SECURING THE GULF: TOWARDS AN
\nINTEGRATED MARITIME SECURITY STRATEGY
\nFOR THE GULF OF GUINEA<\/p>\n
ABSTRACT
\nTitle of Dissertation: Securing the Gulf: Towards an Integrated Maritime Security
\nStrategy for the Gulf of Guinea
\nDegree: Master of Science
\nThe resurgence of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea in 2007 greatly affected the economy of
\nsome West African states especially Nigeria and Benin. The severity of attacks by
\npirates led to United Nations Security Council resolution 2018 (2011) expressing deep
\nconcern about the threat posed by piracy in the region and an intention for a cooperative
\nregional action to combat this maritime security crime .
\nDespite current efforts by some states in the region to curb piracy, this maritime security
\nchallenge still persists. Some factors identified as fuelling piracy include weak
\nlegislation, inadequate capacity of coastal navies, proliferation of small arms and
\nunemployment. To combat piracy in the region certain challenges identified as obstacles
\nto cooperation need to be addressed. These include lack of political will, inadequate inter
\nagency coordination, influence of extra regional powers and poor maritime domain
\nawareness amongst others.
\nThis dissertation analyses the challenges to cooperation in the region as well as the
\nstrengths and limitations of the countermeasures implemented in other piracy hotspots
\nsuch as Southeast Asia and Somalia. Particular attention is given to the Regional
\nCooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in
\nAsia( ReCAAP) and Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC) with a view to suggesting a
\nmaritime security strategy in the Gulf of Guinea as called for by the United Nations.
\nKey words: Piracy, Maritime Security, Gulf of Guinea, Nigeria, Benin, Regional
\nCooperation.
\niv
\nTABLE OF CONTENTS
\nPages
\n– Declaration\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026 i
\n– Acknowledgments\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026 ii
\n– Abstract\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026. iii
\n– Table of contents\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026..\u2026 iv
\n– List of tables\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026. viii
\n– List of figures\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026 viii
\n– List of abbreviations\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026. ix
\nChapter 1: Introduction\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026 1
\n1.1 Background\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026. 1
\n1.2 Aim\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.. 3
\n1.3 Statement of the problem\u2026..\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026… 3
\n1.4 Objectives of the study \u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026..\u2026.. 5
\n1.5 Scope\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.\u2026\u2026\u2026.\u2026.. 5
\n1.6 Research methods\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026. 6
\n1.6.1 Sources of data\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026 6
\n1.6.2 Primary sources of data\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026…\u2026\u2026 6
\n1.6.3 Secondary sources of data\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026..\u2026 6
\n1.6.4 Method of data analysis\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026………. 7
\n1.6.5 Method of data presentation\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026… 7
\n1.7 Organisation\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.\u2026\u2026. 7
\n1.8 Limitation of the study\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026. 7
\nChapter 2: Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026…\u2026.. 8
\n2.1 Origin and development of piracy \u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026..\u2026\u2026\u2026……… 8
\n2.2 Definition of piracy and relationship with maritime security\u2026\u2026.\u2026\u2026 \u2026\u2026.. 8
\n2.3 Contemporary global piracy hot spots \u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026 10
\nv
\n2.3.1 Piracy in Southeast Asia\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.\u2026… 10
\n2.3.2 Piracy in Somalia\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.\u2026. 11
\n2.4 Understanding the Gulf of Guinea \u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026..\u2026 12
\n2.5 Analysis of attacks in the Gulf of Guinea \u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026… 14
\n2.5.1 Trend analysis\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026..\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026…\u2026… 16
\n2.5.2 Total incidents in the Gulf of Guinea\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.\u2026\u2026…. 19
\n2.5.3 Total incidents in the Gulf of Guinea by country \u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026………. 20
\n2.5.4 Total incidents in the Gulf of Guinea by country in 2011\u2026\u2026\u2026. 22
\n2.5.5 Reported incidents in Africa and the Gulf of Guinea\u2026..\u2026\u2026\u2026.. 23
\n2.5.6 Reported incidents in the Gulf of Guinea and Nigeria\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.. 24
\n2.5.7 Reported incidents between Africa, the Gulf of Guinea and
\nNigeria\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026… 25
\n2.5.8 Reported incidents between Africa, the Gulf of Guinea, Nigeria
\nand Somalia\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026… 26
\n2.5.9 Summary of analysis of attacks\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.\u2026..\u2026.. 27
\n2.6 Factors responsible for rise in piracy\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026 27
\n2.6.1 Conflict and disorder\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026……. 28
\n2.6.2 Underfunded law enforcement\/ inadequate Security\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.. 28
\n2.6.3 Poor governance and permissive political environment\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026. 29
\n2.6.4 Proliferation of small arms and light weapons\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026 29
\n2.6.5 Unemployment and poverty\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026 30
\n2.6.6 Promise of reward\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026 31
\n2.6.7 Favourable geography\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026. 31
\n2.6.8 Crude oil theft and illicit bunkering\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026…….\u2026. 31
\n2.7 Modus operandi of pirates \u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026 31
\n2.8 Economic cost and impact of piracy \u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026..\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.\u2026. 33
\n2.8.1 Cost of insurance\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026 34
\n2.8.2 Cost to food price inflation\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026. 34
\nvi
\n2.8.3 Cost of reduced foreign revenue\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026. 35
\n2.8.4 Cost of naval deterrence\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.. 36
\n2.8.5 Impact on seafarers\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.\u2026. 36
\n2.8.6 Potential environmental impact\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026……. 37
\n2.8.7 Political Impact\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026…\u2026. 37
\n2.8.8 Impact on fishing\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.\u2026 37
\n2.9 Conclusion \u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026 38
\nChapter 3: Assessment of Current Efforts to Combat Piracy in the
\nGulf of Guinea\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.\u2026… 39
\n3.1 National measures \u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026 39
\n3.2 Bilateral measures\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026. 41
\n3.3 Multilateral measures\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026 42
\n3.4 The United Nations response\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026 43
\n3.5 Challenges hampering efforts at combating piracy in the Gulf of Guinea\u2026 43
\n3.5.1 Lack of political will\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026 44
\n3.5.2 Maritime border disputes\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.\u2026 44
\n3.5.3 Inadequate inter-agency cooperation\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.\u2026.. 45
\n3.5.4 Poor maritime domain awareness\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026 46
\n3.5.5 Inadequate capacity of navies and coast guards\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026. 46
\n3.5.6 Weak legal framework\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026 48
\n3.5.7 Poor technological base\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026. 51
\n3.5.8 Increasing influence of extra-regional powers in Africa\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.. 51
\n3.6 Conclusion\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.\u2026 53
\nChapter 4: Integrated Maritime Security Strategy to Mitigate Challenges
\nHampering Efforts to Combat Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026..54
\n4.1 Regional cooperation \u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026. 54
\n4.2 Background to ReCAAP\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026..\u2026 56
\n4.2.1 Major features of ReCAAP\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026 56
\nvii
\n4.2.2 Lessons learned from ReCAAP\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.. 58
\n4.3 Background to DCoC\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026 60
\n4.3.1 Principal features of DCoC\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026. 61
\n4.3.2 Lessons learned from DCoC\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026 63
\n4.4 Lessons for the Gulf of Guinea region in developing a maritime security
\nframework to combat piracy\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.\u2026\u2026\u2026 65
\n4.4.1 Review of national legislation\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.\u2026\u2026 65
\n4.4.2 Establishment of an information sharing centre to enhance
\ninter-agency coordination\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026 66
\n4.4.3 Collaborative funding\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.. 67
\n4.4.4 Adoption of best management practices\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026. 67
\n4.5 Other Strategies to combat piracy\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026 67
\n4.5.1 Public enlightenment on maritime issues\/affairs\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026. 67
\n4.5. 2 Enhancement of political will\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.. 68
\n4.5.3 Provision of adequate fleet maintenance facilities\u2026\u2026……………….. 68
\n4.6 ECOWAS as a mechanism to implement regional agreements\u2026\u2026…. 69
\n4.7 Conclusion\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026. 69
\nChapter 5:
\n5.1 Conclusion \u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026 70
\nReferences \u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.\u2026\u2026. 73
\nAppendix A Unstructured interviews\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026..\u2026\u2026\u2026. 83
\nAppendix B Anti-piracy framework\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026..\u2026\u2026.. 84
\nviii
\nLIST OF TABLES
\nPages
\nTable 1 Actual and Attempted Attacks against Ships in African Waters
\nand Gulf of Guinea Nations from 1991 – 2012 (first quarter)………. 15
\nTable 2 Human Development Index in the Gulf of Guinea\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026. 30
\nTable 3 Naval Capabilities of some Gulf of Guinea countries\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026 47
\nLIST OF FIGURES
\nFigure 1 Live Piracy Map showing Hot Spots\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.. 11
\nFigure 2 Map of Gulf of Guinea \u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026. 12
\nFigure 3 Total incidents in the Gulf of Guinea from 1991-2012(Q1)\u2026\u2026… 20
\nFigure 4 Total incidents in the Gulf of Guinea by Country \u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u202621
\nFigure 5 Total incidents in the Gulf of Guinea by Country \u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026… 21
\nFigure 6 Total incidents in the Gulf of Guinea by Country for 2011\u2026\u2026\u2026. 22
\nFigure 7 Total incidents in the Gulf of Guinea by Country for 2011\u2026\u2026.\u2026 23
\nFigure 8 Reported incidents in Africa and the Gulf of Guinea\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026 24
\nFigure 9 Reported incidents in the Gulf of Guinea and Nigeria\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026. 25
\nFigure 10 Reported incidents between Africa, the Gulf of Guinea and
\nNigeria\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026. 26
\nFigure 11 Reported incidents in Africa, the Gulf of Guinea, and Nigeria
\nand Somalia \u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.. 26
\nFigure 12 Attacks by ship types from 1991 to 2011\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.\u2026… 35
\nix
\nLIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
\nAFRICOM Africa Command
\nAPS Africa Partnership Station
\nASF Asian Shipowners\u00b4 Forum
\nBIMCO Baltic and International Maritime Council
\nDCoC Djibouti Code of Conduct
\nECCAS Economic Community of Central African States
\nECOMOG Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
\nECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
\nEiS Eyes in the Sky
\nEU European Union
\nFAO Food and Agriculture Organization
\nGDP Gross Domestic Product
\nGG Gulf of Guinea
\nGLME Guinea large Marine Ecosystem
\nICC International Chamber of Commerce
\nIMB International Maritime Bureau
\nIMO International Maritime Organization
\nINTERTANKO International Association of Independent Tanker Owners
\nISC Information Sharing Centre
\nMALSINDO Malaysia Singapore Indonesia
\nMDA Maritime Domain Awareness
\nMEND Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta
\nMOWCA Maritime Organization of West and Central African States
\nx
\nMSC Maritime Safety Committee
\nNATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
\nNIMASA Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency
\nPCC Patrol and Coastal Combatants
\nReCAAP Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and
\nArmed Robbery against Ships in Asia.
\nSUA Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime
\nNavigation,1988
\nUN United Nations
\nUNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982
\nUNODC United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime
\nUNOWA United Nations Office for West Africa
\nUNSC United Nations Security Council
\n1
\nChapter 1
\n1 – Introduction
\n1.1 – Background
\nPiracy in its various forms have posed a threat to trade and shipping for millennia
\n(Mejia, Cariou & Wolff, 2010, p.2). Cilician pirates raided the Mediterranean in the age
\nof Classical Greece and Rome, and the Vikings pillaged and terrorized the coasts of
\nEurope. Pirates also roamed the waves of the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean (Havern,
\n2012).
\nHistorically, efforts to suppress maritime piracy were characterized as acts of littoral
\nwarfare rather than constabulary or police action (Kraska, 2011a). In 67 BC, Roman
\ngeneral, Pompeius Magnus, was given authority to purge the Mediterranean seas of
\npirates. The General was given the wherewithal for three years and had overriding
\nauthority in all provinces for up to fifty miles inland (Souza,2001). With the rise of
\nEngland in the early modern period, nations thinking about the concept of piracy as a
\nform of warfare faded. It led to the granting of letters of marque and reprisal,
\ngovernments issued licences authorizing private vessels to attack and capture enemy
\nvessels (Kraska, 2011a).
\nHowever in 1856, the Paris Declaration of the worlds\u2019 maritime powers abolished letters
\nof marque. France and the United Kingdom signed an agreement to stop the granting of
\nletters of marque because of the difficulty in controlling privateers (Hutchins, 2011,
\np.854). It was the confluence of naval technology, the maintenance of freedom of the
\nseas by the Royal Navy and the progress of international law that contributed to the
\ndemise of maritime piracy. With the end of World War II, the hegemonic dominance of
\nthe United States Navy assured freedom of the seas and the safety of maritime
\ncommerce (Kraska, 2011a).
\n2
\nAfter the cold war and by the late 1980s, decolonization and globalization were forming
\nthe weak states and the shipping boom that would set conditions for a reemergence of
\npiracy in the 1990s and 2000s. The epicenter of the new piracy in the 1990s and early
\n2000s was Southeast Asia, but the center shifted to the Horn of Africa after 2005
\n(Kraska, 2011a).
\nSince 2007, much of the international efforts in combating piracy have been focused on
\nSomalia waters, after taking over the number one spot of global piracy from Southeast
\nAsia waters (Onuoha, 2012). According to Neethling (2010), of the almost 300 ships
\nthat were attacked in 2008, 111 were around the Horn of Africa and in the Gulf of Aden.
\nSince 2009, attacks continued and a number of ships from various nations were seized
\n(Neethling, 2010.p.90). The spike in attacks prompted the deployment in 2008 of an ongoing international coalition of navies to fight Somali piracy (Onuoha, 2012)
\nThe international focus on the challenges posed by Somali pirates, underscored the
\nmomentous threat that piracy in the Gulf of Guinea posed to the states in the region and
\ninternational community as well (Pham, 2011). According to the International Maritime
\nOrganization (IMO), 64 incidents of piracy were reported in 9 countries of the Gulf of
\nGuinea in 2011, up from 45 in 7 countries in 2010 (Baldauf, 2012). The reported
\nincidents are so severe that some attacks off Benin and Nigeria involve a ship being
\nhijacked and a significant part of its cargo stolen and losses from each attack range from
\nUS$2 million to $6 million (Ichikawa, 2012). The resultant effect is that Nigeria and
\nother countries in the Gulf of Guinea are losing $2 billion annually to this maritime
\ncrime (Okwe, 2012).
\nFurther, United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 10558 states that the
\nthreat of piracy was fitting together with other forms of transnational organized crimes,
\nincluding oil bunkering, sea robbery, hostage-taking, human and drug trafficking and
\nterrorism. As a matter of necessity, the United Nations Security Council could not ignore
\n3
\nthe strategic economic importance of the Gulf of Guinea oil and the significant threat
\npiracy posed to that vital commerce (United Nations Security Council, [UNSC], 2012b).
\nAs a consequence, UN Security Council Resolution 10558 clearly states that Gulf of
\nGuinea countries need to develop a comprehensive and integrated regional anti-piracy
\nstrategy for the region (UNSC, 2012b). Supporting the UNSC resolution, Admiral Ola
\nIbrahim, the Nigeria Chief of Defence Staff, stressed the need for a collective approach
\non maritime security to protect the adjacent maritime environment since 38 out of 54
\nstates in Africa have coastal fronts (Ibrahim, 2012, p.8).
\nAlthough every regional maritime security situation is unique, past experiences in other
\nregions can provide useful lessons in counter piracy operations for the Gulf of Guinea
\nefforts, especially antipiracy operations in Southeast Asia Regional Cooperation
\nAgreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP)
\nand the Horn of Africa the Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC). The negative effect
\npiracy is having in the Gulf of Guinea countries and the call for a comprehensive antipiracy strategy to counter piracy in the region motivated the researcher to embark on this
\nstudy.
\n1.2 – Aim
\nThe purpose of this dissertation is to identify the challenges to the Gulf of Guinea
\ncountries in combating piracy and specific lessons associated with the successful factors
\nand challenges of regional agreements and countermeasures against piracy in Southeast
\nAsia and Horn of Africa with a view to proffering strategies.
\n1.3 – Statement of the Problem
\nThe Gulf of Guinea is off the coast of West Africa and is a significant source of oil
\n(Baldauf,2012).The wider Gulf of Guinea comprises altogether 14 countries: Angola, the
\nDemocratic Republic of Congo, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, S\u00e3o
\nTom\u00e9 and Pr\u00edncipe, Cameroon, Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Ghana, Cote d\u2019Ivoire, Liberia and
\n4
\nSierra Leone (Basedau & M\u00e4hler, 2011, p.74). The region provides a huge market size
\nof about 300 million consumers of global trade and its maritime space facilitates 90
\npercent of West African international trade of 45.5 billion US dollars and 31.62 US
\ndollars of exports and imports respectively (Quashie, 2010, p.66).
\nAs a result of increasing piratical attacks, the Gulf of Guinea maritime space is
\nbecoming unsecured. For instance, the President of Benin sought the intervention of the
\nUnited Nations (UN) to address the issue. Benin was particularly affected by the piracy
\nscourge in 2011 with 20 attacks, which led to a 70 per cent drop in revenue from her
\nseaports and also affected movement of commodities to some landlocked countries in
\nthe region. Recently, however, the Nigerian\/ Benin Maritime Operation Prosperity
\ncommenced to curb the activities of the pirates in Benin waters, with other current
\nefforts to enhance maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea.These measures have not
\nbeen able to adequately tackle piracy and armed robbery at sea as the pirates still
\ncontinue their activities and have even extended their operations to Togo waters.
