authority will notify the competent authority of the Region State where the next port of
\ncall of the ship is situated, the parties mentioned in 3.7 of the MOU, and any other authority
\nas appropriate.
\nThe Memorandum stated that \u201cwhen exercising control under the Memorandum, the
\nauthorities will make all possible efforts to avoid unduly detaining or delaying a ship\u201d, and
\nalso stated that nothing in the Memorandum affects rights created by provisions of relevant
\ninstruments relating to compensation for under detention or delay\u201d.
\nApplication of the MOU to ships below 500 gross tonnage
\nIt was agreed in the Memorandum of understanding (MOU) about the application for ships
\nbelow 500 gross tonnage that in the case of these kinds of ships \u201cthe authorities will apply
\nthose requirements of the relevant instruments which are applicable and will to the extent that
\na relevant instruments does not apply, taken such actions as may be necessary to ensure that
\nthose ships are not clearly hazardous to safety, health or environment. Furthermore, as a result
\nof recent agreements between MOU partners, a List of items to which surveyors should pay
\nspecial attention when inspecting small ships below the size covered by MARPOL 73\/78, has
\nbeen included in Annex 1 of the original Memorandum of Understanding. Also measures
\nhave been agreed for situations in which a ship\u2019s equipment for the protection of the marine
\nenvironment is in operative.
\n6
\nInclusions in the Memorandum of Understanding
\nAfter the international convention for the Prevention of Pollution from ships, 1973 as
\nmodified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto MARPOL 73\/78 entered into force on 02
\nOctober 1983. The IMO procedures for the control of ships and discharges under Annex I of
\nMARPOL 73\/78 by the IMO Assembly (Resolution A.542 (13) and (32)) has been included
\ninto Annex I of the MOU (Guidelines for Surveyors). Also after the International Convention
\non Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for seafarers, 1978(STCW) entered
\ninto force on 28 April 1984. The procedures for control of manning and certification, that had
\nbeen laid down in the Annex I of the Memorandum of Understanding have been up to date in
\norder to cover the new situation after STCW entered into force.
\nLetters of Warning- Also the Nations partners of the MOU have decided to issue letters of
\nwarning to the master of ships from states that are not party to the MARPOL 73\/78 and which
\ndo not comply with MARPOL 73\/78 standards.
\nIn this letter of warning the master is informed that during future calls of ports in the
\n14 port state countries that signed the MOU, his ship may be subject to extensive
\ninspections and\/or denial of port entry unless one of the following documentation of
\nhis ship can be shown:
\n– A wide IOPP certificate in case the Flag State of his ship has become a Party to
\nMARPOL 73\/78, or
\n– A declaration of Compliance, stating that the ship has been surveyed and that the
\nsurvey should that the structure, equipment, systems, fittings, arrangements and
\nmaterial of the ship and the conditions thereof more in all respects satisfactory
\nand that the ship compiled with the applicable requirements of Annex I to
\nMARPOL 73\/78; or
\n– A declaration showing that an application for IOPP certificate or Declaration of
\ncompliance has been filled, and that the survey and inspections necessary for the
\nissue of the said documents will take place as soon as possible.
\nIt is said, \u201cit is also decided that the ships that do not comply with MARPOL
\nrequirements will receive a letter of warning and may be denied entry into ports in the
\nMemorandum of Understanding region. All MOU partners will be informed through
\ntheir computerised information system of the action taken\u201d.
\nIn addition, the master of the ship is informed that the Port State carrying out
\ninspections on his ship may take such steps as will ensure that the ship shall not said
\n7
\nuntil it can proceed to sea without presenting on unreasonable threat of harm to the
\nmarine environment. These steps may include the ship being obliged to discharge all
\nits oily wastes to port reception facilities before permission is granted to leave the
\nport.
\nDocuments established and used for the purpose of the MOU Port State Control
\nThe Memorandum of Understanding in Port State Control in its annexes has established
\ndifferent documents for use for the purpose of Port State Control, such as the following:
\n– Telex form, in case of deficiencies not fully verified or only provisionally repaired. This
\ntelex shall be sent to the competent authority of the region state where the next port of
\ncall of the ship is situated (see appendix)
\n– Report form on inspection in accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding on
\nPort State Control (appendix?)
\n– Information system on inspections (appendix?)
\n– Information system on inspections (Appendix?)
\n– Telex form for ships inspected (Appendix?)
\nAlso the letter of warning is established for the masters of the ships from states that are not
\nparty to MARPOL 73\/78 and which do not comply with MARPOL 73\/78 standards
\n(appendix?)
\nThe Aide Memoire for Surveyors
\nTo Help surveyors in keeping truck of all provisions and amendments thereto of the relevant
\nconventions a so-called \u201cAide-Memoire\u201d was issued to them. It contains, inter alia, referenced
\nto convention provisions, sections and articles of the MOU and codes for the information
\nsystem. The codes for the information system and the report of inspections are shown in
\nappendixes. ? A report on inspections filed with references and codes are shown in
\nappendix?
\nOperational Violations
\nRegarding the operational violations, the entry into force of MARPOL 73\/78 has caused the
\nPort State Control partners to decide that his section should be further elaborated. The section
\n5 of the Memorandum of Understanding stated that the authorities will upon request of
\nanother authorities endeavour to secure evidence relating to suspected violations of the
\nrequirements on operational matter of rule 10 of the International Regulations for Preventing
\nCollisions of Sea, 1972(COLREG) and the International Convention for the Prevention of
\nPollution at sea, 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978, (MARPOL 73\/78) relating
\nthereto. In case of suspected violations involving the discharge of harmful substances, the
\nauthority will, upon request of another Authority, visit in port the ships suspected of such a
\n8
\nviolation in order to obtain information and where appropriate to take a sample of any
\nallegated (alleged) pollutant\u201d. In this respect, the partners of the MOU will establish a
\nnetwork of Liaison officers in the 14 countries to be contacted should violations of discharge
\nprovisions are carried out. Furthermore, the partners are examining whether telexes and forms
\nused ford investigation and reporting purposes should be further harmonised.
\nHowever, we have to note that, Paris MOU on Port State Control is an initiation between
\nEuropean Maritime Authorities and Canada. It consists of Agreements and a number of
\nAnnexes including guidelines for surveyors in Annex I, which now serve as a yardstick for
\ninternational Port State Control inspecting globally (See Tables iv-vi).
\n51
\nCHAPTER V
\nPort State Control in West Africa
\nA number of states, especially Australia, Canada, Japan and the United States of
\nAmerica which have a strict Port State Control system in their own ports followed the
\nfootsteps of the Paris MOU closely. In 1984, Japan announced the establishment of
\nits own port state control regime along the same lines as the Paris MOU. In April
\n1987, the first official co-operation of the MOU was established with the Canadian
\nCoast Guard. This basically serves as general guidelines of co-operation between
\nMOU members and non-member Maritime Administrations. The co-operation
\nagreement includes the mutual exchange of information and guidelines on Port
\nState Control inspection reports in addition to participation in seminars, workshops,
\nconferences and other maritime meetings. Observers also attend the annual
\nseminars of surveyors from Japan and the United States. This co-operation serves
\nas a forum, and should be encouraged for effective Port State Control
\nimplementation and enforcement at the international and regional levels. The forum
\nshould also offer the opportunity for exchanging information and training needs. The
\nshipping industry, particularly the charterers and insurance companies have also
\nexpressed a keen interest in establishing formal arrangements for such co-operation
\nby requesting member States to identify the ships which are repeatedly categorised
\nas SUBSTANDARD.
\nThe Paris MOU Committee on Port State Control had already established a formal
\nagreement with the International Association of Classification Societies (IACS),
\nwhich may lead to the creation of a Code of Conduct practices that will enable the
\nexchange of confidential information on \u201cUnrepentant\u201d vessels in the \u201cBLACK LIST\u201d.
