{"id":133221,"date":"2022-10-20T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2022-10-20T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/nursingstudybay.com\/2022\/10\/20\/employment-law-case-brief-and-presentation-assignment-college-homework-help\/"},"modified":"2022-10-20T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2022-10-20T00:00:00","slug":"employment-law-case-brief-and-presentation-assignment-college-homework-help","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.studyproessays.com\/help\/employment-law-case-brief-and-presentation-assignment-college-homework-help\/","title":{"rendered":"Employment Law Case Brief and Presentation Assignment | College Homework Help"},"content":{"rendered":"

Use the IRAC method to write a case brief on Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP.<\/p>\n

2 slides; 1 for the intro of the presentation and 1 for the “c” in IRAC which is the conclusion.<\/p>\n

I need detailed notes for the slides. I will attach the template that I need the slides added to.<\/p>\n

Please cite any references and add to reference slide.<\/p>\n

THOMPSON v. NORTH AMERICAN STAINLESS, LP<\/p>\n

562 U.S. __ (2011)<\/p>\n

After petitioner Thompson\u2019s fianc\u00e9e, Miriam Regalado,<\/p>\n

filed a sex discrimination charge with the Equal<\/p>\n

Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)<\/p>\n

against their employer, respondent North American<\/p>\n

Stainless (NAS), NAS fired Thompson. He filed his<\/p>\n

own charge and a subsequent suit under Title VII of<\/p>\n

the Civil Rights Act, claiming that NAS fired him to<\/p>\n

retaliate against Regalado for filing her charge. The<\/p>\n

District Court granted NAS summary judgment on<\/p>\n

the ground that third-party retaliation claims were not<\/p>\n

permitted by Title VII, which prohibits discrimination<\/p>\n

against an employee \u201cbecause he has made a [Title VII]<\/p>\n

charge.\u201d The en banc Sixth Circuit affirmed, reasoning<\/p>\n

that Thompson was not entitled to sue NAS for<\/p>\n

retaliation because he had not engaged in any activity<\/p>\n

protected by the statute. By a vote of 8-0, the Supreme<\/p>\n

Court overturned the Court of Appeals. (Justice Kagan<\/p>\n

took no part in the consideration of the case.)<\/p>\n

SCALIA, J.: Until 2003, both petitioner Eric<\/p>\n

Thompson and his fianc\u00e9e, Miriam Regalado, were<\/p>\n

employees of respondent North American Stainless<\/p>\n

(NAS). In February 2003, the Equal Employment<\/p>\n

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) notified NAS that<\/p>\n

Regalado had filed a charge alleging sex discrimination.<\/p>\n

Three weeks later, NAS fired Thompson.<\/p>\n

Thompson then filed a charge with the EEOC.<\/p>\n

After conciliation efforts proved unsuccessful, he sued<\/p>\n

NAS in the United States District Court for the Eastern<\/p>\n

District of Kentucky under Title VII of the Civil Rights<\/p>\n

Act of 1964,78 Stat. 253, 42 U. S. C. \u00a72000e et seq.,<\/p>\n

claiming that NAS had fired him in order to retaliate<\/p>\n

against Regalado for filing her charge with the EEOC.<\/p>\n

The District Court granted summary judgment to NAS,<\/p>\n

concluding that Title VII \u201cdoes not permit third party<\/p>\n

retaliation claims.\u201d 435 F. Supp. 2d 633, 639 (ED Ky.<\/p>\n

2006). After a panel of the Sixth Circuit reversed the<\/p>\n

District Court, the Sixth Circuit granted rehearing en<\/p>\n

banc and affirmed by a 10-to-6 vote. 567 F. 3d 804<\/p>\n

(2009). The court reasoned that because Thompson did<\/p>\n

not \u201cengag[e] in any statutorily protected activity, either<\/p>\n

on his own behalf or on behalf of Miriam Regalado,\u201d<\/p>\n

he \u201cis not included in the class of persons for whom<\/p>\n

Congress created a retaliation cause of action.\u201d . . .<\/p>\n

Title VII provides that \u201c[i]t shall be an unlawful<\/p>\n

employment practice for an employer to discriminate<\/p>\n

against any of his employees . . . because he has made<\/p>\n

a charge\u201d under Title VII. 42 U. S. C. \u00a72000e\u20133(a). The<\/p>\n

statute permits \u201ca person claiming to be aggrieved\u201d to<\/p>\n

file a charge with the EEOC alleging that the employer<\/p>\n

committed an unlawful employment practice, and, if<\/p>\n

the EEOC declines to sue the employer, it permits a<\/p>\n

civil action to \u201cbe brought . . . by the person claiming<\/p>\n

to be aggrieved . . . by the alleged unlawful employment<\/p>\n

practice.\u201d \u00a72000e\u20135(b), (f)(1). It is undisputed<\/p>\n

that Regalado\u2019s filing of a charge with the EEOC was<\/p>\n

protected conduct under Title VII. In the procedural<\/p>\n

posture of this case, we are also required to assume<\/p>\n

that NAS fired Thompson in order to retaliate against<\/p>\n

Regalado for filing a charge of discrimination. This<\/p>\n

case therefore presents two questions: First, did NAS\u2019s<\/p>\n