\nFurther, there is a tendency for the pirates to further extend their operations to other
\ncountries in the region with prospects of new oil finds and weak naval capabilities. The
\nGulf of Guinea is losing about 2 billion dollars annually to piracy as earlier stated. The
\nemerging piracy threat, if left unchecked, can lead to instability in the sub region and
\nadversely impact on the region\u2019s economic, social and political development. Also, the
\nGulf of Guinea vast sea area presents great challenges to the navies of the sub-region’s
\nmember states. The weak enforcement capability of most of the navies in the Gulf of
\nGuinea exposes the vulnerable sea areas to exploitation.These suggest there is still more
\nto be done to suppress piracy in order to enhance maritime security. It is against this
\nbackdrop that the study sought answers to the following questions:
\na. In what ways can the impact of piracy on maritime security in the region
\nbe evaluated?
\nb. What are the current efforts to curb piracy in the region?
\n5
\nc. Why has piracy in the region persisted despite some efforts at combating
\nit?
\nd. Are there cooperative maritime arrangements existing in other regions
\nrelevant in providing useful insight for developing an integrated strategy
\nto enhance maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea?
\n1.4 – Objectives of the Study
\nThe main objective of the study will be to examine the different dimensions of piracy in
\nthe Gulf of Guinea in order to propose strategies to tackle the menace. Specific
\nobjectives are to:
\na. Understand the geo-strategic importance of the Gulf of Guinea.
\nb. Analyse the trend of piracy in the region.
\nc. Identify factors responsible for rise in piracy in the region.
\nd. Identify the impact of piracy in the region.
\ne. Identify some current efforts to curb piracy.
\nf. Identify challenges hampering efforts to combat piracy in the region.
\ng. Identify existing cooperative arrangements that address piracy.
\nh. Proffer strategies to combat piracy in order to enhance maritime security.
\nThis dissertation aims to serve as a reference for policymakers and stakeholders of
\nmember states who are responsible for defence and security within the Gulf of Guinea
\nsub-region. Additionally, the study is expected to contribute to knowledge, fill gaps in
\nthe literature on maritime defence and serve as resource material for future studies on
\nthe Gulf of Guinea maritime domain.
\n1.5 – Scope
\nThe scope of this study is defined by its time and space. In terms of time, the study
\ncovers the period between 2001 and 2012 first quarter. This period was chosen because
\nof the rise of piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Guinea especially Nigerian and
\n6
\nBenin waters. The incidence of piracy assumed a pronounced dimension, prompting
\nefforts at the national and regional levels as well as attracting the attention of the UN,
\nevident in the adoption of UN Resolutions 2018 (October 2011) and 2039 (February
\n2012); the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) efforts at
\nactivating Operation Prosperity as a pilot test to foreground a regional maritime
\nframework.The space is defined by mostly the maritime space of Gulf of Guinea
\nespecially the waters of Nigeria and Benin .
\n1.6 – Research Methods
\nThe research was descriptive using logical reasoning and integrated data comprising
\nqualitative and quantitative data. Official documents and publications were consulted.
\nAlso unstructured interviews with principal staff officers of the Defence Headquarters
\nand ECOWAS resource persons involved in maritime security in the Maritime Domain
\nof Nigeria and West Africa were conducted.
\n1.6.1 – Sources of Data
\nThe sources of data for the research included both primary and secondary sources of
\ndata.
\n1.6.2 – Primary Sources of Data
\nThe primary data were collected through unstructured interviews, discussions and
\nconsultations with some principal officers of the Nigerian Defence Headquarters, Benin
\nrepublic Navy and ECOWAS Secretariat in Abuja. The list of those interviewed is in
\nAppendix A.
\n1.6.3 – Secondary Sources of Data
\nThe secondary sources were materials gathered from books, journals, lectures notes,
\nmagazines, periodicals and official publications. Others include published and
\nunpublished materials as well as information from the internet. In addition, official
\ndocuments were obtained from ECOWAS and the International Maritime Bureau (IMB).
\n7
\n1.6.4 – Method of Data Analysis
\nQualitative method of data analysis was adopted using logical reasoning to arrive at
\ncogent deductions. Quantitative methods involved analysis of statistical data and
\ninference was made from the unstructured interviews.
\n1.6.5 – Method of Data Presentation
\nThe analysed data was presented in a descriptive form. Tables, maps, charts and
\ndiagrams were also used for illustration.
\n1.7 – Organization
\nThe research is organized into five chapters. Chapter One is the introduction where the
\nobjectives, research methods, research questions and the scope are stated. Chapter Two
\nreviews piracy literature in trends, development of piracy, contemporary piracy hotspots,
\nand analysis of piracy incidents .It also looks at relevant factors responsible for piracy,
\nimpact and modus operandi of pirates in the Gulf of Guinea. Chapter Three looks at the
\ncurrent efforts to combat piracy and challenges hampering efforts to combat piracy.
\nChapter Four reviews existing regional arrangements to combat piracy and proffers
\nstrategies to tackle piracy. Chapter Five will contain the discussions and conclusions of
\nthe research.
\n1.8 – Limitation of the Study
\nThe research was limited by inability to access some individuals programmed for
\nunstructured interviews. However, secondary data were used to fill the space to ensure
\nthat the research objectives were achieved.
\n8
\nChapter 2
\n2 – Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea
\n2.1 – Origin and Development of Piracy
\nTo combat the menace of piracy, it is necessary to look at the origin and basic
\ndevelopment of this maritime crime. In some parts of the world piracy is seen as being
\nacceptable as a way of livelihood to supplement agriculture in some cases. The
\nalternative to piracy may well be hunger. Most reported pirate attacks involve the theft
\nof crew belongings or ships\u00b4 equipment which may include petty cash, radios, ropes or
\neven tins on paint. The perpetrators slip onboard ships in the cover of darkness and use
\nlittle violence if there escape is impeded (Abhyankar, 2005).
\nIn addition, many attacks are not reported, because masters of vessels do not want any
\nunnecessary delay of vessels which may cost the ship more (IMB, 2001).Further, the end
\nof the cold war brought the reduction navies of North Atlantic Treaty
\nOrganization(NATO) and the Warsaw Pact countries. The absence of these navies
\nreduced the deterrent effect on pirates especially in the South East region. Another factor
\nthat has fueled the development of piracy is the fact that most third world countries are
\nbattling under debt, which constrained there resources to acquire platforms to maintain
\npresence at sea as deterrence to pirates (Abhyankar, 2005).
\n2.2 – Definition of Piracy and Relationship with Maritime Security
\nAny study of piracy usually raises the issue of how the term is defined particularly when
\nit has to do with issues between state sovereignty and universal jurisdiction over crimes
\n(Mejia, Cariou & Wolff, 2008, p.104).Recognized international law, the United Nations
\nConvention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, 1982) defines piracy in Article .101 as
\nconsisting of any of the following acts:
\n9
\n(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed
\nfor private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private
\naircraft, and directed:
\n(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or
\nproperty on board such ship or aircraft;
\n(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the
\njurisdiction of any State;
\n(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft
\nwith knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
\n(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in
\nsubparagraph (a) or (b). UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982).
\nBy the above definition, UNCLOS 1982 limits piracy to the two ship-model with private
\ngains motive occurring at high seas (Fajriyansah, 2007, p.112). In addition, the
\ndefinition did not take into cognizance the comprehensive legal regime of piracy within
\ndomestic jurisdiction (Mbiah, 2010, p.306) .The IMO, as a specialized UN agency,
\nadopted the UNCLOS definition, but due to the recurrent issue of armed robbery in its
\nagenda for many years came up with the term“ armed robbery against ships\u2019\u2019 as well
\n(Mejia, 2002, p.33). Therefore, IMO in Article 2.2 of the Maritime Safety Committee
\n(MSC) Circular 984, defines armed robbery against ships as \u201cany unlawful act of
\nviolence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other than an act of
\n“piracy”, directed against a ship or against persons or property on board such a ship,
\nwithin a State\u2019s jurisdiction over such offences\u2019\u2019 (IMO, 2000).
\nOn the other hand, Maritime Security is defined as measures employed by maritime
\nadministrations, vessels owners and operators, port facilities, offshore installations and
\nother maritime organizations to protect against unlawful acts (Mukherjee & Mejia,
\n2005).Further maritime security ensures unimpeded sea trade, safe navigation,
\n10
\nprotection of coastal communities and their livelihoods and preservation of the rich
\necosystems in the ocean vital to wellbeing of the planet (Onuoha, 2010).
\nFrom the foregoing, maritime security has two aspects, protection of the environment
\nincluding the ecosystem, fish, sea mammals and safety of the users such as vessels and
\noperators. Hence any piratical act, like attacking a vessel laden with oil and leading to
\npollution that degrades the integrity of the marine ecosystems, is considered a threat to
\nmaritime security. Conversely, an act that negates the safety of operators or vessels that
\nuse the sea legally, also affects maritime security (Onuoha, 2010). Thus from the
\nforegoing a clear link can be established between sea piracy and maritime security in the
\nsense that piracy is a threat and maritime security is the desired end state.
\n2.3 – Contemporary Global Piracy Hotspots
\nAccording to IMB the three hotspots of piracy and armed robbery against ships include
\nSoutheast Asia, Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Guinea (Mbiah, 2007, p.127). The
\nsucceeding paragraphs will briefly discuss piracy in South East Asian and Somali (Horn
\nof Africa) waters before looking at the Gulf of Guinea in detail. See figure 1.
\n2.3.1 – Piracy in Southeast Asia
\nAs a result of increased piracy attacks in Southeast Asia, the IMB in 1992 established
\nthe Piracy Reporting Centre in Kuala Lumpur in Malaysia (Murphy, 2007, p.21).
\nAccording to IMB statistics, cases of piracy increased drastically all over the world since
\nthe late 1990s. The South East Asian maritime environment had the highest number of
\npiracy attacks, attributed to the 1997 Asian financial crises(Banlaoi,2005,p.62), with
\nalmost half taking place in the Malacca and Singapore straits, the surrounding waters of
\nMalaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines (Kaneda, 2005, p.45).
\n11
\nAbhyankar refers to piracy in Southeast Asia as “ Asian\u2019\u2019 piracy. This kind of piracy
\ntakes place in the territories of the various countries where ships are boarded, and cash
\nand valuables are stolen from the ship and crew using minimum force (Abhyankar,
\n2002). Another variant of piracy committed in Southeast Asia is the theft or hijacking of
\nan entire ship.
\nThis is where ships were hijacked given false identity and turning them into \u201cphantom
\nships\u201d with fake registration papers (Bateman, 2010, p.16).
\n2.3.2 – Piracy in Somalia
\nFailure of governance that resulted in the collapse of the Somali state since the ousting
\nof President Siad Barre in 1991 is at the root cause of piracy in Somalia. As a result,
\nSomalia\u2019s coastline has been infested with militia groups who engage in piracy (Onuoha,
\n2009, p.37).The modus operandi of Somali pirates involve the preservation of hijacked
\nship, crew and cargo to enhance bargain for ransom payment. The operators of the
\npiracy model involve fishermen, militia and investors (Mejia, 2010a). According to IMB
\nFigure 1: Live Piracy Map showing hot spots(2008)
\nSource: http:\/\/bldgblog.blogspot.se\/2008\/11\/piracy-live-at-sea.html
\n12
\nreports, the Somali pirates use \u201cMother Vessels\u201d as a means of transportation to attack
\ntheir preys (IMB, 2006). The use of pirate mother ships (fishing vessels converted to
\npirate vessels) allow the pirates to extend their attacks up to 700nm offshore for
\nhijacking of ships even, oil tankers. For example three Thai fishing vessels were
\nhijacked 1200nm of the coast of Somalia; the furthest reported (Geiss & Petrig, 2010,
\np.10). The extension of these attacks has caused a profound effect on sea trade and
\nseafarers alike. In 2011, Somali pirates attacked 237 vessels receiving an estimated US
\ndollars 160 million in ransom. The number of hostages and vessels held reached a peak
\nin February 2011, with reported 33 vessels and 733 hostages as being held by Somali
\npirates. As at 19 March 2012, 13 vessels and 197 hostages were held by pirates
\n(Rhinehard, 2012, p.9).
\n2.4 – Understanding the Gulf of Guinea
\nUnderstanding the geostrategic setting of the Gulf of Guinea would be necessary before
\nlooking at the dynamics of piracy in the region. The Gulf of Guinea starts from Senegal
\nto Angola with a distance of over 6,000 kilometer coastal arc which makes it a strategic
\ngeo-maritime area (Onuoha, 2012, p.4). (See figure 2).
\nFigure 2.Map of Gulf of Guinea
\nSource: 321 Energy (https:\/\/monkessays.com\/write-my-essay\/321energy.com\/editorials\/engdahl\/engdahl060506.html)
\n13
\nThe region is not only abundant in natural resources in oil and other hydrocarbons, but
\nalso fish, cocoa and timber (Crippa, 2012).According to experts, the Gulf of Guinea will
\nsurpass the Persian Gulf nations in the production of oil by 2020 (Paterson, 2007).
\nEstimates suggest the oil producing countries in the region will gain S200 billion from
\noil earnings and S349 billion by 2019(Onuoha, 2009, p.246).Angola and Nigeria are the
\nbiggest producers and have an output of around 2,000,000 barrels per day (bpd). CongoBrazzaville, Gabon and Equatorial-Guinea have extracted between 240,000 and 350,000
\nbpd. Equatorial Guinea started its production in the mid-1990s but Gabon is a longstanding oil producer. Cameroon\u2019s oil production stands at about 77,000 bpd (2009). It
\nis less known that both the Democratic Republic of Congo and Cote d\u2019Ivoire are also oil
\nproducers. Their current output is relatively small with 16,400 and 57,900 bpd
\nrespectively ( Basedau & M\u00e4hler 2011, p.74) .Ghana, Liberia and Sierra Leone are the
\nnext countries to enter the oil production and export business, with new deposits
\ndiscovered in their national waters in recent years (Crippa, 2012).
\nThe international geostrategic importance of the oil and gas reserves in the region is
\nbigger today because the oil found in the Gulf of Guinea is of very high quality and can
\nbe conveniently shipped to all major markets from there (Roll, 2011, p.14). For instance
\nNigeria supplies 10 percent of shipment of oil to the United States (Paterson, 2007).
\nThe ecosystem of the region is a source of global interest (Mane, 2005).Apart from oil
\n16 Gulf of Guinea and ECOWAS countries make up the Guinea Large Marine
\nEcosystem (GLME) which provides nutrient rich ecosystems for fish, prawns and other
\nmarine mammals to thrive. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
\nstatistics, fish production in 2010 was 800,000 tonnes for commercial, industrial, and
\nsubsistence fishing (Usoro, 2012, p. 56). Furthermore, the Gulf of Guinea benefits from
\nthe absence of narrow maritime lanes known as chokepoints that make shipping
\nsusceptible to blockades, pirate attacks, and shipping accidents (Mane, 2005, p.4). Hence
\n14
\na key hub of commercial maritime activities where growing investments in the region
\nmean that coastal trading and maritime traffic are bound to increase in the region. As
\nsuch maritime crimes like piracy, armed robbery at sea, drug trafficking, poaching and
\npollution will tend to increase. The most immediate concern to maritime stakeholders
\nand the shipping industry is the threat posed by piracy and armed robbery against ships
\n(Onuoha, 2012, p.4). Therefore the next section analyses piracy attacks in the region
\nwith a view to understanding the causes, consequences and remedies that may be needed
\nto put in place to secure the Gulf of Guinea.
\n2.5 – Analysis of Attacks in the Gulf of Guinea
\nThis section evaluates the piracy incidents from 1991 to the first quarter of 2012
\n(2012:Q1) based on statistics from the IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships
\nAnnual Reports 2000-2012. The analysis provides a framework for the kind of remedial
\nactions that can be taken to combat piracy and armed robbery against ships. The analysis
\nwould indicate the types of ships attacked, reasons for rise and decline of pirates attacks,
\ncountries most affected and comparisons between countries, regions and Africa in order
\nto find the proportions of incidents from various categories.