\nAlthough the statistics data released by the Secretariat does not indicate whether
\n52
\nthe introduction of the Paris MOU has had any effect on substandard shipping,
\nofficials in a number of ports are convinced that the conditions of vessels have
\nimproved; but it has been a very slow process. No doubt that the MOU Members
\nhave continued their efforts on improving inspection performances in respect of
\nquantity and quality; but much is needed to be done in the fields of safety
\nregulations by improving the living conditions of the vessels and also pollution
\nprevention mechanisms through international and regional co-operations, be it
\ngovernmental or non-governmental.
\nThe relevant Administrations consider the Paris MOU as a formal co-operation
\nregime to enforce the issues, but not as an international regime creating new legal
\nrights and obligations for its members. However, the Paris MOU on Port State
\nControl is only a \u201cMemorandum of Understanding\u201d and not an International
\nConvention or Treaty. In principle, the Paris MOU as the basis of port state control
\nin the world is regarded as an international instrument to be applied by Flag States
\nthat wish to enforce and implement port state control in their territorial waters.
\nEven though the Paris MOU is an informal international instrument, it has,
\nnevertheless, considerable effect. It allows the maritime authorities to concentrate
\ntheir efforts on technical, operational and managerial topic (sample nursing essay examples by the best nursing assignment writing service)s with a realistic approach
\nto the problem, particularly on Port and Flag States responsibilities in their territorial
\nwaters. Since it is not a convention, it does not require any ratification and adoption
\nof national legislation, but it can be speeded up through incorporation by regional
\nco-operation. However, the method of processing the information at such a low cost
\ngives an incentive to administrations with a tight budget and a demand on high
\nreturn to join in the co-operation.
\nThe Port State Control Committee and the Ministers concerned should consider
\nexpansion of the Port State Control and Paris MOU regime in other fields such as
\nincrease in reception facilities at ports and strengthening discharge standards
\nestablished in International Maritime Conventions. However, the Paris MOU on Port
\nState Control is a system of harmonised inspection procedures designed to target
\nsubstandard ships with the main objective being their eventual elimination.
\n53
\nThe States should also continue to achieve the MOU aims and objectives based on
\nthe IMO Regulations and Guidelines by encouraging other regional groups in cooperating and co-ordinating port state control in their own national waters if the
\ndesired international standards are to be realised globally. It is clearly understood
\nthat the responsibility for ensuring that ships comply with the provisions of the
\nrelevant instruments lies upon the owners, Masters and the Flag States
\nAdministrations respectively.
\nUnfortunately, certain flag states, for various reasons, fail to fulfil their commitments
\ncontained in the agreed international legal instruments and subsequently, some
\nships are sailing in the worlds seas in an unsafe condition, threatening the lives of all
\nthose on board as well as the marine environment; visa a vis the role of the ship
\ninvolved, the crew, the owner and others possibly involved. That is what exactly
\nport state control is trying to prevent, control and possibly minimise its occurrence in
\nour international waters.
\nWest and Central African States MOU
\nAll countries have the right to inspect ships visiting their ports to ensure they meet
\nIMO requirements regarding safety and marine pollution prevention standards, and
\nexperience has shown that port state control works best when it is organised on a
\nregional basis. The first such regional port state control agreement, covering
\nEurope and the North Atlantic, was signed in 1982; and is known as the Paris
\nMemorandum of Understanding (Paris MOU). The Latin-American Agreement
\n(Acuerdo de Vina Del Mar) was signed in 1992; the Tokyo Memorandum of
\nUnderstanding \/Tokyo MOU), covering Asia and the Pacific, was signed in 1993; the
\nCaribbean Memorandum of Understanding (Caribbean MOU) was signed in 1996
\nand the Meditterean Memorandum of understanding (Mediterranean MOU) was
\nsigned in 1997.
\nLike the other agreements, the Indian Ocean MOU was also signed in South Africa
\non 5 June 1998. This Indian Ocean MOU requires each maritime authority which is
\n54
\na signatory to the agreement to establish and maintain an effective system of port
\nstate control and also sets out an annual required total number of inspections of at
\nleast 10% of the estimated total of the foreign merchant ships entering the ports
\nduring the year. The MOU encourages exchange of information so that ships which
\nhave been inspected by one port state and found to be complying with safety and
\nmarine pollution prevention rules are not subject to too frequent inspections, while
\nships presenting a hazard and those ships which have deficiencies which need to be
\nrectified will be targeted.
\nIn another development, delegations from several West and Central African
\ncountries discussed establishing a Port State Control Agreement for the region
\nduring the 18th IMO Assembly in\u00b41993. It was agreed that the Ministerial
\nConference of West and Central African States on Maritime Transport (MINCOMAR)
\nwould act as co-ordination body for the Implementation of any such agreement,
\nwhile Guinea offered to convene the establishment of the basis for port state control
\nin the region and related training needs. Nigeria has also expressed interest in
\nactively participating in setting up the regional Port State Control regime.
\nDiscussions between MINCOMAR and IMO are currently under way (1999) with a
\nview to preparing a first preparatory meeting.
\nExternal support is seen as crucial to establishing a Port State Control agreement in
\nthe region and IMO has sought donations to help promote port state control and to
\nprovide backing for convening the meetings. At the same time, competent Port
\nState Control is dependent on the efficient Maritime Administration being in place,
\nand IMO is involved in organising technical co-operation to help those countries,
\nwhich require it to build up their Maritime Administrations. Based on above
\npreparatory stages, eighteen West and Central African States have now agreed to a
\ndraft MOU on Port State Control (PSC), at a meeting in Conakry-Guinea that ended
\non 22 January 1999. The meeting was jointly organised by the Guinean
\nGovernment and IMO and was supported by the Ministerial Conference of West and
\nCentral African States on Maritime Transport (MINCOMAR). The aim is to hold a
\nfurther meeting to adopt the MOU in Nigeria during October 1999.
\n55
\nThe Conakry meeting was also attended by representatives of IMO, the United
\nNations Development Programme (UNDP), the Economic Commission for Africa
\n(ECA), MINCOMAR, the Communa\u00b4aute economique et mone\u00b4taire de I\u00b4Afrique
\nCentrale (CEMAC) and other regional organisations. Funding for the meeting was
\nprovided by the Guinean and Nigerian Governments respectively. Participants
\ncontinued work on developing a set of training measures to improve the maritime
\nAdministration infrastructure and human resource capability of the participating
\nstates. The aim is to develop a regional training programme fore the West and
\nCentral African region. Further, the meeting agreed, in principle, that the Regional
\nSecretariat would be established in Nigeria while a regional Information Centre
\nwould be set up at MINCOMAR Head Office in Co’te d’Ivoire.
\nThe draft MOU that was agreed in Conakry is similar to other regional PSC
\nagreements already established around the world regarding Safety and Marine
\nPollution Prevention standards. However, the West and Central African MOU will
\nalso be expected to cover PSC inspections on smaller ships (below 500 gross
\ntonnage) which are not generally covered by most IMO regulations. These ships
\ntend to trade inter-regionally. Furthermore, establishing PSC agreements in the
\nremaining areas of the world not already covered requires support and co-operation
\nwithin the region. In each region, participating countries (and in particular the focal
\npoint or lead country) are dependent on the developed maritime countries for
\nprovision of the necessary budget to ensure such establishment for the day to day
\nrunning of the PSC Agreement. From outside the region, support is required in
\nterms of technical expertise and databases, as well as financial Helpance from
\ndonor countries. IMO is also involved through its Technical Co-operation
\nProgramme.
\nPort State Control Inspections in Nigeria
\nNigeria got her independence on 1 October 1960. Located in West Africa, bordering
\nthe Gulf of Guinea, between Benin, Cameroon, Niger and Chad republics
\nrespectively. It has an area of 923,773 square kilometres with an approximate total
\n56
\npopulation of 121.8 million people (1998 estimate). In the area of merchant marine
\nsector, Nigeria has a total of 29 ships of 1000 GRT and above. These ships include:
\nBulk carrier 3
\nCargo 2
\nChemical tankers 3
\nOil tankers 20
\nRoll-on\/roll-off cargo 1
\n(Source: Nigerian Ports Authority Annual Report 1997 Estimate).