firing of Thompson constitute unlawful retaliation?<\/p>\n

And second, if it did, does Title VII grant Thompson<\/p>\n

a cause of action?<\/p>\n

With regard to the first question, we have little difficulty<\/p>\n

concluding that if the facts alleged by Thompson<\/p>\n

are true, then NAS\u2019s firing of Thompson violated Title<\/p>\n

VII. In Burlington N. & S. F. R. Co. v. White, 548 U. S. 53<\/p>\n

(2006), we held that Title VII\u2019s antiretaliation provision<\/p>\n

must be construed to cover a broad range of employer<\/p>\n

conduct. We reached that conclusion by contrasting<\/p>\n

the text of Title VII\u2019s antiretaliation provision with its<\/p>\n

substantive antidiscrimination provision. . . . Title VII\u2019s<\/p>\n

antiretaliation provision prohibits any employer action<\/p>\n

that \u201cwell might have dissuaded a reasonable worker<\/p>\n

from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.\u201d<\/p>\n

Id., at 68 (internal quotation marks omitted).<\/p>\n

We think it obvious that a reasonable worker might<\/p>\n

be dissuaded from engaging in protected activity if she<\/p>\n

knew that her fianc\u00e9 would be fired. Indeed, NAS does<\/p>\n

not dispute that Thompson\u2019s firing meets the standard<\/p>\n

set forth in Burlington. Tr. of Oral Arg. 30. NAS raises<\/p>\n

the concern, however, that prohibiting reprisals against<\/p>\n

third parties will lead to difficult line-drawing problems<\/p>\n

concerning the types of relationships entitled to protection.<\/p>\n

Perhaps retaliating against an employee by firing<\/p>\n

his fianc\u00e9e would dissuade the employee from engaging<\/p>\n

in protected activity, but what about firing an employee\u2019s<\/p>\n

girlfriend, close friend, or trusted co-worker? . . .<\/p>\n

Although we acknowledge the force of this point,<\/p>\n

we do not think it justifies a categorical rule that thirdparty<\/p>\n

reprisals do not violate Title VII. As explained<\/p>\n

above, we adopted a broad standard in Burlington<\/p>\n

because Title VII\u2019s antiretaliation provision is worded<\/p>\n

broadly. We think there is no textual basis for making<\/p>\n

an exception to it for third-party reprisals, and<\/p>\n

a preference for clear rules cannot justify departing<\/p>\n

from statutory text. We must also decline to identify<\/p>\n

a fixed class of relationships for which third-party<\/p>\n

reprisals are unlawful. We expect that firing a close<\/p>\n

family member will almost always meet the Burlington<\/p>\n

standard, and inflicting a milder reprisal on a mere<\/p>\n

acquaintance will almost never do so, but beyond that<\/p>\n

we are reluctant to generalize. . . .<\/p>\n

The more difficult question in this case is whether<\/p>\n

Thompson may sue NAS for its alleged violation of<\/p>\n

Title VII. The statute provides that \u201ca civil action may<\/p>\n

be brought . . . by the person claiming to be aggrieved.\u201d<\/p>\n

\u201c. . . to be aggrieved\u201d to bring \u201ca civil action.\u201d It is arguable<\/p>\n

that the aggrievement referred to is nothing more<\/p>\n

than the minimal Article III standing, which consists<\/p>\n

of injury in fact caused by the defendant and remediable<\/p>\n

by the court. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,<\/p>\n

504 U. S. 555, 560\u2013561 (1992). But Thompson\u2019s claim<\/p>\n

undoubtedly meets those requirements, so if that is<\/p>\n

indeed all that aggrievement consists of, he may sue. . . .<\/p>\n

We hold that the term \u201caggrieved\u201d in Title VII<\/p>\n

incorporates this test, enabling suit by any plaintiff with<\/p>\n

an interest \u201carguably [sought] to be protected by the<\/p>\n

statutes,\u201d National Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat.<\/p>\n

Bank & Trust Co., 522 U. S. 479, 495 (1998) (internal<\/p>\n

quotation marks omitted), while excluding plaintiffs<\/p>\n

who might technically be injured in an Article III sense<\/p>\n

but whose interests are unrelated to the statutory prohibitions<\/p>\n

in Title VII. Applying that test here, we conclude<\/p>\n

that Thompson falls within the zone of interests<\/p>\n

protected by Title VII. Thompson was an employee of<\/p>\n

NAS, and the purpose of Title VII is to protect employees<\/p>\n

from their employers\u2019 unlawful actions. Moreover,<\/p>\n

accepting the facts as alleged, Thompson is not an<\/p>\n

accidental victim of the retaliation\u2014collateral damage,<\/p>\n

so to speak, of the employer\u2019s unlawful act. To the contrary,<\/p>\n

injuring him was the employer\u2019s intended means<\/p>\n

of harming Regalado. Hurting him was the unlawful<\/p>\n

act by which the employer punished her. In those circumstances,<\/p>\n

we think Thompson well within the zone<\/p>\n

of interests sought to be protected by Title VII. He is a<\/p>\n

person aggrieved with standing to sue.<\/p>\n