\n15
\nTable 1: Actual and Attempted Attacks against Ships in African and Gulf of Guinea waters between 1991 and 2012 (Q1)
\nAfrica 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total
\nAlgeria 1 1 2
\nAngola* 3 1 1 1 3 1 3 4 1 2 1 21
\nBenin * 1 1 20 1 23
\nCameroon* 3 5 3 2 7 5 2 4 2 1 2 3 5 44
\nCongo DR* 1 1 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 20
\nEgypt 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 3 14
\nEquatorial Guinea* 1 1 2
\nEritrea 1 1 2
\nGabon* 1 2 3 2 3 7 18
\nGhana * 1 2 2 4 2 2 5 5 3 5 3 3 1 7 3 2 2 52
\nGuinea* 1 1 2 3 2 6 6 3 2 4 5 1 4 2 5 6 5 58
\nGuinea Bissau * 1 1 2 1 5
\nGulf of Aden 13 11 11 18 8 10 10 13 92 117 53 37 8 401
\nIvory Coast* 1 4 4 1 5 5 9 5 2 4 3 1 3 2 4 1 3 57
\nKenya 7 5 2 1 1 4 2 1 1 24
\nLiberia* 1 2 1 1 1 6
\nMadagascar 1 1 3 1 1 1 8
\nMauritania 1 2 1 1 5
\nMorocco 1 1 1 1 1 1 6
\nMozambique 2 1 1 3 2 1 10
\nNigeria* 2 1 4 9 3 12 9 19 14 39 28 16 12 42 40 29 19 10 10 318
\nRed Sea 15 25 39 7 86
\nSenegal * 2 6 2 1 1 3 8 5 28
\nSierra Leone * 3 3 3 1 3 2 2 1 18
\nSomalia 1 14 4 5 9 14 9 8 6 3 2 35 10 31 19 80 139 160 28 577
\nSouth Africa 1 1 1 3
\nTanzania 2 1 2 3 4 3 3 2 7 3 5 2 7 9 11 14 5 1 1 85
\nThe Congo* 2 1 1 3 2 9
\nTogo* 1 1 1 1 1 2 6 13
\nTotal(Gulf of Guinea Nations*) 5 2 4 17 31 20 36 32 53 45 64 56 25 31 53 59 48 39 53 17 690
\nTotal (Africa) 7 6 20 24 41 41 55 67 85 71 93 73 80 61 120 189 266 259 293 64 1915
\nSource: Adapted from International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)-International Maritime Bureau (IMB) Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships
\nAnnual Reports 2000 \u2013 2012
\n*Gulf of Guinea Nations
\n*Q1- First Quarter
\n16
\n2.5.1- Trend Analysis
\nAccording to statistics from the International Chamber of Commerce- International
\nMaritime Bureau (ICC-IMB) Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships Annual reports,
\nthere were a total of 1,915 pirate attacks in Africa between 1991-2012 first quarter, see
\nTable 1 showing “Actual and Attempted Attacks against Ships in African and Gulf of
\nGuinea waters between 1991 – 2012 (first quarter)\u2019\u2019. As indicated in the table, there was
\na gradual increase of attacks from 1996, with a double rise in 2007 and steady increase
\ntill 2011. The figures rose from 120 in 2007 to 293 in 2011. This rise was attributed to
\npiracy off the Somalia coast, Gulf of Aden and Nigerian waters.
\nThe Gulf of Guinea which is the focus of this dissertation accounted for 690 of the 1,915
\nattacks in African waters between 1991-2012 first quarter. This figure indicated a rise in
\npiracy and shows an uneven trend of attacks in the Gulf of Guinea. There were no
\nreported attacks of piracy in 1991 and 1992 in the Gulf of Guinea. However, in 1993, 5
\nattacks were reported, that is 2 in Nigeria and 3 in Angola. Only 2 attacks were reported
\nin 1994 which rose to 4 in 1995. From this author`s personal experience in counterpiracy operations in Nigeria during the 1990s, it was widely accepted that the low
\nprevalence of piracy attacks could be attributed to the active presence and high
\noperational state of most naval forces in the region especially the Nigerian Navy. The
\nNigerian Navy fleet at the time was highly operational and used for ECOWAS
\nMonitoring Group (ECOMOG) Peace Support Operations in Liberia 1990-1999 and
\nSierra Leone 1991-2002.
\nReported attacks tripled to 17 in 1996, with a sharp rise to 31 in 1997 and dropped to 20
\nin 1998. The figures started an upward trend to 36 in 1999 and down to 32 in 2000.
\nBetween 1996 and 2000, Nigeria had 37 attacks, followed by the Ivory Coast and
\nGuinea with 19 each, Cameroon 13, Ghana 12, and Senegal 11. In 2001, Nigeria, the
\nIvory Coast and Cameroon with 19, 9, 7 attacks respectively accounted for 36 out of the
\n53 attacks that year. The attacks dropped to 45 in the Gulf of Guinea in 2002. However,
\n17
\nin 2003, 64 attacks were recorded, which was the highest since 1993. Nigeria waters had
\n39 attacks and according to IMB were regarded as the most dangerous area in Africa for
\npiracy and armed robbery against ships. However, 2003 saw a drop in attacks in
\nCameroon, Gabon and the Ivory Coast.
\nLooking at the table, there was a steep rise in attacks in Nigeria waters from 1993 to
\n2003. This could be attributed to deterioration of the Nigerian Navy Fleet endurance
\npatrol capacity as most of the ships could not be repaired after their long deployment for
\nthe ECOMOG peace support mission. This situation affected the operational capability
\nof Nigerian Navy ships and hence left most part of the Nigerian territorial waters
\nunpatrolled favoring rise of piracy (Usoro, 2012, p.55).
\nWith 28 attacks in Nigeria out of 56 reported in 2004, Nigeria was still regarded as the
\nmost dangerous area for piracy in Africa and third in the world aside Indonesia and the
\nMalacca Straits. This was due to the increasing intensity of militant attacks in the Niger
\nDelta region (Nincic, 2009). The Gulf of Guinea recorded 25 attacks in 2005 and 31
\nattacks in 2006. Incidence of attacks in Nigerian waters witnessed a decline from 16 in
\n2005 to 12 in 2006.According to IMB, this drastic reduction was attributed to increased
\nlaw enforcement patrols and international pressure on some governments to act and
\nincreased awareness and anti-piracy watches by ship Masters in risk prone areas. The
\nUS government at the time gave Nigeria 4 warships between 2003 and 2004 to enhance
\nher patrol duties against pirates (Usoro, 2012, p.55).
\nHowever, According to IMB, Nigeria had the most kidnapped victims in 2006, 49
\nagainst foreign oil workers. Local politics in Nigeria had an impact in shipping that year.
\nThis shows that whenever there is reduction in patrol, there is increase in piracy and vice
\nversa. There was significant increase to 53 attacks in 2007 and 59 in 2008 in the Gulf of
\nGuinea. Nigeria was responsible for a total of 82 attacks for the two years. According to
\nIMB, this rise was attributed to increase in militant activities in the Niger Delta region of
\nNigeria, where the Movement of Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) was carrying
\n18
\nout attacks to protest the marginalization of the Niger Delta. The Niger Delta pirates
\nattacked vessels successfully using“ mother vessels\u2019\u2019 further out at sea as well as being
\nbetter armed, organized and coupled with absence of proper law enforcement. The rise
\nindicated a breakdown in the law enforcement capability of the country to address the
\nproblem. In 2008 most attacks occurred in the territorial waters. By 2007, most of the
\nvessels obtained from the US were due for refit and thus affected their patrol capabilities
\n(Usoro, 2012, p.59).
\nThere was a decline in 2009 and 2010 to 48 and 39 attacks respectively. According to
\nIMB reports, this was partly due to acquisition of new patrol boats and increased patrols
\nby the Nigerian Navy and the granting of amnesty to the Niger Delta militants in August
\n2009. The militants submitted most of their arms used in criminal activities. As a result
\nof aggressive patrols, piracy spilled into neighboring states especially Benin. The
\nincrease of attacks to 53 in 2011 was attributed to the Niger Delta militants that rejected
\nthe Nigerian government amnesty offer. Ten reports were received for Nigeria and an
\nincrease in attacks in Benin to 20. It is interesting to note that from 1991 to 2010, Benin
\nhad only 2 attacks. According to IMB reports, the upsurge in piracy attacks in Benin was
\nsuspected to be carried out by pirates from Nigerian waters. Mohammed lends credence
\nto this statement and confirmed the Helpance of Nigeria to tackle the pirates
\n(I.Mohammed, personal communication, September 10, 2012).
\nThe pirates always operated in gang style fashion. According to the IMB Director, \u201cThe
\nattacks off West Africa follow a different modus operandi from pirate activity in other
\nparts of the world\u201d (International Chamber of Commerce, 2012). A case in point was the
\nattack on Energy Centurion Tanker on 28 August 2012, which coincided with the UN
\nbacked ECOWAS Maritime Security Conference, taking place in Togo at the time.
\nPirates in Togo hijacked the tanker Energy Centurion with the 24 Russian crew on board
\nand siphoned 3000 tons of the gas oil cargo. They did not ask for ransom, but took the
\ncrew\u2019s valuables. The vessel was seized 27km off the coast of Lome, Togo\u00b4s capital
\n19
\n.The hijackers steamed off with the tanker after a gunfight with the Togolese navy patrol
\n(Lowe, 2012).
\nPirates\u2019 attacks severely affected Benin economy and prompted the establishment of a
\njoint patrol codenamed Operation Prosperity by Nigeria and Benin navies. According to
\nIMB reports, first quarter of 2012, saw 10 reports of attacks in Nigeria, the same as
\nreported for the whole of 2011, and one reported for Benin, which has been attributed to
\nNigerian pirates. The reduction in the number of attacks was due to the joint patrol effort
\nof the Benin \u2013 Nigerian Navies. The trend of piracy attacks shows a correlation between
\npatrol efforts and presence of the Nigerian Navy fleet at sea.
\n2.5.2 – Total incidents in the Gulf of Guinea
\nThis subsection puts the absolute number of incidents described above in charts and
\ngraphs for better appreciation .Figure 3 shows trend of attacks actual and attempted
\ncombined in the Gulf of Guinea from 1991 till first quarter of 2012. As described above,
\nthere is an uneven trend with piracy and armed robbery at sea in the region. The chart
\nshows a steep rise of attacks from 1991 to 2003 (when it recorded the climax of
\nincidents accounting for about 9.3% of the total attacks within the period under review).
\nIn 2004, there was a slight decrease in attacks which further decreased the following
\nyear, but peaked again in 2006 with steady increase making another climax in 2008. A
\ngradual drop in attacks was recorded from 2009 to 2010, but, increased again in 2011.
\nNevertheless, the first quarter of 2012 recorded about 2.5% of the attacks within the
\nperiod and has already surpassed 1991 \u2013 1995 incidents, currently standing at about
\n32.1% of the total incidents recorded in 2011. This indicates that if proper mechanisms
\nare not put in place, 2012 may be worse hit by pirates\u2019 attacks than 2011.
\n20
\nFigure 3: Total Incidents in the Gulf of Guinea from 1991-2012(Q1) (Source: ICC-IMB, Annual Piracy
\nReports, 2000-2012.)
\n2.5.3 – Total incidents in the Gulf of Guinea by Country
\nFigures 4 and 5 shows the amount of attacks in percentage with respect to the countries
\nwithin the region. From 1991-2012(Q1), Nigeria recorded the highest number of piracy
\nincidents, accounting for about 46.1% of the entire attacks over the period; this was
\nfollowed by Guinea (8.4%), the Ivory Coast (8.3%), Ghana (7.5%), and Cameroon
\n(6.4%). However, Equatorial Guinea recorded the least attacks at about 0.3% of the total
\nattacks over the period.
\n5
\n2
\n4
\n17
\n31
\n20
\n36
\n32
\n53
\n45
\n64
\n56
\n25
\n31
\n53
\n59
\n48
\n39
\n53
\n17
\n0
\n10
\n20
\n30
\n40
\n50
\n60
\n70
\n1991
\n1992
\n1993
\n1994
\n1995
\n1996
\n1997
\n1998
\n1999
\n2000
\n2001
\n2002
\n2003
\n2004
\n2005
\n2006
\n2007
\n2008
\n2009
\n2010
\n2011
\n2012:Q1
\nN\u00b0 of actual and attempted attacks in the Gulf of Guinea
\n21
\nFigure 4: Total Incidents in the Gulf of Guinea by Country (Source: ICC-IMB, Annual Piracy Reports,
\n2000-2012.)
\nFigure 5: Total Incidents in the Gulf of Guinea by Country (Source: ICC-IMB, Annual Piracy Reports,
\n2000-2012.)
\n2
\n5
\n6
\n7
\n13
\n18
\n18
\n20
\n21
\n23
\n28
\n44
\n52
\n57
\n58
\n318
\n0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350
\nEq. Guinea
\nGuinea Bissau
\nLiberia
\nThe Congo
\nTogo
\nGabon
\nSierra Leone
\nCongo DR
\nAngola
\nBenin
\nSenegal
\nCameroon
\nGhana
\nIvory Coast
\nGuinea
\nNigeria
\nTotal Attacks (1991-2012:Q1)
\nAngola
\n3%
\nBenin
\n3%
\nCameroon
\n6%
\nCongo DR
\n3% Eq. Guinea
\n0%
\nGabon
\n3%
\nGhana
\n8%
\nGuinea
\n8%
\nGuinea
\nBissau
\n1%
\nIvory Coast
\nLiberia 8%
\n1%
\nNigeria
\n46%
\nSenegal
\n4%
\nSierra
\nLeone
\n3%
\nThe Congo
\n1%
\nTogo
\n2%
\n22
\n2.5.4 – Total incidents in the Gulf of Guinea by Country in 2011
\nFigure 6 and 7 show the trend of attacks in 2011. This year is particularly interesting
\nbecause Benin republic experienced a new phenomenon of piracy, which seriously
\naffected her economy (see cost of piracy). She accounted for 37.7% of the attacks in
\n2011; as explained earlier, these attacks prompted the President of Benin to seek the
\nurgent response of the UN that culminated to UNSC Resolutions 2018 and 2039 and the
\nestablishment Joint Maritime patrol Operation Prosperity. Nigeria recorded (18.9%),
\nTogo (11.3%) and Guinea (9.4%). However, countries like Cameroon, Equatorial
\nGuinea, Gabon, Guinea Bissau, Liberia and Senegal did not record any incident in 2011.
\nFigure 6: Total Incidents in the Gulf of Guinea by Country for 2011 (Source: ICC-IMB, Annual Piracy
\nReport, 2012.)
\nAngola
\n2%
\nBenin
\n38%
\nCongo DR
\n8%
\nGhana
\n4%
\nGuinea
\n9%
\nIvory Coast
\n2%
\nNigeria
\n19%
\nSierra Leone
\n2%
\nThe Congo
\n6%
\nTogo
\n11%
\n23
\nFigure 7: Total Incidents in the Gulf of Guinea by Country for 2011 (Source: ICC-IMB, Annual Piracy
\nReport 2012.)
\n2.5.5 – Reported incidents in Africa and the Gulf of Guinea
\nFigure 8 show an extensive Assessment of the piracy incidents in Africa and the Gulf of
\nGuinea.The Gulf of Guinea accounted for about 71.4% of the piracy attacks in Africa in
\n1993, which dropped drastically to 20% in 1995, with a sharp surge to 70.8% in 1996
\nwhich increased to 75.6% the next year. Although 2003 witnessed the highest piracy
\nincidents in the Gulf of Guinea, 2004 recorded the greatest contribution (76.7%) to
\nattacks from the region when compared to Africa. Nevertheless, the proportion of piracy
\nincidents from the Gulf of Guinea has been reducing gradually since 2005, with the Gulf
\nof Guinea accounting for about 26.6% of the incidents in the first quarter of 2012.
\n0
\n0
\n0
\n0
\n0
\n0
\n1
\n1
\n1
\n2
\n3
\n4
\n5
\n6
\n10
\n20
\nCameroon
\nEq. Guinea
\nGabon
\nGuinea Bissau
\nLiberia
\nSenegal
\nAngola
\nIvory Coast
\nSierra Leone
\nGhana
\nThe Congo
\nCongo DR
\nGuinea
\nTogo
\nNigeria
\nBenin
\nTotal Attacks in 2011
\n24
\nFigure 8: Reported Incidents in Africa and the Gulf of Guinea (Source: ICC-IMB, Annual Piracy Reports,
\n2000-2012.)
\n2.5.6 – Reported incidents in the Gulf of Guinea and Nigeria
\nFigure 9 reveals the proportion of piracy incidents in the Gulf of Guinea that came from
\nNigeria. By 1993, Nigeria accounted for about 40% of the incidents in the Gulf of
\nGuinea, which dropped to zero (0%) by 1994, rose again to 25% in 1995; and fluctuating
\nbetween 15% (1998) and 64% (2005). By 2007, Nigeria recorded the highest incidents
\nof attacks and accounted for about 79.2% of the attacks in the Gulf of guinea.
\nNevertheless, this reduced gradually to 18.9% in 2011. However, considering 2012
\nseparately, Nigeria accounted for about 58.8% of the attacks in the Gulf of Guinea for
\nthe first quarter of 2012 already.
\n0
\n50
\n100
\n150
\n200
\n250
\n300
\n350
\nGulf of Guinea Africa
\n25
\nFigure 9 Reported Incidents in the Gulf of Guinea and Nigeria (Source: ICC-IMB, Annual Piracy Reports,
\n2000-2012.)
\n2.5.7 – Reported incidents between Africa the Gulf of Guinea and Nigeria
\nFigure 10 show the comparison of attacks between Africa, the Gulf of Guinea and
\nNigeria. In general, piracy incidents in Africa, the Gulf of Guinea and Nigeria shared a
\nsimilar trend from 1991 to 2006, with a gradual increase from 1995 to 2003, and a
\ndecrease in 2004 down to 2006. Nevertheless, while cases in Africa rose in 2007 to a
\nrecord high in 2011, incidents in the Gulf of Guinea and Nigeria increased slightly in
\n2007 and also decreased steadily till 2010. Meanwhile, in 2011 piracy cases rose in the
\nGulf of Guinea as Nigeria recorded a continued decrease from 2010.
\n0
\n10
\n20
\n30
\n40
\n50
\n60
\n70
\nAttacks 1991-2012(Q1)
\nGulf of Guinea Nigeria
\n26
\nFigure 10. Reported Incidents between Africa, the Gulf of Guinea and Nigeria (Source: ICC-IMB, Annual
\nPiracy Reports, 2000-2012.)
\n2.5.8 – Reported incidents between Africa, the Gulf of Guinea, Nigeria and Somalia
\nFigure 11 show a rise in piracy incidents in Africa, while attacks in the Gulf of Guinea
\nand Nigeria experienced a downward trend, incidents in Somalia rose to a record high in
\n2011 accounting for about 54.6% of the total attacks in Africa at the time.