\nNigeria has two major ports otherwise known as cargo interface and feeder ports
\nand four other transit ports in addition to the newly established Inland Waterways at
\nLokoja that serves for local or domestic ports. The ports are as follows: –
\n1.APAPA-WHARF PORT, APAPA, LAGOS; *
\n2.TIN-CAN ISLAND PORT (TCIP), LAGOS; *
\n3.DELTA PORT IN WARRI;
\n4.PORT HARCOURT PORT IN P\/HARCOURT;
\n5.FED. LIGHTER TERMINAL PORT IN ONNE;
\n6.HUB PORT, CALABAR (EPZ); and
\n7 INLAND WATERWAYS, LOKOJA.
\n(Those with asterisks, are the major ports in the country).
\n(Source: Nigerian Ports Authority Annual Report, 1998).
\nNigeria depends mainly on sea transport for her major exports and imports in
\naddition to air and road transport systems.
\n58
\nFigure 3
\nORGANISATINAL CHART: NIGERIAN MARAD POLICY AND OPERATIONS
\nPRINCIPLES.
\nKEY:
\nMSA: Maritime Safety Administration
\nMARADS: Maritime Administration
\nMET: Maritime Education & Training
\nFED. MIN. OF TRANSPORT
\nPERMANENT SECRETARY
\nLEGAL ADVISER
\nMARITIME
\nSERVICES DEPT.
\nLEGAL
\nLEGISLATION
\nREGISTRATION
\nPOLICY
\nINTERNAL
\nPORT\/HARBOURS
\nEXTERNAL
\nSUBSIDIES?
\nLOANS
\nOPERATIONS
\nMSA\/MARADS\/MET
\nSAFETY
\nNAVIGATION, CARGO
\nCONSTRUCTION
\nAIDS TO NAVIGATION,
\nLAND
\nRADAR
\nPLEASURE BOATING
\nSEARCH AND RESCUE
\nACCIDENT
\nINVESTIGATION
\nPILOTAGE
\nPOLLUTION
\nSEAMAN AFFAIRS
\nMANNING
\nSCHOOL AND
\nACADEMIES
\nON BOARD TRAINING
\nCERTIFICATION
\nCOAST GUARD
\nWATER WAY POLICE
\nMARITIME POLICE
\nBORDER POLICE
\nCUSTOM POLICE
\nPOLICY
\n59
\nFigure 4
\nORGANISATIONAL CHART: NMA
\n(Source: National Maritime Authority, Nigeria, Organisational Chart 1997)
\nSHIIP ACQUISITION
\n& SHIP BUILDING
\nFUND UNIT
\nPUBLIC
\nRELATIONS
\nUNIT
\nLEGAL
\nSERVICES
\nDEPARTMENT
\nZONAL
\nOFFICERS
\nADMIN. AND
\nPERSONNEL
\nSERVICES
\nDEPT.
\nINTERNAL
\nAUDIT
\nUNIT
\nSURVEY &
\nINSPECTION
\nDISTRICTS
\nMARITIME
\nSAFETY
\nDEPT.
\nPORT
\nSERVICES
\nCONTROLLERS
\nCOMMERCIAL
\nAND
\nOPERATIONS
\nDEPARTMENT
\nFINANCE &
\nINVESTMENT
\nDEPT.
\nRESEARCH
\nPLANNING &
\nSTATISTICS
\nDEPT.
\nNATIONAL MARITIME
\nAUTHORITY
\nFEDERAL MINISTRY
\nOF TRANSPORT
\n60
\nNigeria is a contracting Party to some of the IMO and ILO Conventions and
\ntherefore, exercises effectively the basic objectives of a “Port State” as given in
\nthese conventions and also to ensure that no preferential treatment is given to nonconvention ships that are substandard in its territorial waters. Administration of
\nmaritime conventions relating to documentation and detention of ships in Nigeria is
\nthe responsibility of the National Maritime Authority (NMA). The former Maritime
\nInspectorate Division (MID) and the Government Inspectors of ships (GIS) initially
\ncarried out such responsibilities respectively.
\nThe aim of the National Maritime Authority (NMA), is to Help in the economic
\nintegration of shipping activities of the West African sub-region by offering protection
\nto Nigerian vessels flying the nation’s flag in another Flag State\u2019s seaports; in
\naddition to achieving a systematic control of the merchant mechanisms of sea
\ntransport and promotion of seafarers training in the Nigerian maritime transport
\ntechnology. It is the Authority that co-ordinates the implementation of the “National
\nPolicy on Shipping” as is being formulated from time to time by the Federal
\nGovernment of Nigeria (source: National Shipping Policy Decree No. 10 of 30 April
\n1987).
\nHowever, the NMA is not a fully autonomous body, because its activities are being
\nmonitored and supervised by the Federal Ministry of Transport as its parent Ministry.
\nIn other words, the National Maritime Authority is one of the parastatals under the
\nMinistry of Transport in Nigeria (See figure 3 on pp 52). The NMA undertakes
\ninspection of national and foreign flag vessels on behalf of the Ministry and the
\nFederal Government of Nigeria, to ensure that ships visiting the Nigerian ports
\ncomply with the standards laid down in the relevant national and international
\ninstruments, without discrimination. Further, the ships of non-parties to the relevant
\nInternational Conventions will be treated neither differently nor more severely by any
\nother individual that is a party to the convention.
\nIn another development, and in order to compete at sea, Nigeria has to meet the
\nSafety Standards as required by the International instruments. The Safety of a ship
\nas we are aware of, is expensive, but this is what we call `affordable safety\u00b4.
\n61
\nWithout keeping certain standards, we cannot have a good Flag State. A national
\ncoast guard regiment is being constituted for search and rescue (SAR) operations
\nas well as for anti piracy action in the country\u2019s territorial waters.
\nThese days, marine pollution and other environmental issues are included in the
\nconcept of `seaworthiness’. But, complying with International Eco-Standards is an
\nexpensive tool for commerce. The EU might say that the emission levels for
\nexhaust should be set at such and such a number. If they push hard enough, they
\nwill push through a convention that fits their own environment. Whenever you to talk
\nof safety you are talking cost and developing countries often cannot afford that level
\nof safety; but if it pays, we have to go right ahead. The laws and regulations
\nconcerning Port State Control in Nigeria are as follows:
\n(i)Federal Government of Nigeria National Shipping Decree No. 10 of 1987 as
\nNational Legislation. (This is subject to review from time to time);
\n(ii)The Federal Ministry of Transport Administrative Directives on Maritime Safety
\nPolicies such as implementation and enforcement;
\n(iii)The National Maritime Authority Policy Guidelines on Regional Agreements and
\nother Treaties on Maritime Safety;
\n(iv) The Nigerian Ports Authority (NPA) Rules and Regulations for seaports.
\nFurthermore, there is the implementation and enforcement of the International
\nInstruments such as ratified namely, SOLAS, MARPOL, LOAD LINE, TONNAGE,
\nCOLREG, STCW, ILO, (see table vii for more details) in order to ensure full
\ncompliance to International Standard requirements in the country. The Nigerian
\nMaritime Administration also derives its international jurisdictional power and control
\nfrom these conventions in addition to those from the National Legislation.
\nThe competent maritime Administration may, at any time, control and inspect
\nNigerian vessels, wherever they are, and foreign vessels in Nigerian ports. The
\ncompetent maritime authority in co-ordination with other ministries such as ministry
\nof Petroleum and Mineral Resources, and that of Environment, that controls and
\ninspects the oil pollution hazards. in conjunction with Nigerian Coast Guards which
\n62
\ncomprises of Naval Police, Nigerian Navy and Custom Border Patrol Team for ships
\nSafety and Marine Pollution Prevention.