\nFigure 11: Reported Incidents in Africa, the Gulf of Guinea, Nigeria and Somalia (Source: ICC-IMB,
\nAnnual Piracy Reports, 2000-2012.)
\n0
\n50
\n100
\n150
\n200
\n250
\n300
\n350
\nGulf of Guinea Africa Nigeria
\n0
\n50
\n100
\n150
\n200
\n250
\n300
\n350
\nGulf of Guinea Africa Nigeria Somalia
\n27
\n2.5.9 – Summary of Analysis of Attacks
\nThe following conclusions can be made from the analysis of incidents:
\nNigeria had the highest number of attacks (318) in the region during the period under
\nreview. The findings indicated certain factors were attributed for the high number of
\nattacks. These include violent attacks carried out by armed Niger Delta militants from
\nNigeria as a result of crisis in the Niger Delta region and poor operational state of most
\nNigerian Navy ships. There was a strong correlation between naval patrols (maritime
\nsecurity) and piracy. On the other hand, drop in piracy was also associated with social
\nprogrammes such as the amnesty programme instituted by Nigerian government. Other
\nmeasures that reduced piracy included international pressure, anti- piracy watches by
\nship crews as well as acquisition of new naval platforms used for sustained patrols.
\nTherefore, apart from military measures, piracy could also be suppressed by sociopolitical means and adoption of best management practices by ships.
\nThe findings also revealed that piracy is a transnational crime. The reduction in piracy in
\nNigeria led to increase in another country, Benin and further extended to Togo. This
\ngoes to show a regional approach in the form of a combined patrol and regional
\nagreement would be necessary to combat piracy and sea robbery. In addition pirates
\nseeking safe haven in other countries, could be stopped by arresting criminals if
\nadequate legislations are in place. A regional agreement could provide the platform for
\nhot pursuit and extradition. The analysis opens up challenges faced by countries in the
\nregion. For example lack of naval capacity and poor technological base for repair of
\nships. The subsequent sections will discuss in details some factors and impact of piracy
\nas well as the challenges faced by the region in combating piracy.
\n2. 6 – Factors responsible for rise in Piracy
\nBefore commanders go to battle, a thorough assessment of the enemy\u2019s strength and
\nweaknesses must be made in order to ensure victory. In this circumstance, it is important
\nthat the causes and reasons for piracy are understood so that appropriate suggestions are
\n28
\nmade to tackle the maritime crime. Hence, there are several interrelated factors
\nresponsible for the persistence of piracy. This section will look at some of these factors
\npeculiar to the Gulf of Guinea.
\n2.6.1 – Conflict and Disorder
\nPiracy and criminal activities flourish in coastal areas where there is civil strife and
\ndisorder, or their aftermath (Murphy, 2009, p.168). West Africa has witnessed many
\nconflicts. The region remains fragile with Cote d\u2019Ivoire recovering from civil war, and
\ncrisis in Guinea and Guinea Bissau (Dokubo, 2010, p.144). The menace of piracy in
\nNigeria is traced to the Niger Delta region. The Movement for the Emancipation of the
\nNiger Delta became a coalition of local groups of militants protesting marginalization in
\nNigeria. The militants attacked vessels and oil platforms in and around the Niger Delta.
\nOver time, it became almost impossible to establish whether a piracy incident was
\npolitically or criminally motivated as the perpetrators often operated interchangeably
\n(Crippa, 2011). Drug trafficking is another maritime crime fitting together with piracy
\nin the Gulf of Guinea. The Gulf of Guinea is becoming a major hub where a sizeable
\namount of cocaine was seized around Cape Verde, the Canary Islands and Madeira in
\nvessels manned by crews from the sub-region (Gilpin, 2007). This state of conflict and
\ndisorder tends to fuel piracy.
\n2.6.2 – Underfunded Law Enforcement\/Inadequate Security
\nMany states are financially constrained to sustain navies, coast guards that can patrol the
\nlength and breadth of their maritime environment thereby encouraging pirates to operate
\nwith impunity (Murphy, 2009, p.168).These weak internal security forces, which are
\nunder-trained, poorly equipped, incapable of effectively policing their internal waters,
\nare also badly in need of education on human rights (Goldwyn & Morrison, 2005).
\nPirates take advantage of these shortcomings to commit crimes illegal activities
\n(Ibrahim, 2009, p.127).
\n29
\n2.6.3 – Poor Governance and Permissive Political Environment
\nPoor governance is a factor that has fuelled rising incidences of insecurity in the region.
\nThe social and economic upheaval that followed bad governance undermined national
\nand sub-regional security (Alli, 2010, p.70). To that end, and to promote good
\ngovernance and security in Africa, Dr Mo Ibrahim, a wealthy Sudanese mobile
\ncommunication businessman established a five million United States dollar prize for the
\nAfrican President adjudged to be the best in terms of good governance (Alli, 2010,
\np.70). Furthermore, piracy thrives where there are weak laws and lax law enforcement as
\na result of a weak state. Permissive environments exist within states and their territorial
\nwaters because the political environment is corrupt or allow illegal activity to take place
\nfor its benefit, or because law enforcement is underfunded and as a result a criminal
\norganization can develop. The likelihood is that corrupt law enforcement officials are a
\nfeature of all areas affected by piracy (Murphy, 2010, p.169).
\n2.6.4 – Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons
\nIllicit small arms and light weapons used by criminal gangs have intensified the lethality
\nof armed violence in West Africa (Golwa, 2010, p .119). The proliferation of small arms
\nin West Africa is as a consequence of current and past conflict zones, corrupt law
\nenforcement and military personnel selling their weapons as well as domestic artisan
\nproduction from Senegal, Guinea, Ghana and Nigeria which passes down established
\nroutes (Dokubo, 2010, p.145). For example there were an estimated 75,000 illegal craft
\nguns circulating in Ghana, constituting the vast majority of the 125,000 unregistered
\nweapons in the country (Kieli, 2008, p.7). Similarly, the Nigerian Maritime
\nAdministration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) raised alarm over the influx of illegal
\narms into Nigerian waters by some shipping firms involved in unauthorized mid-stream
\ndischarge. The Director General of NIMASA explained that most of these arms and
\nammunition are the same arms used by Niger Delta pirates and oil thieves (Oritse,
\n2012).
\n30
\n2.6.5 – Unemployment and Poverty
\nFailure of poor government policies to provide basic necessities has made unemployed
\nyouths ready hands for violent or criminal organizations. For instance, in Sierra Leone
\nwhere despite disarmament, the unemployed youths still jumped at another opportunity
\nto pick up arms in the Liberian Civil war (Dokubo, 2010, p.143).To support the earlier
\nmentioned statement, Mbiah (2007) describes paucity of legitimate employment
\nopportunities and general lack of regional economic development as a pull factor that
\nhave encouraged coastal inhabitants to partake in crimes like maritime piracy (Mbiah,
\n2007, p.130). However, though statistics are unreliable, there is general agreement that
\naround 51 percent of the Niger Delta\u2019s people still live on $2 or less a day, only 49
\npercent have access to safe drinking water and there is one secondary school for every
\n14,679 children (Newsom, 2011, p.5). These conditions could push individuals into
\nunproductive ventures. Table 2 illustrates the relative medium to low living standards in
\nthe region which could indicate fertile ground for criminal acts like piracy.
\nTable 2: Human Development Index in the Gulf of Guinea
\nCountry
\nHuman Development Index (HDI)
\nHDI- 2009 HDI-2010 HDI-2011
\nRanks (general level)
\nAngola 143 (medium) 146(low) 148( low)
\nCongo-Kinshasa 176 (low) 168(low) 187(low)
\nCongo-Brazzaville 136 (medium) 126( medium) 137(medium)
\nGabon 103 (medium) 93(medium) 106(medium)
\nEquatorial Guinea 118 (medium) 117(medium) 136 (medium)
\nSao Tome 131 (medium) 127(medium) 144( low)
\nCameroon 153 (medium) 131(low) 150(low)
\nNigeria 158 (medium) 142(low) 156(low)
\nBenin 161 (low) 134(low) 167(low)
\nTogo 159 (low) 139(low) 162 (low)
\nGhana 152 (medium) 130(low) 135 (medium)
\nCote d\u2019Ivoire 163 (medium) 149(low) 170 (low)
\nLiberia 169 (low) 162(low) 182(low)
\nSierra Leone 180 (low) 158(low) 180(low)
\n(Sources: Basedau, M., & M\u00e4hler, A. (2011); Human Development Index Reports (2010-2011))
\n31
\n2.6.7 – Promise of Reward
\nThe great financial reward of pirate activity has arisen as a motivator for this crime
\n(Otto, 2011). The promise of comfort and expensive cars often lure unemployed youths
\nto engage in piracy which has become a thriving business. (Nincic, 2009, p.7).
\nAccording to the confession of the alleged leader of the hijack of MT Energy Centurion
\nrecently arrested, financiers of cargo oil theft business in Nigeria promised his gang 16
\nmillion naira( about102,000 US dollars) to hijack an oil tanker( Bilesanmi &
\nAmata,2012). Murphy (2010) notes that piracy is a low risk high paying job when
\ncompared to other lines of work, pirates qualify for (Murphy, 2010).
\n2.6.8 – Favourable Geography
\nFavorable geography facilitates and even provides safe havens for pirates (Murphy,
\n2007, p.14). The geography of the Nigerian Delta region with many creeks and swamps,
\nmake the region extremely difficult to police and thus enables pirates to escape after
\ncommitting illegalities (Ukeje, 2009, p.8).
\n2.6.9 – Crude Oil Theft and Illicit Bunkering
\nFuelling piracy are organized crime syndicates operating major crude theft operations
\nfrom the Niger Delta in Nigeria. They are backed by well-armed and increasingly wellfinanced militias (David & Morrison, 2005). In addition, the complex geography of the
\nregion, with a labyrinthine network comprising thousands of creeks and swamps and
\nexistence of an established international market for stolen oil which involves partners in
\nthe Gulf of Guinea (Cote D\u2019Ivoire, Gambia, Liberia, Sao Tome and Principe)
\nencourages illicit bunkering providing cash or exchange for weapons (Obasi, 2011,p.59).
\n2.7 – Modus Operandi of Pirates
\nIf any cooperative arrangement is going to be made to tackle piracy in the Gulf of
\nGuinea, it would be essential to know the modus operandi of the pirates.
\n32
\nIn the Gulf of Guinea, piracy has moved over the years from low-level armed robberies
\nto hijackings, cargo thefts, and large-scale robberies. Pirates often take hijacked tankers
\nto another empty tanker to collect its siphoned fuel to be sold on the black market. The
\noriginal vessel is then brought back and released (McNamee, 2012). A case in point
\naccording to IMB 2011 report, took place on 13 September 2011, where a product tanker
\nMT Mattheos 1, was hijacked and attacked by armed pirates around 62 nautical miles
\nfrom Benin coast. The pirates took hostage of all the 23 crew members and hijacked the
\ntanker. They forced the master to sail to an unknown location, where the tanker was
\nransacked and some items stolen. The pirates released the vessel after a few days.
\nWith respect to the above-mentioned, pirate attacks are often violent and are carried out
\nby assailants armed with automatic weapons and using different types of small boats.
\nMost of the attacks are targeted at expatriates, many of whom are kidnapped for ransom
\n(Fouch\u00e9, 2010a, p.154; IMB, 2006, p.17). In the words of Lieutenant General Victor
\nMalu, a former Nigeria Chief of Army Staff:
\nThe boys in the creeks of Niger Delta operate with military precision and with all
\nthe modern weapons of warfare. The skills with which they use these weapons of
\nwarfare make people to believe that insiders and some influential people at the
\ntop are behind them. More daring is the fact that these boys operate with satellite
\nphones to ease communication. They have modern guns and other high-tech
\nweapons and that is why they easily defy security. They are very strategic in their
\nactivities. (Idehen, 2008, p.477).
\nThe numerous attacks and hijackings of ships taking place in the Gulf of Guinea such as
\nthe attack on MT Mattheos 1 are labeled as major criminal attacks by IMB reports.
\nAccording to Beckman (2002), this kind of criminal attack involves detailed planning
\nand organization. The attack can be described as a major transnational organized crime
\nat sea and are very serious because they involve great losses to ship owners, risk to lives
\nof crew and navigational safety (Beckman, 2002, p. 321).The IMB reports also state
\n33
\nmany attacks occur at ports, anchorages and coastal waters under the jurisdiction of Gulf
\nof Guinea coastal states. For example IMB 2007 report, specify 13 attacks against
\nanchored ships in Benin waters. By the definition of piracy in UNCLOS 1982, many of
\nthese attacks cannot be classified as piracy, which as discussed earlier occurs at high
\nseas or the Exclusive Economic Zone. Therefore UNCLOS 1982 will inadequate to try
\nsuspected pirates in territorial waters.
\nIn 1985, an Italian Cruise liner Achille Lauro was hijacked by a Palestinian armed
\nterrorist group. The terrorists took control of the vessel and demanded for the release of
\ntheir confederates in Israel prisons. In course of the hijacking, an unarmed and disabled
\npassenger was killed and thrown overboard. This incident led IMO to develop the
\nConvention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime
\nNavigation (SUA) 1988 (Mejia, 2007, p.173). According to Hesse (2007), the SUA
\nConvention provides the legal basis for action to be taken against persons committing
\nunlawful acts against ships, including seizure of ships by force, acts of violence against
\npersons on board ships, and the placing of devices likely to cause damage or destroy the
\nship (Hesse, 2007,p.193). As earlier described, serious hijackings, seizures, exercise of
\ncontrol by force and hostage taking against ships in the Gulf of Guinea could come
\nunder the purview of offences of the 1988 SUA Convention. The SUA Convention is an
\nenabling law to repress serious pirate attacks in the Gulf of Guinea. The next section will
\ndiscuss the cost and impact of the operations of these pirates in the Gulf of Guinea.
\n2. 8 – Economic Cost and Impact of Piracy
\nIn terms of cost of piracy, One Earth Future Working Paper (2010) analyses the direct
\neconomic costs of piracy, which include the following: the cost of ransoms, piracy
\ninsurance premiums, deterrent equipment, re-routing vessels away from piracy risk
\nzones, naval deployments in piracy hot zones and piracy prosecutions (Bowden,2010).
\nThis section will look at the relevant costs of piracy to the Gulf of Guinea.
\n34
\n2.8.1 – Cost of Insurance
\nIn reaction to the growing threat and cost of ransoms, the maritime insurance industry
\nhas responded by increasing its shipping rates and premiums, especially in designated
\nhigh-risk piracy zones ((Bowden,2010).). Following increased attacks in the Gulf of
\nGuinea, the Joint War Committee, representing Lloyd\u2019s of London underwriters and
\nother insurers, listed Nigeria, and Benin as higher risk for shipping on August 1, 2011.
\nThe Nigerian risk zone now extends to 200 nautical miles. This implies additional cost
\nfor ships entering Nigeria and Benin waters (Bockmann, 2011). Further, The
\nInternational Bargaining Forum, a body of seafarers, has warned its members to avoid
\nNigerian waters as they declared the country \u2018high risk area\u2019 too with effect from April
\n2012 following increased attacks on vessels and crew members. This also has a
\ndamaging cost implication on shipment into Nigeria and Benin waters (Oritse, 2012).
\n2.8.2 – Cost to Food Price Inflation
\nApproximately 40% of piracy attacks have been on bulk carriers and general cargo
\nvessels. Pirate attacks on these vessels have direct effect on the price of food staples
\nwhich bulk carriers have as deliveries of food cargo is delayed, or in the case of
\nperishable goods, lost (Bowden, 2010, p.22). To support this statement, Figure 12
\nshows the number of attacks by ship types. The most attacked ships in order of
\nfrequency are bulk carriers, general cargo, tanker crude oil, chemical product and fishing
\ntrawlers. Bulk carriers may be targeted probably because they have low freeboards
\n(short distance and the deck) (Murphy, 2010, p.46). Interestingly, there are apparently no
\nreported attacks on warships, probably because they are armed vessels.
\n35
\nFigure 12: Attacks by Ship Types from 1991 to 2011 (Source: ICC-IMB, Annual Piracy Reports, 2000-
\n2012.)
\n2.8.3 – Cost of Reduced Foreign Revenue
\nPiracy can have significant cost on foreign revenue (Bowden, 2010) .All these pirates\u2019
\nattacks and other maritime crimes have resulted in Countries of the Gulf of Guinea
\nlosing $2 billion annually. For instance, Benin saw a 70% decrease in 2011 in the
\nnumber of ships entering its main port of Cotonou, which carries 90% of Benin\u2019s trade,
\nrepresenting 80% of the government\u2019s budget (McNamee, 2012). Further piracy affected
\nBenin\u2019s trade with landlocked States, including Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger that
\ndepend on Cotonou port, which is one of the major transit ports servicing these
\nlandlocked States (UNSC, 2012a).
\n0
\n200
\n400
\n600
\n800
\n1000
\n1200
\n1400
\nTotal Attacks by Ship Types (1991-2011)
\n36
\nSimilarly, Nigeria\u2019s oil industry and ships directly targeted by Niger Delta militants
\nwitnessed a drop in oil production by around 20% in 2006. Nigeria was losing 10% of its
\ndaily oil output (approximately 100,000 barrels) valued at $1.5 million every day at the
\ntime (Bowden, 2010).Due to volatility of regions affected by piracy, foreign investors
\nmay look for alternative regions to invest their money. For instance if Ghana does not
\nadequately protect its waters, her tourism industry might be affected (Bowden, 2010).
\n2.8.4 – Cost of Naval Deterrence
\nThe Nigeria and Benin republic joint maritime patrol is costing Benin an estimated
\n$466,000 US Dollars per month, which is equivalent to 5 per cent of the total cost of the
\noperation, of which Nigeria is bearing 95 per cent of the logistical support cost (UNSC,
\n2012a, p.6).
\n2.8. 5 – Impact on Seafarers
\nThe cost of piracy is not purely economic (Murphy, 2010, p.54). According to IMB
\nreports, between 2000 and 2011, 1,214 seafarers suffered some form of violence in the
\nGulf of Guinea. For instance, Benin had 140 seafarers taken hostage in 2011, which was
\nthe second highest number in the world after Somalia. The impact of piracy on humans
\ncannot be quantified, because some seafarers may have varying levels of long term
\ndistress even after violence on them (Hurlburt & Mody, 2012, p.11). Seafarers even on
\nlarge ships are apprehensive and even afraid when they pass through pirate prone areas.
\nThose that have suffered attacks are unwilling to return to sea (Murphy, 2010, p.54).
\nFortunately, most victims are able to recover after treatment from health care
\nprofessionals (Hurlburt & Mody, 2012, p.11). Apart from the seafarers themselves, their
\nfamilies and friends are even traumatized by long periods of agony, thinking of their
\nloved ones in captivity or even being killed. All the above experiences make the human
\ncost of piracy incalculable.
\n37
\n2.8.6 – Potential Environmental Impact
\nPiracy can cause environmental and navigational hazards as a result of violent attacks on
\nships carrying liquid petroleum cargoes. During a piracy attack, a ship may be
\ncompletely taken over and the crew locked up in a central place, leaving the ship without
\na helmsman to steer, and as a result end up colliding with another ship (Talley & Rule,
\n2008, p.93). For instance a tugboat, Lamnalco Waxbill, in the Niger Delta in Nigeria,
\nwas attacked and the crew abducted by gunmen. The vessel was later found drifting with
\na dead body onboard (Onuoha & Hassan, 2009, p. 19).
\nFurthermore, a spike in violence in the Niger Delta in Nigeria or attacks on super tankers
\nmight shoot up oil prices by $10 or more per barrel. The possibilities of terrorist attacks
\nare there because Nigeria\u2019s growing Liquefied Natural Gas sector large multi-billion
\ndollar facilities could be conspicuous new potential targets (Goldwyn & Morrison,
\n2005).
\n2.8.7 – Political Impact
\nPiracy can have a damaging effect on the political image of a country. A country could
\nbe termed as weak and incapable of protecting lives and properties through its law
\nenforcement agencies causing embarrassment to the nation on the international scene. In
\naddition, the crime demoralizes the citizens and gives false sense of power to the pirates
\nover security agencies (Ekpeyong, 1983). The Benin government was unable to function
\nin the short term as a result of piracy. This situation also hampered its efforts to
\nconsolidate democratic governance, and attract foreign investments in Benin\u2019s oil fields
\n(UNSC, 2012a, p.6).
\n2.8.8 – Impact on Fishing
\nThe fishing industry was greatly affected by piracy in Nigeria. It reached the point that
\nmany captains of fishing vessels refused to put sea (Nincic, 2009).As a consequence, in
\n2008, over 170 Nigerian fishing vessels were idle due to the piracy risk, which
\n38
\nthreatened about 50,000 jobs. Nigeria lost about $600 million in export earnings due to
\npiracy threats to its fisheries (Bowden, 2010).
\nFurther, prices of seafood increased astronomically as a result of the scarcity of fish,
\nthereby an important protein source was out of the reach of most of the average citizens
\n(Nincic, 2009). Nigerian pirates also caused similar piracy problems among fishermen
\nelsewhere in the Gulf of Guinea (Nincic, 2009). In 2011, Benin was experiencing a
\nmonthly loss of $1 million in its fishing sector (UNSC, 2012a).
\n2.9 – Conclusion
\nFrom the analysis of this section, piracy is encouraged by interrelated factors and causes.
\nThe promise of reward was identified as an easy way for pirates especially Niger Delta
\nmilitants to make money. This situation is probably accentuated by high unemployment
\nand poverty pervading many Gulf of Guinea countries. In addition, crisis prone areas
\ncoupled with disorder encouraged the persistence of piracy. A classic example is the
\nNiger Delta crisis in Nigeria. The Niger Delta geographical feature makes it even easier
\nfor pirates to escape after attacking ships. The lack of adequate platforms of the law
\nenforcement agents makes it difficult to pursue them.
\nThe high number of illicit small arms sourced from illegal oil proceeds for example
\nemboldened pirates to attack ships especially oil tankers, bulk carriers and fishing
\nvessels. These attacks have had huge impacts on prices of food commodities, shipping
\ncosts, reduced revenue for the region and trauma on seafarers. The modus operandi of
\nthe pirates which involve violence especially assault, hostage taking suggest the
\nappropriateness of the SUA Convention to repress piracy in the region. The relevance of
\nthis section brings to fore the wider implications of not combating piracy. Hence the
\nnext chapter looks at efforts in combating piracy and the challenges hampering these
\nefforts.
\n39
\nChapter 3
\n3 – Assessment of Current Efforts to Combat Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea
\nFollowing increased piracy attacks, there have been numerous engagements at national,
\nbilateral, multilateral, regional and international levels to combat piracy and secure the
\nmaritime environment of the Gulf of Guinea. This section will discuss some of the
\nmeasures in the succeeding paragraphs.
\n3.1 – National Measures
\nAt the national level, for instance, the Nigerian government established in January
\n2012, a Joint Maritime Task Force led by army officer, known as Operation Pulo Shield,
\nwhich was transformed from Operation Restore Hope initially established to tackle
\nmilitancy in the Niger Delta .The Operation Pulo Shield is mandated to combat piracy,
\narmed robbery at sea and crude oil theft among other crimes (Onuoha, 2012, p10).
\nAccording to Udoh, \u201cthe Nigerian Army recently acquired some flat bottom boats to
\nenhance the operational effectiveness of the amphibious units in the Operation Pulo
\nShield. However the Joint Task Force is challenged by the large expanse of area to patrol
\ncoupled with the organization and sophistication of the pirates\u201d (E.Udoh, personal
\ncommunication, September 3, 2012).
\nOn the other hand, the Nigerian Navy hierarchy has set out a transformation programme
\nto acquire a new mix of warships to enhance maritime security. For instance, between
\nJanuary and April 2012, the newly acquired Nigerian Navy Ship Thunder which was
\ndeployed for intensive patrol duties arrested over seven ships with illegal consignments
\n(Bashir, 2012).
\nFurther, of blessed memory, Alhaji Umaru Musa Yar\u2019Adua, deceased President of
\nNigeria in 2007, introduced the amnesty programme for Niger Delta Militants in 2009.
\nThis amnesty programme drastically reduced piratical attacks in 2009 as indicated in the
\nIMB reports, as many of the militants responsible for piracy surrendered their arms and
\n40
\nembraced the programme. According to Onuoha (2012) over 15 000 militants lay down
\ntheir arms and ammunition including about 2,760 various guns, 287, 445 ammunitions ,
\n18 gunboats, 763 dynamites, 1,090 dynamite caps, 3,155 magazines and other military
\nitems ( Onuoha ,2012,p.7) .
\nIt is instructive to note that the current President, GoodLuck Jonathan, is implementing
\nthe amnesty programme to the letter. Hence, the recent drop of piracy in Nigerian
\nwaters. The success of the programme changed the fortunes of oil production in Nigeria
\nfrom a low 700,000 barrels per day to the current level of 2.6million barrels per day. The
\nmilitants, who have made the waterways unsafe have all been evacuated from the creeks
\nand have been rehabilitated at various institutions in Nigeria and abroad. A total of 5,204
\nex-militants are currently undergoing various forms of skills acquisition training, while
\n6,280 delegates had already been processed for deployment to local and foreign training
\ninstitutions. The rehabilitation of the militants has resulted in the creating relative peace
\nand security in the region (“Fast-tracking\u2019\u2019, 2012).
\nSimilarly, according to Balogun, \u201cthe Nigerian Air force has signed a memorandum of
\nunderstanding with NIMASA for the aerial patrol of Nigeria waters to report real time
\nsuspicious activities at sea. This is similar to the Eyes in the Sky initiative that was
\nlaunched to support the antipiracy efforts of Malaysia-Singapore-Indonesia coordinated
\nPatrols in South East Asia (Storey, 2008, p.116). However political issues might arise if
\nthe wrong persons are attacked by warplanes suspected to be carrying out illegal
\nactivities. This is because it would be difficult to differentiate between a militant or
\npirate\u201d (N. Balogun, personal communication, September 4, 2012).
\nElsewhere in Ghana, the Navy took delivery of four new patrol ships as part of efforts to
\nboost the naval fleet. The late President J.E.A. Mills emphasized at the commissioning
\nof the Ghana navy ships that \u201cWith the increasing incidents of piracy and other related
\nmaritime crimes, we have no option than to equip our Navy to be able to guarantee a
\n41
\nsecure environment where all legitimate entities can operate freely without hindrance.\u201d
\n(Daniel, 2012).
\n3.2 – Bilateral Measures
\nAt the regional level, there are various bilateral and multilateral arrangements to tackle
\npiracy. The Nigerian Navy commenced a joint patrol with the Republic of Benin, code
\nnamed \u2018Operation Prosperity\u2019 led by Nigerian Navy personnel in October 2011. Three
\nwar ships, all from Nigeria, including five support vessels, two defender boats and
\nhelicopters are involved in the exercise (Usman, 2011). This was an initiative of the
\nPresidents of Nigeria and Benin. According to Dieng, \u201cthe maritime operation is a
\npolitical arrangement not a legal one\u201d (A. Dieng, personal communication, September 4,
\n2012). Therefore there is the need enhance the legal aspects especially in the prosecution
\nof piracy suspects.
\nAn IMO\/Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa (MOWCA)Forum in
\nOctober 2006, agreed to the establishment of an integrated coast guard function network
\nfor West and Central African countries which among other things agreed to cooperate in
\nseveral areas such as combating piracy, armed robbery against ships and other maritime
\ncrimes (Addico,2008) . According to Diop, \u201capart from Nigeria, Cape Verde and Cote d
\n\u00b4Ivoire, the implementation of the sub regional coast guard network in other states is
\nfraught with challenges. These include poor legislative framework, poor institutional
\narrangements, lack of funding and inadequate skilled human resources\u201d (A. Diop,
\npersonal communication, October 14, 2012).
\nIn addition, in response to UNSC Resolution 2018 on the need for an anti-piracy strategy
\nand regional cooperation, ECOWAS and the Economic Community of Central African
\nStates (ECCAS) during their meeting in Benin from 26-29 March 2012 signed a
\nmemorandum of understanding in Benin to combat piracy, robbery at sea and other
\nillicit activities in the region ( Chuter ,2012).
\n42
\nAccording to Dieng, \u201cfollowing the recorded success of Nigerian Navy\/ Benin
\nOperation Prosperity, ECOWAS held a workshop from 28-29 August 2012 to draft a
\nmultilateral agreement for the establishment of a proposed Zone that would comprise
\nBenin, Niger, Nigeria and Togo of the maritime region of West Africa to suppress illicit
\nMaritime activities. It is instructive to note that Niger, a landlocked country is part of
\nZone E because of her heavy dependence on the Benin ports for importation of goods
\nand commodities. The Zone E arrangement is a replication of the commendable efforts
\nof the maritime patrols zoning system (A, C and D) of ECCAS\u201d (A. Dieng, personal
\ncommunication, September 4, 2012).
\nAlbeit, ECCAS member States relatively comprehensive collective anti-piracy
\narchitecture over the past three years, their efforts were still limited in scope and
\neffectiveness as individual Central African States were finding it increasingly difficult to
\ncontinue to finance and support naval operations on their own (UNSC , 2012a).
\nHowever, the collaboration between ECCAS and ECOWAS to combat piracy is a
\nprospect for enhanced cooperation.
\n3.3 – Multilateral Measures
\nIn 2005, US introduced its National Strategy for Maritime Security which included
\nplans to improve maritime capacities of African coastal states. In 2007, the US
\nestablished Africa Command (AFRICOM) and in conjunction with United States Navy
\nhas been conducting several activities through its Global Fleet Concept in African
\nPartnership Station (APS) to build capacities of African navies to enforce maritime laws
\n(Ploch, 2011,p.16).The APS conducts joint exercises, port visits and practical
\nprofessional training with the coastal nations( Ezeobi, 2012).In terms of funding, the
\nU.S has provided 35 million dollars, since 2007 to regional states to build maritime
\nsecurity capacity such as coastal radars, equipment, boats, and associated training. The
\nlatter resulted in developing the first multi-national maritime exercise in the Gulf of
\nGuinea, the Obangame Express 2012, over a two-day period (Galamas & Bilala, 2012).
\n43
\n3.4 – The United Nations Response
\nGiven the Gulf of Guinea\u2019s relative economic importance (Nelson & Ware, 2012), and
\nseriousness of the threat the UN sent an assessment mission to West Africa to evaluate
\nthe situation (Rhinehard, 2012). In addition ,United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
\nadopted UNSC resolutions 2018 (2011) and 2039 (2012), expressing concern about the
\nthreat posed by piracy and armed robbery to international navigation and called for
\ninteragency and littoral states (UNSC,2011;UNSC,2012c). To that end, the UN
\nspecifically advocated for a regional conference in concert with the African Union to
\nelaborate on a regional strategy to fight piracy (Philips, 2012).
\n3.5 – Challenges hampering efforts in combating Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea
\nBefore discussing the strategies to combat piracy in the Gulf of Guinea sub region, it is
\nnecessary to look at some of the challenges that could be obstacles to cooperation in the
\nregion. This necessity is based on historical antecedents. According to Fajriyansah
\n(2007) conducting a war against piracy is a heavy and complicated task. Many problems
\nand challenges must be faced by the states and international organizations because every
\nyear the piracy number of attacks remains high (Fajriyansah, 2007, p.121). Giving
\ncredence to this statement, Bateman (2005) ,stated that the proposal for a Regional
\nMaritime Surveillance and Safety Regime for Southeast Asian waters suggested by the
\nInstitute of Strategic and International Studies in Malaysia was marred by several
\ndifficulties such as lack of clear interest between possible member states, regional
\nsensitivities to particular issues including fishing and disputed maritime claims
\n(Bateman, 2005,p.261).It is on this premise that this section looks at challenges
\nhampering the efforts to tackle piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.
\nThese challenges inter alia are lack of political will, poor maritime domain awareness
\nand maritime border disputes. Others include poor technological base, inadequate
\ninteragency cooperation, inadequate capacity of navies and coast guards, increasing
\ninfluence of extra regional powers and weak legal framework.
\n44
\n3.5.1 – Lack of Political Will
\nIn many developing countries, the political will to adequately fund naval assets
\nacquisition and maritime operations is lacking (Usoro, 2012). Often most of the region\u2019s
\npolicy makers and politicians lack the understanding of the importance of maritime
\nsecurity. As a result, maritime strategy, a very strong concept to ensure the adequate
\nsafety and protection of the maritime environment is relegated to the background
\n(Quashie, 2010) .According to Dieng,\u201d most states in West Africa do not have a national
\nmaritime strategy\u201d. The maritime strategy project ( help with nursing paper writing from experts with MSN & DNP degrees) is often seen as an unproductive
\nexercise (Quashie, 2010).There is no gainsaying that an \u201cunwavering political will is
\ncritical to any successful strategy is lacking due to vestiges of a land centric approach\u201d
\n(Gilpin, 2007). Apart from the ECOMOG operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the
\n1990s, no large peacekeeping operation within Africa had involved naval forces (
\nIbrahim, 2009).However, there is still much to be done to educate policy makers on the
\nderivable benefits from a well-protected maritime environment (Quashie,2010). If not
\nadequately addressed, the lack of political will can militate against the establishment of a
\nstrategy to combat piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.
\n3.5.2 – Maritime Border Disputes
\nThe primary obstacle that hinders interstate cooperation anywhere is concern over
\nsovereignty (Murphy, 2010, p.82).Where claims of two or more coastal states intersect
\nfor reasons of territorial, contiguous , Exclusive Economic Zone or continental shelf
\ndelimitation, complex issues or disputes are often raised (Cozens, 2005 ,p.116). This
\nrestraint is reinforced by a certain lack of political commitment to many cooperative
\nactivities and can be manifested also in the failure to implement or comply with
\ninternational instruments (Bateman, 2001). Examples of maritime disputes in the Gulf of
\nGuinea include those between: Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon over an island at the
\nmouth of the Ntem River; and Gabon and Equatorial Guinea over the Mbane Island and
\nCorisco Bay boundaries (Gilpin, 2007). On the other hand, recently, there have been
\n45
\ncalls for the Nigerian government to appeal the International Court of Justice judgment
\nof 2002 in the land and maritime boundary dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria
\nceding the Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon. To ensure a peaceful coexistence with
\nCameroon, the Nigerian government decided not to pursue the review of the case
\n(Ibegwam, 2012). This act by the Nigerian government indicates prospects for enhanced
\ncooperation in the region. In contrast, if maritime disputes are not properly resolved
\ncertain states might take actions based on self-interest and jeopardize any effort to
\nenhance maritime security.