\nNigeria has ratified the following Conventions, namely:
\n(a) IMO Conventions No. 48 and 93
\n(b) SOLAS Convention 1974, 1978 and amended 1988
\n(c) Load Lines Convention of 1966
\n(d) Tonnage Convention of 1969
\n(e) STCW Convention of 1978 and 1979
\n(f) INMARSAT Convention \u00b476 and QA 76
\n(g)Facilitation Convention of 1965
\n(h)MARPOL Convention of 1973 and 1978
\n(i)London Convention (LDC) of 1972
\n(j)Salvage Convention of 1989
\n(k)ILO Convention No. 147
\n(L) UNCLOS- COLREGS of 1972
\n(Source: -Http:\/\/www IMO Webster, 1998).
\nAlthough, the Nigerian Government has ratified many conventions, bureaucratic
\nhurdles have resulted in their inadequate implementation (See Tables 7 (a), (b) and
\n(c) respectively).
\n63
\nFigure 5
\nORGANISATION CHART: MARITIME SAFETY DEPARTMENT
\nD. G.
\nNMA
\nHEAD
\nOFFICE
\nHEAD OF
\nDEPART.
\nMARITIME
\nSAFETY
\nDIVISION
\nSHIP REGISTRY
\nUNIT
\nACCOUNTS AND
\nPERSONNEL
\nUNIT
\nNAUTICAL
\nSURVEY
\nEXAM
\nENGINEERING
\nSURVEY
\nEXAM
\nSHIP
\nINSPECTIONS
\nUNIT
\nMERCHANTILE
\nUNIT
\nNORTHERN
\nDISTRICT
\nEASTERN
\nDISTRICT
\nEAST CENTRAL
\nDISTRICT
\nWEST CENTRAL
\nDISTRICT
\nWESTERN
\nDISTRICT
\n64
\nSelecting ships for Inspection
\nIn selecting ships for inspection, the ” surveyor” is Helped by daily list of incoming
\nships, sensibly concentrating on those registers especially on owners known to be
\nunreliable, and on older vessels. Special attention is paid to ships, which may
\npresent a special hazard, for instance oil tankers, gas and or chemical carries; and
\nalso ships, which have had several deficiency records. However, international
\ninstruments such as principles and procedures on Port State Control, especially
\nthose related to the selecting of ships for inspections from other MOU sectors, are
\napplied.
\nBelow, are the types of ships calling at most of the Nigerian ports. Bulk carriers,
\nTankers such as Oil, gas, Chemicals, Containers, Ro-Ro, etc.
\nNUMBER OF GRT. OF VESSELS ENTERED AT NIGERIAN PORTS & CRUDE OIL
\nTERMINAL 1988-1997
\nYEAR NO. OF VESSELS G. R. T.
\n1988 2,369 69,850,312
\n1992 3,995 83,933,086
\n1993 3,943 87,082,533
\n1994 3,073 79,347,649
\n1995 3,023 78,838,624
\n1996 3,124 79,963,926
\n1997 3,985 91,521,669
\n1998 5,291 91,743,048
\n1999 – –
\n(Source: Nigerian Ports Authority Annual Report, 1998).
\nThe VOLUME of Traffic in most of the major ports has continued to increase from 19976-
\n1983. It went down in 1985-1988. From 1992, it rises as shown in the below table
\nparticularly the Tankers and the Container Carriers.
\n65
\nInspection Procedures
\nIn compliance with the recommendations contained in IMO Resolution A. 466 (xii), it
\nis preferred for the right to board and inspect ships for the purpose of control to be
\nimplemented by Government Inspectors. On boarding a vessel and conducting an
\ninspection, the surveyor must first check the ships DOCUMENTATION
\nCERTIFICATES, and from these documented information regarding dates of issue,
\ninitial survey, expiry, annual survey, and other related issues alike can be extracted
\nand equally detected by the Surveyor on whether the Vessel is in compliance with
\nthe international requirements or not. However, IMO Resolution A.787 (19) \u201c
\nProcedures for port state control\u201d and IMO Resolution A. 481 (xii) \u201c Principles of
\nSafe Manning\u201d respectively, have explained in detail on how Port State Control
\nInspection should be carried out.
\nCertificates and other relevant Documents that must be checked during ship
\ninspection as applicable, are as follows:
\nInternational Tonnage Certificate (1969).
\nPassenger ship Safety Certificate; which must include the following:
\nCargo ship safety construction certificate,
\nCargo ship safety Equipment certificate,
\nCargo ship Radiotelegraphy certificate,
\nCargo ship Radiotelephony certificate,
\nCargo ship Radio safety certificate,
\nExemption certificate,
\nCargo ship safety certificate.
\nInternational Certificate of Fitness for carriage of Liquefied Gases in Bulk,
\nCertificate of Fitness for the carriage of Liquefied Gases in Bulk.
\nInternational Certificate of Fitness for the carriage of Dangerous Chemicals in Bulk,
\nCertificate of Fitness for the carriage of Dangerous Chemical in Bulk.
\nInternational Oil Pollution Prevention Certificate
\nInternational Pollution Prevention Certificate for the carriage of Noxious Liquid
\nSubstances in Bulk.
\n66
\nInternational Load Lines Certificate (1966),
\nInternational Load Line Exemption Certificate.
\nOil Record Book, part 1 and 11.
\nCargo Record Book.
\nMinimum Safe Manning Document,
\nCertificate of Competency (COC).
\nMedical Certificate (see ILO Convention No. 73 Concerning Medical Examination of
\nSeafarers).
\nStability Information. Copy of Document of Compliance (DOC) and Safety
\nManagement Certificate (SMC) issued in accordance with the International
\nManagement Code for the Safety Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention
\n(SOLAS Chapter IX).
\nCertificates as to the ship0\u00b4s Hull Strength and Machinery installations issued by the
\nClassification Society in question (only to be required if the ship maintains its Class
\nwith a Classification Society).
\nDocuments of Compliance with the special requirements for ships carrying
\nDangerous Goods.
\nHigh Speed Craft Safety Certificate and Permit to operate High Speed Craft.
\nDangerous goods special LIST or manifest, or detailed stowage plan.
\nShips logbooks with respect to the records of tests and drills; and the log for records
\nof inspections; and for maintenance of Live saving appliances and arrangements.
\nSpecial Purpose Ship Safety Certificate.
\nMobile Offshore Drilling Unit Safety Certificate.
\nFor oil tankers, the record of oil discharge monitoring and control system for the last
\nBallast voyage must be shown and presented.
\nThe Muster List, Fire control plan, and for passenger ships, a damage control plan.
\nShipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plan.
\nSurvey Reports Files (in case of bulk carriers or oil tankers).
\nReport of Previous Port State control inspection
\nFor Ro-Ro passenger ships, information on the A\/A- max. Ratio.
\nDocument of Authorisation for the carriage of grains.
\nCargo Securing Manual.
\n67
\nCLC-Certificate (applies for ships, which carry more than 2000 tonnes of oil in bulk.
\nIt is a reason for detention or suspending the cargo operation if the ship can not
\npresent the certificate).
\nIf there are clear grounds for believing that the condition of a ship or its equipment,
\nor even its crew, does not SUBSTANCIALLY meet the applicable requirements of a
\nconvention, a more detailed inspection shall be carried out using `professional
\njudgement. \u00b4 The procedures to be followed can be found in IMO Resolution A. 787
\n(19), chapter 2.5 (See Appendix viii).
\nThe Surveyor, on carrying out a more detailed inspection, should be accompanied
\nby a responsible officer on board. To aid him in this tour-inspection of the vessel, a
\nprevious report used could be of great help and Helpance, and this report can
\ndouble as an \u201c aide-memoir\u201d. Items to particularly note are the condition of deck
\nstructure and openings (Load Line items), \u201cgood housekeeping\u201d with regards to
\nSafety. Others include reception facilities for disposing wastes\/rubbish, fire fighting
\nequipment and an inspection of the bridge and relevant navigational equipment.
\nIt is expected and required, that during this tour the surveyor will examine records
\nrequired to be maintained on the vessel such as log books, records of musters and
\ndrills, maintenance of LSA and FFA, oil record book, compass deviations for the
\nintended voyage in addition to other navigational equipment as required by SOLAS,
\nare fitted and functioning effectively as required.
\nRectification and Detention of ships
\nOn completion of the inspection of a vessel, a report is filled in, and the surveyor has
\nto make remarks regarding deficiencies on the report. It is said that: \u201cIf any
\ndeficiency is observed on any vessel, it then means that, the ISM CODE system has
\nnot been applied as required.\u201d I quite agree with this statement. If during the
\ninspection, it is discovered that the ship does not comply with the appropriate
\nInternational Standards, steps are taken to rectify the deficiencies, which are clearly
\n68
\nhazardous to safety, health or the environment. The ship may be delayed or
\ndetained in accordance to the Nigerian Maritime Law and implementing decisions or
\nregulations of the law will prevail until these deficiencies are corrected or rectified to
\ninternational standard levels.
\nThe Master will be requested to acknowledge by signature the completed report of
\nwhich a copy of the report must be retained by him on board for the information of
\nthe owners, and of course, for the inspectorates at subsequent ports of call. The
\nAuthority must ensure that the hazard is removed before the ship is allowed to
\nproceed to sail at sea. For this purpose, appropriate action must be taken to ensure
\nthat No More Favourable Treatment is given to substandard ships.
\nA copy of such a report must also be sent to IMO through a Flag State
\nImplementation (FSI) meeting. The written report shall include when, where and
\nwhy the ship is either delayed or detained with attached photographs, audio and
\nvideotapes where necessary. Any Surveyor or Port State Control Inspector who
\nfails to write and submit an \u201c inspection report\u201d, is considered as NOT a good Flag
\nState representative in the Eyes of IMO. However, the Authority will make all
\npossible efforts to avoid the unduly detaining or delaying of the ship. Compensation
\nwill be required to be paid to the owners for such acts when it is established that,
\ndetention and delay were deliberate.
\nProblems of Port State Control Inspections in Nigeria
\nThere are numerous problems facing the full implementation and enforcement of
\nport state control in Nigeria to the required standards. Despite the inadequate
\nfunding of the shipping sector by the Federal Government, educated and trained
\npersonnel to implement and enforce PSC is lacking, in addition to inadequate
\nplanning. Others include political instability and economic uncertainty. Corruption is
\nalso very eminent. The non-challant attitudes of Nigerian shippers and the mass
\nmedia in Nigerian shipping policy decisions also constitute another set backs.
\nThe PSCO\u00b4s Inspection Reports are not adequate to global requirements. Further,
\nthere is no effective method of communication between surveyors and inspectors in
\n69
\nmost of the Nigerian ports at present (1999). Experience has shown that, vessels
\nare sometimes selected for inspection in different Nigerian ports within a short
\nperiod of time particularly in the major ports of the country, example; in Apapa and
\nTin Can Island ports respectively without adequate information being recorded in
\nany database system. The only evidence of survey is the inspection report held on
\nboard by the master. In order to apply an effective method of communication such
\nas a computerised system used in countries that are Party to the Paris MOU, a
\ndatabase must be created and installed for the proper and adequate record keeping
\nof all surveys and inspections carried out on a vessel including the vessels
\nparticulars. Such a database network system is essential in harmonising port state
\ncontrol activities, particularly within a region.
\nPrecisely, most of the PSC Inspectors do not have the pre-requisite qualifications as
\nprescribed in IMO Res. A. 787 (19), Chapters 2.4 & 2.5 respectively. The emphasis
\nhere is, there the problem of lack of experience and knowledge of nautical and
\nmarine engineering background in addition to incompetence and skills. Furthermore,
\ninspectors have either no sea training background and experience or attend any
\nreputable maritime training institution to qualify them as PSCOs\u00b4. Problem of wrong
\napplications of PSC rules and regulations that creates rooms for PSCOs\u00b4 to have
\nvested commercial interests either in the port of inspections or in the ships
\ninspected. Additional problems include inappropriate criteria for employing PSCIs in
\nthe country.
\nAll these problems create and equally give opportunities for the sub-standard
\nvessels to operate smoothly and freely in the Nigerian coastlines, thereby causing
\nhazards and pollution in our ports and get away with it.
\nOn completion of reports in another development, surveyors under Paris MOU
\nParties must forward such reports to the different ports of National Maritime
\nAuthorities Head offices. It is then the Authority\u2019s responsibility to forward the
\nreceived reports to all other port offices in and within the region, so that such offices
\nwill be aware of such moves. Telex and telexfax, which is considered fast and more
\neconomically reasonable, are also used, in sending inspection reports in addition to
\n70
\ntelephone and e-mail routes. With such reports at hand, surveyors and inspectors
\ncan create a database and take appropriate action when necessary with ships
\ncalling at their ports in the short term. The installation of a computerised system can
\ncreate good grounds for an effective and efficient communications network not only
\nfor Nigerian ports but also for the entire West and Central African regional ports.
\nAlthough the equipment is capital intensive, its operation is more reliable,
\nsustainable, safer and faster.
\nIn the Nigerian context, port state control reports are usually not carried out. Where
\nit is being carried out, it is not up to date and comprehensive enough to one
\nunderstanding. Furthermore, the reports are not being sent to the appropriate
\nquarters for necessary action; rather the Inspection officer will write the report and
\nkeep. One of the Inspectors (Name withheld), reliably told me that, it even useless
\nto write a report since the officer that is going to read the report, will not read or even
\n\u201cblame you\u201d for inability to perform. Therefore, \u201cwhy bothering yourself with PSC
\ninspection reports since it is not going to be read and also of valueless\u201d.
\nOne can see the kind of problems Nigerian PSC processes of implementation are
\nfacing. No doubt, that, one has to conclude that, something is wrong somewhere
\nand that thing requires attention and ratification if progress has to be made. The
\nstumbling blocks that are led on the path of PSC implementation in Nigeria, have to
\nbe cleared, otherwise, if allowed to continue and persist, the long term effect is
\ngoing to be disastrous to the detriment of the majority of the population, and
\nconsequently a set back in the economic and political development of the entire
\ncountry. There is the need for the entire political system of the nation to be overhauled if policies that are formulated are to be achieved.
\n73
\nCHAPTER VI
\nCONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
\nCONCLUSION
\nWhile flag states are responsible for the enforcement of IMO conventions, PSC is
\nseen as fulfilling a caretaker role as regards supervising the application of such
\nconventions. Experience from PSC can have a beneficial influence on flag state
\ncontrol. World wide application of PSC through the global proliferation of regional
\nagreements will emphasise the administrative character of Port State Control, while
\nexchange of information between regions will increase the effectiveness of control,
\nand regional reports on deficiencies reported and ships detained will provide IMO
\nwith valuable statistical data.
\nHowever, the development of PSC raises some questions. Is the traditional role of
\nthe Flag State, which has the ultimate responsibility for safety, being eroded? Are
\nwe promoting yet one more set of already numerous on board inspections? Is there
\na danger that some participating countries may use port state control as a trade
\nbarrier or as a retaliatory tool? Can the introduction of the International Safety
\nManagement (ISM) Code for operational requirements be considered too subjective
\nfor disciplined control? Could port state control be abused by unscrupulous Port
\nAuthorities? Will the whole process cause a global delay in shipping movements?
\nThese are questions that need to be addressed on matters related to the port state
\ncontrol evolution.
\n74
\nIMO has addressed these matters through its Flag State Implementation subcommittee, which was held in its sixth session in June 1998. It is to be hoped that
\nthe need for global economic development (and shipping trade is essential for this
\npurpose) can be balanced with today\u2019s imperatives of safety and the protection of
\nthe environment. However, some of the above questions remained unanswered.