\n3.5.3 – Inadequate Inter \u2013Agency Cooperation
\nConflicting and duplicity of national polices and legislation in many African states has
\nbeen a challenge to regional cooperation in maritime issues. Often times there are two
\nregional organizations with similar mandates which operate in the same area without any
\ntangible effort to harmonize their operations (Wambua, 2009). In addition, the collective
\nefforts being carried out by various countries and regional organizations could be
\ncounterproductive despite the successes gained and militate against the enhancement of
\nmaritime security in the region (Galamas & Bilala, 2012). For instance with 23 diverse
\ncountries across the region, achieving consensus strategies on fighting maritime piracy
\nhas been difficult. A classic case is the several maritime initiatives undertaken by several
\nregional organizations. For example, the Central African States recently set up a
\nRegional Centre for Maritime Security in Central Africa to enhance information sharing:
\nin West Africa, member States of the ECCAS and ECOWAS established their own
\nmaritime security efforts. Another cooperative effort involves the Gulf of Guinea
\nCommission (GGC) and the MOWCA, who set up their respective plans and
\nmemoranda of understanding. With so many concurrent efforts, it could result into
\nduplication of efforts and a regional rivalry may emanate if not properly coordinated
\n(Galamas & Bilala, 2012).
\n46
\n3.5.4 – Poor Maritime Domain Awareness
\nIn the words of Admiral Gary Roughead“Maritime Domain Awareness is where it all
\nbegins. We cannot conduct the operations that we must if we don\u2019t have a good sense of
\nwhat\u2019s out there, moving on, above or under the sea.\u2019\u2019(Boraz, 2009, p.136)
\nMaritime Domain Awareness (MDA) involves generating actionable intelligence to
\neffectively conduct various maritime tasks, counter terrorism and maritime law
\nenforcement operations (Akpan, 2010, p.45). From the foregoing, actionable intelligence
\nis the single most important prerequisite for interdicting illicit traffic at sea (Quashie,
\n2010). As stated earlier, the traditional land centric approach to security has contributed
\nto a systemic neglect of maritime forces. In addition, many citizens of Africa do not
\ncomprehend and have not seen the sea (Fouch\u00e9, 2010b). Basic equipment for
\nsurveillance, patrol boats and trained personnel are inadequate. This situation is a
\nmilitating factor in combating piracy in the sub region (Alege, 2010). In order to address
\nsecurity issues, situational awareness of the maritime domain is critical as it would
\nprovide the necessary information to African leaders to make informed decisions that
\nwould enhance maritime security (Ibrahim, 2009).
\nAccording to Okae, \u201cthe maritime component of the ECOWAS Standby Military Force
\nis the least developed to further lend credence to poor maritime domain awareness in the
\nregion\u201d (C. Okae, September 4, 2012). This lack of maritime domain awareness remains
\nan issue a matter acknowledged by two speakers from West Africa at the 2009 Sea
\nPower for Africa Symposium in Cape Town (Vrey,2009, p.26). Poor maritime domain
\nawareness can seriously hamper efforts to combat maritime crimes in the Gulf of
\nGuinea.
\n3.5.5 – Inadequate Capacity of Navies and Coast Guards
\nMany regional countries lack the capacity to take part on the same plane in any
\ncooperative endeavor (Bateman, 2001). The status of most African navies is an obstacle
\nto effective regional cooperation in the governance of African ocean areas (Wambua,
\n47
\n2009). Many African countries, moreover, have prioritized investment in land-based
\nforces over maritime units (Vogel, 2011).According to Admiral Ola Saad Ibrahim, an
\nassessment of Africa\u2019s naval\/coast guard capabilities reveal most of them cannot
\nadequately enforce laws in their respective maritime zones (Ibrahim, 2009) See Table 3.
\nTable 3: Naval Capabilities of Some Gulf of Guinea Countries.
\nSerial Countries
\nPersonnel
\nNavy\/Coast
\nGuard
\nGDP in
\nbillions-US
\ndollars\/ in
\n2009
\nDefence
\nBudget 2009
\nUS dollars
\nPlatforms
\n1. Angola 1,000 77.7
\n2.77billion(bn) Patrol and Coastal
\nCombatants(PCC)-9
\nSubmarine-1
\n2. Benin 200 7.2bn 79million(m) PCC- 2
\n3. Cameroon 1,300 24.1bn PCC-11
\nAmphibious-2
\n4. Cape Verde 100 PCC -3
\n5. Congo 800 11.6bn PCC-3 with several river
\nboats
\n6. C\u00f4te d\u2019Ivoire 900 24.4bn 360m PCC- 3
\nAmphibious-2
\n7 Senegal 950 13.5bn
\n8.
\nDemocratic
\nRepublic
\nCongo
\n6,703 PCC-3
\n9. Gabon 500 12.2bn PCC-9
\n10. The Gambia 70 189m PCC-3
\n11. Ghana 2,000 15billion 264m PCC-7
\n12 Togo 200 3bn 67m
\n13 Guinea
\nBissau 350 20m PCC-2
\n14. Guinea 400 55m PCC-2
\n15 Nigeria 8,000 135bn 1.49bn
\nPrincipal Surface Frigates-2,
\nPCC-27, Minewarfare-2,
\nAmphibious-1, Logistics and
\nSupport vessels-5
\nSource: The Military balance, 2010.
\n48
\nNavies are not thought to be as necessary as the other branches of the armed forces and
\nare often considered last in budgetary allocations. The high cost of naval equipment
\nworsens the situation (Wambua, 2009). For instance the estimated cost of acquiring new
\nships for the Nigeria Navy in United States dollars are as follows; \u201cGeneral Purpose
\nFrigate-$350million, Long Endurance Offshore Patrol Vessel-$120million, Landing
\nPlatform-$350million, Medium Endurance Offshore Patrol Vessel-$60million,
\nSubmarine-$300million and Landing Ship Tank-$90million among others
\n\u201c(Omonobi,2012). Based on the Gross Domestic Product of the Gulf of Guinea
\nCountries and the defence spending in Table 3, it might be a big burden to acquire these
\nrelatively expensive platforms to patrol the 6000 kilometer stretch of the Gulf of Guinea.
\nAnother challenge is the strength of naval personnel in some the countries. Apart from
\nNigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo and Ghana with 8000, 6703, 2000 personnel
\nrespectively, the other countries are somewhat inadequate in personnel. According to the
\nconfession of the alleged leader of the hijack of MT Energy Centurion, there are about
\n1,250 trained pirates in Nigeria (Bilesanmi& Amata, 2012). In military analysis this
\nnumber of pirates could match the firepower of some of the weak navies put together.
\nAccording to Ogbor, \u201cadequate manpower and warships that would be able to sustain
\npatrols in a country\u00b4s maritime zone is an effective strategy to combat piracy\u201d (E.Ogbor,
\npersonal communication, September 3, 2012). Based on the foregoing, inadequate
\ncapacity of navies and coast guards in the Gulf of Guinea is a challenge to combat
\npiracy.
\n3.5.6 – Weak Legal Framework
\nThe provisions of international law governing piracy are relatively clear, and there are
\nno significant problems of jurisdiction (Guilfoyle, 2011). The legal obstacles in
\ncombating piracy for states occur in implementation of international conventions due to
\nweak navies or inadequate domestic criminal laws (Kraska, 2011b). In Resolution 1918
\n(2010), for instance, the UN Security Council noted that the domestic criminal laws of a
\n49
\nnumber of states lack provisions criminalizing piracy, or are deficient in criminal
\nprocedural rules needed to effectively prosecute pirates (Kraska,2011b).
\nCooperation is also hindered because many regional states do not have extradition
\nagreements in place (Bateman, 2001).There are other complexities involved in
\ncooperation between national systems which could militate against combating piracy
\n(Guilfoyle ,2011). A classic example of a complexity is:
\nIf a Somali pirate is apprehended by a United Kingdom warship, prosecuted in
\nthe Seychelles and then transferred to a third state to serve his sentence, a chain
\nof legal relationships is involved. One of the basic difficulties involved in this
\ntype of chain, involves how to gather evidence if a capturing warship does not
\nknow in advance which state will agree to prosecute suspect pirates. Moreover,
\nsome states may also find it legally difficult to transfer suspects to partner states
\nfor prosecution without human rights guarantees. (Guilfoyle, 2011, p.96).
\nAs a consequence, more than half of suspected pirates in Somali waters deprived of their
\nfreedom up to December 4, 2009, were released without being prosecuted( Fouch\u00e9,
\n2010b).States also face a lack of political will and resources required to conduct
\nexpensive criminal trials and to imprison convicted pirates for long periods of time
\n(Kraska,2011b).This dilemma might arise in the Gulf of Guinea if and when full antipiracy operations involving many of the states within the sub-region take off. Currently
\nin the Gulf of Guinea states, the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Convention has not yet
\nbeen implemented and as far as piracy is concerned and there is no regional arrangement
\nfor hot pursuit across national maritime boundaries( Vrey, 2009,p.25).
\nAccording to Mike Ibokwe, a lawyer and IMO Consultant in Nigeria, the current
\nlegislation with respect to trying pirates in Nigeria is inadequate. However, Nigeria is a
\nsignatory to the UNCLOS 1982 and SUA Convention and 2005 protocols, but these
\nlaws are yet to be domesticated. The current municipal law for trying piracy is the
\ncriminal code of 1906, which is not comprehensive (Ozoeze, 2011). This kind of piracy
\n50
\nlaw was drafted for piracy of a different kind from a different age, and these laws are not
\neasily applied to the modern brand of piracy practiced (Cole, 2011). According to
\nIbokwe, the current situation now is that if the Nigerian Navy arrests pirates or armed
\nrobbers at sea, they would not be able to be prosecuted in Nigerian courts on the basis of
\nthe treaty that Nigeria has signed concerning SUA or the protocols to these treaties. So,
\nit is only by domesticating these Conventions, of which the process is ongoing, that
\nNigeria can be on the same page with the international standards and treaty obligation
\n(Ozoeze, 2011).
\nA similar situation exists in Benin. Benin is a signatory to a both UNCLOS and SUA
\nConventions. However, the UN Assessment mission to Benin revealed that the country\u2019s
\nlegal framework needs to be reformed to effectively address the threat of piracy. First,
\nthe definition of the crime of piracy is outdated and is not consistent with the definition
\nof piracy under the UNCLOS (UNSC, 2012a). For example, in two recent piracy cases
\nreported by the Benin authorities, suspected pirates were charged with generic offences,
\nsuch as armed robbery, premeditated murder and conspiracy (UNSC, 2012a).Unless
\nother modes of liability, such as conspiracy, are not criminalized, the potential for
\ncombating piracy and other forms of organized crime will remain extremely limited. In
\naddition, the universal jurisdiction provided for under the Convention with respect to the
\narrest and the prosecution of pirates is not incorporated in Benin\u2019s Maritime Code. As a
\nresult, Benin\u2019s jurisdiction on piracy acts committed on the high seas is limited to acts
\ncommitted by its citizens or on board of Beninese ships. Moreover, while the national
\nMaritime Code contains rules for the investigation of offences committed at sea by
\nvarious national authorities and the handling of suspects arrested at sea, it needs to be
\nupdated and streamlined (UNSC, 2012a).
\nThe ultimate obstacle to more piracy prosecutions is political will as finding states
\nwilling to detain convicted pirates, is difficult, as this entails a much larger cost than
\nprosecution outside the territorial sea (Guilfoyle, 2011). According to Ukonga of the
\n51
\nGulf of Guinea Commission the inadequate legal framework for dealing with piracy in
\nthe region, is causing the release of piracy suspects. There is an urgent need to have a
\ncommon definition of piracy, with the same type of punishment and a neutral
\njurisdiction to try piracy suspects (UNSC,2012b).The issue of weak legal framework if
\nnot adequately addressed can militate against the implementation of a strategy to combat
\npiracy.
\n3.5.7 – Poor Technological Base
\nMost African governments lack technological expertise and institutions for repair and
\nmaintenance of platforms and equipment. In addition, international partners donate or
\nsell security equipment to Africa with only basic training in operation and repair.
\nCritically absent is support for locally-driven technological adaptation (Vogel, 2011).
\nThis low technological base is an issue hindering development efforts in Third World
\ncountries. For instance Nigeria acquired warships with advanced technologies that
\nrequire high cost of maintenance, where the local technology could not support. Further,
\nthe dockyard repair facilities and surveillance systems are capital intensive and cannot
\nbe supported by the funding of the Nigerian Navy. As previously explained this low
\ntechnological base greatly affected the operational and patrolling capability of most
\nNigerian Navy ships and thus led to increased piracy attacks especially in 2003. From
\nthe foregoing low technological base could pose a challenge to enhance maritime
\nsecurity (Usoro, 2012, p.63). Despite, the poor technological challenge, Nigerian Navy
\nwas able to build a Seaward Defence Boat with high local resources (Stephen, 2012).
\nThis feat attained can be sustained if more funds are appropriated to the Nigerian Navy
\nfor research and development.
\n3.5.8 – Increasing influence of extra-regional powers in Africa
\nThe United States increased its influence and presence in the Gulf of Guinea by the
\nestablishment of AFRICOM (Ibrahim, 2009). On the other hand, the presence of
\nChinese warships in Somalia waters is a subtle way to expand its military influence in
\n52
\nAfrica (Murphy, 2012). Until the crisis in the Niger Delta, US purchased almost
\n1.1million barrels per day of Nigeria\u2019s oil (Mane, 2005). In January 2006, Nigeria
\nextended licenses to China for a commitment to invest $4.4 billion in refining and power
\ngeneration, giving Chinese companies a 45 percent stake in new oil fields (Rougheen,
\n2007). Again, Angola exports about 2 million barrels of oil per day with 25 percent
\ngoing to the US and 25 percent to China. Also China provided $2 billion in loans and
\naid to Angola (Osaretin, 2011).From the foregoing China wants to use its new found
\npower to influence or alter the international system to suit its own worldview (Murphy,
\n2012). For instance China\u2019s investment in Sudan limited the ability of the UN Security
\nCouncil to utilize Chapter VII sanctions to address the conflict in Darfur (Goldwyn &
\nMorrison, 2005). Therefore one of the major roles of AFRICOM in the Gulf of Guinea
\nis to checkmate the rising influence of China in Africa (Onuoha, 2008). There have been
\nmixed reactions as to the implications of AFRICOM on African soil. While some
\ncountries like Ghana, Liberia, Sierra Leone had accepted, and even offered their domain
\nfor AFRICOM, Nigeria has been opposed to the basing of the Command on African soil
\n(Onuoha, 2008).
\nCoupled with the rising influence is the competition for influence between regional
\npowers. China as a global power has access to any leader in the region. African leaders
\ncan now turn to the East for financial and political support. Competition for influence
\nwith the region\u2019s leaders can be a serious obstacle to any cooperative agreement
\n(Goldwyn & Morrison, 2005). This rising influence presents a challenge to African
\nnations to forge a common front (Ibrahim, 2009). Based on the foregoing, and especially
\ncurrent events in the Syria crisis, it is clear that when two opposing global powers with
\ninterests in a certain place are impinged, it could militate against any cooperative
\nregime.
\n53
\n3.6 Conclusion
\nThis chapter identified numerous efforts by national and extra regional governments, as
\nwell as international organizations to address the problem of piracy. It was observed that
\nthat some processes had been ongoing for many years, while some were just recent in
\n2012. Despite all these measures, piracy has not abated. Apart from factors that
\nencourage piracy as discussed earlier, there were identified challenges which could be
\nobstacles to cooperation to combat piracy. It was identified that a major challenge was
\nlack of political will as a result of poor maritime culture and marine domain awareness.
\nOthers were legal barriers and inadequate capacity of navies. With regards to the size of
\nthe Gulf of Guinea it would be difficult for the current platforms available to fight
\npiracy. Therefore it is important to devise a comprehensive strategy to mitigate the
\nchallenges in countering piracy. The next chapter seeks to address that.
\n54
\nChapter 4
\n4. – Integrated Maritime Security Strategy to mitigate the Challenges hampering
\nEfforts to combat piracy in the Gulf of Guinea
\nThe challenges hampering efforts in combating piracy and armed robbery at sea in the
\nGulf of Guinea can be only be addressed by a combination of measures such as
\nenhancement of political will, improved maritime domain awareness and provision of
\nadequate fleet maintenance facilities. Others are heightened public awareness and
\nregional cooperation. Arguably, however the most urgent of these is regional
\ncooperation. Because piracy is a Trans -boundary issue, the cooperation of all affected
\nstates is crucial to controlling the menace. According to Vice Admiral Hideaki Kaneda
\n\u201cMaritime Safety and Security cannot be achieved through the efforts of a single
\ncountry. Only the mutual understanding and cooperation of regional countries can fulfill
\nit\u201d (Kaneda, 2005, p.51).
\n4.1 – Regional Cooperation
\nWe have seen regional cooperation in varying levels in the two areas most affected by
\npiracy-Southeast Asia and the Horn of Africa. In spite of the unique situations in these
\nregions, lessons learnt from them could be applicable in the Gulf of Guinea. Koji
\nSekimizu, IMO Secretary General, when Director of the Maritime Safety Division,
\nstated an African ReCAAP could play an active role in reducing piracy, which has
\nassumed dangerous proportions in Nigeria and Somalia\u2026(Menefee,2010,p.198).
\nThe UN and IMO are the foremost organizations in the world in constant pursuit of
\nrelative peace and safety in the world\u2019s maritime environment. To this end, these
\norganizations have regularly issued resolutions identifying cooperation especially
\nregional cooperation as a sine qua non for suppression of piracy. In furtherance of this,
\nthe UN General Assembly in Resolution 63\/111 of 12, February 2009 dealing with
\nOceans and Law of the Sea, Para 61, recognized the crucial role of international
\ncooperation at the global, regional, sub regional and bilateral levels in combating, in
\n55
\naccordance with international law, threats to maritime security, including piracy, armed
\nrobbery at sea, through bilateral and multilateral instruments and mechanisms (Geiss &
\nPetrig, 2011, p.44).
\nIn a similar vein, the IMO has through the Code of Practice for Investigation of the
\nCrimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery Ships “invited all Governments to develop, as
\nappropriate, agreements and procedures to facilitate cooperation in applying efficient
\nand effective measures to prevent acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships\u2019\u2019(IMO,
\n2010). In tandem with UN Security resolution 2018 and IMO\/MOWCA efforts in
\nestablishing a regional integrated coast guard for the Gulf of Guinea, it would be
\napposite to look at existing main arrangements to counter piracy which are ReCAAP and
\nDCoC.
\nThe ReCAAP was one of the countermeasures set up to combat piracy in the Strait of
\nMalacca. The other measures include a sea patrol initiative and a joint air patrol called
\nEyes in the Sky (EiS) (Ng, 2011, p.1). In 2004, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore
\ninitiated coordinated maritime patrols, called MALSINDO to address crime in the
\nMalacca Straits (Farley & Gortzak, 2009). The Maritime Security Patrol was
\ncoordinated rather than joint each country responsible for patrolling its own waters
\n(Storey, 2008, p.119). In 2005, the EiS initiative was launched and was intended to
\nachieve maritime domain awareness while the naval patrols were to physically secure
\nand defend that domain (Ong & Ho, 2005). These countermeasures successfully reduced
\nthe number of pirate attacks, with only 2 incidents reported in 2009 (Ng, 2011, p.1).
\nBased on the success, the IMO meeting on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore held in
\nMalaysia in September 2006 and the 60th session of the UN General Assembly
\nwelcomed the advances the regional cooperation brought about by ReCAAP (Kraska,
\n2011a, p.145).As a consequence, the IMO sponsored a similar model of a regional
\nagreement in the Horn of Africa to implement anti-piracy measures. This initiative gave
\nbirth to the Djibouti Code of Conduct (Kraska, 2011, p.147).
\n56
\n4.2 – Background to ReCAAP
\nThe ReCAAP Convention had its acknowledged origins in the Tokyo Appeal of March
\n2000 and the Asia Anti-Piracy Challenges 2000 and the Tokyo Model Action Plan of
\nApril (Menefee, 2010, p.188). The Tokyo Appeal makes reference to a set of
\nrecommendations developed by the IMO, that inter alia, call for “further development
\nof regional cooperation\u2019\u2019 and “a regional agreement to facilitate coordinated response at
\nthe tactical as well as the operational level\u2019\u2019 to be concluded between the countries
\nconcerned\u2019\u2019 (Mejia, 2010b). ReCAAP is the first regional government-to-government
\nagreement and it was finalized on 11 November 2004 and entered into force on 4
\nSeptember 2006. To date, 18 States have become Contracting Parties to ReCAAP. The
\nContracting Parties are Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Denmark, India, Japan,
\nthe Republic of Korea, the Lao People\u2019s Democratic Republic, Myanmar, Netherlands,
\nNorway, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, United Kingdom and Viet Nam
\n(ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre, 2011).The Agreement called for the setting up of
\nan Information Sharing Centre (ISC), which was launched 29 November 2006 in
\nSingapore (Ho, 2008). ReCAAP establishes a framework for cooperation among the
\nmember states on three main aspects; information sharing, capacity building and
\noperational cooperation (Storey, 2008, p114). It is pertinent to note that Malaysia and
\nIndonesia, two important countries in the region are not contracting parties to ReCAAP
\n(Mejia, 2010b).
\n4.2.1- Major Features of ReCAAP
\nArticle 1 of the Agreement takes verbatim the definition of piracy in UNCLOS Article
\n101 and armed robbery against ships as contained in Annex to Resolution A.922(22) of
\nthe IMO.This could be due to several issues including locational, two ship requirement
\nsurrounding the definitions of“ piracy and armed robbery against ships\u2019\u2019.
\nArticle 3 deals with General Obligations wherein contracting parties are required to take
\nall effective measures in accordance with national and international laws to prevent and
\n57
\nsuppress piracy and armed robbery against ships, arrest pirates and armed robbery
\nsuspects, seize ships taken by or under the control of pirates and rescue victims of piracy
\nand armed robbery against ships.
\nArticle 4 is one of the pillars of the agreement. It deals with the establishment of the
\nInformation Sharing Center, located in Singapore. With a staff of thirteen to fifteen
\nrepresenting the member states, it has the status of an international organization as found
\nin Article 5 and designed to enhance communication and information on incidents of
\npiracy and armed robbery in the region (Menefee, 2010). The center is composed of a
\nGoverning Council and a Secretariat.
\nArticle 6 provides for the funding of the ISC from host states, voluntary contributions
\nfrom contracting parties and international organizations. It is important to note that
\ninadequate funding can be a major setback for any organizational outfit, hence the need
\nfor the proper funding of the Center.
\nArticle 9 requires each contracting party to designate a focal point responsible for
\ncommunication with the Center. The focal point is the nexus for smooth and effective
\ncommunication with other national authorities. All contracting parties are required to
\nnotify focal points of incidents of piracy or armed robbery against ships.
\nArticle 12 obliges contracting parties, subject to its national laws, shall endeavor to
\nextradite pirates or armed robbery suspects, present in its territory, to the other
\nContracting Party which has jurisdiction over them, at the request of that Contracting
\nParty. This article is worded in a rather cautious language. It does not provide for a strict
\nobligation to prosecute or extradite piracy suspects (Geiss & Petrig, 2011, p.46) .This is
\na limitation, considering the tendency of pirates to evade arrest by seeking refuge in a
\nstate with weak legislation on piracy. Article 13 provides for Contracting states to render
\nmutual legal Helpance in criminal matters, including submission of evidence related to
\npiracy and armed robbery against ships. This aspect is particularly important due to
\nprosecutorial challenges that might arise as a result of want of evidence to try pirates.
\n58
\nArticle 14 deals with Capacity Building one of the pillars of the Agreement. The
\nAgreement obliges Contracting Parties to the fullest possible extent endeavor to
\ncooperate or provide capacity building Helpance which may include educational and
\ntraining programmes to share experiences and best practices.
\nArticle 15 deals with cooperative arrangements such as joint exercises, or other forms of
\ncooperation. Article 17 provides for settlement of disputes which might arise as a result
\nof interpretation or application of the Agreement through negotiations in accordance
\nwith international laws.
\n4.2.2 – Lessons Learned from ReCAAP
\nDesignation of Focal Points
\nThe designation of a focal point by each contracting party for the ISC is considered one
\nof the strengths of ReCAAP. A Contracting Party not in the habit of inter-agency
\ncoordination would have to look at one its numerous organizations for dealing with
\npiracy and armed robbery and also identify the inter-agency processes associated with it
\n(Ho, 2008). This aspect is particularly important for the Gulf of Guinea where there are
\nnumerous agencies involved in maritime security issues and the duplication of effort as
\npreviously mentioned. Hence a focal point for armed robbery and piracy reports could
\nenhance information sharing amongst agencies.
\nCapacity Building Programme
\nThe capacity building programme has been identified as one of the strength of ReCAAP.
\nTechnical Helpance, exercises, training workshops and sharing of best practices
\ninculcates a great awareness among contracting parties (Ho, 2008). This is an
\nopportunity for better resourced and funded parties to Help less funded parties to
\nachieve the common goal of suppressing piracy and armed robbery and vice versa in
\nterms of sharing experiences and best practices.
\n59
\nCooperative Arrangements
\nReCAAP is an inclusive organization. Piracy and armed robbery affects both
\ngovernments and the shipping industry alike. The Agreement shares information and
\ncooperates with all stakeholders such as IMO, Baltic and International Maritime Council
\n(BIMCO), Asian Shipowners\u00b4 Forum (ASF) and International Independent Tanker
\nOwners\u00b4 Organization (INTERTANKO) that have knowledge and the capacity to deal
\nwith piracy issues. ReCAAP also allows accession by any state outside the Asian region,
\nwhich allows the organization to grow (Ho, 2008). A Regional Agreement can serve as
\nvehicle to receive Helpance. While external Helpance can be vital, a regional
\norganization can ensure the efficient use of resources among member states, negating the
\nimpression that measures and programmes are imposed by extra \u2013regional forces (Mejia,
\n2010b).Piracy is a global phenomenon (Murphy, 2010) hence, it would be desirable for
\naffected and interested parties to join and give support for the fight against piracy. This
\narea is particularly necessary in the area of acquisition of ships for weak navies and
\ntechnical support for the Gulf of Guinea countries.
\nChallenges of ReCAAP
\nThere is no gainsaying that when many nations are involved in a project ( help with nursing paper writing from experts with MSN & DNP degrees) there is bound
\nto be some challenges. The fact that Malaysia and Indonesia are not parties to ReCAAP
\nis a big challenge for the Agreement. Most of the piratical attacks occurred in these
\ncountries and they were critical in the reduction of piracy in the region (Mejia, 2010b).
\nReCAAP has been working hard to cover this gap by working with the relevant
\nmaritime agencies in Malaysia and Indonesia (Ho, 2008).
\nAnother challenge facing ReCAAP is the delay in receiving reports from focal points,
\nwhich could undermine operations of the Center. To remedy this situation, the shipping
\nindustry and ships are encouraged to report directly to the ISC, to improve timeliness of
\nreports and facilitate response to incidents (Ho, 2008). If and when an ISC is established
\n60
\nin the Gulf of Guinea, reports from all shipping related agencies could be collated and
\nprocessed to ensure quick response to piracy attacks.
\nSimilar to delay in filing reports, is the challenge of underreporting which ISCs will
\nencounter. Most ships are reluctant to report attacks due to fear of prolonged
\ninvestigations and unnecessary delays. The collation and analysis of data is important in
\nthe fight against maritime crimes (Mejia, 2010b). This is where ship-owners and
\nmaritime stakeholders have to work seriously to cover the information sharing gap. One
\nof the areas that could be improved upon, if ReCAAP is adapted to another region is the
\nissue of capacity building in areas of extradition and mutual legal Helpance (Mejia,
\n2010b).
\nA big challenge to any organization is the issue of funding. Despite the successes
\nrecorded by ReCAAP the challenge of finances rears its ugly head. Only less than half
\nof the members contribute to the organization coffers (Mejia, 2010b). Menefee (2010)
\nnoted \u201cthat this cannot be considered a healthy situation in an organization which is
\nsupposed to be run on consensus and should be rectified as soon as possible. Otherwise,
\nit is hard to believe that countries footing the bill will not eventually develop an
\nunhealthy, if understandable, a sense of entitlement concerning ReCAAP ISC and its
\noperations \u201c(Menefee, 2010, p.191).
\nBased on the foregoing, even though ReCAAP has its shortcomings evident of any
\nhuman endeavor, its strengths of information sharing, capacity building and cooperative
\narrangements are tested and tried ventures that could be replicated in pirate hotspots like
\nthe Gulf of Guinea.
\n4.3 – Background to DCoC
\nThe DCoC was signed on 29 January 2009 by representatives of Djibouti, Ethiopia,
\nKenya, Madagascar, Maldives, Seychelles, Somalia, the United Republic of Tanzania
\nand Yemen. With the signing by South Africa on 15 May, the number of signatures was
\nbrought to 19 States out of the 21 eligible to sign. The 19 signatory States are: the
\n61
\nComoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Jordan, Kenya, Madagascar, Maldives,
\nMauritius, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Somalia, South Africa, the Sudan, the
\nUnited Arab Emirates, the United Republic of Tanzania and Yemen (IMO, 2012). In
\naddition to the DCoC, various international taskforces to combat piracy were established
\nas a response to threat to international shipping in the Horn of Africa. One of the
\ntaskforces was the Combined Maritime Forces led by the United States (Geiss & Petrig,
\n2011, p25). In addition, the European Union (EU) in 2008, created the EU Naval Force
\nSomalia (NAVFOR ATALANTA), to protect ships from the World Food Programme
\n(WFP) (Maouche, 2010, p.6). Another taskforce was initiated by the North Atlantic
\nTreaty Organization (NATO), Operation Allied Provider in October 2008 to escort
\nWorld Food Programme ships delivering supplies to Somalia (Tutu, 2011, p.12). In
\n2008, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolutions 1816 and 1851
\nauthorizing countries to enter Somali territorial waters and use all necessary means to
\nrepress acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea and on land as well in a manner
\nconsistent with the provision of international law with consent with Somalia\u2019s interim
\ngovernment (Ho, 2009).
\n4.3.1- Principal Features of DCoC
\nTo effectively fight the scourge of piracy in the Horn of Africa, Article 1 of the Code
\nadopts both the UNCLOS and IMO definitions of piracy and armed robbery against
\nships.
\nMeasures to Repress Piracy are contained in Annex 4. Paragraph 7 provides for a
\nparticipant which carries out a seizure, may, “subject to its national laws and in
\nconsultation with other interested entities, waive its primary right to exercise jurisdiction
\nand authorize any other Participant to enforce its laws against the ship and \/or persons
\nonboard\u2019\u2019. In addition, it obliges any seizure made in the territorial sea of a Participant
\nshould be subject to the jurisdiction of that Participant. Paragraph 5, states no
\n\u201cParticipant should pursue a ship in or over the territory or territorial sea of any coastal
\n62
\nstate without the permission of that State\u201d. This goes to show respect for the territorial
\nintegrity of a participating state.
\nArticle 7 of the Code deals with Embarked officers. This is a distinct part of the Code
\nthat ReCAAP does not have. The Code provides for armed officers to embark in the
\npatrol ships or aircraft of another Participant. It further states that, the “embarked
\nofficers may Help the host Participant and conduct operations from the host Participant
\nship or aircraft if expressly requested to do so by the host Participant, and only in the
\nmanner requested\u2019\u2019. According to Wambua (2010), this provision is aimed at facilitating
\nthe subsequent exercise of adjudicative jurisdiction by the national courts of the state of
\nthe embarked officials (Wambua, 2010, p.10). Based upon this provision the ongoing
\nanti-piracy operation of Nigerian and Benin is a good opportunity to assess the
\npracticalities of the embarkation of officers from Benin republic onboard Nigerian
\nvessels with a view to improving upon the concept.
\nThe Code also has similar provisions with ReCAAP Article 3 of the Code with regards
\nto protection measures for ships taken after Article 16 of ReCAAP. In the same vein,
\nArticles 8,9,10 of the Code concerning coordination and information sharing, incident
\nreporting and general Helpance among participants resemble Articles 9 and 10 of
\nReCAAP. To ensure coordinated, smooth and effective communications between focal
\npoints, the Code makes provisions for 3 ISCs in Kenya, Tanzania and Yemen. Article 9
\nintends to provide for Participants the \u201cdevelopment of uniform reporting criteria in
\norder to ensure an accurate assessment of the threat of piracy and armed robbery in the
\nWestern Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden\u201d.
\nOne of the pillars of the Code is Article 11 regarding Review of National Legislation. It
\nis thus extracted from the DCoC:
\nIn order to allow for the prosecution, conviction and punishment of those
\ninvolved in piracy or armed robbery against ships, and to facilitate extradition or
\n63
\nhanding over when prosecution is not possible, each Participant intends to review
\nits national legislation with a view towards ensuring that there are national laws
\nin place to criminalize piracy and armed robbery against ships, and adequate
\nguidelines for the exercise of jurisdiction, conduct of investigations, and
\nprosecutions of alleged offenders.
\nThe purpose of this Article is to ensure that persons arrested for piracy and armed
\nrobbery against ships do not evade prosecution.
\nArticle 12 of the Code obligates Parties to settle disputes by consultation and peaceful
\nmeans.The Code is dissimilar to ReCAAP in the sense that it is not binding. Article
\n(15a) states:
\nNothing in this Code is intended to create a binding agreement, except as noted
\nin Article 13, which states that within two years of the effective date of the Code,
\nand having designated the national focal points to in Article 8, the participants
\nintend to consult with the aim of arriving at a binding agreement.
\nThis aspect of a non-binding agreement where the framers adopted the term Code of
\nConduct rather than treaty, convention, or agreement reflects a major weakness of the
\nCode (Wambua, 2010, p.9). Unlike the ReCAAP, DCoC is not open for accession by
\nany state (Geiss & Petrig, 2011, p.50).
\nResolution 3 provides for Enhancing Training in the region for officials designated by
\nGovernments. To that effect, a training centre was established in Djibouti to ensure the
\nwide, effective and uniform implementation of the provisions of the Code.
\n4.3.2 – Lessons learned from DCoC
\nAchievements of the DCoC
\nGeiss and Petrig (2011) suggested that the Code has \u201cbeen praised as a milestone
\ndevelopment a central instrument in the development of regional capacity\u201d (Geiss &
\nPetrig, 2011). In the area of national legislation to meet international standards, 12 of the
\n64
\nmember states have introduced changes to their laws (Bueger & Saran, 2012). This is a
\nclear sign of progress in the fight against piracy.
\nFurthermore, Inter agency cooperation improved amongst the navies, coastguards and
\nmarine police as a result of training and capacity building on legal issues by United
\nNations Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC). The resultant effect was arrest of more
\ncriminals into the national legal systems (Bueger & Saran, 2012).
\nA fund named Djibouti Code of Conduct Trust Fund was established in 2009 for the
\nadministration of the agreement. Many countries and international organizations
\nincluding UN and IMO member states, private individuals have contributed over 14
\nmillion US dollars to the process (Bueger & Saran, 2012).