\nThe IMO sub-committee on Flag State Implementation also has a forum for
\ninteraction between flag states and port states, where discussions on Port State
\nControl requirements as well as difficulties experienced in the control process are
\nbeing debated for the IMO Assembly\u2019s consideration. It is particularly important that
\nthe sub-committee is used in this way; since without proper consultation between
\nflag states and port states, there is a danger that an individual state, or group of
\nstates, may choose to go down the path of unilateral action; thereby imposing local
\nrequirements which can go beyond those contained in the agreed international
\nconventions. But, Port State Control is recognised to be the safety net; the main
\nresponsibility for compliance still rests on the Flag State.
\nPort State Control \u201cThe inspection of foreign flag vessels visiting national ports\u201d has
\nbeen invented for efficient and effective implementation and enforcement of
\nmaritime safety rules and regulations globally. In an ideal word, Port State Control
\n(PSC) would not exist, but when ship owners, classification societies, insurers or
\nflag state administrators have, in one way or another failed to do their job, port state
\ncontrol comes on to the scene.
\nToday, almost all statutory surveys are carried out by classification societies, and
\nonly a very small percentage of the surveys are carried out by the Flag States
\nthemselves or nominated surveyors. The number of ships with deficiencies that are
\nclearly hazardous to safety, human health or the environment has not decreased
\nsince 1980 \/1981, when the \u201c mandatory annual survey scheme\u201d was introduced.
\nShips are seen with \u201cfresh and clean\u201d certificates, which should give a ship certain
\nprivileges, but often-port states find deficiencies where the only appropriate action is
\n\u201cDetention of the Ship.\u201d For the purpose of improving the situation, Port State
\nControl Officers only take photos of the worst areas of the ship. The photos are
\n75
\nusually accompanied by a brief description of the relevant particulars of the detained
\nvessel, which are attached to the Port State Control Reports. Copies of such reports
\nhave to be sent to IMO, ILO and the Flag State of the detained vessel.
\nThese reports cannot be ignored, and the flag states that are the responsible bodies
\nfor the execution of the statutory surveys have to realise that monitoring by quality
\nauditing or checking is necessary. Any flag state has to act if a ship flying its flag is
\ndetained. If the detention is justified, both the ship owner and the master are to be
\nprosecuted. However, if the detention is not justified, the Flag State should inform
\nthe port state that the detention in the opinion of the Flag State is unjustified. Such
\nmatters \u201cin between\u201d will be treated as adhoc.
\nILO-RULES: Except for \u201ccargo gear\u201d, which is covered by ILO convention 152,
\n\u201cConvention Concerning Occupational Safety and Health in Dock Work\u201d, ILOrequirements in general are not controlled within an international survey certification
\nscheme. However, convention No. 178 of 1996, \u201c Labour Inspection- Seafarers,
\ncovers a flag state\u2019s obligation internationally. Flag states should therefore ensure
\nthat the relevant ILO instruments are complied with by establishing a
\nsurvey\/certification scheme especially in these areas. Today, only few flag states
\nhave such systems. However, the current (up to 1999) ILO No.147 convention has
\ncome to rescue the situation of crew members as regards their health, working
\nconditions and other related matters, particularly on board ship.
\nOperational Control:
\nIn an emergency, the best equipment in the world is only effective if the crew is
\nadequately trained to use it. The importance of reining in the use of marine safety
\nequipment cannot be over emphasised and until designers and manufacturers can
\ncome up with equipment that is foolproof; the efficiency of the training will largely
\ndetermine the effectiveness of safety equipment. The problem with trying to train for
\nemergencies is that it is very difficult to get any degree of realism into the training.
\nRealism can be achieved by creating an emergency, which means creating a risk.
\n76
\nIt is no wonder that with this sort of training, crews are ready to abandon ship in a
\nreal emergency. They have no real knowledge of just how harsh conditions on
\nboard a life raft or lifeboat can be. Training does not have to involve risk, but can
\nstill have a strong element of realism if money is spent. Cost, perhaps, is the
\nlimiting factor in bringing realism to safety training. For example, training in lifeboat
\nand life raft launching and operation would be much better if it were done from a
\nship in moderate sea conditions with the ship rolling. This sort of experience is
\nmuch more likely to make a lasting impression than the game-like atmosphere that
\nnow pervades lifeboat training. Realistic training does not seem to be forthcoming
\nexcept in the rather exceptional circumstances of some training vessels.
\nFire fighting is one area where realism can be and is brought into training. On some
\ntraining courses, crews have to enter burning compartments in order to give them a
\nvery healthy respect for fire and confidence in using the equipment. Compare this
\nwith the attitude towards life rafts. Many crewmembers have never seen a life raft
\nopened out. They do not know what is inside and what to do to get the best out of
\nthe life raft. A measure of realism, however, can be brought into training by using
\nfilms.
\nInstead of reassuring passengers that ships are safe, ship owners should send
\n\u201csignals\u201d that there is a minor risk (if anything goes wrong) by going to sea. By
\ndoing so, the public is prepared, or better prepared mentally if the impossible should
\nhappen anyway. The input into the development of safety equipment from those
\nwho would have to use it is small. Fire fighting is perhaps an exception, but much of
\nthe equipment is similar to that used on shore. Training in safety is so important that
\nit must be considered along side the development of new equipment. In connection
\nwith Port State Control, it has become essential to control the crews\u2019 ability to
\nhandle the various emergency situations. Until recently, Port State Control has
\nemphasised the \u201ctechnical aspects\u201d and only very little has been done on the
\n\u201coperational aspects\u201d. In the future, both flag states and port states have to look into
\nthe operational aspects of how the crew and the ship function together. The
\n77
\noperational aspects are the results of co-operation between the \u201ctechnical element\u201d
\nand the \u201chuman element\u201d.
\nIn November 1991, the IMO Assembly adopted IMO Resolution A. 681 (17)
\n\u201cProcedures for the Control of Operational Requirements Related to the Safety of
\nShips and Pollution Prevention\u201d. This Resolution was revoked by another
\nResolution A. 742 (18) \u201c Procedures for the Operational Requirements related to the
\nSafety of Ships and Pollution Prevention\u201d. At the 19th assembly, A.742 (18) was
\namalgamated with the other Port State Control Resolutions into A. 787 (19) \u201c
\nProcedures for Port State Control\u201d, where all the operational requirements are
\nincluded.
\nInternational law has always recognised the sovereign jurisdiction of Coastal or Port
\nStates over their territorial sea and internal waters. Hence, the inclusion of the \u201cNo
\nMore Favourable Treatment\u201d clause in Maritime Safety and Pollution Prevention
\nConventions, beginning in MARPOL 73\/78 and SOLAS 74\/78, were the most
\nconvenient means to enable Port States to exercise control. However, this control is
\nnot absolute. The conventions clearly state the extent to which control may be
\nexercised over foreign flag vessels, and, with the exception of ILO 147 Convention,
\nsuch control may not extend to the internal management of the ship\u2019s affairs. In
\naddition, MARPOL 73\/78, SOLAS 74 and the Protocol of 1978, and the STCW \u00b478,
\nprovide for compensation to be paid for undue delay or detention. The UNCLOS
\nalso provides for this compensation by calling for a \u201cright of recourse\u201d in the courts
\nof the Port State exercising this control.
\nHowever, Port State Control is very effective tool that a State can use to enforce
\nnational and international rules, and also to protect its coastal area from pollution so
\nthat ships may operate and navigate safely in the territorial and EEZ waters towards
\nensuring that, sub-standard ships will not be given easy access to their ports and
\nother ports in the region. With regional co-operation, education and training in
\naddition to seminars and workshops participation, nationals will be able to
\nimplement the laws governing the conduct of Port State Control on foreign ships
\nvisiting their ports.