\nThe DCoC ISCs and ReCAAP established Standard Operating Procedures for
\nexchange of information on piracy related matters. This is considered a major
\nachievement for collaboration between Asia and Africa to enhance the Western Indian
\nOcean anti \u2013 piracy framework (Bueger & Saran, 2012). Based on the above
\nachievements it can be seen that there is appreciable progress in training, information
\nsharing and capacity building.
\nChallenges of DCoC
\nThere is difficulty in fostering security cooperation by the participating states in terms of
\njoint multilateral operations or collective responses. This is evident in the lack of
\nconsensus by the states to have one ISC, like ReCAAP (Bueger & Saran, 2012).
\nAccording to Mejia, the establishment of 3 ISCs makes for a potentially cumbersome
\narrangement (Mejia, 2010b).
\nExcluding two major coastal states that are regional powerhouses, Pakistan and India is
\na major challenge for the Code. The anti-piracy fight is concentrated on Africa and not
\non the Western Indian Ocean region. These countries can provide capacity and
\nleadership. Both states are at the forefront of counter-piracy efforts, given the extension
\n65
\nof the operational terrain of piracy groups (Bueger & Saran, 2012). Moreover, the
\npolitical dimension of the region is a challenge that cannot be overlooked. ReCAAP is
\nmade up of and has the support of vibrant economies and strong governments in Asia.
\nThe littoral states of the Strait of Malacca are much wealthier, their GDP level are 10
\ntimes more than the littoral states in the Somalia region (Mejia, 2010b,:
\nNg,2011,p.11).The case of Somalia is the opposite. Somalia has been plagued by piracy
\nand it is topping the failed states list. To make matters difficult, many states in the region
\nare rather unstable and a few are at a high risk of being classified as failed states (Mejia,
\n2010b).
\n4.4 – Lessons for the Gulf of Guinea Countries in developing a Maritime Security
\nFramework to Combat Piracy
\nBased on the lessons learnt from the experiences of combating piracy in Southeast Asia
\nand Somalia region the formulation of a maritime security strategy framework is
\nconsidered the first step to combat piracy and tackle the identified challenges
\nconfronting the Gulf of Guinea countries. Ng (2011) developed an anti-piracy
\nframework (see Appendix B) were the affected areas are categorized into land, territorial
\nseas and international waters. The important aspects of this framework is where littoral
\nstates provide enabling legislation for prosecution of pirates on land and territorial
\nwaters as well as international support is seen to be critical to states with weak
\ncoastguards and navies. In addition user states and stakeholders collaborate to provide a
\nsecured maritime environment for commercial shipping. Some lessons from ReCAAP
\nand DCoC to combat piracy and mitigate identified challenges in the Gulf of Guinea are
\npresented below.
\n4.4.1- Review of National Legislation
\nAll countries should ascribe to international conventions against piracy and facilitate
\ndomestication of UNCLOS 1982 and SUA 1988 provisions to overcome legal obstacles
\nthat hinder individual nations in combating piracy. The review of national legislation
\n66
\ncould mitigate the challenges of inadequate legislation in the Gulf of Guinea countries.
\nThe United Nations offices in West Africa (UNOWA) and UNODC should Help states
\nin the region to harmonize their laws dealing with piracy and armed robbery against
\nships. The IMO circular letter No.3180 of 17 May 2011 containing information and
\nguidance on elements of international law relating to piracy might be useful (IMO,
\n2011). In addition, the Model National Law on Acts of Piracy and Maritime violence
\nprepared by Comit\u00e9 Maritime International is a useful starting point tool in this regard
\n(Beckman,2002,p.333).
\n4.4.2 – Establishment of an Information Sharing Centre to enhance Inter -Agency
\nCoordination
\nThe enhancement of interagency cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea could mitigate the
\nchallenge of poor interagency cooperation among states. Designating focal points and
\nestablishment of an information sharing center is considered desirable to this end. Focal
\npoints could enhance interagency cooperation by (1) managing all piracy and armed
\nrobbery incidents within its territorial waters, (2) acting as point of contact for the ISC,
\n(3) facilitating its country law enforcement investigation and coordinating surveillance
\nand enforcement for piracy and armed robbery with neighbouring focal points (Ho,
\n2008). The focal points could be the country\u2019s coast guard, marine police, navy, port
\nauthority, maritime administration or customs (Ho, 2005). The ISC could be located at
\nthe Regional Maritime Search and Rescue Coordination Centre in Lagos, Nigeria. The
\nchoice of Nigeria is because as at now Nigeria is in the forefront of the antipiracy fight,
\nand it is where most of the pirates operate from. The ISC could be made up of
\ngovernment and ship industry stakeholders from participating states especially naval,
\ncoast guards and legal personnel to facilitate exchange of information.
\n67
\n4.4.3 – Collaborative Funding
\nAn Agreement could serve as a vehicle for technical support and funding of maritime
\nsecurity activities in a region. Therefore the establishment of a maritime security fund
\nlikened to the current ECOWAS Peace Fund could mitigate the challenge of inadequate
\nfunding. The aim is to source for funds to enable states to combat piracy effectively.
\nInitially, Gulf of Guinea countries could be persuaded to contribute 1 percent of their
\nannual earnings from crude oil sales for the acquisition and joint production programme
\nof appropriate mix of platforms and maritime domain surveillance assets. Financial
\nHelpance could also be made by international organizations, user states, maritime
\nstakeholders and ship-owners to help reduce burden on weak states.
\n4.4.4 – Adoption of Best Management Practices
\nAnalysis from the Horn of Africa reveals 65 per cent of attacks were foiled by efforts of
\nmerchant ships themselves (Ng, 2011, p.8). According to IMB reports described earlier,
\nanti-piracy watches by ship masters in the Gulf of Guinea was a contributory factor in
\nthe reduction of piracy. Taking into account unavailability of naval presence in some sea
\nareas, it is important ocean going vessels, ship owners adopt self-protective measures. It
\nis on this premise that IMO recommended Best Management Practices should be
\nadopted.
\n4.5 – Other Strategies to Combat Piracy
\nAs mentioned earlier integrated maritime security strategies comprise not only an
\neffective regional cooperation mechanism but other important elements as well. Some of
\nthese are public enlightenment on maritime issues, enhancement of political will and
\nprovision of adequate fleet maintenance facilities.
\n4.5.1 – Public Enlightenment on Maritime Issues\/Affairs
\nPublic enlightenment on maritime issues could mitigate the challenge of poor maritime
\ndomain awareness. Public enlightenment could be a step in curbing the problem of sea
\n68
\nblindness in the region. Both leaders and the public in general should be educated
\nthrough conferences, seminars and workshops on the economic importance of the
\nmaritime environment and the need to be stakeholders in the prosperity of any maritime
\nproject ( help with nursing paper writing from experts with MSN & DNP degrees). In addition, the enlightenment on various maritime security challenges gives a
\nbetter understanding of the magnitude of threats in the maritime environment.
\n4.5.2 – Enhancement of Political Will
\nThe enhancement of political will is critical to the success of any maritime security
\nstrategy. Leaders must be properly educated to know the economic importance of the
\nmaritime environment for economic prosperity. The objective is to win political support
\nfor improved funding of maritime security activities. According to Gilpin (2007), given
\nthe transnational character of maritime security threats, political will must be expressed
\nregionally. Countries should be willing to cede sovereignty concerns to advance regional
\nsolutions (Gilpin, 2007). The Nigeria \/Benin Operation Prosperity is a step in the
\ndirection to show a demonstrable political will. In a similar vein, the African Union is at
\nthe verge of creating a maritime security department. The ECCAS and ECOWAS
\nprospects of cooperation are another sign of enhanced political will in the Gulf of
\nGuinea.
\n4.5.3 – Provision of Adequate Fleet Maintenance Facilities
\nThe provision of adequate fleet maintenance facilities could mitigate the challenge of
\npoor technological base. The objective is to put in place repair and maintenance facilities
\nto achieve capacity for sustained maritime security patrols. One of the biggest challenges
\nfaced by Nigeria that led to increase in piracy was the poor operational state of ships
\nwhich lacked necessary refit. The existing dockyards and shipyards in the region would
\nrequire urgent rehabilitation to make them meet international standards. This could be
\nachieved through the encouragement of local and foreign companies to invest in the
\nregions\u00b4 dockyards and shipyards.
\n69
\n4.6 \u2013 ECOWAS as a Mechanism to Implement Regional Agreements
\nRegional Economic establishments such as ECOWAS are most apt to Help states with
\ncommon attributes such as similar legal systems and current socio economic conditions
\nto implement a regional agreement to combat piracy. Through these existing regional
\nmechanisms increased, national, bilateral and trilateral initiatives can be initiated
\n(Fouch\u00e9, 2010b, p.152).
\nECOWAS is a regional organization of 15 West African countries. The countries are
\nBenin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d\u2019Ivoire,the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea \u2013
\nBissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. Its main goal is
\nthe promotion of the economic integration among its members. ECOWAS is one the five
\nregional pillars of the African Economic Community (ECOWAS, 2012). ECOWAS
\nthrough its Technical commission for Transport, fulfill its obligations to instruments of
\nthe African Union, such as the African Union Maritime Transport Charter which calls
\nfor the harmonization of laws relating to maritime security and Helping states (Fouch\u00e9,
\n2010b, p.157). ECOWAS therefore has the framework to operationalize these suggested
\nmaritime security strategies in the short, medium and long terms.
\n4.7 – Conclusion
\nThe Chapter identified regional cooperation as the main thrust of a strategy to combat a
\ntransnational crime like piracy. The UN and IMO have emphasized regional cooperation
\nin their resolutions in view of challenges or obstacles that may arise in the course of
\nimplementing anti-piracy strategies. A review of two existing arrangements to combat
\npiracy-ReCAAP and DCoC reveal information sharing, capacity building, cooperative
\narrangements and International Helpance as key to any successful anti-piracy effort.
\nParticularly important are domestication of the SUA 1988 Convention and protocols,
\ncollaborative funding, best management practices and inter agency cooperation. The
\nECOWAS currently has the institutional framework to implement these strategies to
\ncombat piracy off the waters of West Africa.
\n70
\nChapter 5
\n5 – Conclusion
\nPiracy, which started since man commenced commerce at sea, has become a threat to
\nworld trade and global maritime security. Mostly recently, the contemporary hot spots of
\npiracy are in Africa namely the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Guinea\/West African
\nwaters. The Gulf of Guinea known for its strategic importance in terms of oil
\nexploitation and rich fauna and closeness to the western world for supply of oil is being
\nthreatened by gangs of pirates. Benin republic which only had two reported piracy
\nattacks between1991 and 2010, was severely affected by 20 pirate attacks in 2011. This
\nsituation almost brought the economy of Benin to its knees. As a consequence, several
\nmeasures have been introduced to curb piracy most notably, Operation Prosperity, the
\nNigerian\/Benin maritime patrol. This patrol reduced the rate of pirate attacks in 2012.
\nDespite these efforts piracy still persists in the Gulf of Guinea, with pirates extending
\nfurther to Togo.
\nThe impact of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea can be said to reverberate around the world
\ndue to the fact that attacks on oil tankers and bulk carriers, would definitely raise
\ninsurance premiums, additional costs for ship owners for transiting the Gulf of Guinea
\nand ultimately high cost of goods. Attacks on oil tankers, can cause environmental
\ndisasters or even hike in world oil prices, which would be shown on pump price of fuel
\nin countries thousands of miles from the Gulf of Guinea. Most importantly, the human
\ncost of piracy is not calculable because of the trauma to seafarers and their families.
\nTherefore, the term hostis humani generis or enemy of mankind makes it a duty for the
\nglobal community to tackle this common menace.
\nSeveral factors have been identified as contributory to piracy in the Gulf of Guinea
\nincluding proliferation of small arms, conflict and disorder, geography and promise of
\nreward. Apart from geography which cannot be altered, the other factors stem from
\n71
\nsocio-economic and political short comings in the region. Piracy in the region therefore
\nhas an interrelationship with these factors.
\nThis dissertation has attempted to build a case that regional cooperation is a sine qua
\nnon to combat piracy in most piracy hot spots. However, several difficulties or
\nchallenges do exist in the region which can be obstacles to cooperation. They include
\nmaritime border disputes, lack of political will, and lack of naval capacity. Others
\ninclude influence of extra-regional powers and lack of interagency cooperation.
\nTherefore a common interest must be identified before cooperation can be meaningful.
\nIndeed, there are numerous solutions and measures to counter piracy, the dissertation
\nidentified some counter measures used in Southeast Asia and the Horn of Africa to
\nrepress piracy. The ReCAAP has been praised by many as a model of regional
\nagreement to combat piracy. Its strengths and limitations were analysed to provide
\nlessons to develop a regional anti-piracy framework in the Gulf of Guinea. Other counter
\nmeasures examined were the MALSINDO patrols, EiS initiative and the Djibouti Code
\nof Conduct as well as the international responses to piracy in Somalia. Thus the
\nframework for regional cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea will include collaboration,
\ncoordination, information sharing and capacity building. The coordinated and
\ncooperative approach used in tackling piracy has been acclaimed, because it would be
\ndifficult to eliminate modern day piracy unless the root causes are addressed and all the
\nlittoral states and stake holders are on board-hence a holistic approach.
\nIn combating piracy, key strategies are vital to mitigate identified challenges; they
\ninclude enhancement of interagency cooperation, review of national legislation,
\ncollaborative funding and adoption of IMO best management practices. Others include
\npublic enlightenment on maritime issues, enhancement of political will and provision of
\nadequate fleet repair facilities for effective policing operations.
\nIn conclusion, since piracy is a transnational crime and no individual state has the
\nresources to combat piracy, emphasis should be put on a sustainable regional
\n72
\ncooperation. This is where the ECOWAS, as a lead organization, MOWCA, IMO and
\nthe United Nations can work together to suppress piracy and enhance maritime security
\nin the Gulf of Guinea. If the Gulf of Guinea states together with the rest of international
\ncommunity fail to contain piracy in the Region, the Gulf of Guinea may very well
\nbecome the latest to fall in a domino effect of sea areas where maritime commerce is
\nheld hostage by pirates.
\n73
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\nAppendix A
\nUnstructured Interviews
\nBalogun, N.A. Deputy Director, Operations, Nigerian Air force Headquarters,
\nInterviewed on \u201cEfforts of the Nigerian Air force in Maritime Patrols to Combat Piracy
\nat Sea,\u201d at Nigerian Air force Headquarters, Abuja, Nigeria, September 4, 2012.
\nDieng, A. Head of the ECOWAS Regional Security Division, Interviewed \u201con
\nCurrent Efforts of ECOWAS in Combating Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea,\u201d at ECOWAS
\nSecretariat at Abuja, Nigeria, September 4,2012.
\nDiop, A. Captaine Fregate, Technical Adviser on Maritime Safety, Senegalese Navy,
\nemail communication, on \u201cProgress report on MOWCA sub regional coast guard
\nnetwork\u201d, October 14, 2012.
\nMohammed I, Commander, Beninois Navy, email communication, on\u201d Causes and
\nImpact of Piracy on Benin.\u201d September 10,2012.
\nOgbor, E.O. Chief of Training and Operations, Nigerian Navy, interviewed \u201con Strategy
\nto Combat Piracy in West African waters,\u201d at Naval Headquarters, Abuja, Nigeria,
\nSeptember 3,2012.
\nOkae, C. Director, Peacekeeping and Regional Security, ECOWAS,interviewed\u201d on
\nChallenges of ECOWAS in Combating Piracy and Sea Robbery in the Gulf of
\nGuinea.\u201dat ECOWAS Secretariat, Abuja, Nigeria, September 4,2012.
\nUdoh, E. Deputy Director, Operations, Army Headquarters, on \u201cEfforts of the Nigerian
\nArmy in Internal Security Operations in the Niger Delta of Nigeria,\u201d at Army
\nHeadquarters, Abuja, Nigeria, September 3, 2012.
\n.
\n84
\nAppendix B
\nLand Territorial
\nwaters
\nInternational
\nwaters
\nLegislation
\nProsecution
\nCoast
\nGuarding
\nProviding a
\nSafe Maritime
\nEnvironment
\nGeographic
\nIncentives Capacity
\nEconomy
\nInformation
\nsharing
\nCooperation
\nbetween
\nlittoral States
\nNavies
\nTechnical
\nSupports
\nFinancial
\nSupports
\nPressure
\nOcean
\nCarriers
\nand ship
\nowners
\nContributions of the littoral
\nContributions of International States
\nAn anti-piracy framework
\nSource : (Ng, 2011)<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
SECURING THE GULF: TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED MARITIME SECURITY STRATEGY FOR THE GULF OF GUINEA ABSTRACT Title of Dissertation: Securing the Gulf: Towards an Integrated Maritime\u2026<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[8827,10099,10540,10536,10892,10538,10539,10537,10891],"tags":[10549,10616,10615,7687,10627,8857,10552,10295,10548,10622,8907],"class_list":["post-132910","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-australia-essays","category-buy-essay","category-cheap-essay-writers","category-get-assignments-done","category-page-paper","category-phd-essay-writers","category-research-paper-writing-service-for-any-topic","category-study-bay-essay","category-write-my-assignment-ireland","tag-ai-plagiarism-free-essay-writing-tool","tag-australian-best-tutors","tag-best-trans-tutors","tag-buy-essay-uk","tag-cheap-dissertation-writer","tag-help-with-writing-an-essay","tag-help-write-my-paper-ai-free","tag-homework-for-you","tag-online-essay-writers","tag-phd-essays","tag-write-my-essay-for-me"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/132910","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=132910"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/132910\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=132910"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=132910"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=132910"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}