\n78
\nRECOMMENDATIONS
\nWhen establishing of co-operation and support in each region, participating
\ncountries (and in particular the focal point or lead country) are dependent on the
\ncountries concerned for providing of the necessary budget to ensure the
\nestablishment of day-to-day running of the port state control agreement. From
\noutside the region, support is required in terms of technical expertise and
\ndatabases, as well as financial help from donor countries. IMO is also involved
\nthrough its Technical Co-operation Programme. Thank God and IMO, in October
\n1999, the West and Central African MOU will be signed in Abuja, Nigeria. The
\nadvantage of this regional MOU on PSC is to promote co-operation through effective
\nsharing of information by harmonising the entire implementation globally. Further,
\nthe excessive and unfair competition among regional ports will be avoided to some
\nextent.
\nA review of the region\u2019s maritime safety infrastructure, with particular regard for
\nsurveys and inspection requirements as set out in IMO conventions should also be
\nestablished and evaluated regularly. The convening of one or more regional
\nmeetings of experts (legal and technical) to discuss a preliminary draft of a Port
\nState Control agreement of co-operation with the participation of relevant maritime
\nAdministration has to be given priority. The agreements should be based on the
\nspecial characteristics of the regional consensus as to the establishment of the
\nSecretariat and the location of the required Information Centre.
\nFurthermore, a regional meeting of Heads of Maritime Administrations and
\nGovernment officers to consider and sign the agreement for co-operation (MOU-onPSC), and a plan of action for the training of Port State Control officers (PSCO`S),
\nhas to be pursued vigorously. The preparation of a strategy and a plan of action for
\nfuture training are equally important and should NOT be undermined. Nigerian Port
\nState Control Officers must change their attitudes towards realising safety culture in
\nher territorial waters. IMO has played a vital and important roles in the signing of
\nAgreements globally.
\n79
\nThe task of reinforcing maritime infrastructure and the human resources capability of
\nthe individual regional schemes to effectively meet their objectives according to
\ninternational standards has to be strictly adhered to. In addition, putting in place an
\nelectronic information network for sharing information and tracing suspected
\nvessels, needs to be installed across the regions if the desired goals of Port State
\nControl surveys and inspections are to be realised. The idea is to enable the
\nregions to transmit relevant data to IMO for input into a world database (such as
\nInternational Ship Information Database (ISID)) system equivalent to that of the
\nParis MOU (IRIS project ( help with nursing paper writing from experts with MSN & DNP degrees) on the exchange of inspection records), so that all
\nGovernments can have access to it with the aim of improving safety and protection
\nof the environment. However, in the near future, and with the development of
\nregional PSC Agreements across the world, maritime databases around the globe
\ncould be connected internationally.
\nThe questions here are that: Will the traditional role of Flag State be eroded or is
\nPSC another set of surveys and inspections? Will PSC not be used as trade
\nbarriers or retaliatory tool? Don\u2019t you think PSC will be too subjective to control in
\nthe near future? Will unscrupulous authorities not abuse it if allowed to be
\nimplemented? Will PSC not delay global shipping movements in the next
\nmillennium? How am I sure that, PSC will finally eradicate substandard ships in our
\ninternational waters? However, whether Port State Control will become
\ninstitutionalised and whether, a single global Port State Control (PSC) regime could
\nbe established in the future. Assuming political will and the commitment of the
\ncountries concerned to eradicate substandard ships, it seems that, the regional
\napproach has clear advantages:
\ni. The special characteristics of the region are taken in to account;
\nii. There is more effective sharing of information;
\niii. There is extended control of the ships whilst they are plying the regional waters;
\niv. Better cost\/benefit returns are achieved;
\nv. A harmonised system of surveys and inspections is easier to achieve;
\nvi. There is a harmonised system for training and qualifications of Port State
\nControl officers;
\n80
\nvii. Unfair competition between ports in the region is avoided;
\nviii. The deterrent effect for preventing substandard ships operating elsewhere in
\nthe world is increased; and
\nix. Inter-regional co-operation will become global co-operation through the
\ninterface between regional Secretariats.
\nPort States should have a legitimate interest in the safety of passengers and crew
\non board foreign ships calling at their ports. It is necessary for them to include
\ncontrol of compliance with on board operational requirements in their country. Article
\n2 of ILO Convention No. 147 convention, requires member States to have laws or
\nregulations laying down safety standards, including standards of competency, hours
\nof work and manning social security measures in addition to other living conditions.
\nThat is why it is advisable to set up a Safety Committee among the crew on board.
\nIn exceptional cases where the overall condition of a ship is obviously substandard,
\nthe competent Authority may suspend the inspection of that ship until the response
\nparties have taken the steps necessary to ensure that it complies with the relevant
\nstandard requirements. This possibility has already been inserted in the Paris MOU
\nand is now a generally accepted procedure.
\nThe Flag State\u2019s responsibility is implementation by establishing legislation (primary
\nor secondary) on Port State Control and Flag State Implementation, which will
\ninstruct surveyors and inspectors on what is expected of them. With respect to the
\nships of non-parties to the convention, Parties shall apply the requirements of the
\npresent convention as may be necessary to ensure that “No More Favourable
\nTreatment\u201d is given to such ships (MARPOL 73\/78 ART. 5 (4). Further, Flag States
\nmust verify (by inspection or other means) that their ships comply with national laws
\nand regulations which apply the standards prescribed by the convention. This is
\nbecause national legislation has to be \u201csubstantially equivalent” with the
\nInternational Minimum Standard requirements.
\nIn case of any deficiency, legislation must exist which will instruct the master or
\noperators to rectify such deficiencies immediately, or else the ship may be detained
\nor delayed when there are ” clear grounds ” to do so or if \u201cprofessional judgement\u201d
\n81
\ndeems it necessary. Furthermore, complaints from crew, passengers, masters or
\nany other person on board are to be listened to and action has to be taken
\nappropriately, because ships must be ” sufficiently and efficiently manned”.
\nTherefore, a Port State Control officer on inspection has to ensure always that every
\nship has not only a “Safe Manning Document” on board but also has “Certificates of
\nCompetency \u201d of the seafarers employed. The officer can also simulate in order to
\ncheck how the crew reacts to emergency events. The muster list must always be
\nchecked in case of any misrepresentation in it.
\nMany things could be said about how the ship owner, operator and Captain can
\nmanage Port State inspection at its best. However, if the following items are NOT IN
\nORDER, a Port State Control survey will usually be a matter of routine. Thus:
\ni. The ship should be provided with one (or may be more) ” Certificate ring binder”
\nwhere all certificates and other kinds of documentation can be filed properly.
\nii. Port State Control reports from previous inspections must be retained on board
\nfor a period of TWO years and must also be available for consultation by Port
\nState Control Officer at all times.
\niii. The ship should be provided with a ” Record of Approved Safety Equipment”
\nfrom which it can be seen what the Flag State requirements are, and which
\nrules the ship shall comply with.
\niv. The ship’s officers should be acquainted with IMO Resolution A. 787 (19)
\n\u201cProcedures for Port State Control”.
\nv. Each ship’s (Captain\/Company) must have some kind of contingency plan on
\n“How to handle a situation where the Port State Control survey\/inspection
\ncauses difficulties” (For example; the ship is required to comply with
\ninternational standard regulations or the ship is detained).
\nThe ship has to be in a reasonable condition and comply with all statuary
\nregulations, the gangway properly rigged (remember the net), the alleyways clean
\nand the papers neatly at hand. (This, together with the Captain’s and Crews positive
\nattitude, helps the Port State Control Surveyor or Inspector to run the inspection
\nsmoothly without unreasonable delay, detention or cost for the ship owner).
\n82
\nPort State Control is recognised as being a step in the direction towards the
\neradication of sub-standard ships, when it is carried out in accordance with IMO
\nAssembly resolutions and recommendations. Many of IMO\u2019s technical conventions
\ncontain regulations enabling Governments to inspect ships visiting their ports to
\nmake sure that they meet IMO standards. Therefore, and based on the findings on
\npage 68, I would like to make the following recommendations:
\nA number of PSCOs\u00b4 employed with inadequate qualifications in addition to lack of
\nexperience, need to be reviewed. PSCOs\u00b4 require to be educated and trained in
\naccordance with the stipulated and prescribed guidelines, example, IMO Res. A.
\n787 (19) or as envisaged in the West and Central African MOU. Also, the
\nestablishment and implementation of the West and Central MOU needs to be
\nexpedited. Of course the wage structure of the entire PSC Inspectors has to be
\nreviewed if commercial interests vested on ships inspected or on ports where the
\nships are to be inspected, are to be avoided.
\nThe Maritime Academy of Nigeria, Oron (MAN ORON) as the only maritime
\ninstitution in the country, should develop a model training course for training of
\nPSCOs\u00b4 taking in to account the technical advise and Helpance from the IMO
\nTechnical Co-operation Committee for international standards requirements to be
\nmet. There is the need for regular review of PSCOs\u00b4 activities by the Director
\nGeneral of the NMA in order to assess and ascertain the quality of performances.
\nFurthermore, in addition to competency in carrying out PSC responsibilities as
\nrequired, the methodology adopted in appointing PSCOs\u00b4 and the allies Officers
\nneed to be reviewed based on credibility, integrity, passed-experience and
\nappropriate qualifications of individual applying for the post or seeking promotion to
\nsuch position.
\nIn another development, the Maritime Safety Dept. should establish an inter and
\nintra Districts Links that will serve as an effective means of communication not only
\nbetween PSCOs\u00b4, but also between PSCOs\u00b4and the other agencies in the ports in
\ncase of high traffic. Such agencies include. The Ports Authority, the Customs, the
\nImmigrations, Navy, etc.
\n83
\nFor efficiency and effectiveness, PSCOs\u00b4 should be provided with the necessary
\ntools related to PSC Inspections. Such tools include, a car, chauffeur or boat,
\nmobile radio or telephone, helmet, hand-gloves, rain-boot, raincoat, writing materials
\nand other necessities required of PSC implementation.
\nFor sustainable and effective implementation of PSC in the region, the newly
\nestablished West and Central African MOU needs funding on continuous
\nincremental approach if the regional agreement is to survive.
\nWith regard to the need for harmonisation and training, it is clear that the
\nestablishment of the various regional Port State Control regimes, essential as it is, is
\nonly the beginning. Problems already identified within the European MOU, which, is
\ncomposed of quite similar maritime Administrations, will be accentuated in other
\nregions where European conformity and affinity do not exist. Some of the problems
\nare related to the peculiarities of the regions and their different stages of
\ndevelopment which dictate different patterns of control, as regards the methodology
\nof inspection, targets to be achieved, different training and experience among the
\ncontrol officers, and possibilities of abuse. However, solutions to these problems
\nhave to be found by whatever means.
\nOf course, we are not unaware of the problems facing developing countries from
\npolitical instability to economic uncertainty in addition to socio-cultural and religious
\ndiversities. However, if such countries are interested in developing maritime and
\nshipping activities in their regional domains, such differences and barriers need to
\nbe resolved. The flag and port states respectively have to prioritise the maritime
\nsector in order to enable the developed maritime nations to give both financial and
\ntechnical aid where applicable.
\nIt is therefore, imperative to continue working towards the harmonisation of basic
\nprocedures and qualifications and experience of control officers as the way ahead.
\nThe IMO sub-committee on Flag State Implementation has agreed on a global
\nstrategy for port state control and has also the authority to deal with the training and
\n84
\nqualification of Port State Control officers as a matter of urgency in co-operation with
\nthe Standards of Training and Watchkeeping (STW) sub-committee. A code of
\nconduct for Port State Control officers has also been developed in this regard.
\nThere is an arduous task ahead. While regional Port State Control has now been
\noperating for 15 years, there is still room for improvement and need for review of the
\nagreements and minor adjustments. IMO\u00b4s work will depend on the success of the
\norganization\u2019s efforts to improve flag state performances, which is the top priority of
\nthe organization at present. However, the best way forward seems to be to continue
\nthe process already started by increased control in the various regions and to strive
\nfor better and more efficient implementation by the states (acting as Flag States) on
\ntheir own ships rather than as a port state acting on foreign flag ships.
\nBut Port State Control is here to stay, and this means effective regional agreements,
\ncommon criteria for inspections, harmonised inspections and detention procedures,
\ninternationally approved qualifications of Port State Control officers, an
\ninternationally applied Code of Conduct and transparency through increased
\ninformation within the regions themselves and the inter-regions respectively.
\nIn summary, the emphasis has to be on \u201cEnhanced International Cooperation\u201d!
\nFinal Remarks:
\nInstead of being an excellent tool to eliminate the operation of substandard ships,
\nPort State Control Regional Agreements might well develop into a monster of
\nbureaucracy. Port State Control officers must put any reference in their inspection
\nreport if they are not sure of its applicability. They must also never detain or delay
\nany ship unnecessarily or without any justification. Conventions are regarded as the
\nbest medicine for curing ship deficiencies if the qualified personnel properly
\nprescribe it. However, and in recognition of the importance of our oceans, the PSC
\nofficers must intensify their efforts towards effective implementation and
\n85
\nenforcement of PSC in Nigeria in order to achieve the maritime safety culture in the
\nnext millennium.
\nPort State Control is a right and not an obligation. Safety culture must be imbedded
\nbetween ship owners and seafarers vis-\u00e0-vis the Administrations. Nigerian
\nMARADS needs dialogue with the industry in order to establish a safety culture
\ntowards avoiding conflicts of interests in our Port State Control implementation and
\nenforcement. Nigeria must devise means of overcoming all available pressures on
\nPSC- Inspections from ship owners, seafarers, Administrations or any
\nunion\/pressure groups. A Port State Control officer needs to be aware of the
\n\u201cmissing links\u201d in case of any deficiencies identified. Port State Control inspection is
\nnot auditing. According to an ancient Greek Philosopher: \u201c The measure of success
\nis not what you were unable to achieve, it is what you are not able to loose\u201d.
\nTherefore, Port State inspectors must be watchful and vigilant in carrying out Port
\nState Control survey or inspection particularly on board ships. However, they can
\nnot work miracles! But should ensure that ships have priority. Progress can only be
\nmade gradually and along the developmental axis of the desired objectives.
\nExcessive bureaucracy decays infrastructure. Port State Control officers must be
\nhonest and what they can offer for safety of our ships, crews, passengers and the
\nprotection of the environment. Safety is EXPENSIVE, but accidents are
\nDANGEROUS. As long as our shipping activities are across the international
\nterritorial boundaries, ship owners and their operators must be held responsible foe
\nnon-compliance of shipping rules and regulations as required by the International
\nstandards.
\nAccording to Winston Churchill, \u201c It is wise to look ahead but difficult to look
\nfurther than you can see\u201d. Therefore, be careful.
\n87
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\nImplementation, vol. 2, No 2 pp 11-17.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVED IMPLEMENTATION OF PORT STATE CONTROL IN NIGERIA Abstract This dissertation is an appraisal of Port State Control as the concept and practice\u2026<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[8827,10099,10540,10536,10892,10538,10539,10537,10891],"tags":[10549,10616,10615,7687,10627,8857,10552,10295,10548,10622,8907],"class_list":["post-132801","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-australia-essays","category-buy-essay","category-cheap-essay-writers","category-get-assignments-done","category-page-paper","category-phd-essay-writers","category-research-paper-writing-service-for-any-topic","category-study-bay-essay","category-write-my-assignment-ireland","tag-ai-plagiarism-free-essay-writing-tool","tag-australian-best-tutors","tag-best-trans-tutors","tag-buy-essay-uk","tag-cheap-dissertation-writer","tag-help-with-writing-an-essay","tag-help-write-my-paper-ai-free","tag-homework-for-you","tag-online-essay-writers","tag-phd-essays","tag-write-my-essay-for-me"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/132801","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=132801"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/132801\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=132801"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=132801"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=132801"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}